District of Columbia v. Razjooyan
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-1210
JudgeJudge Christopher R. Cooper
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 26-cv-1210 (CRC)
ALI RAZJOOYAN, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
The District of Columbia has sued a family of local landlords for allegedly operating a
criminal enterprise that has victimized D.C. tenants and taxpayers, as well as private lenders, by
maintaining dilapidated and dangerous rent-controlled apartments. One of the defendants’
lenders now moves to intervene in the case. Concluding that the lender is not entitled to
intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and that permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b) would unduly interfere with the District’s efforts to protect the
public interest, the Court will deny the motion.
I. Background
The Court recounted the factual and procedural background of this case in a prior opinion
and provides only a brief summary of the relevant details here. See District of Columbia v.
Razjooyan, No. 26-cv-1210 (CRC), 2026 WL 2295368, at *1–6 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2026).
The District of Columbia (the “District”) brought suit against brothers Ali (“Sam”) and
Eimon Razjooyan and their mother Houri Razjooyan (collectively, “Defendants”) for allegedly
“operat[ing] a criminal enterprise that acquires and controls dozens of dilapidated multi-family
residential properties in the District.” Compl. ¶ 1. According to the District, Defendants are
“running a Ponzi-like scheme,” allowing acquired properties to “remain in or deteriorate into
deplorable condition” while using those same properties “as bait to secure an ever-increasing
number of sizeable loans” in order to “line the[ir] pockets” with the loan proceeds. Id. ¶ 2. The
District brings five claims against Defendants, see id. ¶¶ 306–69, including—as relevant here—
two counts under the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), see
id. ¶ 306–38.
Velocity Commercial Capital, LLC, d/b/a New Day Commercial Capital (“New Day”) is
one of Defendants’ lenders. New Day maintains that it was “defrauded by Defendants’ illegal
scheme in violation of [RICO] as specifically alleged in the District’s Complaint.” Mot. to
Intervene as Pl. by Velocity Commercial Capital, LLC d/b/a New Day Commercial Capital
(“Mot. to Intervene”) at 1. New Day has moved to intervene, both as of right and at the Court’s
discretion. See id. Both the District and Defendant Sam Razjooyan oppose intervention.
II. Analysis
A. Intervention as of Right
The Court must permit a party to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a)(2) if: (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the party “claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action”; (3) the party “is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to
protect that interest”; and (4) “the applicant’s interest is [not] adequately represented by existing
parties.” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Mova
Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
New Day contends it is entitled to intervene as of right because it “meets all four criteria”
set out by Rule 24(a). Mot. to Intervene at 3. The District contests application of the third
prong, arguing that “denying intervention does not impair [New Day’s] ability to protect its
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interests in redressing its commercial lending loss with a money judgment against Defendants.”
Pl. the District of Columbia’s Statement of Opposing P. & A. in Opp’n to New Day’s Mot. to
Intervene (“District’s Opp’n”) at 5. The Court agrees with the District. New Day is not entitled
to intervention as of right because it is not “so situated that disposing of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede [its] ability to protect its interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
New Day argues that because “the District’s allegations include claims regarding Sam
Razjooyan’s fraudulent scheme directed at New Day,” it “could be practically impaired from
bringing successful RICO claims based on the same operative facts.” Mot. to Intervene at 4.
That is sufficient, according to New Day, to carry the “minimal” burden of demonstrating that its
“interest would be impaired if it cannot intervene.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court is unpersuaded by New Day’s impairment argument because it can bring its
damages claims against Defendants under RICO or other applicable legal theories in a separate
suit without facing any impediment or impairment from this case. To be sure, New Day is
correct that impairment can result from “a practical disadvantage . . . even if the intervenor could
raise the issue in another forum,” regardless of whether its claims would later be barred by
collateral estoppel or res judicata. Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Intervene as Pl. by Velocity
Commercial Capital, LLC d/b/a New Day Commercial Capital (“New Day’s Reply”) at 6–7; see
also Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (explaining that “the opportunity to
raise the same issue in another forum” is not in itself a “bar to intervention as of right”). New
Day identifies such “a risk of practical impairment that justifies intervention” based on the
possibility of an adverse ruling. New Day’s Reply at 7. Specifically, New Day claims that if its
“loan is found not to have been a ‘predicate act’ in furtherance of the racketeering Enterprise,”
then that could “create practical obstacles for New Day in a later action.” Id. at 7. New Day
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appears to be referring to complications stemming from stare decisis. See id. (citing Nuesse, 385
F.2d at 702, where the D.C. Circuit held that “stare decisis principles may in some cases supply
the practical disadvantage that warrants intervention as of right”).
But “the stare decisis problem is greatly lessened where there are parties already in the
suit whose position on the issues is the same as the absent party’s,” Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d
947, 954 (9th Cir. 1977), as is the case here. See also SEC v. Everest Mgmt. Corp., 475 F.2d
1236, 1239 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining that stare decisis could not provide the requisite
“practical disadvantage” because “the SEC is adequately representing the interests of appellants
insofar as the stare decisis problem is concerned,” even though the court found that the interests
of the party seeking to intervene were “not adequately represented by existing parties because
only appellants claim damages”). 1 Because both the District and New Day offer New Day’s loan
to Defendants as a RICO predicate act, any stare decisis problem is minimized. And the
consequences of stare decisis are further diminished by the fact that this is not “a question of first
impression” such that one “may expect that a decision by the District Court here, the first judicial
treatment of this question, would receive great weight.” Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 702. Rather, there
is no particular reason to think that any decision by this Court pertaining to New Day’s loan
“would receive great weight,” id., since that ruling would simply be persuasive and not binding
authority if another district court were to consider the issue. For example, if New Day brings its
1
New Day tries to distinguish the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Everest by arguing that
“[u]nlike the intervenors” there, “New Day is not being adequately represented by the District
(which the District does not contest)” because “the [D]istrict has not sought damages on behalf
of New Day, but only on its own behalf.” New Day’s Reply at 7 (emphasis omitted). That
distinction is of no matter, though, because the Second Circuit found there was no impairment
based on stare decisis despite also holding that the intervenors’ interests were not adequately
represented due to the very fact that the SEC was not claiming damages. See Everest, 475 F.2d
at 1239 & n.4.
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own RICO claims against Defendants, it could advance a different argument than the District as
to whether its loan constitutes a predicate act. That argument could dissuade a district court from
adopting any future decision on the issue by this Court, and it would not matter for purposes of
stare decisis whether that distinct argument is presented in the current litigation or a separate suit.
Accordingly, denying intervention would not cause New Day to suffer undue practical
impairment in protecting its interest, so it is not entitled to intervention as of right. 2
B. Permissive Intervention
Alternatively, New Day urges the Court to permit it to intervene under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24(b), which allows intervention by a party who “has a claim or defense that
shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
“[P]ermissive intervention is an inherently discretionary enterprise.” EEOC v. Nat’l Child.’s
Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In evaluating a motion for permissive
intervention, “the court must consider ‘whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the rights of the original parties’ and may also consider ‘whether parties seeking intervention will
2
In its reply brief, New Day also argues that “considering that the underlying predicate
acts alleged by the District involve multiple, prosecutable federal crimes, [it] also is concerned as
to its practical ability to gather evidence, later, in furtherance of a separate RICO claim should
such a criminal action be pursued.” New Day’s Reply at 7. The Court need not consider this
because “[a]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.” Nippon Shinyaku Co.
v. Iancu, 369 F. Supp. 3d 226, 239 n.8 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 796 F. App’x 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
In any case, consideration of New Day’s argument would not change the Court’s
conclusion. New Day cites Twenty First Century Corp. v. LaBianca, 801 F. Supp. 1007, 1009
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). See New Day’s Reply at 8. In that case, the court granted the federal
government’s motion to intervene where it sought “to stay civil discovery pending disposition of
the criminal case” because the plaintiff’s claims, including under RICO, were related to a
pending federal criminal trial. Twenty First Century Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 1009. While New
Day could hypothetically face a similar issue if it pursues its RICO claims in a separate suit, this
does not impair its ability to protect its interest because (1) that very same issue could arise in
this case as well if the federal government sought to intervene; and (2) the Court is not aware of
any pending federal criminal prosecution based on the acts alleged by the District.
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significantly contribute to . . . the just and equitable adjudication of the legal question
presented.’” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 274 F.R.D. 305, 313 (D.D.C. 2011) (alteration
in original) (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b); and then quoting
Aristotle Int’l, Inc. v. NGP Software, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2010)).
In arguing that “intervention will not delay or prejudice any parties,” New Day
emphasizes the timeliness of its motion to intervene and the fact that the Court “has yet to rule on
the substance of the District’s claims for relief.” Mot. to Intervene at 5; see also id. (“[T]his
Motion was filed within two weeks of the Court’s setting a status conference . . . and within 2
business days of the status conference[.]”).
But as the District rightly points out, “the ‘complicating effect’ of New Day’s
intervention ‘outweighs any advantage of a single disposition of the common issues.’” District’s
Opp’n at 9 (quoting Everest, 475 F.2d at 1240). “Where suit is brought by the government to
enforce the law, public . . . policy militates against the pendency of private claims and the
concomitant delay, confusion and complexity they introduce.” SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg.
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 305, 307 (D.D.C. 1973); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Efrosman, No. 05 Civ 8422 (KMW), 2012 WL 2510338, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2012)
(explaining that “[c]ourts are reluctant to allow private parties to intervene in government
enforcement actions” and “have denied permissive intervention because it places undue costs and
burdens on the government, including increasing the complexity of cases and slowing
litigation”). Even if New Day is correct that “this RICO case is not akin to a government
enforcement action by one of Congress’s designated federal regulators,” New Day’s Reply at 10,
the same logic applies. For one, the District points out that there are at least 28 other “similarly
situated, sophisticated financial institutions that lost money” at the hands of Defendants, meaning
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that New Day’s intervention could “open the floodgates to intervention by any number of other
lenders[,] giving rise to an unwieldy case with dozens of plaintiffs by intervention.” District’s
Opp’n at 9. And allowing New Day and potentially dozens of other lenders to intervene “would
inevitably reorient the case toward the private interests of sophisticated financial institutions that
can easily bring their own actions.” Id. at 10. That would undermine the purpose of the
District’s suit, which was brought “to vindicate the interests of the public and the District for
serious violations” of not just RICO, but also two other state statutes. Id. at 9. Allowing New
Day and other interested private parties to piggyback on the District’s suit through intervention
would foreseeably complicate that effort.
New Day responds that (1) “any potential prejudice or delay” that would result from it
and potentially other lenders intervening can be mitigated by the Court imposing conditions to
ensure efficient discovery; and (2) prohibiting intervention would instead “unnecessarily burden
the courts” by requiring a separate suit involving the same Defendants, “overlapping predicate
acts,” and “much of the same discovery.” New Day’s Reply at 9. But these responses overlook
the prejudice the District would suffer by shifting the focus of the suit from vindicating the
public interest to vindicating the interests of private financial institutions. And given the
primacy of the public interest in this case, New Day’s intervention will likely not “significantly
contribute to . . . the just and equitable adjudication of the legal question presented.” Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, 274 F.R.D. at 313 (quoting Aristotle Int’l, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d at 18).
Exercising the “wide latitude afforded to district courts under the rule,” Nat’l Child.’s Ctr., Inc.,
146 F.3d at 1046, the Court concludes that any potential tools to mitigate prejudice or delay and
any potential reduced burden on the courts do not outweigh the distinct prejudice that the District
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would likely suffer should New Day and possibly other lenders be allowed to intervene in the
case. It therefore denies intervention under Rule 24(b). 3
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Velocity Commercial Capital, LLC, d/b/a
New Day Commercial Capital’s [14] Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff. A separate Order shall
accompany this Opinion.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date: November 19, 2026
3
The Court also notes that because the District and New Day have “divergent interests”
in related proceedings in D.C. Superior Court and the Bankruptcy Court, “any judicial efficiency
that would ordinarily be achieved through intervention” may be lost here. District’s Opp’n at 10.
New Day insists that “New Day and the District have met and conferred in this case as well as in
the bankruptcy case” despite those divergent interests and that there is “no reason” why either
party would be unable “to continue to act professionally in this matter.” New Day’s Reply at 10.
Still, the possibility that those divergent interests could undermine any benefit to judicial
economy further counsels against permissive intervention here.
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