Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. United States Department of the Interior

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SCOTTS VALLEY BAND OF POMO INDIANS, Plaintiff, Case No. 1:26-cv-02814 (TNM) v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM ORDER This case is about an Indian tribe’s quest to build a casino. A decade ago, the Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians asked the Department of the Interior to allow it to conduct gaming on a parcel in Vallejo, California. After several rounds of litigation, Interior recently issued a final determination that the Band’s Vallejo parcel is ineligible for gaming. Foiled in its casino plans, Scotts Valley now moves for a preliminary injunction that would vacate Interior’s latest opinion and restore the agency’s previous decision in the Band’s favor. The Band’s bid for preliminary relief fails on all four factors. Scotts Valley has not shown likelihood of success on any of its claims. It has not established that Interior’s decision on gaming eligibility defied the remand order from another judge in this district. Nor is the Band likely to prevail on its claims that Interior’s reconsideration process was arbitrary and capricious, that the agency disregarded its reliance interests, or that Interior violated its due-process rights. Scotts Valley also does not clear the high bar for irreparable harm, whether for its economic losses or sovereign harm. Finally, the equities and public interest weigh against preliminary relief.  I. The facts are familiar to followers of this case by now. See Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 633 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.D.C. 2022) (“Scotts Valley I”); Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Burgum, 2025 WL 1639901 (D.D.C. June 10, 2025) (“Scotts Valley II”); Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Burgum, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2025) (“Scotts Valley III”). The Court retells and updates them here. Scotts Valley is a federally recognized Indian tribe from the Clear Lake region in Northern California that became landless in the mid-20th century after Congress ended its reservation. Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 10. For ten years, the Band has sought to build a casino in Vallejo, roughly 80 miles from Clear Lake. Id.; see also Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 158. In 2016, Scotts Valley asked Interior to take a Vallejo parcel into trust on its behalf and to declare it eligible for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 10. The Band invoked IGRA’s “restored lands” provision, id., which allows gaming on “lands . . . taken into trust as part of . . . the restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition,” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii). Under Interior regulations, a tribe seeking gaming eligibility via that provision “must demonstrate a significant historical connection to the land.” 25 C.F.R. § 292.12(b). Interior denied Scotts Valley’s application, finding that the Band had not established “a significant historical connection” to the parcel. Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (cleaned up). The Band sued, and another judge in this district vacated and remanded Interior’s decision. Id. at 165. The court rejected all but one of Scotts Valley’s claims. See id. at 141–71. It held that Interior “did not act outside of its statutory authority under the Indian Gaming 2 Regulatory Act or the Indian Reorganization Act when it promulgated . . . a regulation requiring tribes to demonstrate a ‘significant historical connection’ for purposes of the restored lands exception.” Id. at 171. But the court “conclude[d] that the agency’s application of its regulation to the Band under the particular factual circumstances of this case was inconsistent with the canon of Indian construction and clear policy behind the IGRA and the restored lands exception.” Id. In particular, the court faulted Interior for disregarding “the government’s role in weakening the historical connection between the Band and its land” and “the fundamental remedial nature of the restored lands exception.” Id. at 165–68. Given those shortcomings, the court reasoned, Interior’s gaming eligibility decision could not “withstand arbitrary and capricious review.” Id. at 171. On remand, Interior reversed itself in Scotts Valley’s favor. In the Biden Administration’s final month, the agency issued an Indian Lands Opinion (“ILO”) “conclud[ing] that the Parcel qualifies as restored lands.” 2025 ILO, ECF No. 2-2, at 2. That finding flowed from Interior’s “ha[ving] given additional consideration to (1) the historical circumstances underlying the Band’s landless status; and (2) the policy underlying IGRA and the restored lands exception.” Id. At the same time, Interior’s 2025 ILO did not “consider[] any additional evidentiary materials from outside parties,” including “those opposed to the Band’s request.” Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 48, at 24:2–3 (“[T]he Department made th[e] 2025 decision based on the record that it had in 2019 . . . .”). Based on its revised determination, Interior took the Vallejo parcel into trust on Scotts Valley’s behalf and declared it eligible for gaming. Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 10. This state did not last long. Frustrated with Interior’s refusal to consider their post- remand submissions challenging the Band’s historical ties to the Vallejo parcel, four neighboring 3 tribes sued the agency after the Trump Administration took over. See id. at 10–12. Those lawsuits remain pending. See Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation et al. v. Dep’t of Interior et al., No. 25-cv-867 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 24, 2025); United Auburn Indian Cmty. v. Dep’t of Interior et al., No. 25-cv-873 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 24, 2025); Lytton Rancheria of Cal. v. Dep’t of Interior et al., No. 25-cv-1088 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 10, 2025). Days after those lawsuits hit the docket, Interior reversed course again. In a March 2025 letter to the Band, the agency announced that it was “temporarily rescinding the Gaming Eligibility Determination for reconsideration,” though the Vallejo parcel “remain[ed] in trust.” March 2025 Letter, ECF No. 10-8, at 1 (footnote omitted). Interior explained that it was “concerned that [it] [ha]d not consider[ed] additional evidence submitted after the 2022 Remand.” Id. “To aid in [its] reconsideration,” Interior “invite[d] the [Band] and other interested parties to submit evidence and/or legal analysis regarding whether the Vallejo Site qualifies as restored lands.” Id. The agency also instructed that “any documents submitted to the Department after the 2022 Remand should be resubmitted.” Id. Finally, Interior advised that “[d]uring the pendency of this reconsideration, neither the [Band] nor any other entity or person should rely on the Gaming Eligibility Determination.” Id. Shortly after receiving Interior’s letter, Scotts Valley sued once more, “assert[ing] that Interior’s rescission and reconsideration of its gaming eligibility violated § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act and infringed its Fifth Amendment right to due process.” Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 12 (footnote omitted). The Band moved for a preliminary injunction to vacate Interior’s rescission and “to immediately stop” the reconsideration. Scotts Valley II, 2025 WL 1639901, at *1. 4  This Court denied that motion. Id. at *9. As the Court held, the Band had not carried its “heavy burden to show that any harms it could experience during this litigation w[ould] be irreparable.” Id. at *1. Neither the economic nor sovereign injury met the mark. Id. On the economic side, the Court reasoned that “[e]ven if all $2 million in anticipated contract payments were due before the likely end of this litigation—and the tribe ha[d] made no such showing—the Band ha[d] not shown that this expenditure would ‘threaten[] the very existence of the movant’s business’ or similarly compromise tribal services and programs.” Id. at *4 (quoting Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). As to sovereign harm, the Court concluded that the Band had forfeited its argument. Id. at *1. And even if properly argued, “any sovereignty change” in the Band’s ability to conduct and regulate gaming “ha[d] not produced the type of actual, tangible harm that the D.C. Circuit requires.” Id. at *6 (cleaned up). Because of the Band’s failure to establish irreparable harm, the Court denied its bid for preliminary relief. Id. at *1. Then came summary judgment, where Scotts Valley secured a narrow win. The Court rejected the Band’s challenge to the ongoing reconsideration because that process was “non-final and thus not subject to APA review.” Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 10. The rescission, by contrast, “amounted to final agency action.” Id. at 16. The Court ruled against Scotts Valley’s three APA claims targeting the rescission: that it exceeded Interior’s reconsideration authority, that it resulted from undue political influence, and that it disregarded the Band’s reliance interests. Id. at 16–23. But the Court held in Scotts Valley’s favor on one claim: due process. Id. at 23. As the Court concluded, “the Band’s gaming eligibility was a protected property interest,” and “Interior provided too little process to rescind it.” Id. Because Interior’s rescission “infringed the Band’s 5 due-process right,” the Court vacated it. Id. at 28. As the Court emphasized, though, that “remedy d[id] not bar Interior from continuing its reconsideration, nor d[id] it stop the Department from revoking the Band’s gaming eligibility at the end of that process.” Id. “For that reason,” the Court cautioned Scotts Valley that it “would be ill-served by placing undue reliance on [the] decision.” Id. After this summary-judgment ruling, Interior adapted its reconsideration process. In December 2025, Interior shared with the Band all the “evidence and legal analysis” that other tribes and stakeholders had submitted to the agency by June of that year. 2026 ILO, ECF No. 2- 1, at 3 (cleaned up). After twice “discuss[ing] a time frame for reconsideration with the Band,” Interior “gave the Band until May 1, 2026, to review and respond to the June 2025 Submissions.” Id. (footnotes omitted). Interior officials also met with the Band in person in mid-April, where the Band delivered its response. Id. at 3–4. Upon receiving Scotts Valley’s response, Interior “accepted no further submissions.” Id. at 4. While Interior was reconsidering, the Band forged ahead with its gaming plans. After this Court vacated the rescission in Scotts Valley III, “the Band proceeded with development of the Vallejo Site in reliance on the 2025 [ILO] and the rights it conferred.” Davis Decl., ECF No. 10-2, ¶ 20. Scotts Valley “undertook substantial expenditures and financial commitments”—to the apparent tune of $10 million—“to develop gaming operations at the Vallejo Site, including the development of a temporary Class II gaming facility known as the ‘Preview Casino.’” Id. ¶¶ 23, 56. To set up the “Preview Casino,” the Band “convert[ed] two modular buildings.” Id. ¶ 26. The casino opened “on a limited basis” on July 24, 2026. Id. ¶ 37. During its operation, the Preview Casino offered 17 class II gaming devices (bingo and the like) maintained by nine Band members. See id. ¶ 33; Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 11:3–8. 6  A week later, Interior issued its reconsidered ILO. As the agency concluded, “the Vallejo Parcel does not qualify as restored lands within the meaning of applicable law, and the Band may not conduct gaming on the Parcel pursuant to IGRA’s restored lands exception.” 2026 ILO at 39. In its 39-page analysis, Interior examined the original 2019 ILO, the 2025 ILO, the other tribes’ and stakeholders’ June 2025 submissions, and the Band’s response. Id. at 12–31. The agency recounted the “additional historical context” of the Band’s displacement and dispossession throughout the 19th century. Id. at 14–16. Interior also considered “the fundamental remedial nature of the restored lands exception and the Indian canon of construction,” including by “adopt[ing] broad understandings of the terms ‘occupancy’ and ‘vicinity’ within Part 292’s definition of ‘significant historical connection.’” Id. at 18 (cleaned up). Ultimately, though, the newly submitted evidence led Interior to “revisit several factual questions that [had] inform[ed]” the 2025 ILO. See id. at 31–39. Viewed as a whole, the record now counseled that “the Band ha[d] not demonstrated the requisite significant historical connection.” Id. at 39. One week after Interior’s reconsidered ILO, Scotts Valley came back to this Court. Like its predecessor, the Band’s newest lawsuit brings three APA claims and one due-process claim. Compl., ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 125–83. On the heels of its Complaint, the Band also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which asks the Court to “(1) enjoin[] the Department from implementing and otherwise giving legal effect to the July 30, 2026, [ILO] during the pendency of the Band’s action for judicial review of the Decision; and (2) [to] reinstat[e] and preserv[e] the legal force 7 and effect of the January 2025 [ILO] during the pendency of this action.” Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10, at 1. That motion is fully briefed, 1 and the Court held a motion hearing. II. “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (cleaned up). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[T]he degree of proof required for irreparable harm is high,” and “a failure to surmount it provides grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.” Olu-Cole v. E.L. Haynes Pub. Charter Sch., 930 F.3d 519, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Meanwhile, the equities and public interest “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). III. Like every movant, Scotts Valley faces an uphill battle to win preliminary relief. The Band falters on every front. The likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and the merged equities and public interest all counsel against a preliminary injunction. The Court addresses each factor in turn. 1 The Court acknowledges the helpful amicus briefs in this case. See Governor Newsom Amicus Br., ECF No. 38; Lytton Rancheria Amicus Br., ECF No. 39; United Auburn Amicus Br., ECF No. 40; Patwin Tribes Amicus Br., ECF No. 41; Cal. Gaming Ass’n Amicus Br., ECF No. 42. 8  A. Scotts Valley advances four claims. First, the Band asserts that the 2026 ILO violated the remand order in Scotts Valley I. Compl. ¶¶ 125–42; Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 17–31. Second, it contends that Interior did not adequately justify its decision to reconsider the 2025 ILO. Compl. ¶¶ 150–68; Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 31–37. Third, the Band argues that the agency again ignored its reliance interests. Compl. ¶¶ 143–49; Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 39–45. And finally, Scotts Valley maintains once more that Interior infringed its due-process rights. Compl. ¶¶ 169–83; Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 37–39. The Band is unlikely to succeed on any of these theories. 1. Start with Scotts Valley I’s remand order. According to the Band, the 2026 ILO “unlawfully abandon[ed] the analytical framework adopted in the January 2025 [ILO] and required by Scotts Valley I.” Compl. ¶ 133. A proper application of that “analytical framework,” the Band contends, would have compelled a favorable finding on the Vallejo parcel’s gaming eligibility. See id. ¶¶ 134–39; Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 20–22. The Band claims the 2026 ILO’s departure from Scotts Valley I makes it arbitrary and capricious. Compl. ¶ 141. Recall that in Scotts Valley I, Judge Jackson held that the 2019 ILO “was inconsistent with the canon of Indian construction and clear policy behind the IGRA and the restored lands exception.” 633 F. Supp. 3d at 171. In the court’s view, “Interior’s parsimonious interpretation” of the “significant historical connection” requirement defied the Indian canon’s instruction to “constru[e] the law liberally and interpret[] any ambiguous provision to the tribe’s benefit.” See id. at 168. In particular, the court took issue with Interior’s failure to consider “the government’s role in weakening the historical connection between the Band and its land” and “the fundamental remedial nature of the restored lands exception.” Id. at 165–68. Considering those failures, the 9 court vacated the 2019 ILO as arbitrary and capricious and remanded it to Interior “for further proceedings consistent with th[e] opinion.” Id. at 171. The Band is unlikely to succeed on its fact-intensive claim that the 2026 ILO infringed Scotts Valley I. a. “Under settled principles of administrative law, when a court reviewing agency action determines that an agency made an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the case must be remanded to the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1995). While the remanding court may set forth the governing law, it “may not . . . ‘dictate to the agency the methods, procedures, and time dimension of the needed inquiry and order the results to be reported to the court without opportunity for further consideration on the basis of the new evidence by the agency.’” See Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Dep’t of Lab., 836 F. Supp. 3d 137, 154 (D.D.C. 2026) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 544–45 (1978)). Against that backdrop, consider first where the parties agree: the Indian canon’s proper role on remand. Both the 2025 and 2026 ILOs emphasized that “although the Indian canon requires that ambiguous laws be interpreted in favor of the Indians, the canon ‘has no applicability to the weighing of evidence, for example, regarding occupancy or use of a given plot of land.’” 2026 ILO at 31 (quoting 2025 ILO at 10). At the motion hearing, both Interior and Scotts Valley concurred that the Indian canon does not apply to an agency’s factfinding— i.e., that Scotts Valley I did not compel Interior to weigh ambiguous facts in the Band’s favor. See Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 17:15–24, 49:6–11. 10  Rightly so. Like other substantive canons, the Indian canon is a “rule[] of construction that advance[s] values external to a statute.” See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 508 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). It instructs “that statutes dealing with the Indians must be construed in their favor.” Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 151 (2010). The canon emerged in the 19th century, with courts deploying it when interpreting treaties between Indians and the United States. Id.; see, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring) (“The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. . . . How the words of the treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction.”). In other words, the canon began “as essentially a rule of contract interpretation.” Barrett, supra, at 152. Then, in the early 20th century, the canon “jumped without discussion from the interpretation of treaties to the interpretation of statutes.” Id.; cf. Arizona v. Navajo Nation, 599 U.S. 555, 572 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“To this day, it remains unclear how the ‘trust relationship’ [between Indians and the federal government] could justify freestanding pro-Indian canons that authorize courts to depart from the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.”). Whatever the Indian canon’s pedigree in the context of treaties and statutes, its role ends there. In Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Bernhardt, 466 F. Supp. 3d 199 (D.D.C. 2020), the court rebuffed an effort to extend it to agency factfinding. There, “[t]he Mashpee Tribe invoke[d] the Indian canon of construction in order to suggest that the [agency’s] application of ” a two-part factual test “should be favorable to the Tribe.” Id. at 216. But that “argument misunderst[ood] the canon.” Id. “The Indian canon of construction says that ambiguous statutes should be construed liberally in favor of Indians.” Id. After statutory ambiguity is “resolved, 11 however, the canon’s role is complete.” Id. at 217; see also Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Indian Rsrv. v. United States, 185 F.4th 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (stating that the Indian canon “ha[s] no application where the relevant law is unambiguous”). Extending the canon to agency factfinding would “place courts, not democratically accountable executive officials, in the policymaking role the Framers (and the drafters of the APA) reserved for the political branches.” Cal. Gaming Ass’n Amicus Br., ECF No. 42, at 8. And that expansion would be particularly inappropriate here, where applying the canon in Scotts Valley’s favor would harm the interests of several neighboring tribes. Accord Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Oregon v. Jewell, 75 F. Supp. 3d 387, 396 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]he Indian canon of construction does not apply for the benefit of one tribe if its application would adversely affect the interests of another tribe.”), aff’d, 830 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Rather than falling under the Indian canon’s purview, agency factfinding is “subject to arbitrary and capricious review under the APA.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, 466 F. Supp. 3d at 217 (cleaned up). “[W]hen an agency exercises discretion granted by a statute, judicial review is typically conducted under the [APA]’s deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard.” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 179–80 (2025). “Under that standard, a court asks not whether it agrees with the agency decision, but rather only whether the agency action was reasonable and reasonably explained.” Id. at 180. An agency decision is “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 12 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Id.; see also Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 392 (2024) (emphasizing that APA “Section 706 does mandate that judicial review of agency policymaking and factfinding be deferential”). b. The Band is unlikely to establish that the 2026 ILO fell short of the APA’s or Scotts Valley I’s demands. Interior’s 39-page analysis reviewed the entire record—including the 2019 ILO, the 2025 ILO (which was based on the same evidence as the 2019 one), the June 2025 submissions from third parties, and the Band’s response. 2026 ILO at 12–31. Consistent with its 2025 predecessor and in keeping with Scotts Valley I, the 2026 ILO laid out the “additional historical context” on the Band’s displacement at the hands of Mexican settlers and the U.S. government. See id. at 14–16; see also 2025 ILO at 15–18; Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 165–68. On that same note, the 2026 ILO also considered “the fundamental remedial nature of the restored lands exception and the Indian canon of construction,” including by adhering to the 2025 ILO’s “broad understandings of the terms ‘occupancy’ and ‘vicinity’ within Part 292’s definition of ‘significant historical connection.’” See 2026 ILO at 18 (cleaned up); see also 2025 ILO at 19–20. Through that lens, the 2026 ILO drew certain inferences in Scotts Valley’s favor. One of them concerned a Band ancestor: “an individual named Augustine, a ‘chief of the Hoolanapo Indians’ who lived and worked in the North Bay region during the mid-1800s.” 2026 ILO at 11 (footnote omitted). The 2026 ILO stood by the 2025 ILO’s finding that “Augustine and other Band ancestors worked on ranchos in the North Bay Region.” Id. at 32. As Interior explained, the history showed “that the livestock operations on the ranchos were labor-intensive, involving 13 hundreds of Indian laborers, and that the Vallejos and other settlers raided Pomo communities, including at Clear Lake, to work on the ranchos.” Id. (footnote omitted). The 2026 ILO also “confirm[ed] that Augustine’s residency in Napa in the 1870s constituted occupancy, as defined in the 2025 ILO,” and it “le[ft] in place the determination that that occupancy is attributable to the Band as a whole, for the reasons stated in the 2025 ILO.” Id. at 33 (footnote omitted); see also Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (faulting the 2019 ILO for “declin[ing] to attribute Augustine’s connections to the land to the Band as a whole”). Ultimately, though, the updated record made Interior conclude that “the Band ha[d] not demonstrated the requisite significant historical connection.” 2026 ILO at 39. The newly submitted evidence led the agency to “revisit several factual questions.” Id. at 31. Three merit closer examination. First, the 2025 ILO had noted “Augustine’s possible baptism at Mission San Francisco Solano in the late 1830s,” which it deemed “consistent with a broader, documented practice of the removal of Indian children from their villages and their placement in the missions.” 2025 ILO at 17. The 2025 ILO “credit[ed] th[is] experience[] of Augustine to the Band as a whole for the purposes of demonstrating a significant historical connection to the Parcel.” Id. at 17–18. The 2026 ILO, meanwhile, found this assumption untenable in light of new evidence. 2026 ILO at 31. As Interior now observed, “the names of the parents of the Agustin listed in the relevant baptismal register, as well as the name of his village, are different from those associated with the Band’s ancestor Augustine.” Id. (footnote omitted). In the agency’s view, two other tribes “persuasively argue[d] that ‘the names of the 1837 Baptismal Cohort, the names of the parents of the 1837 Baptismal Cohort, and the village of origin of the 1837 Baptismal Cohort are all distinctively Southern Pomo,’ not Eastern Pomo like the Band’s ancestors.” Id. at 32 (cleaned 14 up). Based on those and other submissions, Interior reversed its previous assumption that Augustine (and, by extension, the Band) had possibly been baptized near the Vallejo parcel. Id. Second, Interior reassessed its finding on the Band’s presence at Rancho Suscol, the large Mexican ranch that embraced what now is the Vallejo parcel. See id. at 12. On that evidentiary issue, the 2025 ILO had reasoned that “[a]lthough no documentation link[ed] the Band’s ancestors specifically to Rancho Suscol . . . , it [wa]s reasonable to assume that the Band’s ancestors worked there after Vallejo acquired it in 1843 and used or occupied the Parcel in the process.” 2025 ILO at 23 (footnote omitted). By contrast, the 2026 ILO highlighted the third- party submissions contesting Scotts Valley’s ties to Rancho Suscol. 2026 ILO at 24–25. The Yocha Dehe Tribe, for example, “explain[ed] that by 1870 the Project Site [on Rancho Suscol] was a small family farm owned and worked by non-Indian labor and that, before that, Rancho Suscol had been set aside as a Rancho Nacional, . . . for military use, and therefore distinct from the other ranchos controlled by the Vallejos.” Id. at 25 (cleaned up). “Contrary to leading to a natural inference of use or occupancy,” the 2026 ILO reasoned, “the evidence (or the lack of it) suggests that Rancho Suscol was indeed different from other ranchos in the region, as the opposing parties contend[ed].” Id. at 37 (footnote omitted). Finally, Interior reconsidered “whether the Parcel is located in territory ceded by the Band’s predecessors.” Id. at 31. In 1851, “the Band’s predecessors-in-interest were tribal signatories to an unratified treaty with the United States,” in which they agreed to cede certain California lands. Id. at 9. “In exchange, the United States designated a tract of land to be set apart as a reservation on the western shore of Clear Lake . . . .” Id. Some decades later, “cartographer Charles Royce compiled maps purporting to depict Indian land cessions in the United States, including the land that would have been ceded under the 1851 Treaty, as well as 15 tracts set apart for reservations, including the reservation at Clear Lake.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Court reproduces an excerpt from the map below. Id. at 10. “The area numbered ‘296’ . . . purports to show the ceded territory, while the area numbered ‘295’ . . . shows the Clear Lake reservation.” Id. at 9. The Vallejo parcel “is located in the southwestern portion of Area 296, south of Napa.” Id. at 10. According to the 2025 ILO, “Royce’s inclusion of Vallejo in Area 296 . . . reinforce[d] the reasonableness of granting a favorable inference to the Band,” “notwithstanding the fact that the 1851 Treaty did not specifically describe the land that its tribal signatories used, occupied, or purposed to cede.” 2025 ILO at 23 (cleaned up). The 2026 ILO rethought that conclusion. In the June 2025 submissions, several third parties “challenge[d] the reasonableness of the inference linking the Band with the Parcel based on the Parcel’s location within Area 296.” 2026 ILO at 25. One of the other tribes’ historians, 16 for example, “explain[ed] that the 1851 Treaty ‘failed to describe the ceded lands,’ only the reservation to be set aside at Clear Lake.” Id. (footnote omitted). In his assessment, “Royce’s description of the ceded lands in his map amounted to a ‘guess.’” Id. (footnote omitted). He also “point[ed] out that none of the tribes residing along the north side of San Francisco and San Pablo bays entered into [the 1851] treaty negotiations with the United States.” Id. Faced with these new submissions, the 2026 ILO withdrew its inference in favor of the Band’s occupancy. Id. at 33. As Interior now reasoned, “[e]ven if . . . Area 296 depicts what the federal agents who negotiated the 1851 Treaty understood to be the boundaries of the ceded territory, no one seems to argue that the Band, its predecessors, or the other tribal signatories had the authority to cede the land around Vallejo at the time of the treaty.” Id. And “nothing in the extensive record before the Department suggest[ed] that they had that authority.” Id. Because of the Royce map’s historical deficiencies, the 2026 ILO concluded that “[f]avorable treatment of Royce’s map in this analysis would not only be ahistorical but also unfair to any successors-in- interest of the original inhabitants of those territories, who did not participate in the negotiation of the 1851 Treaty.” Id. (footnote omitted). These were some of the key evidentiary issues on which Interior revised its findings in light of new evidence. Zooming out, the 2026 ILO also noted “the shortcomings in the Band’s evidence, more generally.” Id. at 37. Especially “striking,” according to Interior, “[wa]s the discrepancy between the evidence of a Band presence elsewhere during the time period in question, in places where the Band might attain a different result, and the lack of evidence indicating a Band presence on Rancho Suscol, much less the Parcel.” Id. (cleaned up). Ultimately, even considering Scotts Valley’s historical displacement and IGRA’s remedial 17 purpose, “the Band ha[d] not demonstrated the requisite significant historical connection.” See id. at 39. * * * As the above recounting shows, “[t]he Vallejo parcel’s gaming eligibility is an avowedly complex question.” Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 18. It raises issues of the accuracy of historical documents and assumptions based on tantalizing clues. Some of these issues could arguably go either way. But whether the Band demonstrated a “significant historical connection” to the parcel involves fact-intensive judgments that fall within Interior’s realm of expertise. In this setting, “[t]he Court recognizes that it is not its role to scour through the ILO and substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 168. Instead, this is where the APA’s “deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard” applies, and it requires only that the agency decision be “reasonable and reasonably explained.” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal., 605 U.S. at 179–80. Against this backdrop, the Court holds that Scotts Valley is unlikely to succeed on its claim that the 2026 ILO defied Scotts Valley I or was otherwise arbitrary and capricious. The Band has not made “a clear showing” that Interior’s reconsidered analysis was inconsistent with Scotts Valley I’s demands or the 2025 ILO’s overall method. See Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972 (cleaned up). Rather, at this preliminary stage, the record suggests that the 2026 ILO reversed Interior’s previous finding based on an updated set of facts. That is no APA violation. 2. Scotts Valley also asserts that Interior “had no lawful basis to reopen the 2025 [ILO].” Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 32–34. The Band faults Interior for “fail[ing] to articulate a coherent and 18 reasoned explanation” for revisiting the 2025 ILO. Compl. ¶ 165. This Court rejected the bulk of that claim in Scotts Valley III, and it remains unlikely to succeed now. In this case’s previous iteration, Scotts Valley contended that Interior’s decision to rescind the parcel’s gaming eligibility “exceeded [its] authority to revisit its prior decision.” Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 16–17 (cleaned up). The Court disagreed, emphasizing the D.C. Circuit’s longstanding “rul[ing] that ‘administrative agencies . . . possess at least some inherent authority to revisit their prior decisions.’” Id. at 17 (quoting Ivy Sports Med., LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.)). In the Court’s eyes, the rescission fell within Interior’s inherent authority to reconsider. Id. at 19. For one part, the Court saw “no statutory limit on Interior’s reconsideration authority.” Id. at 17–18. For another, the agency’s decision to revisit the 2025 ILO less than eleven weeks after its issuance met the doctrinal guideposts for timeliness. Id. at 18–19. That conclusion holds true today, and it foils Scotts Valley’s renewed challenge to the “lawful basis [of] reopen[ing] the 2025 [ILO].” See Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 32–34. Nor is the Band likely to succeed on its theory that Interior “failed to articulate a coherent and reasoned explanation” for exercising its inherent authority to reconsider the 2025 ILO. Compl. ¶ 165. In the March 2025 letter that launched the reconsideration process, Interior stated that it “[wa]s concerned that the Department did not consider additional evidence submitted after the 2022 Remand.” March 2025 Letter at 1. In announcing its intent to continue reconsideration post-Scotts Valley III, the agency reaffirmed its “concern[] that not taking those submissions into consideration in this particular case could be deemed legal error.” December 2025 Letter, ECF No. 10-9, at 1. Interior also explained that its misgivings revolved around “whether the Vallejo Site qualifies as restored lands under 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(l)(B)(iii) and 25 C.F.R. Part 292.” 19 March 2025 Letter at 1. On that issue, the agency “invite[d] the [Band] and other interested parties to submit evidence and/or legal analysis.” Id. “To ensure that [it] ha[d] all the relevant materials,” Interior also advised that “any documents submitted to the Department after the 2022 Remand should be resubmitted.” Id. Interior’s unease about legal error stemmed from arguably unkept promises to other tribes following the Scotts Valley I remand. Consider the Yocha Dehe Tribe for instance. Yocha Dehe moved to intervene in Scotts Valley’s lawsuit challenging the 2019 ILO. See Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Dep’t of the Interior, 337 F.R.D. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2020). The tribe “argue[d] that the land at issue was the exclusive territory of its ancestors, the Patwin people, and that if Scotts Valley [wa]s permitted to develop the parcel, including by establishing a casino there, Yocha Dehe’s existing nearby gaming facility w[ould] suffer severe injury, thereby harming the important tribal programs and cultural resources that depend upon casino revenue.” Id. (cleaned up). Judge Jackson denied Yocha Dehe’s motion to intervene. Id. at 27. As the court reasoned, “Yocha Dehe submitted a considerable volume of material about its historical connection to the land when the question about Scotts Valley’s association with the parcel was pending before the agency the first time, and it c[ould] do so again.” Id. at 26. In defending that ruling on appeal, Interior argued that “Yocha Dehe w[ould] have additional opportunities to submit relevant information or views” after any potential remand to the agency. Federal Appelle