Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1694-24 XJH1, LLC, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JUSTIN CARTER, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued October 6, 2026 – Decided November 6, 2026 Before Judges Gummer and Paganelli. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-006685-22. Justin Carter, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf. Dale W. Keith argued the cause for respondent (Keith & Keith LLC, attorneys; Dale W. Keith, on the brief). PER CURIAM In this landlord-tenant case, defendant Justin Carter appeals an order denying his motion to "[e]xpunge" from the public record the "eviction filing" in this case or to seal the record.1 Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, we affirm. I. On March 21, 2023, the court entered a "judgment for possession against [d]efendant [t]enant(s) JUSTIN CARTER, CHAIM WOLFINGER, GARY GAINES, JR., [and] ANTHONY HARRIS, for failure to comply with the terms of the parties' settlement agreement." 2 The judgment contained the following provision: A tenant can . . . file a motion under Rule 4:50-1 requesting that the judgment for possession be vacated (reversed) and the complaint dismissed, if the tenant can show good reason such as mistake or excusable neglect, fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct by an adverse party, newly discovered evidence or any other reason justifying relief from the judgment for possession. 1 The term "expungement" generally applies to records in a criminal matter. "The Legislature defined 'expungement' as the 'extraction and isolation' of records 'of an offense within the criminal justice system.'" Bd. of Educ., Twp. of Middletown v. Middletown Tchrs. Educ. Ass'n, 365 N.J. Super. 419, 423 (Ch. Div. 2003) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1(a)). As discussed later in this opinion, a court may "seal" information in a court record in a civil matter under certain circumstances pursuant to Rule 1:38-11. 2 Because he is the only defendant participating in this appeal, we use "defendant" to refer to appellant Carter. A-1694-24 2 Nothing in the record demonstrates defendant appealed or moved to vacate the judgment. Defendant subsequently moved to "[e]xpunge" or seal the record. Defendant did not include in his appellate appendix copies of the notice of motion or any certification he may have submitted in support of the motion. On January 16, 2025, the trial court entered an order and placed a decision on the record denying the motion. The court found defendant was not entitled under Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) to the relief he sought and had not established good cause to seal the record. On appeal, defendant contends "he was not the subject of the judgment of possession," he had not violated the parties' settlement agreement, and the judgment of possession was without merit. He also asserts he was not served with a copy of the judgment of possession and that "[b]ecause the eviction filing remains publicly associated with [him], he has been denied housing and faces ongoing risk of homelessness." II. "We . . . review orders denying motions to seal [court] records for abuse of discretion." Pine Ridge Realty Assocs., LLC v. A.O., 483 N.J. Super. 487, 492 (App. Div. 2026). "A court abuses its discretion when its 'decision is made A-1694-24 3 without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) (quoting State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo a trial court's legal conclusions, including its "applica[tion] or interpretation of court rules." Pine Ridge, 483 N.J. Super. at 492. Rule 1:38 governs public access to court records. As set forth in Rule 1:38-1, court records "are open for public inspection" unless an exception applies and "[e]xceptions . . . shall be narrowly construed in order to implement the policy of open access to records of the judiciary." The Rule is premised on the public's "common-law right of access to judicial proceedings and . . . right to inspect judicial records." Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am. Inc., 385 N.J. Super. 307, 315 (App. Div. 2006). Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) excludes from public access "records of (i) adjudicated or otherwise disposed of landlord tenant cases in which no judgment for possession ever has been entered; and (ii) landlord tenant cases in which judgment for possession was entered seven years ago or longer." Neither exception under that Rule applies here. The court entered a judgment for possession in this case less than seven years ago. Contrary to defendant's A-1694-24 4 assertion that "he was not the subject of the judgment of possession," the judgment of possession was expressly entered against him as well as the other defendants. Defendant's belief that the judgment should not have been entered against him does not change the fact that it was entered against him less than seven years ago. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining defendant was not entitled to relief under Rule 1:38-3(f)(11). A court may seal court records pursuant to Rule 1:38-11 if the moving party demonstrates "by a preponderance of the evidence that good cause exists" for sealing the records. R. 1:38-11(a). Good cause exists if "[d]isclosure will likely cause a clearly defined and serious injury to any person . . . and . . . [t]he person's . . . interest in privacy substantially outweighs the presumption that all court . . . records are open for public inspection pursuant to R[ule] 1:38." R. 1:38-11(b); see also Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356, 381 (1995) (finding "the person who seeks to overcome the strong presumption of access must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the interest in secrecy outweighs the presumption"). In applying this rule, the court must conduct "[a] flexible balancing process . . . to determine whether the need for secrecy substantially outweighs the presumption of access." In re T.I.C.-C., 470 N.J. Super. 596, 608 (App. Div. A-1694-24 5 2022) (quoting Hammock, 142 N.J. at 381). "Th[at] need for secrecy must be demonstrated with specificity as to each document. Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient." Hammock, 142 N.J. at 381-82 (emphasis omitted). A trial court may seal court documents pursuant to Rule 1:38-11 "only after it has 'examin[ed] each document individually and ma[de] factual findings with regard to why the presumption of public access has been overcome.'" States Newsroom, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 261 N.J. 392, 419-20 (2025) (alterations in original) (quoting Hammock, 142 N.J. at 382). We perceive no abuse of discretion in the court's determination that defendant failed to establish good cause to seal the records at issue. In his appellate merits and reply briefs, defendant makes factual assertions about the judgment of possession, service of that judgment, and the consequences of that judgment on him. The record does not contain a certification or affidavit that supported those factual assertions and that was submitted to the trial court. See Pine Ridge, 483 N.J. Super. at 491 (noting the defendant had submitted a certification in support of her motion to vacate a judgment of possession and seal the court record); see also R. 1:6-6 ("If a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, or not judicially noticeable, the court may hear it on A-1694-24 6 affidavits made on personal knowledge, setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify . . . ."). Defendant makes many of those factual assertions in an effort to support his claim that the judgment of possession was improvidently entered. The motion at issue in this appeal, however, was not a motion to vacate the judgment. It was a motion to seal the court's record. And, as the trial court found, defendant did not demonstrate the court records at issue should be excluded from public access under Rule 1:38-3(f)(11) or that good cause exists to seal them. Accordingly, we affirm the January 16, 2025 order denying defendant's motion. Affirmed. 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