Matiella v. Murdock Street LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHARLES MATIELLA, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 21-cv-2112-GMH MURDOCK STREET, LLC, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendant Murdock Street, LLC, owned land located next to Plaintiff Charles Matiella’s. Plaintiff alleges that Murdock Street, along with the general contractor it hired to develop the land and two subcontractors, are liable for negligence and trespass that resulted in damage to the struc- tures on Plaintiff’s property. In prior decisions, as relevant here, the Court excluded the testimony of Plaintiff’s retained expert and thereafter granted summary judgment to all Defendants on Plain- tiff’s claims against them. Now pending is Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, which challenges (1) the Court’s decision excluding the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert and (2) the Court’s summary judgment decision, but only as to Murdock Street. The present motion is the thirteenth dispositive motion directed at Plaintiff’s negligence and/or trespass claims the Court has resolved, and—hope- fully—the last. 1 For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied. 2 I. BACKGROUND Readers interested in the full saga of this long-running tort action may review Matiella I through Matiella VI, citations set out in the margin at note 1. For the purposes of this decision, this abridged version should suffice. In this action, Plaintiff has alleged that the construction of a multi-unit dwelling on a neigh- boring lot “so damaged the two townhomes on his own property that they are now uninhabitable.” Matiella IV, 2025 WL 2298614, at *1. He filed claims of negligence and trespass against Murdock Street, which owned the neighboring property; EWORA/IFG, the general contractor and developer of the project on Murdock Street’s property; and City Concrete and Luis Construction, which were allegedly involved in the excavation on that property. See id. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that inadequate shoring of the earth exposed by the excavation on the building site, which allowed 1 The other dispositive motions addressing Plaintiff’s claims the Court has resolved are (1) the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint filed by general contractor/developer EWORA, LLC, and IFG Group, LLC (together, “EWORA/IFG”) and (2) the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint filed by subcontractor City Con- crete Corp., both of which were denied in large part in Matiella v. Murdock Street, LLC, No. 21-cv-2112, 2023 WL 4684854 (D.D.C. July 21, 2023) (Matiella I); (3) the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint filed by subcontractor Luis Construction, Inc., (4) City Concrete’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, (5) EWORA/IFG’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, and (6) Murdock Street’s motion for partial judg- ment on the pleadings, which were denied in large part in Matiella v. Murdock Street, LLC, No. 21-cv-2112, 2024 WL 3967367 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2024) (Matiella II); (7) Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on its negligence claim against Luis Construction, which the Court denied in Matiella v. Murdock Street, LLC, No. 21-cv-2112, 2025 WL 689177 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2025) (Matiella III); (8) Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on its negligence claims against EWORA/IFG, City Concrete, and Luis Construction, which the Court denied in Matiella v. Murdock Street, LLC, No. 21-cv-2112, 2025 WL 3533451 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2025) (Matiella V); and (9) Murdock Street’s motion for summary judgment, (10) EWORA/IFG’s motion for summary judgment, (11) City Concrete’s motion for summary judgment, and (12) Luis Construction’s motion for summary judgment, which the Court granted in Matiella v. Murdock Street, LLC, No. 21-cv-2112, 2025 WL 3533452 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2025) (Matiella VI). The Court’s decision excluding Plaintiff’s expert report is Matiella v. Murdock Street, LLC, No. 21-cv-2112, 2025 WL 2298614 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2025) (Matiella IV). Plaintiff’s current motion challenges Matiella IV and Matiella VI (again, only to the extent that it granted summary judgment in Murdock Street’s favor). 2 The filings most relevant to this Memorandum Opinion and Order are (1) Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 243; (2) Murdock Street’s opposition, ECF No. 245; and (3) Plaintiff’s reply, ECF No. 246. The page numbers cited herein are those assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF system. 2 soil under the structures on his property to migrate (the negligence claim), and reverberations from the construction (the trespass claim) caused damage to those structures that rendered them unin- habitable. See id. To support his claims, Plaintiff designated an expert—Thomas Galarnyk—who produced an expert report and thereafter sat for a deposition by Defendants. See id.; see also ECF No. 197-2 at 51–57 (Galarnyk Expert Report); ECF No. 197-3 (Galarnyk Deposition Transcript). All Defendants joined in a motion to exclude Galarnyk’s testimony. Matiella IV, 2025 WL 2298614, at *1. As relevant here, the Court reviewed and analyzed Galarnyk’s expert report and his depo- sition testimony. See id. at *7–15. Ultimately, it found that Galarnyk’s opinions were purportedly “based on his years of experience—or, perhaps, experience along with training and education—in construction and related fields”; however, he failed to explain in his report or his deposition “how that experience, training, and education ‘lead to the conclusions reached, why they are a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how they are reliably applied to the facts’” as required by Supreme Court precedent—specifically, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)—and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Matiella IV, 2025 WL 2298614, at *8 (citation modified) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). The Court observed, for example, that the “ex- planation of his method or technique in reaching his opinions is sweeping but empty” consisting of “conclusory assertions” that “[n]owhere . . . even gesture toward, let alone explain” how his opinions satisfy the requirements of Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Rule 702. Id. at *9. It further found that “Galarnyk’s deposition provide[d] little, if any, illumination as to how his experience informed his opinions”; indeed, when pressed on that issue, he repeatedly cited only his “years of experience doing this kind of work” and similar vague assertions. Id. at *10. And, although 3 Defendants’ motion provided “Plaintiff an opportunity to provide evidence and argument buttress- ing those opinions,” he failed to do so, offering no additional evidence and mounting an argument “largely devoid of support and consist[ing] merely of the ipse dixit of counsel.” Id. at *11. The Court excluded Galarnyk’s testimony in its entirety. See id. at *15. That exclusion affected the Court’s decision on Defendants’ motions to dismiss—particu- larly Murdock Street’s motion, which was the only one that did not argue the statute of limitations also barred Plaintiff’s suit. 3 In Matiella VI, the Court described Plaintiff’s negligence claim as alleging “that Defendants negligently performed excavation work, including installation of a ‘sol- dier pile and lagging retaining wall’ without ‘walers, rakers or crossbracing’ or ‘backfill in the space behind [the] lagging,’ and installed underpinning without ‘shoring to brace [it] during con- struction.’” 2025 WL 3533452, at *6 (citation modified) (first quoting Matiella I, 2023 WL 4684854, at *2; and then quoting ECF No. 199-3 at 2). The Court found that, to make out a prima facie case of negligence against any Defendant—that is, to establish “the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that devi- ation and the plaintiff’s injury”—Plaintiff was required to present expert testimony. id. at *5–6 (quoting Williams v. Aviles, No. 20-cv-931, 2022 WL 2643559, at *5 (D.D.C. July 8, 2022)). In- deed, Plaintiff did not argue otherwise. See id. at *6. Because Plaintiff had disclosed only one expert—Galarnyk—and the Court had excluded his testimony, Plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case and Defendants, including Murdock Street, were entitled to summary judgment. See id. at *6–7. As to Plaintiff’s theory of trespass—that “vibrations caused by Defendants’ negligent ex- cavation and shoring practices resulted in structural damage to Plaintiff’s property”—the Court 3 Matiella VI also found that Plaintiff’s claims against EWORA/IFG, City Concrete, and Luis Construction were time- barred, 2025 WL 3533452, at *9–14, rulings not challenged here. 4 found that the “lack of expert evidence also fell[ed]” that claim. Id. at *8 (citation modified) (quoting ECF No. 215 at 13). Again, the Court noted that Plaintiff had not argued that he could prove his case without expert testimony. See id. Canvassing case law from this jurisdiction and others, Matiella VI found that courts faced with similar allegations had required expert testimony to establish causation. See id. (citing Massengale v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 983 F. Supp. 210 (D.D.C. 1997); Hoffman v. Vulcan Materials Co., 91 F. Supp. 2d 881, 888–89 (M.D.N.C. 1999); and Trull v. Car.-Va. Well Co., 142 S.E.2d 622, 624 (N.C. 1965)). And the Court expressly distinguished cases alleging damage caused by construction vibrations in which expert testimony was not required. See id. (citing Hiser v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. 11-cv-517, 2012 WL 3542009 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2012); and Legendre v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 268 So.2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1972)). Specifically, those cases found that lay testimony about “repeated experiences of vibra- tions and contemporaneous aural or visual manifestations of cracking” were sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to causation; in this case, however, Plaintiff testified that he felt vibrations from the construction only once—on or about September 29, 2017—which was months before the period in which he claimed construction caused the damage about which he complains. Id. Ac- cordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of all Defendants, including Murdock Street. See id. at *14. That decision, however, did not dispose of all claims remaining in this case, such as EWORA/IFG’s counterclaims against Plaintiff, see Matiella v. Murdock Street, No. 21- cv-2112, 2025 WL 3533454 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2025), and therefore judgment was not entered at that time and, in light of this motion for reconsideration, still has not been entered. 4 4 The Court ultimately granted summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on EWORA/IFG’s claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with prospective business opportunity but allowed the unjust enrichment claim to go forward. See Matiella 2025 WL 3533454, at *1. Thereafter, the Court granted EWORA/IFG’s request to dismiss its unjust enrichment claim. See ECF No. 250. 5  As noted, Plaintiff now asks the Court to reconsider its exclusion of Galarnyk’s testimony or, in the alternative, to reverse its ruling that Plaintiff required expert testimony to make out his negligence and trespass claims. See ECF No. 243. II. LEGAL STANDARD Both decisions at issue here are interlocutory orders. See, e.g., In re E. Palestine Train Derailment, No. 23-cv-242, 2025 WL 581003, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Feb, 21, 2025) (noting that “Daub- ert rulings” are “interlocutory” (quoting Campbell v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 12-cv-8633, 2016 WL 5796906, at *16 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 3, 2016))); Norris v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 20-cv- 3315, 2022 WL 5054099, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2022) (noting that a summary judgment decision adjudicating fewer than all claims in an action is interlocutory). Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are governed by Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a [final] judgment.” Rule 54(b) does not define a standard for a court to apply when determining a request for reconsideration, but the D.C. Circuit has recognized that a court may “reconsider an interlocutory order ‘as justice requires.’” Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., Inc., 630 F.3d 217, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 764 F.2d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 1985)). In light of that standard, which “leave[s] a great deal of room for the court’s discre- tion,” Robinson v. District of Columbia, 296 F. Supp. 3d 189, 192 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Lewis v. District of Columbia, 736 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2010)), courts in this Circuit and else- where have developed guidelines for the exercise of that discretion derived from bedrock princi- ples of fairness, efficiency, and finality. First, “where litigants have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” 6 Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1964)); accord, e.g., U.S. Tobacco Cop. Inc. v. Big S. Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 257 (4th Cir. 2018); Britt v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No 23-cv-844, 2024 WL 5106544, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2024); Henok v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 96, 101 (D.D.C. 2013). Second, “in order to promote finality, predictability and economy of judicial resources, ‘as a rule a court should be loath[] to revisit its own prior decisions in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Pueschel v. Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers’ Ass’n, 606 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation modified) (quoting Lederman v. United States, 539 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2008)); see also, e.g., Pilkin v. Sony Interactive Ent. LLC, No. 17-cv-2501, 2020 WL 7339920, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2020) (“Although deciding whether to grant reconsideration lies within the Court’s sound discretion, considerations of judicial economy and the obligation of the courts ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding,’ require ‘good reason’ before reopen- ing matters once resolved.” (citations omitted) (first quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; and then quoting In Def. of Animals v. NIH, 543 F. Supp. 2d 70, 76 (D.D.C. 2008))). Accordingly, “[m]otions for reconsideration are generally ‘disfavored’ and granting them [is] an ‘unusual measure.’” Woods v. District of Columbia, No. 20-cv-782, 2022 WL 17989326, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2022) (quoting Walsh v. Hagee, 10 F. Supp. 3d 15, 18 (D.D.C. 2013)); see also, e.g., Lerner & Rowe PC v. Brown Engstrand & Shelly LLC, 684 F. Supp. 3d 953, 955 (D. Ariz. 2023) (“Motions for reconsidera- tion are disfavored and should be granted only in rare circumstances.”). A court may reconsider a prior order if the moving party “identif[ies] an ‘intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or 7 prevent manifest injustice.’” North v. United States Dep’t of Just., 17 F. Supp. 3d 6, 8 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also, e.g., Acon- Chen v. Duffy, No. 24-cv-1529, 2026 WL 1998768, at *4 (D.D.C. July 10, 2026) (“[R]easons [warranting reconsideration] might include ‘(1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the discovery of new evidence not previously available; or (3) a clear error in the Court’s previous order.’” (ci- tation modified) (quoting United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius, Baer & Co., Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 3d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2018))); United States v. Anand, No. CR 19-518-1, 2025 WL 2698985, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2025) (noting that reconsideration may be granted where “(1) there has been ‘an intervening change in the controlling law,’ (2) ‘new evidence’ exists ‘that was not avail- able when the court issued its order,’ or (3) there is a ‘need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.’” (quoting Gibson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 2021)); Cassidy v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 22-cv-3890, 2025 WL 4231026, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2025) (noting reasons to grant reconsideration “include (i) intervening change in law, (ii) avail- ability of previously unavailable new evidence, and (iii) a need to correct a clear legal error or to prevent manifest injustice”); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Loc. 150 v. Barrington Excavating, LLC, No. 23 C 15257, 2024 WL 3888902, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2024) (“[A] motion to recon- sider is only appropriate where a court has misunderstood a party, where the court has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, where the court has made an error of apprehension (not of reasoning), where a significant change in the law has oc- curred, or where significant new facts have been discovered.” (quoting Tapia-Rendon v. United Tape & Finishing Co. Inc., No. 21 C 3400, 2024 WL 406513, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2024))). Courts widely agree that “[m]otions for reconsideration are not vehicles for either reasserting ar- guments previously raised and rejected by the court or presenting arguments that should have been 8 raised previously with the court.” 5 Roggio v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 09-cv-1733, 2018 WL 7141320, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2018) (quoting Lovely-Coley v. District of Columbia, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2017)); see also Kirwa v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 17-cv-1793, 2018 WL 7141989, at *1 (D.D.C. May 23, 2018) (“In this Circuit, it is ‘well-established’ that motions for reconsideration ‘cannot be used as an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been ad- vanced earlier.’” (citation modified) (quoting Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Sebelius, No. 11-cv- 0116, 2011 WL 13248160, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2011))); Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (“[I]t is well-established that motions for reconsideration cannot be used as an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier.”); Davis v. D.C. Child & Fam. Servs. Agency, No. 10-cv-1564, 2014 WL 12802261, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2014) (“[N]ot only does the motion for reconsideration present claims the Court already considered, [the movant’s] arguments also were waived and therefore not proper in the first place because a Rule 54(b) motion is not an avenue for raising new arguments that could have, and should have, been brought before a court issued its ruling.”). That is, a “motion for reconsideration is not a chance for a do-over,” allowing litigants to present argument they could have, but did not, raise in the briefing on the original motion. Richards v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 23-cv-00242, 2024 WL 6895447, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 28, 2024) (“A motion for reconsideration is not a chance for a do-over; nor is it a vehicle for raising arguments that could have been raised in the original motion.”); see also, e.g., Fairbank 5 The Court recognizes that in Cobell v. Jewell, the D.C. Circuit found that raising new arguments is not “flat[ly] barred” by Rule 54(b). 802 F.3d 12, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015). However, that case did not purport to require a court to consider new arguments on reconsideration that could—and should—have been raised before or to cabin a district court’s wide discretion in addressing a motion for reconsideration. Rather, it reaffirmed that discretion, noting that a court’s “approach to the interlocutory presentation of new arguments” under the Rule “can be . . . flexible.” Id. 9 Reconstruction Corp. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., Inc., No. 13-cv-907, 2020 WL 7427025, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020) (“If the movant had the opportunity to present the evidence or litigate the issue earlier but did not do so, either because of inadvertence or as a strategic maneuver, the Rule 54(b) motion should be denied.” (citation modified) (quoting Vornado Realty Tr. v. Castlton Env’t Contractors, LLC, No. 08-cv-4823, 2013 WL 5719000, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2013))); Big Chief Plant Servs., LLC v. Panhandle Maint., LLC, No. 18-cv-1226, 2019 WL 1472321, at *4 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2019) (“A movant for reconsideration faces an uphill battle when it ‘files a broad motion to reconsider that essentially asks the court to grant the movant a mulligan on its earlier failure to present persuasive argument and evidence.’” (quoting Patterson v. Nine Energy Serv., LLC, No. 17-cv-1116, 2018 WL 6250608, at *30 (D.N.M. Nov. 29, 2018))). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff attempts to show that the Court overlooked pertinent evidence when it excluded Galarnyk’s testimony and relevant precedent when it found that expert testimony was necessary for Plaintiff make out a prima facie case for both his negligence claim and his trespass claim. His motion will be denied for two independent reasons. First, he failed to make the arguments he now presents when he had the opportunity and provides no “good reason” for the Court to “reopen[]” these resolved matters. Pilkin, 2020 WL 7339920, at *2. He does not, for example, contend that the “legal issues develop[ed] over the course of [the] litigation” to make arguments that would not have been worthwhile at summary judgment appropriate now. Lin v. District of Columbia, 47 F.4th 828, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2022); see also Cobell, 802 F.2d at 25 (noting that “Rule 54(b)’s ap- proach to the interlocutory presentation of new arguments as the case evolves can be . . . flexible” (emphasis added)). The Court will therefore exercise its discretion to deem them forfeited under Rule 54(b)’s “as justice requires” standard. See, e.g., Richards, 2024 WL 6895447, at *2; 10 Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., 2020 WL 7427025, at *6; Big Chief Plant Servs., 2019 WL 1472321, at *4; Patterson, 2018 WL 6250608, at *30; Roggio, 2018 WL 7141320, at *1–2; Kirwa, 2018 WL 7141989, at *1; Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 192; Lovely-Coley, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 9; Davis, 2014 WL 12802261, at *3; Vornado Realty Tr., 2013 WL 5719000, at *3; Dist. Hosp. Partners, 2011 WL 13248160, at *1. Second, the arguments fail on their merits. A. Matiella IV and the Exclusion of Galarnyk’s Expert Testimony As the Court observed in Matiella IV, the purported basis for Galarnyk’s opinions was clearly his “years of experience—or, perhaps, experience along with training and education—in construction and related fields.” Matiella IV, 2025 WL 2298614, at *8. As the Court explained, “[A] witness who relies on ‘experience alone, or experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training, or education, must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.’” Id. (citation modified) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory com- mittee’s note to 2000 amendments). Defendants’ motion to exclude Galarnyk’s testimony argued, as relevant here, that his opinions were “nothing more than inadmissible ipse dixit[s],” not based on “reliable principles and methods” or a “reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” ECF No. 197-10 at 6–17. In response, Plaintiff offered this: Defendants fail to identify any specific deficiencies in Galarnyk’s method- ology. His conclusions about differential settlement, inadequate shoring, and re- sulting structural damage are grounded in well-recognized forensic investigative practices. His reliance on photographic and visual documentation aligns with ac- cepted methods for evaluating causation in construction cases. Defendants’ insistence on numerical quantification or specific measure- ments misunderstands the nature of Galarnyk’s testimony. His qualitative analysis focuses on causal mechanisms and is admissible under Rule 702.[6] 6 Plaintiff then cites a supposed quotation from United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir. 2006): “Daubert does not require a perfect methodology, only a reliable one.” That quotation does not appear in Sandoval- Mendoza or, as far as the Court can tell, any other opinion issued by a federal court. 11 ECF No. 216 at 5. Leaving to the side that it is an “argument” so devoid of content as to be useless, see Simien v. Mayorkas, No. 23-cv-888, 2026 WL 2410123, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2026) (“It is not the job of the federal courts to develop parties’ arguments: ‘That is for them to do.’” (quot- ing United States v. Vásquez Rijos, 119 F.4th 94, 112 n.12 (1st Cir. 2024))), it emphatically does not “explain how [Galarnyk’s] experience leads to the conclusion[s] reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Now, he attempts to do just that, pointing to a single passage from Galarnyk’s report and four passages from his deposition to sup- port “three narrowed categories” of opinions: (1) “construction custom and practice for protecting adjacent structures during demolition, excavation, and shoring”; (2) “whether the observed pat- terns of cracking and structural distress on Plaintiff’s property are mechanically consistent with adjacent excavation, inadequate underpinning, and rebar intrusion”; and (3) “the technical feasi- bility of repair [of the structures on Plaintiff’s property] versus replacement.” ECF No. 243 at 13– 17. But Galarnyk’s report and deposition transcript were available at the time Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion to exclude Galarnyk’s testimony. Whether Plaintiff’s counsel failed to make the argument he now presses “because of inadvertence or as a strategic maneuver” does not matter: his failure to do so is reason enough to deny his motion to reconsider the exclusion of Galarnyk’s testimony, and the Court does so on that basis. Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., 2020 WL 7427025, at *6 (quoting Vornado Realty Tr., 2013 WL 5719000, at *3). The Court also denies this branch of plaintiff’s motion on the independent basis that Plain- tiff’s newly minted argument does not cure the deficiencies of Galarnyk’s testimony. Plaintiff first points to Galarnyk’s statement in his report that “[f]rom 1981 to the present day, I have conducted several hundred building and other structures inspection before, during and after adjacent 12 construction operations to document pre-existing conditions, changing conditions (if any) during adjacent construction, and post adjacent construction. Each of these inspections were necessitated due to concerns for construction related damage issues.” ECF No. 243 at 13 (quoting ECF No. 197-2 at 53). That, Plaintiff asserts, establishes “a category of work (inspections of structures adjacent to construction operations), a frequency (several hundred), a duration (forty years), and a subject matter (pre-existing, changing, and post-construction conditions) directly relevant to the analysis [at issue].” Id. He then contends that the Court’s failure to “quote or address that passage” shows that it missed “controlling data” in the record. Id. (citation modified) (quoting Singh v. George Washington Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005)). But in Matiella IV, the Court cited several assertions from Galarnyk’s report that set forth materially identical descriptions of his experience. See 2025 WL 2298614, at *9. The opinion found that such representations failed to explain “how his experience, education, and training ‘lead to the conclusions reached, why they are a sufficient basis for the opinions, and how they are reliably applied to the facts.’” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Thus, no “controlling data” was missed and the passage Plaintiff points to would not alter the Court’s con- clusion. Plaintiff then highlights deposition testimony in which Galarnyk (1) asserted that he performed “crack and damage stud[ies],” deployed “crack monitors and seismographs,” and created hundreds of shoring “sketch[es]” when he was em- ployed by a company called Lunda Construction. ECF No. 243 at 14 (quoting ECF No. 197-3 at 43–45); (2) testified that a particular crack in the foundation of one of the buildings on Plain- tiff’s property was not caused by vegetation because he had “seen cracks similar to [it] for 40 years” and it was at the wrong angle and too wide. Id. (quoting ECF No. 197-3 at 115); (3) opined that an “adjacent structure’s foundation depth, wall thickness, and wall char- acter should be evaluated before designing the shoring system, so it can be installed 13  without damaging the existing structure” and described a method of shoring involv- ing augur casting piles and installing lagging. Id. at 15 (citing ECF No. 197-3 at 162–165); and (4) asserted that, after the demolition of an old building on Murdock Street’s property, excavation began, then shoring and underpinning were installed, “[a]nd the snow- ball started at the top of the hill in September [2017] and progressively got worse as the new work was started.” Id. (quoting ECF No. 197-3 at 196). Nowhere in that testimony does Galarnyk make explicit how his experience “leads to the conclu- sion reached, why it is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how it is reliably applied to the facts.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments. That is clear from Plaintiff’s own motion, which asserts that Galarnyk “grounds his causal opinion in pattern recognition built up over forty years of comparable inspections.” ECF No. 243 at 16. Plaintiff fails to explain how that explanation improves upon Galarnyk’s repeated recourse during his deposition to conclusory assertions about “the ‘totality of the evidence’ or . . . his 40 years of experience[,] without offering any details on how that experience informed his analysis of the evidence or his conclusions.” 7 Matiella IV, 2025 WL 2298614, at *10 (emphasis added) (cataloguing several instances in Galarnyk’s deposition where he fell short of the requirements of Rule 702 by failing to detail how his experience reliably led to his conclusions). A trial court has “broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude expert tes- timony.” United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Likewise, the 7 Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ expert employed “materially the same methodology” as Galarnyk and so the Court erred when it “credited [the expert’s] ‘extraordinary rain event’ opinion at summary judgment.” ECF No. 243 at 18– 19 (quoting Matiella VI, 2025 WL 3533452, at *8). But Plaintiff did not challenge Defendants’ expert’s testimony as unreliable on that basis and he has cited no authority supporting the position that a trial court may not rely on an expert opinion that has not been challenged. Nor did the Court “rest” its summary judgment opinion on Defendants’ expert’s opinion that an “extraordinary rain event” caused the damage to Plaintiff’s property. ECF No. 246 at 12. Rather, it found that expert testimony was necessary not “‘to disprove’ or ‘rule out’” the possibility that rain caused the damage, id. at 7 (quoting KS Condo, 302 A.2d at 511), but to help a lay jury determine whether the alleged vibrations caused that damage, see Matiella VI, 2025 WL 3533452, at *8–9. The Court’s single mention of the rain theory was not the foundation of that ruling. 14 “as justice requires” standard for granting a motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) “leave[s] a great deal of room for the court’s discretion.” Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 192 (quoting Lewis, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 102). By failing to raise them in opposition to Defendants’ motion to exclude Galarnyk’s testimony, Plaintiff has forfeited the arguments made here that it is admissible and the motion for reconsideration is denied on that basis. More, Plaintiff’s attempt to cobble together a coherent argument for its admissibility from disparate snatches of Galarnyk’s testimony fails for the same reason the Court originally excluded it in Matiella IV: He has not sufficiently shown that it is reliable under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion is therefore denied for that independent reason. B. Matiella VI and the Grant of Summary Judgment to Murdock Street Like his arguments about the admissibility of Galarnyk’s opinion testimony, Plaintiff’s arguments that expert testimony is unnecessary to his negligence and trespass claims should not be presented on a motion for reconsideration because he failed to make them at the appropriate time—in response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. They are also substantively deficient. Some procedural history will be useful here. In compliance with an order of the Court, Defendants each filed a motion for summary judgment on November 12, 2024, along with the motion in limine to exclude Galarnyk’s testimony. See ECF Nos. 195, 197, 198, 199, 200. Mur- dock Street argued, among other things, that Plaintiff’s claims required expert testimony and that, for the reasons outlined in the motion in limine, Plaintiff had provided no admissible expert testi- mony. See ECF No. 198-1 at 4–7, 10. In his omnibus opposition to Defendants’ motions, Plaintiff relied on Galarnyk’s testimony to argue that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. See ECF No. 215 at 12–14. As the Court noted in 15  Matiella VI, Plaintiff did not argue that he could prove his negligence and trespass claims without expert testimony, see 2025 WL 3533452, at *6, *9—even in the face of Defendants’ then-pending motion to exclude that testimony. Briefing on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and the motion in limine was complete on January 25, 2025. See ECF Nos. 217, 218, 219, 222. The Court granted Defendants’ motion in limine on August 8, 2025. See Matiella IV, 2025 WL 2298614. On September 17, 2025, the Court held a status conference to address, among other things, whether supplemental briefing as to summary judgment should be ordered in light of the grant of Defendants’ motion in limine. Minute Entry (Sep. 17, 2025). No party—not even Plain- tiff—believed supplemental briefing necessary. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel urged the Court to rule on the pending summary judgment motions without supplemental briefing to “give everybody cer- tainty on where [the case] stands.” 8 Accordingly, the Court resolved the motions for summary judgment on the briefing as it stood on January 25, 2025—briefing in which Plaintiff had failed to argue that his causes of action could be proved without expert evidence. See Matiella VI, 2025 WL 3533452. Now, Plaintiff argues that the Court overlooked controlling authority from the D.C. Court of Appeals, KS Condo, LLC v. Fairfax Village Condominium VII, 302 A.2d 503 (D.C. 2023). Ac- cording to Plaintiff, KS Condo establishes that, as to the causation of “two discrete damage catego- ries”—described as “the September 29, 2017 demolition event and the rebar intrusion”—the Court was wrong to require expert testimony. ECF No. 243 at 4–7. Plaintiff calls KS Condo a “recent[]” opinion, but it was issued on September 23, 2023, well before briefing on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment began. ECF No. 243 at 6; see KS Condo, 302 A.2d at 503. Plaintiff did not cite this purportedly “controlling” authority in his opposition brief or raise any of the other arguments he mounts here to support his contention that 8 No party ordered a transcript of that hearing; however, the Court has reviewed the recording of it. 16 expert testimony is unnecessary in this case. Again, the Court will exercise its discretion to deem this argument forfeited under Rule 54(b)’s flexible standard. See, e.g., Richards, 2024 WL 6895447, at *2; Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., 2020 WL 7427025, at *6; Big Chief Plant Servs., 2019 WL 1472321, at *4; Patterson, 2018 WL 6250608, at *30; Roggio, 2018 WL 7141320, at *1–2; Kirwa, 2018 WL 7141989, at *1; Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 192; Lovely-Coley, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 9; Davis, 2014 WL 12802261, at *3; Vornado Realty Tr., 2013 WL 5719000, at *3; Dist. Hosp. Part- ners, 2011 WL 13248160, at *1. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision is therefore denied on this ground. Even had Plaintiff provided some justification for the Court to reopen its summary judg- ment ruling, the Court would—and does—deny the motion on substantive grounds. Plaintiff admits that his argument relates only to “causation” evidence. ECF No. 243 at 4 (“The Court’s summary judgment ruling rests on the proposition that whether vibrations from excavation and shoring caused damage to Plaintiff’s property is ‘beyond the ken of the average lay juror’ and therefore requires expert testimony. That proposition is not wrong as a general matter. But it does not cover two discrete damage categories relative to causation . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Matiella VI, 2025 WL 3533452, at *9)). As to Plaintiff’s negligence claim, the Court found that he lacked evidence not only of causation, but also of the standard of care and a breach of that standard. See Matiella VI, 2025 WL 3533452, at *7 (“Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of negligence, because he cannot establi