In Re: Leon County Grand Jury Presentment, Fall of 2025
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket1D2026-2435
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2026-2435
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IN RE: LEON COUNTY GRAND
JURY PRESENTMENT, FALL OF
2025.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
James Lee Marsh, Judge.
November 16, 2026
ORDER ON INTERVENORS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR AS
APPELLEES, TO WITHHOLD THE MANDATE AND PRESERVE THE
PRESENTMENT, AND FOR REHEARING, CLARIFICATION, REHEARING
EN BANC, AND CERTIFICATION
NEFF, J.
The Florida Center for Government Accountability, Inc., and
Michael Barfield (together, “Movants”) move for leave to appear as
appellees in this appeal, to withhold the mandate and preserve the
Presentment under seal, and for rehearing, clarification, rehearing
en banc, and certification. The predicate for every subpart of the
motion is Movants’ asserted status as parties entitled to
participate in, and to defend the orders governing their
participation in, an appeal taken under section 905.28, Florida
Statutes. These assertions seem to presuppose that Movants must
be given access to confidential documents during the course of the
proceedings.
This appeal arose from a grand jury presentment not
accompanied by a true bill or indictment, governed by section
905.28. On March 25, 2026, the circuit court granted Movants
limited intervention “to test the correctness of the trial court’s
closure order (if any),” while denying them access to the
Presentment, the repression and expungement motions, related
matters, and any hearings. On July 8, 2026, on Movants’ motion
for clarification, the circuit court reiterated the limits of that
intervention and directed the State Attorney to notify Movants,
within three days, in the event of an appeal. On July 29, 2026, the
circuit court repressed and expunged most of the Presentment but
denied full expungement. On October 7, 2026, this court reversed
to the extent the circuit court denied full expungement, remanded
with directions to expunge the Presentment in full, and reversed
the orders concerning notification to Movants. Movants now seek
to appear as appellees and to have this court rehear the appeal.
A report or presentment of the grand jury relating to an
individual that is not accompanied by a true bill or indictment is
confidential and may not be made public until “the individual
concerned” has been furnished a copy and given fifteen days to
move the circuit court to repress or expunge the report or any
portion that is improper and unlawful. § 905.28, Fla. Stat. Such a
motion under section 905.28, whether granted or denied, delays
public announcement of the report until the circuit court’s ruling
is affirmed or reversed by the district court of appeal, or until the
time to appeal expires. Id. The statute thus defines both the
persons it protects and the parties whose interests are at stake on
appeal. The Florida Legislature mandated this process so that
those impugned in a Presentment may have adequate process to
clear their names. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Marko, 352 So.
2d 518, 520–21 (Fla. 1977).
The class of parties with a cognizable interest in a section
905.28 proceeding is narrow.1 First, the statute covers “the
1 The class is “narrow” only in the sense that the report must
relate to, and reflect adversely on, the person invoking section
905.28. The qualifying reference, however, need not be substantial.
Republic Properties found the threshold met by a brief, passing
mention, rejecting any requirement of a “significant” connection.
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individual concerned”—i.e., the person or entity to whom the
report relates and whose character is impugned by it—and those
persons or entities may move to repress or expunge and, if denied,
appeal. Republic Props. Corp. v. Grand Jury Presentment on City
of W. Palm Beach, Part A, Fall Term 2006, 971 So. 2d 289, 291–92
(Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Standing in such a proceeding turns solely on
“whether the report is one ‘relating to’” the movant, giving that
person standing to seek relief for the loss of notice and the
opportunity to clear his or her name. Id. at 293. Second, the State,
through the state attorney as the grand jury’s legal adviser and
the attorney general on appeal, may defend the report against
motions to repress or expunge. In re Grand Jury-1st Term of 2018,
300 So. 3d 775, 778–79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
Movants fall within neither category. They do not contend
that the Presentment relates to them or impugns their character.
They are a “news organization” and its “director” who seek access
to, and a voice in, the proceeding. Section 905.28 confers no
standing on a stranger to the report. The statute’s protections exist
to afford an unindicted person referred to in a presentment the
notice and opportunity to be heard that due process requires before
publication. In re Grand Jury, Fall Term 1986, Pinellas Cnty., 528
So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). A party to whom the report does
not relate has no interest the statute recognizes, and therefore no
standing to seek relief under it or to resist relief sought by those it
does protect. See Republic Props. Corp., 971 So. 2d at 293.
The United States Supreme Court has observed the following
about the grand jury process:
Although many governmental processes operate best
under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to
recognize that there are some kinds of government
operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted
openly. A classic example is that “the proper functioning
Republic Props. Corp., 971 So. 2d at 292–93. A wide range of
persons may therefore invoke the statute, but only those the report
actually touches, which Movants are not.
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of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings.”
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S.
1, 8–9 (1986) (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S.
211, 218 (1979)). Chapter 905 protects two interests at once—the
integrity of the grand jury process and the due-process rights of
those its work wrongfully impugns—and both depend on
confidentiality. That concern has particular force here. The
statutory scheme is built on the premise that confidential material
furnished during the review process will travel no further than the
law requires. Extending access, or a merits role, to a person who is
a stranger to the proceeding and holds no statutory interest in it
would place confidential grand jury material in the hands of one
with no corresponding incentive to preserve its confidentiality.2 As
this case and Pinellas County both illustrate, a circuit court’s
ability to preserve the confidentiality of a presentment while the
statutory process runs its course may require legislative
refinement. Absent such legislation, vigorous enforcement of the
current criminal sanctions against those who unlawfully disclose
grand jury testimony or evidence, see § 905.27(2), (4), Fla. Stat.,
and against those who solicit or conspire to procure their
disclosure, see § 777.04, Fla. Stat., would go far in curing the
statutory shortcomings.
Movants’ position is also foreclosed by a factually similar case.
In Pinellas County, a newspaper and one of its reporters sought to
intervene and gain access to the motions to repress or expunge a
presentment not accompanied by a true bill or indictment. 528 So.
2d at 52. In that case, as in this one, the presentment was
published after the individuals named in it were furnished copies.
Id. There, the circuit court denied access but granted intervention
“solely to enable the newspapers to seek review of the order
foreclosing revelation of the motions.” Id. The Second District held
2 Prudence counsels against furnishing confidential grand
jury materials to any stranger to the proceeding who holds no
interest in them. This caution carries added weight where, for
example, such a person has a history of misconduct before a grand
jury.
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that a newspaper has no First Amendment right of access to the
procedural motions to repress or expunge such a presentment and
affirmed. Id. at 52–53. Granting the media limited intervention to
test the correctness of a closure order is “not an uncommon
practice.” Id. at 52 n.2. That is precisely the limited intervention
the circuit court granted here—intervention to test any closure
order, not to participate in the repression and expungement
merits. Pinellas County confirms that such limited intervention
does not make a news organization a party entitled to litigate, or
to defend orders bearing on, the section 905.28 proceeding itself.
Id. at 52–53.
Movants’ reliance on Smith v. Crawford, 645 So. 2d 513, 515
n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A.
Knott, Inc., 247 So. 2d 517, 519–20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), and Union
Central Life Insurance Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla.
1992), does not change the result. Those decisions establish that
an intervenor is ordinarily a party and may be designated an
appellee; that an intervenor may appeal a ruling adverse to it so
long as it is aggrieved, subject always to the qualification that
intervention is in subordination to the main proceeding; and that
the status of intervenor “assures the right to be heard and the
ability to appeal an adverse ruling.” Such participation is limited
only to the extent of the interest that supports the intervention.
Carlisle, 593 So. 2d at 508. Movants’ interest below was expressly
confined to testing the correctness of a closure order, and they were
denied access to the Presentment, the motions, and the hearings.
Even accepting that the limited intervention made them parties
for that confined purpose, it did not enlarge their interest into a
stake in the repression and expungement merits that section
905.28 reserves to the individual concerned and the State. In re
Grand Jury-1st Term of 2018, 300 So. 3d at 778–79. An intervenor
cannot bootstrap a limited procedural interest into standing to
relitigate a determination on interests the statute does not assign
to the intervenor.
Nor does the asserted lack of notice of the appeal supply the
missing standing. The July 8, 2026 order required the State
Attorney to notify Movants of an appeal, but Movants were owed
no such notice: a party whose limited interest cannot be affected
by the disposition of the appeal has no cognizable stake in it, and
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this court has in any event reversed the orders imposing that
requirement. Service and notice follow party status in the
proceeding; they do not create it. The absence of a direct,
statutorily recognized interest is what defeats Movants’ request,
and a party with no cognizable interest in the merits of a section
905.28 appeal is neither aggrieved by, nor entitled to defend
against, its disposition.
This conclusion is reinforced by the discretionary nature of
intervention itself. Intervention is not a matter of right and
whether to permit it rests in a court’s sound discretion. Fla.
Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement, 707 So.
2d 841, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). And any intervention that is
allowed remains “in subordination to, and in recognition of, the
propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the
court in its discretion.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.230. Consequently, a “court
has discretion in imposing any conditions on the intervenor
necessary to preserve the original parties’ rights, inasmuch as ‘the
rights of an intervenor are subordinate to the rights of the
parties.’” Bondi v. Tucker, 93 So. 3d 1106, 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
(quoting Env’t Confederation of Sw. Fla., Inc. v. IMC Phosphates,
Inc., 857 So. 2d 207, 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)). That subordinating
principle is especially warranted where, as here, the main
proceeding is a confidential grand jury matter whose secrecy
section 905.28 protects—a setting in which a limited intervenor’s
participation cannot expand to engulf the merits the statute
commits to any individual concerned and the State.
Moreover, an intervenor granted leave for one limited purpose
“ha[s] no authority to move to rehear the final judgment” on
matters outside that purpose. Macana Invs., LLC v. Longridge Fin.
LLC, 418 So. 3d 145, 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). Yet Movants’ motion
is directed not to any closure order but to the merits of the
repression and expungement ruling. Independently, a motion for
rehearing “shall not present issues not previously raised,” Fla. R.
App. P. 9.330(a)(2)(A), and is not “an open invitation for an
unhappy litigant or attorney to reargue the same points previously
presented, or to discuss the bottomless depth of the displeasure
that one might feel toward this judicial body as a result of having
unsuccessfully sought appellate relief.” Ayala v. Gonzalez, 984 So.
2d 523, 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Movants, who concede they have
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not seen the record, the briefs, or the exhibits, instead rest on
extensive argument and materials never presented to this court.
“That an appellate court may not consider matters outside the
record is so elemental that there is no excuse for any attorney to
attempt to bring such matters before the court,” and “[w]hen a
party includes in an appendix material or matters outside the
record, or refers to such material or matters in its brief, it is proper
for the court to strike the same.” Altchiler v. State, Dep’t of Pro.
Regul., Div. of Pros., Bd. of Dentistry, 442 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983).
Every subpart of the motion—leave to appear as appellees, to
withhold the mandate and preserve the Presentment, and for
rehearing, clarification, rehearing en banc, and certification—
depends on a party status and merits interest that Movants do not
possess, and each therefore fails for want of standing.3 The request
for rehearing fails for the additional, independent reasons
discussed above. Accordingly, the Intervenors’ Motion for Leave to
Appear as Appellees, to Withhold the Mandate and Preserve the
Presentment, and for Rehearing, Clarification, Rehearing En
Banc, and Certification is denied.
BILBREY and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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3 This court’s October 7, 2026 opinion reversed the March 25,
July 8, and August 6, 2026 orders—the “Notification Orders”—in
full. To the extent Movants seek clarification, the reversal
extended to the March 25, 2026 order, and Movants therefore no
longer hold a subsisting grant of intervention. In any event, for the
reasons stated above, the limited intervention that order conferred
would not confer appellee status or a right to participate in the
merits of this appeal.
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Jesse Panuccio and David Costello of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP,
Fort Lauderdale, for Katie Strickland.
Alan Lawson of Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, Tallahassee, for
Mark Wilson, Frank Walker, and Secure Florida’s Future.
Joseph W. Jacquot of Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A.,
Jacksonville, for Andrew Sheeran.
Christopher Kise of Continental PLLC, Tallahassee, for James
Uthmeier.
Thomas E. Bishop of Bishop & Page PLLC, Jacksonville, for Jason
Weida.
John M. Guard, pro se.
Bradford L. Thomas, Acting Attorney General; Jeffrey P. DeSousa
and Jason J. Muehlhoff, Chief Deputy Solicitors General,
Tallahassee, for the State of Florida.
Barbara A. Petersen, Tallahassee, and Robert Craig Waters,
Pensacola, for Proposed Intervenor Florida Center for Government
Accountability, Inc.
Michael Barfield, pro se, Proposed Intervenor.
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