Full Opinion

Rel: November 20, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CL-2026-0056 _________________________ C.J.S. v. Alabama Department of Human Resources and Blount County Department of Human Resources Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-25-246) PER CURIAM. C.J.S. appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the circuit court") affirming a decision of an administrative-law judge ("the ALJ") that, in turn, upheld the finding of the Blount County Department of Human Resources ("the Blount County DHR") that he was CL-2026-0056 "indicated" for sexual abuse and sexual molestation of I.D. ("the child"). For the reasons discussed herein, we dismiss the appeal. Background Our review of the record indicates that in January 2022, the child was in foster care and living with L.J. ("the foster mother"). The child was four years old and had lived with the foster mother for about two or three weeks when the foster mother became concerned with some of the child's behavior. She reported her concerns to the Jefferson County Department of Human Resources ("the Jefferson County DHR"), telling workers that she had observed that the child clinched her legs together at bath time and that she had told the foster mother that C.J.S. showered with her and took her for candy afterward. The Blount County DHR investigated the foster mother's report because it had been asked to assist the Jefferson County DHR with its investigations at that time. On March 4, 2022, the Blount County DHR sent a letter to C.J.S. informing him that it had completed its initial assessment and had found him "indicated" for sexual abuse and sexual molestation of the child. An "indicated" finding is made "[w]hen credible evidence and professional judgment substantiates that an alleged 2 CL-2026-0056 perpetrator is responsible for child abuse or neglect." § 26-14-8(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. In the letter to C.J.S., the Blount County DHR informed him that he had the right to an administrative-record review and explained that such a review meant that the county's written report would be reviewed by "an independent panel of DHR employees who were not involved in the case."1 In its appellate brief, which was filed on behalf of both the State of Alabama Department of Human Resources ("the State DHR") and the Blount County DHR (both collectively referred to as "DHR"),2 DHR represents that an administrative record review was completed by April 1, 2022. The record does not contain a copy of C.J.S.'s request for such a review. Additionally, in its brief, DHR represents that, because of a change in the State DHR policy in 2024 regarding who was entitled to an administrative hearing to review an "indicated" finding for child abuse 1The letter did not make clear whether the independent panel would be made up of Blount County DHR employees, employees of other county Departments of Human Resources, or employees of the State of Alabama Department of Human Resources. 2For ease of reference, when discussing the State DHR and the Blount County DHR, their brief, and the arguments that they made therein, we refer to those entities as if they were a single entity, that is, as DHR. 3 CL-2026-0056 and neglect, it afforded C.J.S. a hearing pursuant to Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-5-34.08. On December 6, 2024, the State DHR sent C.J.S. a certified letter informing him that the administrative hearing had been scheduled for January 21, 2025, at the offices of the Blount County DHR. On May 2, 2025, after several continuances, the ALJ held an investigative hearing on the allegations against C.J.S. of child abuse and neglect. On May 14, 2025, the ALJ entered a final decision, which included findings of fact and conclusions of law, affirming the Blount County DHR's "indicated" finding against C.J.S. for sexual abuse and sexual molestation. On June 3, 2025, C.J.S. filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court. On December 16, 2025, after a hearing, the circuit court purported to enter a judgment affirming the ALJ's final decision. C.J.S. filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment, which the circuit court denied. C.J.S. appealed to this court. Analysis As a threshold matter, we address DHR's contention that judicial review of the ALJ's decision upholding the Blount County DHR's 4 CL-2026-0056 "indicated" finding against C.J.S. for sexual abuse and sexual molestation should have been by petition to the circuit court for a common-law writ of certiorari rather than by an appeal to the circuit court. Under § 41-22-20, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act ("the AAPA"), § 41-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, a person is authorized to appeal from a final decision of a statewide administrative agency, like DHR, in a "contested case," which is defined as "[a] proceeding ... in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." § 41-22-3(3), Ala. Code 1975. The question, then, is whether C.J.S.'s administrative challenge to the "indicated" finding constituted a contested case. We conclude that it did not. When an "indicated" finding is challenged, DHR must provide an opportunity for a hearing to a person " 'who is employed by, serves as a volunteer for, holds a license or certificate for, or is connected with any facility, agency, or home which cares for and controls any children and which is licensed, approved, or certified by the state, operated as a state facility, or any public, private, or religious facility or agency that may be exempt from licensing procedures ....' " P.H. v. Alabama Dep't of Hum. Res., 422 So. 3d 1126, 1129 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025) (quoting § 26-14-7.1, Ala. Code 1975); see also Ala. Admin. Code 5 CL-2026-0056 (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-5-34-.08(2). However, DHR is not required to provide a hearing to other persons aggrieved by a preliminary "indicated" finding. 422 So. 3d at 1129. Instead, individuals who are not entitled to a hearing are entitled only to an administrative-record review. See Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-5-34-.08(3). When DHR voluntarily provides a hearing to someone who is not statutorily entitled to a hearing, the hearing is not part of a "contested case" under the AAPA, and, therefore, § 41-22-20 does not authorize an appeal of the final decision to affirm a finding of "indicated." 422 So. 3d at 1130. Under such circumstances, the individual can obtain judicial review of the administrative order only through a petition for a common- law writ of certiorari. Id.; see also J.C. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2025-0217, Oct. 10, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025). There is no evidence that C.J.S. falls within the category of people entitled to a hearing to challenge the "indicated" finding against him, even though DHR permitted him to have such a hearing. As a result, the proceeding was not a "contested case" under the AAPA, and C.J.S. could seek judicial review of the ALJ's decision upholding the finding of "indicated" only by filing a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in 6 CL-2026-0056 the circuit court. He did not do so. Instead, he filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to § 41-22-20(h), which, as discussed, is inapplicable in this situation. See P.H., 422 So. 3d at 1130. There is no indication in the record that C.J.S. ever requested that the circuit court treat his filing as a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, and it is clear from the circuit court's judgment that the circuit court did not treat it as such. Because C.J.S. did not file with the circuit court a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, he did not properly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction to review the administrative determination upholding the "indicated" finding. Because C.J.S. did not properly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over his purported appeal. "A judgment entered by a court that lacks subject- matter jurisdiction is void." Woodruff v. Glenn, 386 So. 3d 472, 475 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). Because a void judgment will not support an appeal, we must dismiss C.J.S.'s appeal. See C.J.L., 868 So. 2d at 454. Conclusion Because the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, its judgment upholding the decision of the ALJ is void. 7 CL-2026-0056 We therefore dismiss the appeal with instructions to the circuit court to vacate its judgment and dismiss C.J.S.'s circuit-court action. The motion filed by C.J.S. requesting that certain portions of the record on appeal be redacted and that this court no longer treat the above-referenced appeal as a confidential case is denied. APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. All the judges concur. 8