In Re: IIG Structured Trade Fin. Fund, Ltd.

25-2577 In re: IIG Structured Trade Fin. Fund, Ltd. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit August Term 2025 Submitted: August 11, 2026 Decided: September 21, 2026 No. 25-2577 I N RE : IIG S TRUCTURED T RADE F INANCE F UND , L TD . IIG S TRUCTURED T RADE F INANCE F UND , L TD ., IIG G LOBAL T RADE F INANCE F UND L TD ., G IROBANK , N.V., G IROBANK I NTERNATIONAL , N.V., Petitioners, v. M ARTIN S ILVER , Respondent. Petition directed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, No. 20 Cr. 360, Alvin K. Hellerstein, Judge. Before: B IANCO , M ENASHI , and K AHN , Circuit Judges. Petitioners are four entities that lost millions of dollars because of a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Martin Silver and his co- conspirator. After the scheme unraveled, the two were prosecut- ed. At Silver’s sentencing, the district court imposed 13 months’ imprisonment and, inter alia, ordered him to pay over $300 million in restitution to his victims—including Petitioners. In imposing restitution, the district court ordered Silver, both orally and in the written judgment, to make a $40,000 lump-sum payment before he reported to prison, and then payments of 10% of his monthly income upon his release. When Silver was released from prison, he had relatively little income and therefore his restitution payments were meager. However, despite his limited income, Silver had substantial assets in various retirement, life insurance, and other financial accounts. Those assets had appreciated from roughly $3.5 million at the time of sentencing to about $5.1 million about one year after he was released from prison. Thus, the government—joined by certain of Silver’s victims (including Petitioners)—filed a motion in the district court which sought an order (1) compelling the holders of these assets to turn over their full value to the Clerk of Court for distribution as restitution, and (2) modifying Silver’s payment schedule to make payment due immediately and increasing his monthly payment. The district court ordered Silver to liquidate the appreciated value of the assets and pay that amount as restitution, but otherwise denied the motion. Exercising their statutory right to file a petition for a writ of mandamus under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act to seek review of the district court’s decision, Petitioners argue that the district court erred by refusing to order the holders of Silver’s assets to turn over the full value of the assets for restitution. We disagree. 2 Based upon the plain text of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, because the judgment here did not make the full restitution amount due immediately and contained a payment schedule which established a fixed monthly payment, and because Silver remained in compliance with that payment schedule, the government was not entitled to a turnover order to collect the full value of the assets above and beyond the payment schedule. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion for such an order. Accordingly, we DENY the petition for a writ of mandamus. Stephen B. Selbst and Nicholas G.O. Veliky, Herrick, Feinstein LLP, New York, New York, for Petitioners IIG Structured Trade Finance Fund, Ltd. and IIG Global Trade Finance Fund Ltd. Constance M. Boland, Thompson Hine LLP, New York, New York, for Petitioners Girobank, N.V. and Girobank International, N.V. Paul A. Batista, Paul Batista, P.C., New York, New York, for Respondent Martin Silver. J OSEPH F. B IANCO , Circuit Judge: Petitioners are four entities that lost millions of dollars because of a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Martin Silver and his co- conspirator. After the scheme unraveled, the two were prosecut- ed. At Silver’s sentencing, the district court imposed 13 months’ imprisonment and, inter alia, ordered him to pay over $300 million in restitution to his victims—including Petitioners. In imposing restitution, the district court ordered Silver, both orally 3 and in the written judgment, to make a $40,000 lump-sum payment before he reported to prison, and then payments of 10% of his monthly income upon his release. When Silver was released from prison, he had relatively little income and therefore his restitution payments were meager. However, despite his limited income, Silver had substantial assets in various retirement, life insurance, and other financial accounts. Those assets had appreciated from roughly $3.5 million at the time of sentencing to about $5.1 million about one year after he was released from prison. Thus, the government—joined by certain of Silver’s victims (including Petitioners)—filed a motion in the district court which sought an order (1) compelling the holders of these assets to turn over their full value to the Clerk of Court for distribution as restitution, and (2) modifying Silver’s payment schedule to make payment due immediately and increasing his monthly payment. The district court ordered Silver to liquidate the appreciated value of the assets and pay that amount as restitution, but otherwise denied the motion. Exercising their statutory right to file a petition for a writ of mandamus under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act to seek review of the district court’s decision, Petitioners argue that the district court erred by refusing to order the holders of Silver’s assets to turn over the full value of the assets for restitution. We disagree. Based upon the plain text of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, because the judgment here did not make the full restitution amount due immediately and contained a payment schedule which established a fixed monthly payment, and because Silver remained in compliance with that payment schedule, the government was not entitled to a turnover order to collect the full value of the assets above and beyond the payment schedule. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion for such an order. Accordingly, we DENY the petition for a writ of 4 mandamus. BACKGROUND Petitioners IIG Structured Trade Finance Fund, Ltd., IIG Global Trade Finance Fund Ltd., Girobank, N.V., and Girobank, International, N.V. are victims of a fraud perpetrated by Respondent Martin Silver and his co-conspirator, David Hu. The IIG entities are investment funds that themselves have investors across the globe, including asset management companies, private individuals, public and private pension funds, and government- related entities such as sovereign funds. Girobank (and associated entities) is a bank based in Curaçao, whose primary accountholders are pensioners or retirees and the pension fund for Curaçaoan civil servants. From 2007 to 2019, Silver was the co-founder, managing partner, and chief operating officer of International Investment Group, LLC, a registered investment advisor. In those positions, Silver “conspired with others to defraud [International Investment Group]-managed funds by overvaluing loans, creating fake loans, transferring overvalued and fake loans between [International Investment Group] and advised funds, and using the proceeds from those fraudulent sales to generate what would be required to pay off earlier investors.” Plea Tr. at 16, United States v. Silver, No. 1:20-cr-00360 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2021), Dkt. No. 46. After this Ponzi-like scheme unraveled, investors and other victims—including Petitioners—lost millions of dollars. Silver was charged with, and pled guilty to, one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, and investment advisor fraud, and substantive counts of wire fraud and securities fraud. Prior to sentencing, Petitioners submitted victim impact statements. In those statements, the Girobank entities asserted 5 their right to $138,635,248 in restitution, and the IIG entities sought $171,934,741. In connection with the United States Probation Office’s preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report, Silver disclosed that he owned the following assets (the “Subject Assets”), among others: (1) a Vanguard IRA account worth approximately $3.1 million; (2) a life insurance policy from Brighthouse Universal worth approximately $257,000; (3) a life insurance policy from AON worth approximately $123,000; and (4) approximately $41,000 in stock held at Computershare. He also reported that he was the co-signer—but not title-holder—of a house in Long Branch, New Jersey and an apartment on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. On February 8, 2023, Silver was sentenced to 13 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. As relevant here, at sentencing, the district court entered an order of restitution ordering Silver to pay $364,402,116.08 (jointly and severally with his co-defendant, Hu) to the victims of his offenses. Also during the sentencing proceeding, the district court orally ordered Silver to make a $40,000 restitution payment by February 28, 2023, and to pay 10% of his income on the 30th day of each month, starting on the first day of supervised release. In the written judgment issued after sentencing, consistent with its oral pronouncement, the district court included the following language regarding restitution: The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $364,402,116.08. Restitution shall be joint and several with [co-defendant Hu]. Defendant shall pay $40,000 by 2/28/2023. The balance shall be paid at a rate of 10% of monthly net income payable on the 30th day of each month, to begin on the first day day [sic] of supervised release. 6 Petition at 82 1 (the amended judgment). No party or victim objected to the terms of Silver’s restitution at the time of sentencing. Following sentencing, the government served restraining notices on the companies holding the Subject Assets, which required them to preserve those assets, and barred Silver from accessing or withdrawing them. On September 24, 2024, the government alerted the district court that Silver had paid the $40,000 lump-sum payment it ordered, but he had made only nominal payments of $100 per month since starting his term of supervised release on November 9, 2023. Meanwhile, the Subject Assets had appreciated in value by more than $1.5 million in the approximately one-and-one-half years following Silver’s sentencing. Thus, the government sought a turnover order in rem directing the holders of the Subject Assets “to submit the full liquidated value of Silver’s accounts to the Clerk of Court” so that it could be distributed as restitution. Id. at 103. The government also requested “[a]s supplemental relief” that the district court modify Silver’s restitution payment schedule “to make the restitution due immediately and to order Silver to pay restitution at the rate of at least 15% of his gross monthly income.” 2 Id. at 120–21. Petitioners filed a memorandum of law stating that they “join[ed] in the motion of the 1 Citations to the Petition use the page numbers designated by this Court’s ACMS system. 2 As the government clarified, in seeking to make restitution “due immediately,” it did not seek “immediate payment in full[,] but rather payment to the extent that the defendant can make . . . in good faith, beginning immediately.” Id. at 123 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 [g]overnment” and requested the same relief. 3 Id. at 187. On December 18, 2024, the district court granted the government’s motion in part and denied it in part. The district court denied the government’s request for a turnover order of the full value of the Subject Assets, reasoning that “[a] restitution order is generally considered a final judgment and can be modified only in a few prescribed circumstances” not present here. Id. at 236. However, the district court concluded that the appreciation in value of the Subject Assets qualified as a “material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances” under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), which allowed it to order Silver to liquidate the appreciation and make immediate payment of that amount to his victims in restitution. Id. at 237–39. Petitioners filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus in response to that order. 4 The government did not join this 3 TriLinc Global Impact Fund–Trade Finance, Ltd. also joined that motion, but it is not a party to this mandamus proceeding. 4 Petitioners filed the petition on October 16, 2025, nearly ten months after the district court issued the challenged order. Silver has not argued that this delay renders the petition untimely. He has thus forfeited any argument that it is untimely. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. United States, 882 F.3d 348, 365–66 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting that this timeliness inquiry “does not affect our jurisdiction”); see also U.S. ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 371 (1919) (noting that a petition for a writ of mandamus “is generally regarded as not embraced within statutes of limitation applicable to ordinary actions, but as subject to the equitable doctrine of laches”); Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 380 (1893) (“Defenses existing in equity suits [like laches] may be waived, just as they may in law actions, and, when waived, the cases stand as though the objection never existed.”); In re U.S., 572 F.3d 301, 308 n.8 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Neither the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), nor Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 21, provides a specific time frame within which all petitions for [a] writ of mandamus must be filed.”). 8 petition, nor did it file its own petition or otherwise appeal from the district court’s order. Meanwhile, other proceedings relating to restitution—that are not challenged by this petition—continued before the district court. More specifically, one day after the district court issued the decision that is the subject of this petition, the government moved for an order requiring Silver to forfeit the remainder of the Subject Assets not covered by the district court’s order regarding the appreciated value. As the government explained, “[o]nce the [Subject Assets] have been forfeited, the [g]overnment intends to recommend to the Department of Justice’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section . . . that those funds be restored to restitution for the victims of the Defendant’s crimes.” Motion in Support of Proposed Preliminary Order of Forfeiture at 5, United States v. Silver, No. 1:20-cr-00360 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2024), Dkt. No. 177. Months later, Silver and the government came to a settlement regarding the government’s forfeiture motion, which required Silver to pay $600,000 over six years in forfeiture. The district court then endorsed the parties’ stipulation over the Petitioners’ objection. In September 2025, the government reached a further settlement with Suzanne Silver, Martin Silver’s ex-wife. As the government explained, while Silver’s fraud was ongoing, he allegedly fraudulently transferred his interest in the couple’s house in New Jersey and apartment in Manhattan to his wife. In her settlement with the government, Ms. Silver agreed to sell both properties and pay 40% of the net proceeds of each sale to the Clerk of Court as restitution. She also agreed to immediately pay $166,000 as restitution, which represented 40% of a settlement the couple received in connection with a lawsuit they had brought against the contractors that built their home in New Jersey. Mr. Silver and attorneys representing him in an ongoing divorce 9 proceeding between him and Ms. Silver objected to the settlement, but the district court overruled those objections and ultimately, in March 2026, entered a final order of garnishment requiring Ms. Silver’s attorneys to release the $166,000 to the Clerk of Court as restitution. In May 2026, the government informed the district court that Mr. Silver was obstructing Ms. Silver’s ability to sell the home in New Jersey and apartment in Manhattan, and in response, the district court ordered Mr. Silver to facilitate the sale of both properties. In the same order, the district court also modified Mr. Silver’s restitution payment schedule from 10% of his monthly income, to a fixed payment of $600 per month. DISCUSSION As Petitioners describe, they “seek a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to issue a new order directing liquidation of Silver’s available assets and turnover of the value of those assets to the [g]overnment, for Petitioners, to pay, in part, Silver’s restitution obligation.” Petition at 13. Because Petitioners do not contend that the district court erred when it modified Silver’s payment schedule to require immediate payment of the portion of the Subject Assets that had appreciated, we construe the petition as challenging only the district court’s refusal to issue a turnover order allowing the government to seize the full value of the Subject Assets and then distribute the proceeds to victims as restitution. I. Standard of Review This petition is brought pursuant to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Under the CVRA, “[i]f the district court denies the relief sought [by a crime victim], the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. . . . In 10 deciding such application, the court of appeals shall apply ordinary standards of appellate review.” Id. § 3771(d)(3). Accordingly, the usual rigorous standards to obtain a writ of mandamus do not apply. See In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] petitioner seeking relief pursuant to the mandamus provision set forth in § 3771(d)(3) need not overcome the hurdles typically faced by a petitioner seeking review of a district court determination through a writ of mandamus.”). Our ordinary standard for reviewing a restitution order is as follows: we review “issues solely of law de novo, findings of adjudicative fact for clear error, and the multi-factor balancing aspects of such an order for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Jaffe, 417 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 2005). II. The Applicable Law of Restitution “Federal courts have no inherent power to order restitution, which is traditionally a civil remedy. A sentencing court’s power to order restitution, therefore, depends upon, and is necessarily circumscribed by, statute.” United States v. Zangari, 677 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). Three statutes are relevant here: The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (the “VWPA”), the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (the “MVRA”), and the CVRA, which was enacted in 2004. We briefly summarize each statute as it pertains to the issues arising in this petition. A. The VWPA The VWPA provides that a district court “may order . . . that the defendant make restitution to any victim of the offense.” Pub. L. No. 97-291 § 5(a)(1), 96 Stat. 1248 (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A)). The VWPA thus “gives district courts the discretion to order a defendant who is convicted of a criminal 11 offense to pay restitution, in full or in part, to the victim of that offense.” United States v. Kovall, 857 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2017). In exercising this discretion, the district court must “consider the amount of the loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the defendant’s financial resources, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents, and other factors the court deems appropriate.” United States v. Battista, 575 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2009). B. The MVRA Congress enacted the MVRA in 1996, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227 (codified in most relevant part at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A and 3664). “[T]he MVRA was enacted as a supplement to, and amendment of, the VWPA.” United States v. Ekanem, 383 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2004). It thus built on the VWPA in many important respects. First, as the MVRA’s name suggests, it makes restitution mandatory for victims of certain crimes, including any offense committed by fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii). It also requires a district court to order restitution “in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A). Although full payment is required, the MVRA also provides flexibility to the district court in fashioning the manner of a defendant’s restitution payments, including “the schedule according to which[] the restitution is to be paid.” Id. § 3664(f)(2). For example, the statute provides that “[a] restitution order may direct the defendant to make a single, lump-sum payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a combination of payments at specified intervals and in-kind 12 payments.” Id. § 3664(f)(3)(A). However, in setting such a schedule, the timeline for such payments “shall be the shortest time in which full payment can reasonably be made.” Id. § 3572(d)(2). In addition, if the court does not set a payment schedule, the defendant must “make such payment immediately.” Id. § 3572(d)(1). Moreover, in specifying the manner of restitution payments— including whether to order a payment schedule—the district court must consider the defendant’s “financial resources and other assets,” “projected earnings and other income,” and “any financial obligations.” Id. § 3664(f)(2)(A)–(C). Thus, “[a]lthough the MVRA requires the district court to determine the amount of restitution without regard to the economic circumstances of the defendant, in determining the manner in which the restitution is to be paid, the court must consider the financial resources and other assets of the defendant, projected earnings of the defendant and any financial obligations of the defendant.” United States v. Hosking, 567 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Lagos v. United States, 584 U.S. 577 (2018). Next, although the MVRA provides that a sentence imposing restitution is a “final judgment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o), it also provides for mechanisms to modify an order of restitution once entered. For example, upon notification from the defendant, the government, or a victim of a “material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances,” the court “may . . . adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice require.” Id. § 3664(k). The district court may also adjust the order of restitution pursuant to Sections 3572 or 3613A. See id. § 3664(o)(1)(D). Among other things, those sections provide that “[n]otwithstanding any installment schedule, when a . . . payment of restitution is in default, the entire amount of the 13 . . . restitution is due within 30 days after notification of the default.” Id. § 3572(i). Moreover, upon default, a district court may modify or revoke the defendant’s term of supervised release, “resentence a defendant pursuant to [S]ection 3614, hold the defendant in contempt of court, enter a restraining order or injunction, order the sale of property of the defendant, accept a performance bond, enter or adjust a payment schedule, or take any other action necessary to obtain compliance with the order of . . . restitution.” Id. § 3613A(a)(1). The MVRA also has mechanisms to enforce an award of restitution once it is issued by the district court. For example, it provides that “[a]n order of restitution may be enforced by the United States” in the same manner as a fine or “by all other available and reasonable means.” Id. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). As relevant here, a fine (and thus, an order of restitution) may be enforced by the government “in accordance with the practices and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment under Federal law or State law.” Id. § 3613(a), (f). Moreover, a restitution order automatically becomes “a lien in favor of the United States on all property and rights to property” of the defendant upon entry of judgment. Id. § 3613(c). The filing of such a lien has the same effect as a lien for unpaid tax under the Internal Revenue Code. Id. § 3613(c)–(d). However, the MVRA does not limit enforcement power solely to the government. Instead, it also provides that a victim may obtain an “abstract of judgment certifying that a judgment has been entered in favor of such victim in the amount specified in the restitution order.” Id. § 3664(m)(1)(B). If the victim properly records that abstract of judgment in the state court of the state where the relevant district court is located, “the abstract of judgment shall be a lien on the property of the defendant located in such State in the same manner and to the same extent and 14 under the same conditions as a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in that State.” Id. Despite this limited role for victims to enforce an order of restitution that has already been issued, under the MVRA, “the government, as the prosecuting authority, was responsible for litigating any issues that might arise as to the existence and extent” of a defendant’s restitution obligation because the statute “did not provide any means for victims themselves to assert their own rights to restitution in the criminal proceeding or to appeal unfavorable restitution decisions.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. United States, 882 F.3d 348, 357 (2d Cir. 2018). C. The CVRA The final entry in this statutory trilogy is the CVRA. Its life began not as a bill sitting on Capitol Hill, but as a proposed constitutional amendment. As we have explained elsewhere, “[b]etween the 1980s and the early 2000s, a wave of pro-victim (and, in some corners, anti-defendant) sentiment motivated a bipartisan group of legislators to propose for ratification a constitutional amendment guaranteeing certain procedural rights to crime victims.” Id. After that effort stalled, Congress quickly passed the CVRA as a statute with little change or discussion. Id. at 357–58. This development means that the statute has “relatively sparse technical detail” and is phrased in “general, rights-conferring language” that generally seeks to ensure that “victims have dignity and ‘voice’ in criminal proceedings” but does not provide “specific procedures for their implementation.” Id. at 358. As relevant here, the CVRA guarantees crime victims “[t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6). As the phrase “as provided in law” indicates, however, the right to restitution conferred by the CVRA is “a purely procedural one” which “does not expand any substantive 15 rights to restitution provided by the MVRA or other statutes.” Fed. Ins. Co., 882 F.3d at 358; accord Kovall, 857 F.3d at 1070 (same); In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2014) (same). The CVRA also provides (as discussed above) a new mechanism for a victim to obtain appellate review: if a district court denies relief to a victim asserting a right under the statute, “the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). 5 III. Whether Petitioners are Entitled to a Writ of Mandamus Petitioners contend that, under the MVRA, the district court should have granted the government’s request for a turnover order against the full value of the Subject Assets notwithstanding the payment schedule that was already in place. We disagree. As set forth below, based on the plain language of the statutory text, we conclude that where, as here, (1) a judgment imposing restitution does not specify that payment is due immediately and contains a payment schedule with a fixed monthly amount, and (2) the defendant is in compliance with that payment schedule, the government is not entitled to a turnover order to effectively force restitution payments above and beyond the payment schedule. 5 The same subsection contains other procedural requirements, such as a requirement that “[t]he court of appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed, unless the litigants, with the approval of the court, have stipulated to a different time period for consideration.” Id. As we have noted elsewhere, this 72-hour deadline is “an awkward fit” for a complicated issue like restitution “that may take weeks or months to litigate in the district court.” Fed. Ins. Co., 882 F.3d at 359. In any event, here, Petitioners expressly waived the deadline. 16  A. Statutory Analysis “When interpreting a statute, we begin with the plain language of the statute, giving the statutory terms their ordinary or natural meaning.” Rivera-Perez v. Stover, 171 F.4th 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]o ascertain a text’s plain meaning, we draw on the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” In re Soussis, 136 F.4th 415, 427 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the MVRA creates a default presumption that “[a] person sentenced to pay . . . restitution . . . shall make such payment immediately.” 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1); see also United States v. Nucci, 364 F.3d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Where a judgment is silent as to the timing of restitution payment, the default rule is that full payment is to be immediate.”). However, a defendant’s obligation to make immediate payment is triggered “unless, in the interest of justice, the court provides for payment . . . in installments.” 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that Section 3572(d)(1) “in no way eliminates the district court’s obligation . . . to consider the defendant’s financial situation and schedule payments accordingly”); Hosking, 567 F.3d at 336 (same). By specifying that payment shall be made immediately unless the district court orders a payment schedule, Section 3572(d)(1) makes clear that the default presumption of immediate payment in full is triggered only if the district court does not provide for installment payments. To illustrate, if an employer tells a job applicant, “I will not hire you unless you have experience,” that means the applicant would get the job only if they had experience. In short, “unless” establishes a necessary condition to trigger the 17 default presumption of immediate payment: the absence of a payment schedule. Therefore, where the district court imposes a payment schedule, the default presumption of immediate payment is dissipated. Moreover, the text of the MVRA establishes a clear division of responsibility between the district court and the government. The district court—not the government—determines how a defendant is to pay restitution. The statute tells us that “the court shall . . . specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) (emphasis added); see also id. § 3664(f)(3)(A) (“A restitution order [issued by the district court] may direct the defendant to make a single, lump-sum payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a combination of payments at specified intervals and in-kind payments.”). If an installment or payment schedule is ordered, “the length of time over which scheduled payments will be made shall be set by the court.” Id. § 3572(d)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court has the duty to determine the manner and schedule according to which the defendant must pay restitution. See United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that “setting a schedule for a [defendant] to pay restitution . . . is a core judicial function under the MVRA”). Then, once ordered by the district court, the government “may enforce a judgment” imposing a restitution obligation. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i) (“[A]n order of restitution may be enforced by the United States . . . .”) (emphasis added). To enforce a judgment means to “cause [it] to take effect” or to “compel obedience” to it. Enforce, B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). That means “[t]he government has statutory authority to enforce only the terms of a restitution order, not to take an enforcement action that would exceed a 18 restitution order’s payment terms.” United States v. Martinez, 812 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2015). Therefore, where a judgment ordering the payment of restitution also contains a payment schedule (or incorporates by reference an order of restitution that does so), the scope of the government’s enforcement power is cabined by the terms of the judgment, including the payment schedule. To be sure, nothing in the statute prevents a district court from imposing restitution that is both due immediately in full and payable according to a payment schedule. Despite these seemingly contradictory commands, this arrangement is feasible because “[a]ll that a ‘due immediately’ statement in a judgment does is command the defendant to discharge his obligations as quickly as possible.” United States v. Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Miller, 406 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that in the restitution context “payable immediately” does not necessarily require a defendant “to make full restitution at once”). Thus, as the Tenth Circuit has explained, “[c]ourts have almost uniformly recognized a crucial distinction between cases . . . in which the court orders the defendant to pay only through a payment schedule with no requirement of immediate payment in full, and cases . . . in which the judgment specifies that the amount owed is due in full on the date of judgment, regardless of whether the judgment includes a back-up schedule of payments to cover any unpaid amounts.” United States v. Williams, 898 F.3d 1052, 1055 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (collecting cases); but see United States v. Holden, 908 F.3d 395, 403–05 (9th Cir. 2018) (vacating as “internally inconsistent” a restitution order requiring full restitution to be paid immediately in a “lump sum” 19 and imposing a payment schedule). 6 In other words, courts have interpreted judgments that provide restitution is “due immediately,” but also contain a payment schedule to mean that the schedule sets a floor, but not a ceiling, on the government’s collection efforts. See, e.g., United States v. Shusterman, 331 F. App’x 994, 996–97 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Schwartz, 503 F. App’x 443, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished); United States v. Behrens, 656 F. App’x 789, 790 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Khan, 550 F. App’x 2, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished). 7 6 Subsequent cases in the Ninth Circuit have distinguished Holden as resting on the “lump sum” language contained in the judgment in that case. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 163 F.4th 578, 583–85 (9th Cir. 2025) (distinguishing Holden because of this “lump sum” language and otherwise recognizing in the fine context that “due immediately” and a payment schedule are not inconsistent). 7 Numerous district courts in this Circuit have reached this same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Moryan, 767 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (“A restitution order ‘due immediately’ makes the lien created by the restitution order enforceable in full at any time, notwithstanding compliance with the payment schedule.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Price, No. 17-CR-301 (NGG), 2023 WL 4599841, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2023) (“Here, the Judgment specified that [the defendant’s] restitution was ‘due immediately’ and payable at a rate of $25 while in custody and ten percent of gross monthly income while on supervision. The phrase ‘due immediately’ made the lien created by the restitution order enforceable in full at any time, notwithstanding compliance with the payment schedule.”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Schwartz, No. 20-Cr-6033 (FPG), 2022 WL 537621, at *2 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022) (“[T]he Court ordered payment on restitution ‘to begin immediately’ and stated that restitution ‘is due immediately.’ Nothing in the payment plan gives the impression that . . . the 20  However, unless there is language in the restitution order or judgment indicating that the funds are immediately due, the imposition of the payment schedule establishing a fixed payment precludes the government from seeking to collect the entire amount of the restitution immediately in the absence of a default on the payment schedule. Here, at sentencing, the district court entered an order of restitution in the amount of $364,402,116.08, and further ordered that Silver make a $40,000 restitution payment by a fixed date, and then 10% of his income on a monthly basis once he commenced his supervised release term. The district court, however, did not make the full restitution amount due immediately. Therefore, we hold that, because Silver made the $40,000 payment and is not in default on the payment schedule, the government is not entitled to a turnover order for the full value of the Subject Assets. 8 Several of our sister circuits have reached the same conclusion. For example, in Martinez, the district court had ordered the defendant at sentencing to pay roughly $2.7 million in restitution, but did not make payment due immediately and included a condition that he was to pay this amount through fixed monthly installments based on a percentage of his disposable income. 812 F.3d at 1201. When the defendant was released from prison, he was unable to obtain steady employment, and because his restitution payment schedule was pegged to income, he paid very little in restitution but was still in compliance with the schedule. Id. The government nevertheless sought to garnish two of the government would be barred from exercising its statutory authority to enforce the full restitution order.”) (internal citation omitted). 8 Of course, this holding does not prevent the government from otherwise seeking to modify the restitution order which, as discussed i