In Re Jade Gorham, Relator v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket07-26-00436-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00436-CV
IN RE JADE GORHAM, RELATOR
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
November 12, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
“Justice demands a speedy resolution” of child custody issues. Proffer v. Yates,
734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987). See also In re Tex. Dep’t Fam. & Protective Servs.,
210 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).
By this original proceeding, Relator, Jade Gorham, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ
of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Honorable William R. Eichman II, presiding
judge of the 364th District Court of Lubbock, and the Honorable Kara Darnell, associate
judge, to vacate temporary orders issued in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship.
She also seeks emergency relief in the form of a stay of all further proceedings in trial
court cause number DC2025FM1824 pending resolution of the petition for mandamus.
By nine issues, Relator asserts the challenged orders were based on a
fundamentally defective adversary hearing. She maintains the hearing occurred without
a complete presentation of prima facie evidence. She also claims she was denied
effective assistance of counsel and lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. At the core of
her complaints, Relator complains the Department failed to establish an immediate and
exigent danger at the time of removal when it did not enter its reason to believe neglectful-
supervision finding until 45 days later. For the reasons expressed herein, we deny
mandamus relief. Relator’s request for emergency relief is moot as there are no pending
proceedings until December 3, 2026.
BACKGROUND
According to the limited mandamus record, Relator’s two minor children were
removed from her care on September 4, 2025, after the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services found an immediate danger to their physical health or safety. The
Department’s Notice of Removal expressed concerns with Relator’s ongoing drug and
alcohol use and untreated mental health issues. No other adults lived in Relator’s home
and no relative was available to care for the children. Documentation included with
Relator’s petition indicates she tested positive for amphetamines and was not feeling well.
She was unable to care for her children and although the children were clean and well-
mannered, they complained of inadequate nourishment. Relator claimed she was
experiencing a temporary medical crisis—kidney stones.
On September 5, 2025, the Department filed its Original Petition for Protection of
a Child, For Conservatorship, and for Termination in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child
Relationship alleging there was an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of
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the children. That same date, the court signed its Order for Protection of a Child in an
Emergency and Notice of Court Proceeding. The order reflects Relator was appointed
temporary counsel to represent her. Later in September, the Department implemented a
Family Service Plan for Relator.
A temporary adversary hearing was held on October 7, 2025, and the associate
judge entered the following findings of sufficient evidence to satisfy a person of ordinary
prudence and caution that:
(1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the children;
(2) the urgent need for protection required the children’s immediate
removal; and
(3) reasonable efforts were made to enable the children to return home but
there was a substantial risk of a continuing danger if returned.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 262.201(g). Based on the findings, the associate judge signed
temporary orders on October 8, 2025, appointing the Department as temporary managing
conservator. Relator did not provide a transcription of the hearing with her petition for
mandamus.1 She was granted de novo review of the temporary orders on November 6,
2025. The temporary orders were upheld on December 22, 2025.
According to documents included with the Department’s response to Relator’s
petition, the case was set for trial on the merits for June 18, 2026, and later for September
1, 2026. The trial did not occur and on September 1, the trial court signed an order
1 Relator filed her unsworn declaration of “No Court Reporter’s Record for Ex Parte Proceeding.”
She asserts the “ex parte hearing” was conducted “entirely without an official court reporter recording the
proceeding.”
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retaining the suit on the docket with a dismissal date of March 6, 2027, 2 a trial setting of
February 1, 2027, and a pretrial hearing set for December 3, 2026.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy granted only when a relator can show (1)
the trial court clearly abused its discretion and (2) there is no adequate remedy by appeal.
In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding);
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). To establish an
abuse of discretion, the complaining party must demonstrate the trial court acted
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer
v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). The relator bears
the burden to show entitlement to mandamus relief. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837.
Because a trial court’s temporary orders are not subject to an interlocutory appeal,
mandamus is the appropriate procedure to challenge them. Dancy v. Dagget, 815
S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991). Relator has established she has no adequate remedy at
law thereby satisfying the second prong for seeking mandamus relief. Thus, our review
is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.
ANALYSIS
Despite having satisfied the second prong for mandamus relief—no adequate
remedy at law—Relator cannot satisfy the first prong—abuse of discretion by the trial
court.
2 TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a), (b) (requiring automatic dismissal unless trial begins by the
dismissal date).
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A relator challenging a trial court’s ruling as an abuse of discretion “labors under a
heavy burden.” Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985);
In re Welch, No. 07-02-00338-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6513, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Aug. 29, 2002, orig. proceeding). As the Department notes, a relator is required
to file certified or sworn copies of documents material to her claim and a properly
authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying proceeding
including exhibits offered in evidence, or a statement that no testimony was adduced in
connection with the complaint being made. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a).3
Here, Relator failed to comply with some of the requirements for the form and
content of her petition. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3. Relator’s appendix to her petition contains
certain documents but they are not certified or sworn as required by Rule 52.7(a)(1) of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. She also failed to provide a properly
authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying proceeding
including exhibits offered in evidence, or a statement that no testimony was adduced in
connection with the complaint being made.4 TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(2). Neither did she
include a transcript of the de novo hearing.
Relator filed an unsworn statement that no court reporter was present at the
hearing but does not claim no testimony was adduced. In fact, she acknowledges she
3 In an amended reply, Relator disputes that her uncertified copies of documents must be
disregarded. Relying on In re M-I L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2016), and Rule 193.7 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, she claims her documents are self-authenticating. The authorities relied on do
not apply to the requirements for a petition for writ of mandamus.
4 In her amended reply, she mistakenly relies on Rule 52.7(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure and places the burden on the Department to supplement her mandamus record with a transcript
of the hearing. The rule places the burden on the relator. A basic tenet of mandamus is that the relator
bears the burden to provide a sufficient record showing entitlement to relief. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837.
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testified “without validly appointed counsel.” In the absence of a transcript, a reviewing
court presumes sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court’s ruling. In re
Lambdin, No. 07-03-00328-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7110, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Aug. 20, 2003, orig. proceeding).
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in Relator’s petition, she cannot prevail on the
merits of her petition. Mandamus issues to assist the diligent and not those who slumber
on their rights. In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding).
Whether a relator’s delay in asserting its rights precludes mandamus relief depends on
the circumstances. In re Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V., 494 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Tex. 2016)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). An unreasonable delay and an opponent’s detrimental
change in position due to the delay factor into whether a party slumbered on its rights.
Satisfaction of these elements depends on the circumstances of the particular case. In
re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d at 318.
This Court has found a four-month delay in seeking mandamus relief in a custody
case, albeit partly explained, unreasonable and denied relief in In re E.S., No. 07-19-
00323-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 11228, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 30, 2019, orig.
proceeding). In the pending case, Relator waited approximately a year to challenge
temporary orders. The delay was detrimental to the Department in that Relator sat idle
as trial was rescheduled three times, and she waited until less than four months before
the third trial setting to seek mandamus relief.5 The delay was also detrimental and
against the children’s best interests as the Legislature has expressed these matters to be
5 Relator asserts the Department successfully delayed the trial on the merits three times. There is
nothing in the limited record supporting her contention.
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handled expeditiously. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a), (b). We find Relator slumbered
on her rights.
Finally, Relator claims she was denied effective assistance of counsel. The
“statutory right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases embodies the right to
effective counsel.” In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003). But one is not entitled
to perfect counsel, only reasonably effective counsel. In re L.G., No. 07-14-00365-CV,
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *13–14 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 26, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op.). The standard applied in criminal cases in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), applies to parental rights cases. In re
M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545. Strickland requires a party to show counsel’s performance was
deficient and the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A relator
must satisfy those two prongs before a reviewing court may denounce counsel as
ineffective. In re M.M., No. 07-20-00089-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 6816, at *22 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Aug. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
On September 5, 2025, when the trial court signed the Order for Protection of a
Child, it appointed temporary counsel to represent Relator as required by section
107.013(a) of the Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.013(a). Thus, she had the benefit
of appointed counsel thirty-two days before the full adversary hearing held on October 7,
2025. She alleges counsel “failed to object, demand exculpatory evidence, make offers
of proof, authenticate the body-camera material and contrary records, or preserve
evidentiary rulings.” After the adversary hearing, the trial court entered a permanent order
appointing counsel. The trial court’s order reflects Relator was present at the hearing and
represented by counsel. Relator’s failure to provide a transcription of the hearing renders
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it impossible to review whether counsel’s representation was deficient and prejudiced her
case.
In addition to Relator’s unreasonable delay in seeking relief, she has not provided
a record demonstrating the adversary hearing was fundamentally defective. She has not
shown she was denied effective assistance of counsel. Without a record of the hearing,
we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in entering temporary orders appointing
the Department as managing conservator. We overrule her issues and deny mandamus
relief.
CONCLUSION
Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus requesting the trial court be ordered to
vacate its temporary orders is denied. Relator’s request for emergency relief is moot.
Alex Yarbrough
Justice
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