Reyner Labrada v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJuly 17, 2026
Docket3D2026-1330
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 17, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D26-1330
Lower Tribunal Nos. F22-13226, F22-16013, F23-20339, F22-13535,
F23-020340
________________
Reyner Labrada,
Petitioner,
vs.
State of Florida,
Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Mandamus.
Reyner Labrada, in proper person.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Before FERNANDEZ, LOBREE and GOODEN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Reyner Labrada seeks a petition for writ of mandamus
concerning the trial court’s ruling that he is not indigent, and therefore, not
entitled to a court-appointed counsel. In accordance with Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.040(c), we treat this as a petition for writ of certiorari.
See Mansfield v. State, 16 So. 3d 302, 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Guy v.
State, 473 So. 2d 234, 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
To obtain a writ of certiorari, a party must demonstrate a departure
from the essential requirements of the law that results in material injury that
cannot be corrected on plenary appeal. Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla.,
Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004); Kilgore v. Bird, 6 So. 2d 541, 545 (Fla.
1942). Because this issue implicates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
the required showing of irreparable harm is satisfied. So, we focus on
whether there has been a departure of the essential requirements of the law.
A departure of the essential requirements of law is “a violation of a clearly
established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Combs v.
State, 436 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983). It is more than mere legal error. Id. at
95.
Under Florida law, a court “may not appoint the public defender to
represent, even on a temporary basis, any person who is not indigent.” §
27.51(2), Fla. Stat. (2025). “A finding of indigency is based upon only the
2
defendant’s financial status.” Guy, 473 So. 2d at 235. “Indigent” means “a
person who is unable to pay for the services of an attorney, including costs
of investigation, without substantial hardship to the person or the person’s
family.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(b)(4). Where a person “owns, or has equity
in, any intangible or tangible personal property or real property or the
expectancy of an interest in any such property having a net equity value of
$2,500 or more, excluding the value of the person’s homestead and one
vehicle having a net value not exceeding $5,000,” a presumption of non-
indigency arises. § 27.52(2)(a)(1), Fla. Stat.
If the clerk of court determines that the applicant is not indigent, the
applicant may request that the trial court review the decision. § 27.52(4),
Fla. Stat. If that occurs, the trial court considers additional factors, along with
the criteria considered by the clerk of court:
1. Whether the applicant has been released on bail in an amount
of $5,000 or more.
2. Whether a bond has been posted, the type of bond, and who
paid the bond.
3. Whether paying for private counsel in an amount that exceeds
the limitations in s. 27.5304, or other due process services
creates a substantial hardship for the applicant or the
applicant’s family.
4. Any other relevant financial circumstances of the applicant or
the applicant’s family.
3
Id. at (4)(a).
Because we find that the trial court did not depart from the essential
requirements of the law, we deny the petition. Labrada owns real property.
The record indicates that the trial court conducted two hearings to provide
Labrada an opportunity to overcome the presumption in section
27.52(2)(a)(1), Florida Statutes. But Labrada did not provide sufficient
information or evidence as to his assets. See Martin v. State, 711 So. 2d
117, 119–20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“At all times he had the burden to prove
that he is indigent for purposes of this appeal.”). The trial court denied the
motion based on the information presented and in accordance with the
statute. It did not violate a clear principle of law that would result in a
miscarriage of justice.
Petition denied.
4