T.J. v. Superior Court CA1/3

Filed 11/6/26 T.J. v. Superior Court CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE T.J., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A175245 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, (Contra Costa County Respondent; Super. Ct. Nos. J2400437, J2400438, J2400439, J2400440) CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Real Party in Interest. T.J. (Mother) appeals from juvenile court dependency orders made during a hearing to select a permanent placement for her four minor children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; statutory references are to this Code.) Before selecting a permanent plan, the court denied Mother’s section 388 petition for additional reunification services. It then appointed the children’s aunt as their legal guardian, and adopted a visitation plan that requires a professional monitor to supervise monthly visits. We affirm. 1  BACKGROUND Proceedings Prior to Termination of Reunification Services1 In August 2024, Contra Costa County Children and Family Services (the Bureau) filed dependency petitions on behalf of 14-year-old T.1, 12-year- old T.2, eight-year-old T.3, and two-year-old M.S. Jurisdiction was alleged under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) due to severe domestic violence between Mother and M.S’s father (Father), which included allegations about physical altercations in front of the children; violation of an active restraining order; and interjecting T.2 into the middle of a particularly violent dispute. According to the Bureau’s reports, Mother’s child welfare history dates back to 2008. In 2022, the Bureau initiated an investigation of the family after substantiating a report that Mother had been “ ‘foaming at the mouth’ ” and apparently under the influence of methamphetamines and amphetamines while holding two-month-old M.S. The investigation disclosed domestic violence which resulted in a dependency case being filed. That dependency was vacated after the family received reunification services and family maintenance services. Less than four months later, on July 29, 2024, Mother and Father had another physical altercation, which precipitated the current petitions. During the July 29 incident, Mother and Father had an argument that turned physical, with both participants hitting each other, then Mother ran into T.2’s bedroom and asked her to barricade the door. T.2 tried to do so, but Father “ ‘ “busted through” the door’ ” and Mother jumped out a second story window, breaking both her ankles and fracturing her spine. A detailed account of proceedings before these cases were set for a 1 section 366.26 hearing can be found in T.J. v. Superior Court of Contra County (Nov. 17, 2025, A174042) [non. pub.]. 2  In interviews after the current petitions were filed, Mother denied other recent domestic violence with Father and claimed he had not been living in the home. But Father reported staying there more than half the time (despite the fact that Mother had a restraining order against him). Moreover, the three older children reported witnessing multiple incidents, which occurred mostly at night and involved Father inflicting serious injuries on Mother, as well as breaking things, including the front door of the home. In November 2024, the juvenile court adjudged the children dependents and ordered reunification services for Mother and Father. The children had been placed with their maternal aunt (Aunt), where they remained throughout the proceedings. The six-month review hearing was originally set for April 2025. The Bureau recommended terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26. Mother had engaged in some services, the Bureau reported. She took a five-week domestic violence prevention class, participated in a domestic violence survivors’ support group, and told the social worker she was attending individual therapy. She had failed to complete one parenting class but was participating in another. She had not consistently participated in visitation, and the three older children were indifferent about missed visits. T.1 and T.2 both expressed fear about returning to Mother’s care. They reported Mother was physically and verbally abusive, neglectful of their needs, and that she was still together with Father. Other family members reported seeing Mother and Father together despite the restraining order. Mother objected to the Bureau’s recommendation and the matter was set for a contest, which was held in August 2025. In June, the Bureau reported Mother had attended only three of seven visits since the last 3 hearing, and ended one visit early after expressing frustrations with T.1’s attitude. T.1 was upset after the visit and asked to have fewer visits because of Mother’s “ ‘mood swings.’ ” T.1 and T.2 described Mother’s behavior as “ ‘ “very odd, very confusing,” ’ ” and they did not know why interactions “ ‘ “turned so argumentative.” ’ ” The Bureau also reported Mother had not been truthful about the extent of her participation in individual therapy; she did not attend her intake interview until December 2024, and her initial therapist terminated the service the following April because of poor attendance. In August 2025, the Bureau reported Mother’s attendance at visits had recently improved, but she still had attended only 60 percent of the visits available to her. T.1 and T.2 were “ ‘unwavering’ ” in their wish to remain in Aunt’s care, and T.3 had also spoken about wanting to remain there despite his love for Mother. At the contested review hearing, Mother offered evidence she completed a 12-hour parenting course, and two domestic violence programs, one five hours and one four hours. The social worker testified that he had told Mother her domestic violence programs were not sufficient; she needed a 26- week comprehensive domestic violence victim program that included safety planning and prevention because of the severity of the family’s domestic violence and the fact that the previous dependency had ended only four months before the current proceedings began. Other evidence presented at the review showed that Mother had been attending weekly sessions with a domestic violence counselor since June, and they had been working on a safety plan; Mother had engaged in some individual therapy; and she had expressed a desire for family therapy, which the Bureau intended to provide. Mother had recently told the social worker 4 she would be moving to a different city and would no longer be living in the home to which Father had access. At the conclusion of the contested review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services, finding that neither parent had participated regularly and made substantive progress in their case plan. The court observed that the prior dependency involved the same domestic violence issues as the current cases, and Mother had made some efforts in the current proceedings, particularly given her injuries, but her participation was less than adequate. Despite the additional three months that had passed since the initial review hearing date, Mother had not made significant progress. The court held out the prospect that there might be progress in family therapy before the section 366.26 hearing, in which case Mother could bring a section 388 petition, the court opined. The court set a hearing for December 1, 2025, to select a permanent plan for the children pursuant to section 366.26. Mother’s Section 388 Petition On November 17, 2025, this court denied on the merits Mother’s petition for extraordinary review of the August 2025 orders terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. That same day, a section 388 petition was filed on behalf of Mother. Her counsel requested that the juvenile court change its order terminating Mother’s reunification services and order instead that she receive additional services and increased visitation. According to the petition, Mother’s circumstances had changed in the following respects: she was receiving counseling through the STAND organization, including assistance preparing a safety plan; she had “consistently engaged” in family therapy; and she had secured a new 5 residence separate from the one where she had been assaulted. Mother alleged that granting the section 388 petition would be better for the children because they were “extremely attached” to Mother; Mother had worked to stabilize her situation; and she had “made it safe” to continue reunification efforts. Three exhibits were attached to Mother’s petition. Exhibit 1 is a four- page safety plan comprised of an outline-type form that includes some personalized information, such as names and contact numbers for neighbors and relatives. Exhibit 2 is a 16-page document titled “Domestic Violence: Safety Planning and Support Options.” The document appears to be part of a PowerPoint presentation providing general information about domestic violence. Exhibit 3 is another form document for making an earthquake safety plan. A hearing on the section 388 petition was set for December 1, 2025, to be held in conjunction with the permanency planning hearing. Bureau Reports On November 7, 2025, the Bureau submitted section 366.26 reports recommending that Aunt be appointed as legal guardian of all four children. According to the reports, Aunt was committed to being the children’s guardian; they had been in her care throughout the dependency; and she had met all of their physical, medical and emotional needs. The Bureau updated the court as to each child. T.1 was in tenth grade, had been diagnosed with an adjustment disorder and also experienced the typical ups and downs of being a teenager. She had a good relationship with Aunt, although she sometimes felt misunderstood. She expressed negativity, disappointment, frustration and anger at Mother, which was being addressed through individual therapy. She initially declined to participate in family 6 therapy, but was persuaded to attend and seemed receptive to Mother’s efforts to take responsibility for past events. However, she had stated firmly that she did not want to return to Mother’s home. T.2, who was in eighth grade, was in good physical health, but had recently displayed behaviors consistent with a psychological disorder and had a provisional diagnosis of autism. She had also been diagnosed with PTSD, an adjustment disorder and depression. Feelings of abandonment and hurt relating to Mother were being addressed during individual therapy. During family therapy, T.2 had displayed a strong emotional attachment to Mother. T.3 was in fourth grade and presented as a “cheerful young boy.” Despite being diagnosed with PTSD and an adjustment disorder, T.3 did not display major emotional or behavior concerns. He attending weekly counseling at his school and declined to participate in any additional therapy. M.S. was a generally happy toddler, who had adjusted well to living with Aunt. The Bureau also updated the court regarding Mother’s visitation. Since services were terminated, she had been offered twice monthly two-hour supervised visits, and her “engagement with the children ha[d] varied depending on the emotional climate of the visit and the children’s receptiveness.” An August 27 visit was terminated early due to a disagreement between Mother and T.1. Subsequent visits in September were generally positive. Mother engaged appropriately with M.S., but her actions reflected an ongoing emotional disconnection with the older children, and the Bureau opined that visitation had not led to “significant improvement in the parent-child relationship or indicated readiness for increased contact.” On November 26, 2025, the Bureau submitted a “Court Memo” outlining its concerns about Mother’s section 388 petition. Although Mother 7 had expressed her intention to move to a new residence where Father could not find her, as of November 24, she had not moved or signed a lease. The new address she provided to the Bureau was very close to the old one, which was concerning in light of reports that Mother and Father were still having contact. Moreover, Mother’s evidence that she had received additional services since the August 2025 review hearing pertained to programs she completed prior that hearing. Furthermore, there was “an ongoing issue” about Mother sending unkind texts to T.1, particularly when Mother was upset about a development in the dependency proceedings. For example, the previous week Mother had cancelled family therapy and sent T.1 a text telling her daughter to “stay away and leave her alone,” and the timing of that behavior appeared to coincide with Mother’s receipt of the section 366.26 report. In light of these circumstances, the Bureau took the position that there had not been “a significant enough change to increase visitation or grant more reunification services.” December1, 2025 Orders At the December 1 hearing, the court admitted the Bureau’s reports into evidence and then turned to the section 388 petition. Mother offered her own testimony as additional support for the petition. Mother testified she had moved into a new “housing situation” the previous week, and STAND had assisted her in obtaining that confidential housing. The housing was temporary, Mother testified, as she was having a house built for herself and her children. STAND also assisted her in preparing the safety plan submitted with her petition, which alerted the children to call 9-1-1 if they saw any intruders, including Father. Mother testified repeatedly that she was not currently in contact with Father. But she described the issue as a trigger for her and was unable or unwilling to 8 say when she last saw Father outside of court. Mother testified that since the status review hearing, she had participated in domestic violence services, individual therapy and family therapy. Testimony about her recent participation in a domestic violence program was confusing. Apparently, she believed she had complied with her case plan requirement for comprehensive domestic violence education by participating in a victim support group, which she had attended throughout the earlier reunification period. Regarding individual therapy, Mother testified that she had found the right therapist for her needs in late June, her sessions were held virtually, and since September she had been attending every other week. Mother testified that her entire family had benefited from family therapy as it provided the opportunity to “talk about different topics,” which brought everyone closer together. When asked to elaborate, Mother shared that she wanted family therapy so she could learn how her children were feeling about everything, not just domestic violence, but also the death of the older children’s father. She had learned that her children were “okay basically.” They were “upset,” but “ultimately” they said that they missed her, and they just did not want to talk about what had happened. Mother believed that her children understood that domestic violence was something that had happened to Mother. They saw it and may have been affected by it, but basically they saw her “get hurt protecting them.” When asked how jumping out a window and leaving the children in the house with Father was protecting them, Mother explained that she had no other way to go find help because she was cornered in a room. Mother acknowledged there were other incidents when she had failed to protect the children from domestic violence and testified that “I just want to take 9 accountability to make the change.” For that reason, Father would never be around the children or her again, Mother testified. Mother acknowledged understanding that children exposed to domestic violence could grow up learning “basically the pattern of abuse.” Initially, Mother testified she missed only one family therapy session, explaining she had to cancel it because of her move. When asked why the therapist reported Mother cancelled two sessions, she responded that she had proof that the other session was cancelled not by her but by Aunt. Mother denied that the session she cancelled had anything to do with T.1. She acknowledged, however, that she sent a text message telling T.1 to leave her alone. According to Mother, T.1 had been calling and asking for money. Mother elaborated that T.1 was always asking for money, and added that she did not understand why her children were always asking her for things. Mother testified that granting her additional visitation would benefit her family and help bring them back together. According to Mother, the children asked her for more visits and did not understand why they were so limited. At their most recent visit, all the children could talk about was moving to a new house and when they could get overnights. Mother acknowledged T.1 had not stated that she wanted to return to Mother’s care. According to Mother, T.1 was going “back and forth” about what she wanted, she cried a lot and could not communicate, and Mother suspected something had happened between T.1 and Aunt. The court heard arguments before ruling. Mother’s counsel argued the court should reopen the reunification period based on the progress Mother had made since the six month review: she had utilized services to obtain confidential housing; there was an active restraining order; and family therapy had been very beneficial. The other significant change, counsel 10 argued, was Mother’s consistent engagement with individual therapy, which helped her better understand the domestic violence issues. Mother’s counsel argued the children would benefit from the prospect of reunification and therefore Mother should be granted another six months of services, with increased visitation being a “key component to that.” Counsel acknowledged T.1 was “a little bit differently situated,” as she was not “keen” to return to Mother, but the younger children would benefit from continued contact, therapy and increased visitation. The Bureau continued to recommend that the court deny Mother’s section 388 petition, order legal guardianship and dismiss the dependency cases. County counsel emphasized domestic violence was a long-standing problem and expressed concern about Mother’s testimony, pointing out that there was evidence she had been with Father as recently as April, and that she had not completed the 26-week domestic violence education requirement despite contending otherwise. The Bureau acknowledged Mother’s recent efforts, but argued it took her “a really long time” to settle in to do the work she needed to do and meanwhile, the children deserved to have the stability of a legal guardianship. The Bureau was not opposed to individualized visits with the children, but would object to unsupervised visits, given a number of issues, including the lack of information about who was living at Mother’s new residence. Minors’ counsel acknowledged the work Mother had done for herself, opining that she was “in a different place” and had greater understanding of her situation. However, the children needed stability and consistency on a long term basis, which Mother was not in a position to provide. Minors’ counsel argued that because a guardianship would provide the children with long-term stability without terminating Mother’s rights, it afforded her more 11 time to continue to improve her situation. Counsel also suggested T.1 should have more agency about when to visit Mother. Minors’ counsel shared with the court that her concurrence with the Bureau’s recommendation was based in part on recent conversations with the three older children. T-3 wanted more time with Mother and was enticed by Mother’s new home, but was also happy in Aunt’s home, and his counsel was concerned about him going back to Mother before he worked through many issues that could take considerable time to resolve. Assessing T-2 was difficult because of her autism-like behaviors, but she did convey that she wanted to stay where she was. Although she wanted to spend more time with Mother, she never said she wanted to live with Mother, even when asked that direct question. T.1 was “very specific” with minors’ counsel about wanting to stay with Aunt. “She said deliberately and specifically she wants mom to work on herself more,” and she did not think it was the right time to return to Mother’s home. “She absolutely wanted to stay where she was,” and expressed hurt feelings that perhaps could be improved through therapy. Before announcing its rulings, the court observed that Mother had been able to articulate the impact of domestic violence on her children, which she was unable to do at the prior status review. And she had used services to secure confidential housing. But the prior dependency involved the exact same issues that led to these proceedings only four months later. And the court found that Mother was still unable to acknowledge or understand that, although she is absolutely the victim in her criminal case, the children are the real victims in dependency proceedings. The court also observed that the effects of domestic violence on these children were quite clear, especially as to T.1. The court found that Mother needed to focus on herself for now; she needed to deal with her own issues before she could become a “safe, fit 12 appropriate parent.” Although Mother had demonstrated some change or changing circumstances, she had not demonstrated “sufficient change to put these kids through six more months of lack of permanency,” the court found. After denying the section 388 petition, the court adopted a permanent plan of legal guardianship, finding, among other things, that terminating parental rights would not be in the best interest of the children given their bond with Mother. Regarding visitation, the court contemplated expanding visits for the younger children. It ordered the parties to return on December 18 to discuss modified visitation proposals and exit orders. December 18, 2025 Orders The Bureau submitted a court memo to update the court about Aunt’s reaction to increasing visitation and Mother’s behavior after her section 388 petition was denied. Aunt was concerned about increasing Mother’s visitation in light of tension between herself and Mother, but she was open to a professional visitation supervisor. Aunt also expressed concerned that Mother might interfere with the children’s educational needs by moving them to schools that were more convenient for her. The family therapist had reported having to suspend sessions with the children due to Mother’s behavior during a December 1 session, which had to be terminated after 20 minutes. Mother was upset about the outcome of the court hearing that day and angry at T.1 for saying she wanted to live with Aunt. Mother also accused T.1 of bullying T.2, and when T.1 asked where that was coming from, Mother raised her voice and was “really ‘laying into’ ” T.1, to the point that the session had to be terminated. Mother was cruel, saying things the Bureau did not record in its memo because it wanted to protect T.1 from further retribution. 13  Mother did not appear at the December 18 hearing. The court expressed extreme disappointment regarding the recent developments. It also observed that, unfortunately, Mother’s conduct at the December 1 family therapy session was in keeping with the manner in which she had comported herself throughout the duration of the dependency proceedings: “She really emotionally abuses these children when she perceives any sort of disloyalty or comments made [by the] children to the Department about their concerns, their preferences.” The court also found that Mother had not been genuine when she testified on December 1; she had apparently learned what to say at a hearing, but did not “grasp” or “understand” the issues resulting in the dependency. Describing Mother’s treatment of T.1 during family therapy as “appalling,” the court pointed out that Mother had tried to play the children off against each other and was so abusive the therapist had to end the session. Regarding visitation, the court proposed granting Mother a minimum of one 90-minute visit once a month; requiring that visits be supervised by a professional monitor paid for by Mother; and giving T.1 and T.2 the option not to attend visits. County counsel and minors’ counsel concurred, also expressing disappointment about the recent developments. Mother’s counsel objected, but the court adopted its proposed visitation plan. The court vested education rights with the legal guardian, and ordered that Mother was not to be invited to school events or other events where a professional monitor would not be present. Dependency jurisdiction was terminated, with the court retaining jurisdiction over the guardianship. DISCUSSION Mother contends that the orders of December 1 and 18 must all be reversed because her section 388 petition was erroneously denied as to T.2, 14 T.3, and M.S. In seeking to change the order terminating her reunification services pursuant to section 388, Mother had the burden to show there was either new evidence or changed circumstances that made the requested change in the best interest of each of her children. (§ 388, subd. (a).) We review the denial of Mother’s section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion under the facts presented here. At the December 1 hearing, the court found Mother demonstrated some change by securing confidential housing and articulating that domestic violence impacted her children, but it questioned the extent to which she comprehended the actual impact that the parents’ violent relationship has had on the minors. Moreover, Mother needed more time to work on her own issues before she could provide the children with a safe home, the court found. These findings are consistent with the Bureau’s reports as well as Mother’s own testimony, and they are reinforced by Mother’s behavior after her section 388 petition was denied. Mother’s behavior during the family therapy session, including her emotional abuse of T.1, reinforces the court’s finding that Mother lacks true insight about the problems that led to the dependency. Mother contends her petition was amply supported by evidence that she had significantly improved her circumstances and complied with her case plan both before and after the section 366.26 hearing was set. We do see progress leading up to the December 1 hearing, but not enough to constitute changed circumstances as a matter of law. When a section 388 petition alleges changed circumstances, the evidence must show “ ‘changed, not changing circumstances,’ ” which is “ ‘another way of describing the distinction . . . between changes that are material and those that are not.’ ” 15 (In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 119, 137.) Evidence Mother presented at the December 1 hearing may have constituted changing circumstances. She participated in some services, and secured a new residence, which is potentially important, but she had only just moved in, and she did not complete the 26-week program specified in her case plan or otherwise demonstrate that she understands the impact that her history of domestic violence had on her children. Moreover, the prospect that Mother’s circumstances would materially change in the near future was significantly diminished by her own behavior after her section 388 petition was denied. Nor has Mother established that granting her additional services and increased visitation was necessarily in the best interests of the three younger children. After reunification services have been terminated, the parent’s interests in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer the overriding concern, and the focus of dependency proceedings shifts to the child’s need for permanency and stability. (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 847; Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254.) Section 388 establishes a mechanism for a parent to demonstrate that a change in circumstances after the reunification period has ended might justify changing the order terminating that parent’s services. The best interests inquiry, however, must be focused on “promoting the child’s needs for permanency and stability.” (In re. J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 (J.C.).) In this case, Mother takes the position that because she engaged in some services after the reunification period ended, we should assume that granting her an additional six months of reunification services will benefit the younger children. We do not share that assumption. Section 388 is not a mechanism for rewarding Mother for her efforts to reunify after the section 366.26 hearing was set. (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) The focus is 16 no longer on Mother’s needs but on the needs of her children. The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it would not be in the best interest of these children to “further delay permanency and stability” by granting Mother’s petition. (Ibid.) Mother relies heavily on In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, which identifies three non-exclusive factors for courts to consider when conducting a best interest inquiry under section 388. (Id. at p. 532; but see J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527 [declining to apply Kimberly F. factors because they fail to account for shifting focus after reunification efforts have been terminated].) Courts applying Kimberly F. consider (1) the relative seriousness of problems leading to the dependency and the reason the problems have continued; (2) the strength of the bond the dependent child has with the parent as well as the caretaker; and (3) the degree to which the parent’s problems may be easily resolved, as well as the degree to which they have actually been ameliorated. (Kimberly F., at p. 532.) None of these factors warrants granting Mother’s petition. Domestic violence between Mother and Father is an extremely serious, long-standing issue that put these children at serious risk of physical and emotional harm. This core problem appears to be causally related to other issues, such as Mother’s emotional abuse and neglect of her children. In back-to-back dependency cases, the Bureau provided Mother with services to address these problems, but they persisted, as did the risk of harm to these children. Evidence presented on December 1 suggested Mother’s circumstances may be changing, but not that they have yet materially changed. Mother cannot avoid these facts by excluding T.1 from her appeal. Her emotional abuse of T.1 during family therapy is evidence that she has 17 not made the changes necessary to show that granting her petition would be in the best interests of these children. The other Kimberly F. factor—the strength of the child’s bond to both the parent and the caretaker—does not favor granting Mother’s petition despite evidence that Mother loves her children and they have a bond with her. The record also shows that the children have bonded with Aunt and feel safe in her care. Moreover, the permanent plan recommended by the Bureau and adopted by the court is legal guardianship, not termination of parental rights. Thus, Mother has the opportunity to preserve and strengthen her relationship with the children without reopening the reunification period and depriving the children of the safety and security of a permanent placement with their maternal aunt who has committed to be their legal guardian. Finally, we address briefly Mother’s separate argument that the juvenile court abused its discretion by making the December 18 orders vesting educational rights with Aunt and restricting Mother’s visitation. Mother contends the court made these orders to punish her for her interaction with T.1 during family therapy despite evidence showing that Mother had simply scolded her daughter for misbehaving and bullying her sister. We reject this argument, which seriously misconstrues the record evidence. Substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that these orders are appropriate efforts to protect “the emotional stability of the children,” and we note that the court expressly left open the possibility that Mother might, at some future date, be able to return to court and establish that circumstances truly had changed. But at this time, Mother fails to show that any order made at the December 18 hearing was erroneous, unsupported by evidence, or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion. 18  DISPOSITION The appealed orders are affirmed. TUCHER, P. J. WE CONCUR: FUJISAKI, J. RODRÍGUEZ, J. T.J. v. Superior Court (A175245) 19