Full Opinion

J-A20041-26 2026 PA Super 243 STACEY WELLIVER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : AMANDA GILLIS : No. 1031 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Order Entered July 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at No: CV-2025-01158 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 29, 2026 Stacey Welliver (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order denying the petition for protection from intimidation (PFI) she filed on behalf of her teenage daughter, N.B., against her ex-husband’s friend, Amanda Gillis (Gillis), pursuant to the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 62A01-62A20. We affirm the denial of relief. Background Appellant’s ex-husband is Travis Bartlett (Bartlett).1 Appellant’s current husband is the ex-husband of Gillis. As Gillis explains: ____________________________________________ 1 This Court recently affirmed the denial of a protection from abuse (PFA) petition Appellant filed against Bartlett. See Welliver v. Bartlett, No. 1030 MDA 2025, 2026 WL 1470213 at *1 (Pa. Super. filed May 26, 2026) (non- precedential decision) (noting Appellant and Bartlett “were involved in a custody action” regarding N.B. and Appellant had filed the PFA petition two days before the parties’ custody hearing). J-A20041-26 The parties’ intra-familial dynamic is problematic. Appellant and [Gillis] were friends when their same aged daughters[, N.B. and E.W.,] began spending time together several years ago. Appellant and [Gillis] both divorced [from their husbands]. Appellant is now married to [Gillis’s] ex-husband[, while Appellant’s ex-husband, Bartlett] and [Gillis] have remained friends. Appellant’s daughter N.B. is now stepsister to [Gillis’s] same aged daughter E.W. Gillis’s Brief at 5. Appellant agrees that Gillis “is the former spouse” of Appellant’s current husband, and emphasizes that Gillis “has no familial, household, or custodial relationship” to N.B. Appellant’s Brief at 5. In addition, N.B. explained: I’ve known [Gillis] since I was a real little kid, so I … grew up with her and [E.W.] before [Appellant] and [Gillis’s ex-husband] got together and … I don’t really know what type [of] relationship we have. It’s kind of just like my dad’s friends with her so I’ll go over there and I used to go over there and, like, hang out with [E.W.] … and hang out with [Gillis] and my dad. N.T., 7/2/25, at 25. On June 24, 2025, Appellant filed the underlying petition which requested that the trial court order Gillis “to not have any contact” with N.B. Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/15/25, at 1. The court held a hearing on July 2, 2025. Appellant appeared pro se and presented testimony from N.B., who was 14 years old at the time. Appellant also testified. Gillis was represented by counsel and testified in opposition to the petition. In response to Appellant’s direct examination, N.B. testified that Gillis tried to talk with her at one of N.B.’s softball games and “was talking to the group of my friends I was hanging out with.” N.T., 7/2/25, at 11-12. N.B. stated that Gillis “came up to the dug-out and [was] talking to some of my -2- J-A20041-26 teammates, and some my friends including me.” Id. at 13. She added that Gillis “came up to me and said hi, and then she walked away but [Appellant] was trying to get her attention and she just walked away.” Id. at 14. When Appellant said to N.B.: “It’s your time to tell everyone how you feel,” N.B. said, “I don’t have anything else to add.” Id. at 15. On cross-examination, N.B. testified that she did not like being in court and agreed that Appellant “put [her] up to com[ing to court] to testify.” Id. at 16. Gillis’s counsel asked N.B.: Q. And when it comes to feeling uncomfortable, you were uncomfortable having to come here and testify about this, weren’t you? A. Yes. Q. Because you really don’t want to be here, do you? A. No, I don’t. Q. And as far as that’s concerned, you don’t really consider Amanda Gillis a threat to you, do you? A. Not really, no. Id. at 17. N.B. testified that Appellant told her not to “go anywhere near” Gillis and stated that when Gillis “is within a hundred feet” of N.B., Appellant “kind of gets upset.” Id. at 18. Appellant called N.B. on re-direct, and the following exchange occurred: [GILLIS’S COUNSEL]: Excuse me, [Appellant is] signaling to [N.B.] THE COURT: I saw that. [APPELLANT]: I just wanted her to elaborate. -3- J-A20041-26 THE COURT: Just so -- her last question was, do you feel threatened by [Gillis]? N.B.: No, I don’t feel threatened. Id. at 23. In response to the trial court’s questioning, N.B. testified that Appellant wanted N.B. to have a “safety plan” when she is around Gillis. Id. at 25. When N.B. finished testifying, the court stated, “I get the picture.” Id. at 26. Appellant testified next. She stated that Gillis “showed up” at N.B.’s school softball game despite having “no kids on the team.” Id. at 28. Appellant said she “had to ask Ms. Gillis to please refrain from talking or cheering for [N.B.]. I would like to point out that her presence there not only made [N.B.] uncomfortable [but] made me uncomfortable.” Id. at 29. Appellant also referred to an “instance where she showed up again, and then at the winter chorus concert -- whenever those two get together, meaning Mr. Bartlett and Ms. Gillis, there is potential for problems, and I was very uncomfortable.” Id. at 31. Gillis testified last. She explained that she separated from her ex- husband, who is Appellant’s current husband, in 2018, and “the divorce was final in 2020.” Id. at 32. Gillis testified that she “has had interactions” with Appellant. Id. at 33. She stated: I try not to. I, for the most part, try to avoid eye contact, as well as speaking with her in any form of communication. I have her blocked on social media. I have her phone number blocked. I informed [my ex-husband that] the only way that I wish to communicate with her is in case of an emergency through email. The last time that I had any verbal interaction directly with her … -4- J-A20041-26 was Easter Sunday … and that was the last time [Appellant] and I have actually face-to-face had any communication, and I told her I liked her dress and good morning and things like that, but I really try not to interact with her at all. Id. Gillis testified that she has “never done anything harassing to [N.B.] or threatening … all I ever do is say hi and then walk away, or I’ve given her hugs when reciprocated [sic] when she’s been with [her father, Bartlett], but I’ve never done anything threatening or harmful to her.” Id. at 33-34. Gillis stated that the “only time I ever see [N.B.] is coincidentally being out in public…. It’s more just an organic, like, hi, [N.B.], when I see her.” Id. at 34. She explained that her daughter, E.W., and N.B. are both in the school chorus, and [Bartlett] said that he was also going, and the auditorium filled up really bad. I was sitting down with my mom and it ended up I had two seats next to me. He called me and said, hey, where are you sitting? I can’t find a seat. And I said, you can come sit with me. Id. at 35. With respect to the softball game, Gillis explained: I actually only came because [E.W.], my daughter, [Appellant’s] stepdaughter, requested me to bring her, and [S.] is [E.W.’s] best friend who also plays on the team who sleeps over very regularly, [and S.] was playing at the same time. I cheered for [S. and N.B.] and I was screamed at in public to stop cheering for [N.B.], and so I left and I said, you’re kidding me, right? And [Appellant] was, like, no. Id. at 38. -5- J-A20041-26 After hearing from the three witnesses, the trial court advised that it was going to deny the petition. The trial court stated: So the Protection from Intimidation Statute covers certain events. It’s not going to cover the acrimony between these two families. Certainly people can go to whatever public event they want. They can cheer for whoever they want. It’s not going to meet the definition of intimidation that requires court involvement or an order. I’m going to dismiss the petition. Id. at 40. The court entered a written order denying relief on July 3, 2025. On July 30, 2025, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Although the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, Appellant failed to do so.2 Appellant presents the following issues for review: 1. Whether the trial court violated Appellant’s due process rights by preventing the full presentation of evidence and witnesses. 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or committed an error of law in denying the PFI despite evidence of a pattern of intimidation. Appellant’s Brief at 4. ____________________________________________ 2 The court’s Rule 1925 order appears to be unenforceable because the docket indicates a lack of appropriate notice by stating only “cc: Parties served by the court.” See Carr v. Michuck, 234 A.3d 797, 805 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating the “prothonotary should make a notation that specifically states, for example, ‘Rule 236 notice provided on’ followed by the date the notice was given, in order to comply with the notification mandate and procedural requirement of Rule 236”); Hartdegen v. Berger, 839 A.2d 1100, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2003) (declining to find waiver for failure to file a concise statement where appellant was not served with proper notice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236). Also, the order does not specify that any issues not included in the statement shall be deemed waived. Cf. Linn v. Perrotti, 308 A.3d 885, 888 (Pa. Super. 2024); Commonwealth v. Stroud, 298 A.3d 1152, 1156 (Pa. Super. 2023). -6- J-A20041-26 Discussion We review Appellant’s challenge to the denial of her petition for a PFI “using the same standards applicable to Protection from Abuse Act orders: we assess the order for an abuse of discretion or error of law.” A.M.L. v. J.R., 353 A.3d 237, 239 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment, but an overriding or misapplication of the law, or a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id. (citation omitted). The Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act (the Act) is intended to protect minor victims of “sexual violence or intimidation.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A01. The protections are extended to victims who “desire safety and protection from future interactions with their offender, regardless of whether they seek criminal prosecution.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A02(5); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A05(a) (explaining that adults may seek relief under the Act on behalf of minor children). Notably, this Court has affirmed the application of the Act and entry of a PFI order when the intimidation is not sexual in nature. We explained: Our General Assembly set forth its findings and the purpose of the Act, in relevant part, as follows: (2) [I]ntimidation can inflict humiliation, degradation and terror on the victim. .... -7- J-A20041-26 (5) Victims of [ ] intimidation desire safety and protection from future interactions with their offender, regardless of whether they seek criminal prosecution. (6) This chapter provides the victim with a civil remedy requiring the offender to stay away from the victim, as well as other appropriate relief. A.M.D. on Behalf of A.D. v. T.A.B., 178 A.3d 889, 893 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A02(2), (5) & (6)). The Act defines “intimidation” as: Conduct constituting a crime under either of the following provisions between persons who are not family or household members: 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4), (5), (6) or (7) (relating to harassment) where the conduct is committed by a person 18 years of age or older against a person under 18 years of age. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1 (relating to stalking) where the conduct is committed by a person 18 years of age or older against a person under 18 years of age. 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A03.3 ____________________________________________ 3 A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person: (4) communicates to or about such other person any lewd, lascivious, threatening or obscene words, language, drawings or caricatures; (5) communicates repeatedly in an anonymous manner; (6) communicates repeatedly at extremely inconvenient hours; or (7) communicates repeatedly in a manner other than specified in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6). 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4)-(7). (Footnote Continued Next Page) -8- J-A20041-26 Before a trial court can enter a PFI order, it must hold a hearing at which the plaintiff must: (1) Assert that the plaintiff or another individual, as appropriate, is a victim of … intimidation committed by the defendant; and (2) Prove by preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff or another individual, as appropriate, is at a continued risk of harm from the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A06(a). The plaintiff must “assert that the plaintiff or another individual, as appropriate, is a victim of ... intimidation committed by the defendant,” and the court must find the assertion credible by a preponderance of the evidence. See E.A.M. v. A.M.D. III, 173 A.3d 313, 319 (Pa. Super. 2017). A preponderance of the evidence is “a more likely than not inquiry” as to whether there is a continued risk of harm from the defendant. Id. at 319- 20. ____________________________________________ A person commits the crime of stalking when the person either: (1) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts toward another person, including following the person without proper authority, under circumstances which demonstrate either an intent to place such other person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to such other person; or (2) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly communicates to another person under circumstances which demonstrate or communicate either an intent to place such other person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to such other person. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1(a)(1), (2). -9- J-A20041-26 In interpreting the Act, this Court stated that “an assertion is a ‘declaration or allegation’” and “contrary to [the] appellant’s claim, nothing in the statutory language required Mother, on behalf of the victim, to prove any element of criminal harassment [or stalking]. The Act only required Mother to assert or allege that the victim is a victim of [the] appellant’s intimidation.” A.M.D. on Behalf of A.D. v. T.A.B., 178 A.3d at 894 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 124 (8th ed. 2004)). We held that the Act’s statutory language does not require the plaintiff to prove that criminal harassment or criminal stalking was committed by the defendant, only that it is more likely than not that the defendant presents a continued risk of harm. See id. Here, Appellant argues in her first issue that the trial court “improperly limited testimony and prevented full presentation of evidence,” and that such “actions deprived Appellant of a meaningful opportunity to present her case.” Appellant’s Brief at 6, 8. The record indicates otherwise. Appellant quotes the trial court as saying, “The day is getting late.” Id. at 7 (citing N.T., 7/2/25, at 8). For context, the trial court made the comment at the beginning of the hearing when Appellant advised the court that she had “a whole bunch of stuff for you, Your Honor,” and the court responded, “Okay. Well let’s go, the day is getting late.” N.T., 7/2/5, at 8. Appellant further claims she “was repeatedly interrupted during testimony,” “was not permitted to fully present evidence,” “witnesses were not allowed to testify,” and the “hearing was concluded before Appellant completed her case.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. Mother does not expand upon - 10 - J-A20041-26 these claims with any detail or citation to the record. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1263 (Pa. 2013) (Supreme Court stating that an appellant is not entitled to relief when she presents an argument that is “speculative, undeveloped, unexplained, unsupported, contrary to the facts of record—and meritless.”). As Gillis observes, there is nothing in the record to “suggest that [Appellant] desired to call any other witnesses other than her daughter and herself.” Gillis’s Brief at 13. Gillis also posits that “Appellant, who is pro se, did not understand the rules of evidence or procedure,” and her evidentiary claims relate to “objections to inadmissible attempts to present hearsay testimony.”4 Id. at 12-13. Upon review, we agree that there “is nothing in the record from Appellant to support her claim that she had not presented all of her evidence.” Id. at 13. In her second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court “failed to consider the totality of the evidence demonstrating a pattern of unwanted contact and emotional distress affecting” N.B. Appellant’s Brief at 6-7. Appellant maintains that the “record establishes [Gillis’s] repeated unwanted contact and emotional distress [to N.B].” Id. at 9. She asserts that N.B.’s “avoidance of events and ongoing distress demonstrate continuing harm ____________________________________________ 4 Appellant’s pro se status “confers no special benefit.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa. Super. 2003). A person who represents herself “must, to a reasonable extent, assume that h[er] lack of expertise and legal training will be h[er] undoing.” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018). - 11 - J-A20041-26 warranting protection.” Id. at 11. Again, we agree with Gillis, who states that Appellant failed to present “one (1) scintilla of evidence justifying an order for protection from intimidation.” Gillis’s Brief at 12. After hearing the testimony of the three witnesses, the trial court “did not find that [Appellant] proved by a preponderance of the evidence that there was any intimidation” or “that the minor was at any continued risk of harm.” TCO at 1 (citations omitted). The court reasoned: There was extensive testimony by which it was clear that there is a great deal of acrimony between [Appellant] and [Gillis] whereby [Appellant] doesn’t want any friendly contact by [Gillis] with [N.B.] (this would also be significant in the ongoing custody fight with her ex-husband). Clearly, the mere attendance of [Gillis] at the teen’s sporting and other events and saying “hi” does not meet the definition of “intimidation.” Id. The record fully supports the trial court’s reasoning. Accordingly, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the court in denying Appellant’s petition for a PFI order.5 Order affirmed. ____________________________________________ 5 Given our decision in this case and Welliver v. Bartlett, supra, we caution Appellant that commencing proceedings in bad faith may result in the trial court ordering her to pay “actual damages and reasonable attorney fees.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A17; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 6117. - 12 - J-A20041-26 Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/29/2026 - 13 -