Full Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. CROIX MARY MOORHEAD ) ) CASE NO. SX-2026-MC-00071 Petitioner, ) ) MANDAMUS, DECLARATORY v ) JUDGMENT, AND EXPEDITED ) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF VIRGIN ISLANDS BOARD OF ) ELECTIONS; ELECTION SYSTEM OF )} THE VIRGIN ISLANDS and CAROLINE ) F. FAWKES, in her official capacity as ) Supervisor of Elections, ) ) Respondents ) ) 2026 VI Super 39 Mary Moorhead Petitioner Pro se Julie Beberman, Esq Assistant Attorney General Virgin Islands Department of Justice Counsel for the Respondents Velazquez, J. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER q1 THIS MATTER came before the Court for hearing on the Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Declaratory and Injunctive relief. The Court denied Temporary Restraining Order and advanced the action on the merits, which were heard on August 28, 2026. Petitioner Mary Moorhead (“Moorhead”; “Petitioner”) appeared pro se; Respondents Board of Elections (“Board”) and Supervisor Caroline Fawkes (“Fawkes”; collectively, “Respondents”) were represented by Assistant Attorney General Julie Beberman. For the reasons which follow, and as fully set forth on the record, the Petition will be DENIED in all respects I FACTS Moorhead y. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page 2 qj2 The Virgin Islands Board of Elections has traditionally incorporated the race for the office of Delegate to Congress on the same physical ballot with other races and has done so for at least the past 24 years. See Test. Of Raymond Williams (Board Chairman and member of the Board for 24 years). The Board has continued to do so in its current electronic voting system, at least since the inception of the new system in 2014. See Test. of Caroline Fawkes, Supervisor of Elections Earlier this year, some Board members raised concerns about the “separate ballot” language in 48 U.S.C. § 1712; Fawkes subsequently acknowledged the issue in testimony before the Legislature in January 2026, indicating her intent “to follow the law.” See Test. of Fawkes; Test. of Moorhead; Petr’s Exh. | (video of testimony). Subsequently, the Board further considered the issue and voted in June 2026 to continue its practice of presenting the Delegate’s race as a separate contest on the same physical ballot, consistent with 18 V.I.C. § 21(b), which requires that the races be reflected on the ballot as “separate contests”. See Test. of Fawkes; Test. of Moorhead; Test. of Williams The Board announced its decision in that regard on June 4, 2026. Moorhead filed this Petition on August 18, 2026, seeking to enjoin the Board from incorporating the Delegate’s race on the same physical ballot as other races q3 The Court denied temporary injunctive relief and advanced the matter on the merits, with the consent of the parties. Following the hearing, the Court orally on the record, and by order entered September 1, 2026, denied the Petitioner’s requested relief and indicated that this Memorandum Opinion would follow. Ii LEGAL STANDARD q4 To obtain injunctive relief, a movant bears the burden to establish: 1) that she has a probability of success on the merits; 2) that the movant will be irreparably harmed if relief is denied; 3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party, and 4) that granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. See Yusuf v. Hamed, 58 V.I. 841, 842. (VI. 2013) (citing Petrus vy. Queen Charlotte Hotel Corp., 56 V.1. 548, 554 (V.I 2012). The moving party bears the burden to make a showing on all four of the above factors, which are evaluated by the Court under a “sliding scale standard” in which no single factor is dispositive; rather, the Court must balance all factors to determine if relief is warranted. Hansen v. St. Croix Board of Elections, 2016 V.1. LEXIS 141, *8 (Super Ct. 2016) (citing 3RC & Co. v. Boynes Trucking Sys., 63 V.1. 544, 553 (V.I. 2015); see also Gourmet Gallery Crown, Inc., v. Crown Moorhead v. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page 3 Bay Marina, L.P. 68 V.1. 584, 586-87 (V.I. 2018) (internal citation omitted). However, where, as here, the matter advances to a trial on the merits, the Petitioner must demonstrate “actual success on the merits,” rather than a mere probability of success, failing which the request for permanent injunction must be denied; the Court need not reach or balance the remaining factors unless the movant has demonstrated success on the merits. Moses v. Fawkes, 66 V.I. 454, 461-462 (V.I. 2017) q5 A Writ of Mandamus is a drastic remedy that may be granted only where there is a clear right to relief and no other adequate remedy. See O'Reilly v. Board of Elections, 61 V.1. 118, 126 (Super. Ct. 2014) (citing Richardson v. VI. Housing Auth., 18 V.1. 351, 356 (D. V.I. 1981). Finally. the Court may, in its discretion, determine the respective rights of parties who have a justiciable dispute or controversy. See V.I. CODE ANN., tit. 5 § 1261; Newman v. McKay, 58 V.I. 170, 180 (Super. Ct. 2013) III. DISCUSSION qo Petitioner brought this matter, alleging the Respondents are violating federal law, specifically 48 U.S.C. § 1712, in failing to reflect the race for the Virgin Islands Delegate to the United States House of Representatives on a different physical ballot (paper and electronic) than the other contests for the upcoming General Election on November 3, 2026. Petitioner argues the language of 48 U.S.C. § 1712 directing that the Virgin Islands Delegate “shall be elected at large by separate ballot” requires the Board to print the contest for Delegate to the House of Representatives on a physically separate piece of paper. Petitioner alleges she is entitled to relief, as she has an interest in the law being followed and that choosing not to follow the interpretation of the statute, as she sees it, may engender public distrust in the elections. She accordingly asks this Court to: issue a Writ of Mandamus directing Respondents to print the election for Delegate on a separate piece of paper for the November 3, 2026 General Election; enjoin Respondents from approving, programming, distributing, or utilizing ballot configurations inconsistent with the above requirement; order Respondents to configure the electronic voting system such that it creates a separate balloting system for the Delegate’s race; order Respondents to certify their compliance with the Court before ballots are distributed, and; grant any other appropriate and just relief. q7 Respondents oppose the Petition to order a dual balloting system, challenging Petitioner’s interpretation of the federal statute as requiring a separate physical ballot. Respondents further argue they are not in violation of law, where 18 V.I.C. § 21(b), enacted by the V.I. Legislature Moorhead v. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page 4 pursuant to Congress’ grant of authority to the territories to implement procedures to administer the election, requires the Delegate to the House of Representatives to be elected by “separate contest” and in light of the definition of “ballot” as set forth in local law. See 18 V.LC. §§ 21(b) 1; 48 U.S.C. § 1714. The provisions of Title 18 of the Virgin Islands Code, Respondents argue, are not inconsistent with 48 U.S.C. § 1712 and are, therefore, valid q8 The issue this Court must now decide is whether Congress’ apparent direction in 48 U.S.C § 1712 that the Virgin Islands elect its delegate to Congress “by separate ballot” compels this Court to grant Petitioner’s request for affirmative injunction to direct the Board of Elections to implement a dual ballot system for the 2026 General Election in November. Based on applicable law and the testimony and evidence adduced at the hearing, the Court determines that Petitioner is not entitled to relief. A. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF q9 Petitioner has not met her burden to establish that she is entitled to relief under the injunction factors, as set forth below 1. The Movant Does Not Succeed on the Merits 410 The threshold issue is whether the Respondents’ inclusion of the Delegate race on a single physical ballot, set apart distinctly from other election contests as required under local law, thereby violates 48 U.S.C. § 1712 and local law as enacted to implement the federal law. 411 When interpreting a statute, the Court’s first responsibility “is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning” and, if so, the Court’s inquiry is at an end. One St. Peter, LLC., v. Bd. of Land Use Appeals, 67 V.1. 920, 924 (V.I. 2017). A statute is ambiguous if it is, “susceptible to more than one interpretation.” /d. Ifa statute is ambiguous, the Court must attempt to discern and apply the Legislature’s intent, as reflected in the statutory scheme as a whole; the Court may also look to Legislative history. See id.; Sonson v. People of the VIL, 59 VI. 590, 598 (VI. 2012); see also In re Infant Sherman, 49 V.I. 452, 463 (V.I. 2008) Further, in interpreting a statute, the Court must be mindful of its responsibility to interpret a statute “sensibly” and in a manner that would avoid “injustice or absurd consequences.” One St. Peter, LLC., 67 V.1. at 926 (quoting Gilbert v. People, 52 V.I. 350, 356 (V.I. 2009); see also Sonson, 59 V.I. at 598. Where terms in a statute are not defined therein, the Court must interpret those terms in accordance with their common meaning and usage. | V.I.C. § 42 Moorhead vy. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page 5 qi2 In 1972, Congress enacted Public Law 92-271, now codified in 48 U.S.C. § 1712, et. seq with the stated purpose of ensuring “that the unincorporated territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands shall each be represented in Congress by a delegate to the House of Representatives.” See 92 P.L. 271, 86 Stat. 118 (April 10, 1972). That statute provided that the territories shall elect a Delegate “by separate ballot and by a majority of the votes cast for the office of Delegate.” Jd. However, the statute was subsequently amended in 1998 to remove the “separate ballot” requirement for Guam, while retaining that language for the Virgin Islands. The statute, as amended, now provides, in pertinent part The Delegate from the Virgin Islands shall be elected at large, by separate ballot and by a majority of the votes cast for the office of Delegate 48 U.S.C. § 1712(a).! Congress further left to the Territories the authority to otherwise determine the election procedures for administering the election for the office of Delegate, except as otherwise provided in the statute. 48 U.S.C § 17142 413 Significantly, Congress did not define what it meant by “separate ballot” as used in Section 1712. However, pursuant to the authority provided by Congress in 48 U.S.C § 1714 to fill any procedural gaps left in the federal law, the Virgin Islands Legislature enacted further provisions to define the applicable election procedures. In that regard, the Legislature in 18 V.I.C. § 1 adopted a definition of the term, “ballot”, and related terms, that is largely consistent with the common usage of that word ? as an “instrument” or mechanism by which voting choices are recorded, as follows ' While stating the purpose of the statute was to provide territories the right to vote for Delegate, it is also worth noting that the statute did not identify a particular harm impacting the fairness or integrity of the vote, to be remedied by the law. See 48 U.S.C. § 1712; 92 P.L. 271,86 Stat.118 (April 10, 1972). Congress also did not identify or express concern about election integrity in considering an amendment requested by Guam to remove the “separate ballot” language but, rather, considered arguments based solely on changed times, technological advances, lack of necessity and costs. See 105 CONG. REC. 1653 (1995) ? Section 1714 ostensibly extended to the Territories the authority to regulate procedures for the election of Delegate, as provided to the states under the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause. See 48 U.S.C. § 1714; compare, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, cl. | (reserving to states the power to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner" of federal elections); cf United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 835 (1995) (noting it is in the states’ purview to pass regulations regarding the procedures for congressional elections to Congress, especially with the intent to mitigate voter confusion or chaos) * Generally, where a term is undefined in a statute, the Court must interpret the term as used in common parlance. In that regard, “‘ballot” commonly refers to a system or instrument used for recording a vote. See Ballot, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (8th ed. 2004) (“ 1. An instrument, usu. A paper or ball, used for casting Moorhead v. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page 6 “TBjallot” or “official ballot” means the instrument upon which the voter's choices are recorded. A ballot or official ballot may contain ballot information “(BJallot information” means the material containing the names of offices and candidates and the questions to be voted on “{I]nstrument” means paper ballots, absentee ballots, provisional ballots, voting machine apparatus or system or any other device of any kind used to record a voter's choice 18 V.ILC. § 1. Moreover, section 21 of the statute, as amended in 2023, now expressly provides that the Delegate race must be reflected on the ballot in a “separate contest”, as follows In order to carry out the provisions of P.L. 92-271, 92nd Congress (approved Apr 10, 1972), providing for a nonvoting Virgin Islands Delegate to the United States House of Representatives, the following subsection shall govern the administration of such Federal Act (a) Candidates for the office of Delegate to the House of Representatives shall be nominated pursuant to the pertinent provisions of this title (b) After review and approval the Supervisor of Elections shall cause to be entered on the Official Ballot a separate contest containing the names of candidates for the office of Delegate to the House of Representatives which shall be contained in the electronic voting machines. Such names shall appear in an order thereon as determined by lot. The ballot shall conform to the requirements regarding its form and content as prescribed by this title 18 V.L.C. § 21 (emphasis added) 414 Nothing in the plain language of these statutes compels a finding that candidates for the office of Delegate are to be indicated on a different physical paper or electronic record from other races. Rather, as reflected in its plain language, and as consistent with the federal law, the race for Delegate is required only to be set apart and distinguished on the ballot from other races. The separate contest requirement further addresses the concern, clearly evident in 48 U.S.C § 1712, that votes for Delegate be distinguishable and separately accounted for from votes for other races, a vote. 2. The system of choosing officers by a recorded vote, usu. by marking a paper”). The term “separate”, as commonly used, means “to set or keep apart”; “disconnect . .. sever. . . sort” or “to make a distinction between.” See Separate, © WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, __ https://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/separate (last viewed September 2, 2026) Moorhead v. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al. Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page 7 to permit a determination of the winner by a majority of votes cast for that race. See 48 U.S.C § 1712 q15 The testimony at the hearing indicates that the Delegate’s race is, indeed, reflected separately represented and distinguishable from other races on the official ballot as contemplated by law, in several respects. The candidates for Delegate are numbered separately within that race and are not numbered sequentially with other races on the official ballot. See Test. of Fawkes; Resp. Exh. 2. Additionally, the Delegate race (and all other races, for that matter) is separated from other races and distinguished by a unique color-coded banner and a separate textual heading identifying that race. Resp. Exhs. 2, 15; see also Test. of Fawkes; Test. of Guy Riner, Vice President of Account Management, Election Systems and Software (“Riner’). Additionally, and significantly, Fawkes testified that votes for the Delegate race are separately accounted for, to permit the determination of the majority of votes cast in that contest. These distinctions adequately separate the vote for Delegate from other contests, satisfying statutory requirements. 48 U.S.C § 1712; ef Chicago Bar Ass'n v. White, 898 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (ill. App. 2008) (holding there was no authority to find that the term “separate ballot” under a different statutory scheme meant a physically separate piece of paper; finding a contest on the same piece of paper with distinct borders and shading to be sufficient because it achieved the fundamental purpose of the legislation, to draw special attention to the ballot question). In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has failed to establish a violation of legal requirements for the election of the Delegate 416 Accordingly, Petitioner cannot succeed on the merits and, therefore, is not entitled to relief.4 The Court will, nonetheless, consider the remaining factors 2. The Movant has Not Shown Irreparable Harm 417 While the Court has finally determined the merits as set forth above and, therefore, need not balance the remaining injunction prongs, the Court will nonetheless briefly address those factors. To obtain injunctive relief, Petitioner must ordinarily show she will be irreparably harmed which is, “certain and imminent harm for which monetary award does not adequately compensate.” Yusuf, 59 V.1. at 854 “ For the same reasons, Petitioner’s request for declaratory relief will also be denied Moorhead y. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page 8 G18 Petitioner offered no evidence she would be irreparably harmed by the Board’s continued use of a single ballot for the election. The sole basis for Petitioner’s requested relief is her stated interest in ensuring adherence to 48 U.S.C. § 1712. However, despite repeated questioning by the Court, Petitioner was unable to articulate the potential irreparable harm to her or, for that matter, to any harm to the public’s right to cast a vote for Delegate or to the integrity of the election if the status quo were preserved. Indeed, Petitioner was unable to articulate any distinction or impact to the vote, based on whether two ballots or a single ballot with separate and distinct races is used 3. The Nonmovant Will Suffer Greater Harm if Relief is Granted 419 |The Court further determines that the non-moving party will suffer greater harm if the preliminary and permanent injunction were issued, which further weighs against granting the requested relief. 420 Respondents established at the hearing that requiring implementation of a dual ballot system would require significant changes to physical and electronic programming changes that would be both time-consuming and costly. In that regard, Respondents adduced testimony and evidence that, if required to present dual printed ballots for the Delegate race and other races, it would be required to purchase a substantial number of additional ballots at a cost of more than $32,000 based on historical data reflecting the number of printed ballots obtained in each election to account for registered voters and spoilage of three ballots per voter. See Resp’s Exhs. 4, 8 Additionally, substantive changes would be required to permit dual voting through electronic voting machines, as voters would have to scan two separate cards to register their votes for each ballot; voters would additionally be required to check-in twice when they appear to vote, in order to produce a card to be entered into the tabulating machines. See Test. of Riner. And, because voters would need to check in twice in order to generate two separate cards to be scanned following the vote, the Board would also be required to implement a dual check-in process for voters who appear to vote, thus requiring the purchase of 50 percent more Express pollbooks to facilitate that check-in process; additionally, and 20 percent more DS200 Scanner and Tabulator machines would have to be purchased to facilitate the double-scanning process and alleviate backlogs that could affect the voting experience. See Test. of Riner; Resp. Exh 5. Though Riner acknowledged the DS 200 machines are programmed to take multiple cards, the Board would have to purchase additional cards (twice as many), as each voter would have to be provided two separate cards (one for each Moorhead v. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page 9 ballot), to obtain separate unique bar codes for each race under a dual voting system. /d. While Riner testified the process is certainly not impossible to accomplish, he indicated that implementation would necessarily come with significant added equipment costs. Riner and Fawkes testified that added cost could be approximately $650,000. Moreover, the changes would also come with an added non-monetary cost: additional training for election officials and volunteers; voter uncertainty, confusion and a longer process for voting, as they participate in a more tedious dual voting process and two ballot instruments for one election. See Test. of Williams; Fawkes; Riner. Public education of voters would also be required to alleviate concerns for confusion and distrust that a dual voting process could engender. /d. Williams further raised concerns that implementing dual balloting could make it more difficult to track voting numbers/statistics and differentiate voters and could result in chaos and confusion that ultimately breeds distrust. Test. of Williams q21 ~=As earlier noted, Petitioner has articulated no measurable harm she will suffer from the continued single-ballot process, except her concern that doing so appears to be violative of the law To the contrary, Respondents have demonstrated they would suffer real and great harm — both monetary and non-monetary — if a dual balloting system is implemented, particularly on the eve of the General Election. Accordingly, this prong militates against granting the requested relief. 4. The Movant has Not Shown Relief is in the Public Interest q22 ~Finally, the Court must consider the public consequences of granting this “extraordinary remedy.” Yusuf, 59 V.{. at 857 423 Both Fawkes and Williams testified that the single ballot system, which separately designates each race on one official instrument, has been used for decades and, certainly, for at least the past 24 years that Williams has served on the Board. Petitioner acknowledges her awareness that the single ballot system has been in use since at least 2013 and cites to no evil associated with this practice or specific harm to be remedied by changing to a dual voting process Indeed, Petitioner was unable to articulate any distinction - whether in the public’s ability to vote for Delegate, the integrity of the election, the impact on that race or otherwise - based on whether a single or dual ballot system is used. In light of the failure to demonstrate any appreciable difference or evil to be remedied by employing a dual balloting system, Petitioner’s request for relief simply invites this Court to elevate form over substance, without regard to the harm to the Moorhead v. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page 10 nonmovant and the public. This Court simply cannot do so. See, e.g., One St. Peter, LLC., 67 V.I at 926 (quoting Gilbert v. People, 52 V.I. 350, 356 (V.I. 2009) (noting the Court must be mindful that, “a statute should not be construed and applied in such a way that would result in injustice or absurd consequences.”’) 424 Furthermore, it is worth noting that Petitioner acknowledged in testimony that she has been aware of the single balloting process used in the Territory, at least since 2013. She further testified she knew of the Respondent’s intent to continue to employ that process, which was announced on or about June 4, 2026. Yet, Petitioner waited until August 18, 2026 to file this action for extraordinary emergency relief. The general election is now less than two months away and, based on Fawkes’ testimony, overseas ballots must be issued by September 19, 2026. Such delay in filing a petition to seek to compel implementation of substantive changes in an election process that has been in place for decades, on the eve of an election, is further prejudicial to the public’s interest q25 Accordingly, for these reasons and all the reasons set forth in the preceding subsection, the Court finds that changing the balloting process at this juncture would not be in the public’s interest B. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO MANDAMUS RELIEF §26 As earlier set forth, mandamus relief may be granted only where, inter alia, there is no other adequate remedy. See O'Reilly v. Board of Elections, 61 V.1. 118, 126 (Super. Ct. 2014) (citing Richardson v. V1. Housing Auth., 18 V.I. 351, 356 (D. V.I. 1981)). As petitioner has available injunctive and declaratory relief remedies, which she has exercised in this matter, mandamus relief is inappropriate and must be denied. See, e.g., Bryan v. Fawkes, 62 V.I. 19, 33 (Super. Ct. 2014) CONCLUSION 427 Respondents’ identification and separation of the Delegate contest on the official ballot, distinct from other contests thereon, satisfies statutory requirements. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to injunctive, declaratory or mandamus relief. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the instant Petition for relief is DENIED; it is further ORDERED that the Clerk shall mark this matter as CLOSED; it is further Moorhead y. Virgin Islands Board of Elections, et. al. Case No: SX-2026-MC-00071 Page Il ORDERED that a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall be directed to Petitioner Mary Moorhead and Assistant Attorney General Julie Beberman, and to Respondents Board of Elections and Supervisor Caroline Fawkes SO ORDERED this 7" day of September, 2026 —_— HON HARVEY VELAZQUEZ Judge ATTEST TAMARA CHARLES Clerk of Court , BY: phen Court Clerk II 09/ 8 /2026