Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 26-1042 Document: 21 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 29, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court MARVIN HOPGOOD, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 26-1042 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-01765-LTB-RTG) ANDRE (MOSES) STANCIL, Executive (D. Colo.) Director; CORECIVIC, INC., d/b/a Crowley County Correctional Facility (C.C.C.F.); BARRY GOODRICH, Warden; STEVEN BROWN, Assistant Warden; HOPE MARMOLEJO, Chief of Unit Management; KATHERINE JOHNSON, Unit Manager; VICTORIA DENBAUGH, Grievance Coordinator; DANIEL BARBEROS, Chief of Security, Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before MORITZ, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges. ** _________________________________ * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined ** unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellate Case: 26-1042 Document: 21 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 2 Plaintiff Marvin Hopgood is in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections at the Crowley County Correctional Facility, a private facility under contract with the State of Colorado and run by Defendant CoreCivic, Inc. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an amended complaint (AC) asserting three claims against CoreCivic, its executive director, and prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In claim one, Plaintiff alleges that after he filed a grievance over Defendants’ refusal to allow him to use his prison-issued tablet computer in the dayroom, Defendants retaliated against him by removing him from the “Webuild Vocational Trade Program” (WVTP), transferring him to another housing unit, raising his security level, and interfering with the grievance process, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. In claim two, Plaintiff contends Defendants deprived him of his liberty and property interests in participating in the WVTP, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee to due process. In claim three, Plaintiff contends he was treated differently from two inmates who also used their tablet computers in the dayroom but were not disciplined, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee to equal protection. A magistrate judge (MJ) issued a 15-page written report to the district judge (DJ) recommending that Plaintiff’s AC be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). That subsection of § 1915 provides that where a prisoner brings a civil lawsuit in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous.” As to Plaintiff’s first claim, the MJ explained it failed to state a cause of action (1) against CoreCivic’s executive director 2 Appellate Case: 26-1042 Document: 21 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 3 because the Eleventh Amendment barred suit against him in his official capacity, (2) against CoreCivic itself because the claim failed to allege that his injury was the result of its customs or policies, and (3) against the remaining Defendants because the claim failed to allege facts, apart from a close temporal connection between his grievance and termination, indicating any of them had retaliated against him for filing a grievance. As to the second claim, the MJ explained that it too failed to state a cause of action because the claim (1) did not allege facts linking Plaintiff’s alleged denial of due process to each Defendant, and (2) did not allege facts establishing his participation in the WVTP was constitutionally protected. Moving to the third claim, the MJ explained it also did not state a claim against Defendants because (1) like the second claim, it did not allege what each Defendant did or did not do that allegedly violated his constitutional rights, in particular his right to equal protection, and (2) did not allege facts demonstrating that he and the other two inmates referred to were similarly situated. In his “Report & Recommendation,” (R&R) the MJ informed Plaintiff that his failure to file specific objections with the DJ within 14 days of service may bar him “from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the [MJ] that are accepted and adopted by the [DJ].” The MJ further informed Plaintiff that any objections “must specifically identify those findings and recommendations to which the objections are being made” and that the [DJ] “need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections.” Thereafter, Plaintiff objected to the MJ’s R&R. Regarding his first claim, Plaintiff stated only that the AC “alleges he was removed from his vocational program, 3 Appellate Case: 26-1042 Document: 21 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 4 reclassified, and subjected to grievance interference immediately after filing grievances.” Plaintiff objected to dismissal of his second claim stating only that “[a]rbitrary deviation from prison regulations and punitive classification consequences implicate due process.” Finally, Plaintiff objected to dismissal of his third claim stating he was treated differently than two inmates who were in the same housing unit as Plaintiff, used their table computers in the prison dayroom, and were not terminated from the WVTP. As to each claim, Plaintiff referenced without discussion both his original and AC and the 15 pages of exhibits attached to his original complaint. He also stated as to each claim that he “specifically named each involved defendant . . . and the action(s) he/she committed/participated in, or ignored.” This was the extent of Plaintiff’s objections. The DJ originally adopted the MJ’s R&R and dismissed Plaintiff’s AC because, applying the mailbox rule found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, Plaintiff filed his objections one day too late. After Plaintiff filed a motion to alter the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) establishing that he had not received the MJ’s report until after the date presumed, the DJ entered an order denying said motion because “even accepting” Plaintiff’s argument that his objections to the MJ’s report were timely, “the objections were not sufficiently specific to trigger de novo review.” The DJ explained that Plaintiff asserted “generally” in his objections that he provided sufficient factual allegations in the original and AC and the 15 pages of attachments to the original complaint. But the court was not required to consider facts not contained in the operative pleading, in this case the AC. Nor was the court required to search the record 4 Appellate Case: 26-1042 Document: 21 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 5 to support Plaintiff’s “generalized” factual arguments. With respect to new factual allegations related to Plaintiff’s equal protection claim contained in the objections but not the AC, the court concluded Plaintiff could not amend the AC by alleging new facts in his objections. Plaintiff timely appealed. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and because we agree with the district court that Plaintiff’s general objections to the MJ’s R&R were insufficient to preserve his legal issues for appellate review, we dismiss the appeal on the basis of the “firm-waiver rule.” Subsection (b)(2) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 provides in relevant part that “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” (emphasis added). In United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996), we relied on the purposes underlying the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, to hold “a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review.” (emphasis added). “The firm waiver rule applies . . . when a plaintiff has made ‘general objections” if those objections are not ‘sufficiently specific to focus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that a truly in dispute.’” Laham v. City of Maize, 2026 WL 2983718 at *2 (10th Cir. 2026) (unpublished) (quoting One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060). In this case, Plaintiff’s curt objections to the MJ’s R&R largely consisting of conclusory allegations speak for themselves. As for his first two claims, Plaintiff failed 5 Appellate Case: 26-1042 Document: 21 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 6 to provide the district court with any specific explanation as to why the MJ’s analysis of the AC was erroneous. He pointed to nothing in his AC which even remotely suggests the MJ erred in reading its allegations and recommending dismissal of the complaint. As for his third claim, Plaintiff does specifically tell us for the first time in his objections that two inmates residing in his housing unit uses their tablets in the day room and were not terminated from the WTVP as he was. But all the AC’s third claim offers by way of factual allegations is the conclusory statement that “Plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated inmates who committed the same conduct but were not disciplined or terminated from their work programs.” Plaintiff offers no explanation why his revised facts were not contained in the AC and has not identified any factor to persuade us to apply the interests-of justice exception to the firm-waiver rule. See Licerio v. Lamb, 2022 WL 4100400 at *3 (10th Cir. 2022) (unpublished); see also One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060 (explaining the firm-waiver rule “as a procedural bar need not be applied when the interests of justice so dictate”). Accordingly we grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and dismiss Plaintiff’s appeal on the basis of the firm-waiver rule. We remind Plaintiff that he remains obligated to continue making partial payments to the Clerk of Court until the entire filing fee has been paid in full. We have no occasion to address the district court’s determination under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) that Plaintiff’s action was frivolous. 6 Appellate Case: 26-1042 Document: 21 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 7 IFP GRANTED; APPEAL DISMISSED. Entered for the Court Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge 7