Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00436-CV IN RE JADE GORHAM, RELATOR ORIGINAL PROCEEDING November 12, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ. “Justice demands a speedy resolution” of child custody issues. Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987). See also In re Tex. Dep’t Fam. & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding). By this original proceeding, Relator, Jade Gorham, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Honorable William R. Eichman II, presiding judge of the 364th District Court of Lubbock, and the Honorable Kara Darnell, associate judge, to vacate temporary orders issued in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. She also seeks emergency relief in the form of a stay of all further proceedings in trial court cause number DC2025FM1824 pending resolution of the petition for mandamus. By nine issues, Relator asserts the challenged orders were based on a fundamentally defective adversary hearing. She maintains the hearing occurred without a complete presentation of prima facie evidence. She also claims she was denied effective assistance of counsel and lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. At the core of her complaints, Relator complains the Department failed to establish an immediate and exigent danger at the time of removal when it did not enter its reason to believe neglectful- supervision finding until 45 days later. For the reasons expressed herein, we deny mandamus relief. Relator’s request for emergency relief is moot as there are no pending proceedings until December 3, 2026. BACKGROUND According to the limited mandamus record, Relator’s two minor children were removed from her care on September 4, 2025, after the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services found an immediate danger to their physical health or safety. The Department’s Notice of Removal expressed concerns with Relator’s ongoing drug and alcohol use and untreated mental health issues. No other adults lived in Relator’s home and no relative was available to care for the children. Documentation included with Relator’s petition indicates she tested positive for amphetamines and was not feeling well. She was unable to care for her children and although the children were clean and well- mannered, they complained of inadequate nourishment. Relator claimed she was experiencing a temporary medical crisis—kidney stones. On September 5, 2025, the Department filed its Original Petition for Protection of a Child, For Conservatorship, and for Termination in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship alleging there was an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of 2 the children. That same date, the court signed its Order for Protection of a Child in an Emergency and Notice of Court Proceeding. The order reflects Relator was appointed temporary counsel to represent her. Later in September, the Department implemented a Family Service Plan for Relator. A temporary adversary hearing was held on October 7, 2025, and the associate judge entered the following findings of sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary prudence and caution that: (1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the children; (2) the urgent need for protection required the children’s immediate removal; and (3) reasonable efforts were made to enable the children to return home but there was a substantial risk of a continuing danger if returned. TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.201(g). Based on the findings, the associate judge signed temporary orders on October 8, 2025, appointing the Department as temporary managing conservator. Relator did not provide a transcription of the hearing with her petition for mandamus.1 She was granted de novo review of the temporary orders on November 6, 2025. The temporary orders were upheld on December 22, 2025. According to documents included with the Department’s response to Relator’s petition, the case was set for trial on the merits for June 18, 2026, and later for September 1, 2026. The trial did not occur and on September 1, the trial court signed an order 1 Relator filed her unsworn declaration of “No Court Reporter’s Record for Ex Parte Proceeding.” She asserts the “ex parte hearing” was conducted “entirely without an official court reporter recording the proceeding.” 3 retaining the suit on the docket with a dismissal date of March 6, 2027, 2 a trial setting of February 1, 2027, and a pretrial hearing set for December 3, 2026. STANDARD OF REVIEW Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy granted only when a relator can show (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion and (2) there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). To establish an abuse of discretion, the complaining party must demonstrate the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). The relator bears the burden to show entitlement to mandamus relief. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837. Because a trial court’s temporary orders are not subject to an interlocutory appeal, mandamus is the appropriate procedure to challenge them. Dancy v. Dagget, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991). Relator has established she has no adequate remedy at law thereby satisfying the second prong for seeking mandamus relief. Thus, our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. ANALYSIS Despite having satisfied the second prong for mandamus relief—no adequate remedy at law—Relator cannot satisfy the first prong—abuse of discretion by the trial court. 2 TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a), (b) (requiring automatic dismissal unless trial begins by the dismissal date). 4 A relator challenging a trial court’s ruling as an abuse of discretion “labors under a heavy burden.” Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985); In re Welch, No. 07-02-00338-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6513, at *6 (Tex. App.— Amarillo Aug. 29, 2002, orig. proceeding). As the Department notes, a relator is required to file certified or sworn copies of documents material to her claim and a properly authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying proceeding including exhibits offered in evidence, or a statement that no testimony was adduced in connection with the complaint being made. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a).3 Here, Relator failed to comply with some of the requirements for the form and content of her petition. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3. Relator’s appendix to her petition contains certain documents but they are not certified or sworn as required by Rule 52.7(a)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. She also failed to provide a properly authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying proceeding including exhibits offered in evidence, or a statement that no testimony was adduced in connection with the complaint being made.4 TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(2). Neither did she include a transcript of the de novo hearing. Relator filed an unsworn statement that no court reporter was present at the hearing but does not claim no testimony was adduced. In fact, she acknowledges she 3 In an amended reply, Relator disputes that her uncertified copies of documents must be disregarded. Relying on In re M-I L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2016), and Rule 193.7 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, she claims her documents are self-authenticating. The authorities relied on do not apply to the requirements for a petition for writ of mandamus. 4 In her amended reply, she mistakenly relies on Rule 52.7(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and places the burden on the Department to supplement her mandamus record with a transcript of the hearing. The rule places the burden on the relator. A basic tenet of mandamus is that the relator bears the burden to provide a sufficient record showing entitlement to relief. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837. 5 testified “without validly appointed counsel.” In the absence of a transcript, a reviewing court presumes sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court’s ruling. In re Lambdin, No. 07-03-00328-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7110, at *6–7 (Tex. App.— Amarillo Aug. 20, 2003, orig. proceeding). Notwithstanding the deficiencies in Relator’s petition, she cannot prevail on the merits of her petition. Mandamus issues to assist the diligent and not those who slumber on their rights. In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding). Whether a relator’s delay in asserting its rights precludes mandamus relief depends on the circumstances. In re Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V., 494 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). An unreasonable delay and an opponent’s detrimental change in position due to the delay factor into whether a party slumbered on its rights. Satisfaction of these elements depends on the circumstances of the particular case. In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d at 318. This Court has found a four-month delay in seeking mandamus relief in a custody case, albeit partly explained, unreasonable and denied relief in In re E.S., No. 07-19- 00323-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 11228, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 30, 2019, orig. proceeding). In the pending case, Relator waited approximately a year to challenge temporary orders. The delay was detrimental to the Department in that Relator sat idle as trial was rescheduled three times, and she waited until less than four months before the third trial setting to seek mandamus relief.5 The delay was also detrimental and against the children’s best interests as the Legislature has expressed these matters to be 5 Relator asserts the Department successfully delayed the trial on the merits three times. There is nothing in the limited record supporting her contention. 6 handled expeditiously. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a), (b). We find Relator slumbered on her rights. Finally, Relator claims she was denied effective assistance of counsel. The “statutory right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases embodies the right to effective counsel.” In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003). But one is not entitled to perfect counsel, only reasonably effective counsel. In re L.G., No. 07-14-00365-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *13–14 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). The standard applied in criminal cases in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), applies to parental rights cases. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545. Strickland requires a party to show counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A relator must satisfy those two prongs before a reviewing court may denounce counsel as ineffective. In re M.M., No. 07-20-00089-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 6816, at *22 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). On September 5, 2025, when the trial court signed the Order for Protection of a Child, it appointed temporary counsel to represent Relator as required by section 107.013(a) of the Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.013(a). Thus, she had the benefit of appointed counsel thirty-two days before the full adversary hearing held on October 7, 2025. She alleges counsel “failed to object, demand exculpatory evidence, make offers of proof, authenticate the body-camera material and contrary records, or preserve evidentiary rulings.” After the adversary hearing, the trial court entered a permanent order appointing counsel. The trial court’s order reflects Relator was present at the hearing and represented by counsel. Relator’s failure to provide a transcription of the hearing renders 7 it impossible to review whether counsel’s representation was deficient and prejudiced her case. In addition to Relator’s unreasonable delay in seeking relief, she has not provided a record demonstrating the adversary hearing was fundamentally defective. She has not shown she was denied effective assistance of counsel. Without a record of the hearing, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in entering temporary orders appointing the Department as managing conservator. We overrule her issues and deny mandamus relief. CONCLUSION Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus requesting the trial court be ordered to vacate its temporary orders is denied. Relator’s request for emergency relief is moot. Alex Yarbrough Justice 8