C.J.S. v. Alabama Department of Human Resources and Blount County Department of Human Resources
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketCL-2026-0056
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: November 20, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027
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CL-2026-0056
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C.J.S.
v.
Alabama Department of Human Resources and Blount County
Department of Human Resources
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-25-246)
PER CURIAM.
C.J.S. appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court
("the circuit court") affirming a decision of an administrative-law judge
("the ALJ") that, in turn, upheld the finding of the Blount County
Department of Human Resources ("the Blount County DHR") that he was
CL-2026-0056
"indicated" for sexual abuse and sexual molestation of I.D. ("the child").
For the reasons discussed herein, we dismiss the appeal.
Background
Our review of the record indicates that in January 2022, the child
was in foster care and living with L.J. ("the foster mother"). The child
was four years old and had lived with the foster mother for about two or
three weeks when the foster mother became concerned with some of the
child's behavior. She reported her concerns to the Jefferson County
Department of Human Resources ("the Jefferson County DHR"), telling
workers that she had observed that the child clinched her legs together
at bath time and that she had told the foster mother that C.J.S. showered
with her and took her for candy afterward.
The Blount County DHR investigated the foster mother's report
because it had been asked to assist the Jefferson County DHR with its
investigations at that time. On March 4, 2022, the Blount County DHR
sent a letter to C.J.S. informing him that it had completed its initial
assessment and had found him "indicated" for sexual abuse and sexual
molestation of the child. An "indicated" finding is made "[w]hen credible
evidence and professional judgment substantiates that an alleged
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perpetrator is responsible for child abuse or neglect." § 26-14-8(a)(1), Ala.
Code 1975. In the letter to C.J.S., the Blount County DHR informed him
that he had the right to an administrative-record review and explained
that such a review meant that the county's written report would be
reviewed by "an independent panel of DHR employees who were not
involved in the case."1
In its appellate brief, which was filed on behalf of both the State of
Alabama Department of Human Resources ("the State DHR") and the
Blount County DHR (both collectively referred to as "DHR"),2 DHR
represents that an administrative record review was completed by April
1, 2022. The record does not contain a copy of C.J.S.'s request for such a
review. Additionally, in its brief, DHR represents that, because of a
change in the State DHR policy in 2024 regarding who was entitled to an
administrative hearing to review an "indicated" finding for child abuse
1The letter did not make clear whether the independent panel
would be made up of Blount County DHR employees, employees of other
county Departments of Human Resources, or employees of the State of
Alabama Department of Human Resources.
2For ease of reference, when discussing the State DHR and the
Blount County DHR, their brief, and the arguments that they made
therein, we refer to those entities as if they were a single entity, that is,
as DHR.
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and neglect, it afforded C.J.S. a hearing pursuant to Ala. Admin. Code
(Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-5-34.08. On December 6, 2024, the State DHR
sent C.J.S. a certified letter informing him that the administrative
hearing had been scheduled for January 21, 2025, at the offices of the
Blount County DHR.
On May 2, 2025, after several continuances, the ALJ held an
investigative hearing on the allegations against C.J.S. of child abuse and
neglect. On May 14, 2025, the ALJ entered a final decision, which
included findings of fact and conclusions of law, affirming the Blount
County DHR's "indicated" finding against C.J.S. for sexual abuse and
sexual molestation. On June 3, 2025, C.J.S. filed a petition for judicial
review in the circuit court.
On December 16, 2025, after a hearing, the circuit court purported
to enter a judgment affirming the ALJ's final decision. C.J.S. filed a
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment, which the
circuit court denied. C.J.S. appealed to this court.
Analysis
As a threshold matter, we address DHR's contention that judicial
review of the ALJ's decision upholding the Blount County DHR's
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"indicated" finding against C.J.S. for sexual abuse and sexual
molestation should have been by petition to the circuit court for a
common-law writ of certiorari rather than by an appeal to the circuit
court. Under § 41-22-20, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Alabama
Administrative Procedure Act ("the AAPA"), § 41-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code
1975, a person is authorized to appeal from a final decision of a statewide
administrative agency, like DHR, in a "contested case," which is defined
as "[a] proceeding ... in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a
party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an
opportunity for hearing." § 41-22-3(3), Ala. Code 1975. The question,
then, is whether C.J.S.'s administrative challenge to the "indicated"
finding constituted a contested case. We conclude that it did not.
When an "indicated" finding is challenged, DHR must provide an
opportunity for a hearing to a person
" 'who is employed by, serves as a volunteer for, holds a license
or certificate for, or is connected with any facility, agency, or
home which cares for and controls any children and which is
licensed, approved, or certified by the state, operated as a
state facility, or any public, private, or religious facility or
agency that may be exempt from licensing procedures ....' "
P.H. v. Alabama Dep't of Hum. Res., 422 So. 3d 1126, 1129 (Ala. Civ. App.
2025) (quoting § 26-14-7.1, Ala. Code 1975); see also Ala. Admin. Code
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(Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-5-34-.08(2). However, DHR is not required to
provide a hearing to other persons aggrieved by a preliminary "indicated"
finding. 422 So. 3d at 1129. Instead, individuals who are not entitled to
a hearing are entitled only to an administrative-record review. See Ala.
Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-5-34-.08(3).
When DHR voluntarily provides a hearing to someone who is not
statutorily entitled to a hearing, the hearing is not part of a "contested
case" under the AAPA, and, therefore, § 41-22-20 does not authorize an
appeal of the final decision to affirm a finding of "indicated." 422 So. 3d
at 1130. Under such circumstances, the individual can obtain judicial
review of the administrative order only through a petition for a common-
law writ of certiorari. Id.; see also J.C. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms.
CL-2025-0217, Oct. 10, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025).
There is no evidence that C.J.S. falls within the category of people
entitled to a hearing to challenge the "indicated" finding against him,
even though DHR permitted him to have such a hearing. As a result, the
proceeding was not a "contested case" under the AAPA, and C.J.S. could
seek judicial review of the ALJ's decision upholding the finding of
"indicated" only by filing a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in
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the circuit court. He did not do so. Instead, he filed a petition for judicial
review pursuant to § 41-22-20(h), which, as discussed, is inapplicable in
this situation. See P.H., 422 So. 3d at 1130. There is no indication in the
record that C.J.S. ever requested that the circuit court treat his filing as
a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, and it is clear from the
circuit court's judgment that the circuit court did not treat it as such.
Because C.J.S. did not file with the circuit court a petition for a
common-law writ of certiorari, he did not properly invoke the circuit
court's jurisdiction to review the administrative determination upholding
the "indicated" finding. Because C.J.S. did not properly invoke the circuit
court's jurisdiction, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over his
purported appeal. "A judgment entered by a court that lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction is void." Woodruff v. Glenn, 386 So. 3d 472, 475 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2023). Because a void judgment will not support an appeal, we
must dismiss C.J.S.'s appeal. See C.J.L., 868 So. 2d at 454.
Conclusion
Because the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction
over this matter, its judgment upholding the decision of the ALJ is void.
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We therefore dismiss the appeal with instructions to the circuit court to
vacate its judgment and dismiss C.J.S.'s circuit-court action.
The motion filed by C.J.S. requesting that certain portions of the
record on appeal be redacted and that this court no longer treat the
above-referenced appeal as a confidential case is denied.
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
All the judges concur.
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