Klingensmith, B. v. Klingensmith, J.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket1423 WDA 2025
JudgeBowes
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
BONNIE KLINGENSMITH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN KLINGENSMITH III : No. 1423 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 10, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
No(s): FD-16-000947-017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: November 16, 2026
Bonnie Klingensmith (“Wife”) appeals pro se from the order denying her
petition to reopen the divorce decree. We affirm.
In light of our disposition, we need not recount the full history of the
underlying divorce or the subsequent alleged revelations about the finances
of John Klingensmith III (“Husband”). Suffice it to say, after Wife filed a
divorce action in 2016, the parties settled their economic disputes by consent
order of January 10, 2018, with the final decree issued in March 2018. Over
six years later, on August 19, 2024, Wife filed the underlying petition to
reopen the divorce decree. The petition was primarily based upon alleged
financial misrepresentations and fraud that she uncovered during discovery in
her legal malpractice suit against her divorce attorneys, which she litigated
between 2023 and 2025. See Wife’s brief at 33. Wife scheduled the petition
for presentation to the court approximately one year later and, after a hearing
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at which the court heard from Wife and Husband’s attorney, the court denied
the petition.
This appeal followed. The trial court directed Wife to file a concise
statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).1 Wife timely responded and the
court authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion in support of its decision. In this Court,
Wife lists four questions:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
motion to reopen the divorce decree when [Wife] provided new
evidence showing [Wife]’s former attorneys and [Husband]
concealed bank accounts with $531,689.02 and $45,251.72,
which would have materially altered the property division?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
consider evidence of [Husband]’s concealed inheritance of
$1,559,278.34?
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring
evidence of fraudulent income, which would have materially
altered the equitable distribution of marital assets?
4. Whether the trial court committed a procedural error by
denying the motion to reopen the divorce/vacate the divorce
decree signed by an unauthorized administrative law judge
instead of the presiding judge?
Wife’s brief at 4 (numbering supplied).
In sum, Wife challenges the court’s decision to deny her request to
reopen the divorce decree. “A trial court’s exercise or refusal to exercise its
authority to open, vacate, or strike a divorce decree is reviewable on appeal
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1 We remind the trial court that all Rule 1925(b) orders must include the
address where the statement may be mailed. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii).
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for an abuse of discretion.” Bardine v. Bardine, 194 A.3d 150, 152
(Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). We have explained:
For a petition to open, the motion must be made within thirty days
of the divorce decree and allege intrinsic fraud or new evidence.
For a motion to vacate, the petition must be filed within five years
of the divorce decree where the attack is based on extrinsic fraud,
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or a fatal defect
apparent upon the face of the record. The intent of [23 Pa.C.S.
§] 3332 is to codify the extraordinary circumstances which will
outweigh the interests of the parties and the court in finality, and
to delimit the time periods which within such circumstances must
be established.
Id. at 153 (cleaned up).
Our review confirms that Wife’s 2024 petition was filed beyond both the
thirty-day and five-year applicable timeframes. Instead of explaining why her
late petition should nevertheless entitle her to disturb the finality of the
divorce decree, she expends the bulk of her brief detailing the history of this
divorce matter. See Wife’s brief at 5-33. At the conclusion of that summary,
she avers, without citation or further argument, that the five-year “clock didn’t
start until [she] discovered the fraud.” Id. at 33. Meanwhile, Wife’s argument
contains bald allegations of error and not a single reference to legal authority
in support of her request for relief or her pronouncement that she had not run
afoul of the aforementioned time-bars.2 Id. at 35-36.
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2 In her entire brief, the only authority she cites is Pa.R.A.P. 2135 in certifying
her compliance with this Court’s requirements as to the length of her brief.
See Wife’s brief at 37.
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While we recognize Wife is proceeding pro se and we will liberally
construe her filings, we cannot make arguments for her. See Smithson v.
Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 761 (Pa.Super. 2021)
(“Although this Court construes materials filed by a pro se litigant liberally, we
cannot act as Appellant’s counsel.” (cleaned up)). Instead, this Court has
routinely held “that the failure to develop an argument with citation to, and
analysis of, pertinent authority results in waiver of that issue on appeal.”
Zabrosky v. Smithbower-Zabrosky, 273 A.3d 1108, 1121 n.4 (Pa.Super.
2022) (cleaned up). Having presented no developed legal advocacy in support
of Wife’s claims of error, we are compelled to find them waived.3 Accordingly,
we affirm the order denying Wife’s petition to reopen the divorce decree.
Order affirmed.
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3 Even if not waived, we would affirm. It is well-settled that “while a court
possesses equitable powers in divorce proceedings, those powers do not allow
the court to ignore the limited circumstances set forth in [§] 3332 for vacating
a final decree[.]” Hassick v. Hassick, 695 A.2d 851, 853 (Pa.Super. 1997)
(cleaned up). Since Wife’s petition to reopen was filed beyond the statutes of
limitation set forth in § 3332, the court did not err in denying her request. Id.
at 852-54 (holding that regardless of whether the petitioner averred intrinsic
or extrinsic fraud, she failed to prove it within the time limits of § 3332
because the petition was filed fourteen years after the entry of the divorce
decree).
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DATE: 11/16/2026
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