Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 439 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-25-81 FLORINE WILLIAMS Opinion Delivered September 23, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ST. FRANCIS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 62CV-24-194] WOGAN GROUP, LLC, D/B/A HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER W. CHAPEL RIDGE APARTMENTS OF MORLEDGE, JUDGE FORREST CITY APPELLEE DISMISSED WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge Appellant Florine Williams, pro se, appeals the St. Francis County Circuit Court’s October 15, 2024 order granting appellee Wogan Group, LLC, d/b/a Chapel Ridge Apartments of Forrest City a writ of possession against appellant. Appellant argues that the circuit court erred by (1) finding that she failed to pay rent without considering the lease terms or circumstances of payment failure; (2) finding that appellee was entitled to a writ of possession when appellant was not given a reasonable opportunity to cure the default before eviction proceedings commenced; and (3) proceeding despite procedural irregularities that undermined appellant’s rights to due process. She also argues that the eviction resulted in irreparable harm that is disproportionate to the alleged default. We dismiss appellant’s appeal due to briefing deficiencies that prevent us from engaging in meaningful review, including the submission of fictitious cases. Appellee filed a verified complaint for unlawful detainer against appellant on August 12, alleging that appellant breached her March 2024 lease agreement by failing to make the agreed-on rental payment for the month of July. Appellant’s last rental payment was on June 7, and although she was served on July 8 with a notice to pay or quit within three days, no payment had been made by the deadline, and appellant had not vacated the property. The complaint alleged that appellant had committed unlawful entry and detainer as defined by Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-60-304.1 Appellee asked the circuit court to grant it relief for actual damages, attorney’s fees, and costs and for all other relief to which it might be entitled. Appellant filed an answer on August 20 agreeing that her July rent had not been paid; however, she said that it was due to problems with her Chime app. She said she did not realize that the payment had not been made until the payment was considered late. She acknowledged that she received the notice on July 8 and that she received an eviction 1 (Repl. 2015). Section 18-60-304 states that a person shall be guilty of an unlawful detainer if the person shall, willfully and without right: (2) Peacefully and lawfully obtain possession of any land, tenement, or possession and hold it willfully and unlawfully after demand made in writing for the delivery or surrender of possession of the land, tenement, or possession by the person having the right to possession or his or her agent or attorney; (3) Fail or refuse to pay the rent for the land, tenement, or possession when due, and after three (3) days’ notice to quit and demand made in writing for the possession of the land, tenement, or possession by the person entitled to the land, tenement, or possession or his or her agent or attorney, shall refuse to quit possession. 2 warning notice on July 11. She said she did not attempt to make payment until July 26, which was refused since her account had already been referred to appellee’s attorney for eviction. Appellant agreed that she was breaking the law by not vacating the premises, and she also stated that she agreed with appellee’s writ of possession and that appellee was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs but questioned the meaning of actual damages and other relief to which appellee may be entitled. Appellant asked for sixty to ninety days to find another residence. A hearing took place on October 14. Amanda Moffett testified that she is the property manager at Chapel Ridge Apartments of Forrest City. She stated that, according to their ledger, appellant has a current balance of $4,092.22. She said she prepared the July 8 notice to quit or vacate and that the courtesy officer delivered it to appellant. When questioned by appellant, Moffett agreed that she helped appellant set up her account and provided appellant with the information to get online to pay her balances. She stated that she also provided appellant with the phone number of the corporate office. She said she could not do anything more to help appellant in this matter. Appellant told the circuit court that she usually pays her rent on time and that, in any case, she would pay it before the next rent was due. She said that she set up recurring payments and tied the payments to her account number. She testified that she did not know the rent had not been paid until she got the notice on July 8. She stated that she had enough money to cover her July rent and that she wanted to bring Chime in as a third party since it 3 was to blame for her missed payment. She admitted that she was still residing at Chapel Ridge. The circuit court found that appellant had committed unlawful detainer. The order granting appellee a writ of possession was filed on October 16. 2 Appellant was also ordered to pay appellee past-due rent and fees for the months of July, August, September, and October in the amount of $4,092.22; court filing fees of $165; a summons fee of $2.50; a process-service fee of $50; and $500 attorney’s fees. Appellant filed her notice of appeal on October 16. The standard of review on appeal from a bench trial is whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. 3 A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that an error has been made. 4 Facts in dispute and determinations of credibility are solely within the province of the fact-finder.5 Appellant’s brief contains multiple deficiencies that prevent us from conducting a meaningful review.6 Parties appearing pro se receive no special consideration of their 2 Appellant filed an emergency motion for stay of eviction on October 15, which was denied on October 21. 3 Hrdlichka v. Bengston, 2026 Ark. App. 205, 734 S.W.3d 774. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 See id. 4 argument and are held to the same standard as licensed attorneys.7 Appellant’s brief fails to comply with Rule 4-2 of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in numerous respects. Rule 4-2(a) prescribes the required contents and organization of an appellant’s brief. There are no points on appeal or a table of contents as required by the rule.8 The statement of the case fails to include citations to the record, and it includes argument, which is also against our rules.9 Appellant’s argument section is not presented under clear subheadings, and it does not list the applicable standard of review for each issue before discussing it. In fact, there is no real discussion of any issue, only conclusory statements.10 Appellant’s brief also fails to include a certificate of compliance as required by our rules.11 Although any one of the above-described deficiencies, viewed in isolation, might appear technical or minor, taken together they reflect appellant’s complete failure to comply with Rule 4-2. In addition to the above deficiencies, none of the cases cited by appellant exist. They are fictitious, and the brief seems to be generated by artificial intelligence. We cannot evaluate arguments predicated on nonexistent precedent. When a party cites fabricated 7 Id. 8 Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(2)–(3). 9 Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(6). 10 See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(7). 11 See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(10). 5 cases, we are deprived of any meaningful ability to conduct review.12 All counsel appearing before this court are bound to exercise professional judgment and responsibility and to comply with the rules of appellate procedure. Among other obligations, Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 11 provides that by presenting a submission to the court, an attorney certifies that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good- faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.13 Parties are duty- bound to confirm the existence and validity of the legal authorities on which they rely.14 These significant violations of our rules mandate dismissal of this appeal. Dismissed. HARRISON and BARRETT, JJ., agree. Florine Williams, pro se appellant. Boyd & Buie, Attorneys at Law, by: Rufus T. Buie III; and Law Office of Tyler A. Griffin, PLLC, by: Tyler A. Griffin, for appellee. 12 See Hrdlichka, supra. 13 Id. 14 Id. 6