Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D2026-2435 _____________________________ IN RE: LEON COUNTY GRAND JURY PRESENTMENT, FALL OF 2025. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. James Lee Marsh, Judge. November 16, 2026 ORDER ON INTERVENORS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR AS APPELLEES, TO WITHHOLD THE MANDATE AND PRESERVE THE PRESENTMENT, AND FOR REHEARING, CLARIFICATION, REHEARING EN BANC, AND CERTIFICATION NEFF, J. The Florida Center for Government Accountability, Inc., and Michael Barfield (together, “Movants”) move for leave to appear as appellees in this appeal, to withhold the mandate and preserve the Presentment under seal, and for rehearing, clarification, rehearing en banc, and certification. The predicate for every subpart of the motion is Movants’ asserted status as parties entitled to participate in, and to defend the orders governing their participation in, an appeal taken under section 905.28, Florida Statutes. These assertions seem to presuppose that Movants must be given access to confidential documents during the course of the proceedings. This appeal arose from a grand jury presentment not accompanied by a true bill or indictment, governed by section 905.28. On March 25, 2026, the circuit court granted Movants limited intervention “to test the correctness of the trial court’s closure order (if any),” while denying them access to the Presentment, the repression and expungement motions, related matters, and any hearings. On July 8, 2026, on Movants’ motion for clarification, the circuit court reiterated the limits of that intervention and directed the State Attorney to notify Movants, within three days, in the event of an appeal. On July 29, 2026, the circuit court repressed and expunged most of the Presentment but denied full expungement. On October 7, 2026, this court reversed to the extent the circuit court denied full expungement, remanded with directions to expunge the Presentment in full, and reversed the orders concerning notification to Movants. Movants now seek to appear as appellees and to have this court rehear the appeal. A report or presentment of the grand jury relating to an individual that is not accompanied by a true bill or indictment is confidential and may not be made public until “the individual concerned” has been furnished a copy and given fifteen days to move the circuit court to repress or expunge the report or any portion that is improper and unlawful. § 905.28, Fla. Stat. Such a motion under section 905.28, whether granted or denied, delays public announcement of the report until the circuit court’s ruling is affirmed or reversed by the district court of appeal, or until the time to appeal expires. Id. The statute thus defines both the persons it protects and the parties whose interests are at stake on appeal. The Florida Legislature mandated this process so that those impugned in a Presentment may have adequate process to clear their names. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Marko, 352 So. 2d 518, 520–21 (Fla. 1977). The class of parties with a cognizable interest in a section 905.28 proceeding is narrow.1 First, the statute covers “the 1 The class is “narrow” only in the sense that the report must relate to, and reflect adversely on, the person invoking section 905.28. The qualifying reference, however, need not be substantial. Republic Properties found the threshold met by a brief, passing mention, rejecting any requirement of a “significant” connection. 2 individual concerned”—i.e., the person or entity to whom the report relates and whose character is impugned by it—and those persons or entities may move to repress or expunge and, if denied, appeal. Republic Props. Corp. v. Grand Jury Presentment on City of W. Palm Beach, Part A, Fall Term 2006, 971 So. 2d 289, 291–92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Standing in such a proceeding turns solely on “whether the report is one ‘relating to’” the movant, giving that person standing to seek relief for the loss of notice and the opportunity to clear his or her name. Id. at 293. Second, the State, through the state attorney as the grand jury’s legal adviser and the attorney general on appeal, may defend the report against motions to repress or expunge. In re Grand Jury-1st Term of 2018, 300 So. 3d 775, 778–79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). Movants fall within neither category. They do not contend that the Presentment relates to them or impugns their character. They are a “news organization” and its “director” who seek access to, and a voice in, the proceeding. Section 905.28 confers no standing on a stranger to the report. The statute’s protections exist to afford an unindicted person referred to in a presentment the notice and opportunity to be heard that due process requires before publication. In re Grand Jury, Fall Term 1986, Pinellas Cnty., 528 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). A party to whom the report does not relate has no interest the statute recognizes, and therefore no standing to seek relief under it or to resist relief sought by those it does protect. See Republic Props. Corp., 971 So. 2d at 293. The United States Supreme Court has observed the following about the grand jury process: Although many governmental processes operate best under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of government operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly. A classic example is that “the proper functioning Republic Props. Corp., 971 So. 2d at 292–93. A wide range of persons may therefore invoke the statute, but only those the report actually touches, which Movants are not. 3 of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.” Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986) (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979)). Chapter 905 protects two interests at once—the integrity of the grand jury process and the due-process rights of those its work wrongfully impugns—and both depend on confidentiality. That concern has particular force here. The statutory scheme is built on the premise that confidential material furnished during the review process will travel no further than the law requires. Extending access, or a merits role, to a person who is a stranger to the proceeding and holds no statutory interest in it would place confidential grand jury material in the hands of one with no corresponding incentive to preserve its confidentiality.2 As this case and Pinellas County both illustrate, a circuit court’s ability to preserve the confidentiality of a presentment while the statutory process runs its course may require legislative refinement. Absent such legislation, vigorous enforcement of the current criminal sanctions against those who unlawfully disclose grand jury testimony or evidence, see § 905.27(2), (4), Fla. Stat., and against those who solicit or conspire to procure their disclosure, see § 777.04, Fla. Stat., would go far in curing the statutory shortcomings. Movants’ position is also foreclosed by a factually similar case. In Pinellas County, a newspaper and one of its reporters sought to intervene and gain access to the motions to repress or expunge a presentment not accompanied by a true bill or indictment. 528 So. 2d at 52. In that case, as in this one, the presentment was published after the individuals named in it were furnished copies. Id. There, the circuit court denied access but granted intervention “solely to enable the newspapers to seek review of the order foreclosing revelation of the motions.” Id. The Second District held 2 Prudence counsels against furnishing confidential grand jury materials to any stranger to the proceeding who holds no interest in them. This caution carries added weight where, for example, such a person has a history of misconduct before a grand jury. 4 that a newspaper has no First Amendment right of access to the procedural motions to repress or expunge such a presentment and affirmed. Id. at 52–53. Granting the media limited intervention to test the correctness of a closure order is “not an uncommon practice.” Id. at 52 n.2. That is precisely the limited intervention the circuit court granted here—intervention to test any closure order, not to participate in the repression and expungement merits. Pinellas County confirms that such limited intervention does not make a news organization a party entitled to litigate, or to defend orders bearing on, the section 905.28 proceeding itself. Id. at 52–53. Movants’ reliance on Smith v. Crawford, 645 So. 2d 513, 515 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott, Inc., 247 So. 2d 517, 519–20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), and Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992), does not change the result. Those decisions establish that an intervenor is ordinarily a party and may be designated an appellee; that an intervenor may appeal a ruling adverse to it so long as it is aggrieved, subject always to the qualification that intervention is in subordination to the main proceeding; and that the status of intervenor “assures the right to be heard and the ability to appeal an adverse ruling.” Such participation is limited only to the extent of the interest that supports the intervention. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d at 508. Movants’ interest below was expressly confined to testing the correctness of a closure order, and they were denied access to the Presentment, the motions, and the hearings. Even accepting that the limited intervention made them parties for that confined purpose, it did not enlarge their interest into a stake in the repression and expungement merits that section 905.28 reserves to the individual concerned and the State. In re Grand Jury-1st Term of 2018, 300 So. 3d at 778–79. An intervenor cannot bootstrap a limited procedural interest into standing to relitigate a determination on interests the statute does not assign to the intervenor. Nor does the asserted lack of notice of the appeal supply the missing standing. The July 8, 2026 order required the State Attorney to notify Movants of an appeal, but Movants were owed no such notice: a party whose limited interest cannot be affected by the disposition of the appeal has no cognizable stake in it, and 5 this court has in any event reversed the orders imposing that requirement. Service and notice follow party status in the proceeding; they do not create it. The absence of a direct, statutorily recognized interest is what defeats Movants’ request, and a party with no cognizable interest in the merits of a section 905.28 appeal is neither aggrieved by, nor entitled to defend against, its disposition. This conclusion is reinforced by the discretionary nature of intervention itself. Intervention is not a matter of right and whether to permit it rests in a court’s sound discretion. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement, 707 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). And any intervention that is allowed remains “in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.230. Consequently, a “court has discretion in imposing any conditions on the intervenor necessary to preserve the original parties’ rights, inasmuch as ‘the rights of an intervenor are subordinate to the rights of the parties.’” Bondi v. Tucker, 93 So. 3d 1106, 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quoting Env’t Confederation of Sw. Fla., Inc. v. IMC Phosphates, Inc., 857 So. 2d 207, 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)). That subordinating principle is especially warranted where, as here, the main proceeding is a confidential grand jury matter whose secrecy section 905.28 protects—a setting in which a limited intervenor’s participation cannot expand to engulf the merits the statute commits to any individual concerned and the State. Moreover, an intervenor granted leave for one limited purpose “ha[s] no authority to move to rehear the final judgment” on matters outside that purpose. Macana Invs., LLC v. Longridge Fin. LLC, 418 So. 3d 145, 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). Yet Movants’ motion is directed not to any closure order but to the merits of the repression and expungement ruling. Independently, a motion for rehearing “shall not present issues not previously raised,” Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a)(2)(A), and is not “an open invitation for an unhappy litigant or attorney to reargue the same points previously presented, or to discuss the bottomless depth of the displeasure that one might feel toward this judicial body as a result of having unsuccessfully sought appellate relief.” Ayala v. Gonzalez, 984 So. 2d 523, 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Movants, who concede they have 6 not seen the record, the briefs, or the exhibits, instead rest on extensive argument and materials never presented to this court. “That an appellate court may not consider matters outside the record is so elemental that there is no excuse for any attorney to attempt to bring such matters before the court,” and “[w]hen a party includes in an appendix material or matters outside the record, or refers to such material or matters in its brief, it is proper for the court to strike the same.” Altchiler v. State, Dep’t of Pro. Regul., Div. of Pros., Bd. of Dentistry, 442 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Every subpart of the motion—leave to appear as appellees, to withhold the mandate and preserve the Presentment, and for rehearing, clarification, rehearing en banc, and certification— depends on a party status and merits interest that Movants do not possess, and each therefore fails for want of standing.3 The request for rehearing fails for the additional, independent reasons discussed above. Accordingly, the Intervenors’ Motion for Leave to Appear as Appellees, to Withhold the Mandate and Preserve the Presentment, and for Rehearing, Clarification, Rehearing En Banc, and Certification is denied. BILBREY and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 3 This court’s October 7, 2026 opinion reversed the March 25, July 8, and August 6, 2026 orders—the “Notification Orders”—in full. To the extent Movants seek clarification, the reversal extended to the March 25, 2026 order, and Movants therefore no longer hold a subsisting grant of intervention. In any event, for the reasons stated above, the limited intervention that order conferred would not confer appellee status or a right to participate in the merits of this appeal. 7 Jesse Panuccio and David Costello of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for Katie Strickland. Alan Lawson of Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, Tallahassee, for Mark Wilson, Frank Walker, and Secure Florida’s Future. Joseph W. Jacquot of Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., Jacksonville, for Andrew Sheeran. Christopher Kise of Continental PLLC, Tallahassee, for James Uthmeier. Thomas E. Bishop of Bishop & Page PLLC, Jacksonville, for Jason Weida. John M. Guard, pro se. Bradford L. Thomas, Acting Attorney General; Jeffrey P. DeSousa and Jason J. Muehlhoff, Chief Deputy Solicitors General, Tallahassee, for the State of Florida. Barbara A. Petersen, Tallahassee, and Robert Craig Waters, Pensacola, for Proposed Intervenor Florida Center for Government Accountability, Inc. Michael Barfield, pro se, Proposed Intervenor. 8