Ifeoma Ezekwo v.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledOctober 28, 2026
Docket26-2937
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
ELD-032 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 26-2937
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IN RE: IFEOMA EZEKWO,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to 1:25-cv-17386)
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
September 17, 2026
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SHWARTZ, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed )
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
Ifeoma Ezekwo, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus.
For the reasons below, we will deny the petition.
Ezekwo filed a complaint in the District Court against the state of New Jersey,
Bergen County, and various bankers associated with US Bank Trust, challenging the
allegedly improper foreclosure and seizure procedures that were initiated against Ezekwo
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
and her familial home. The District Court then filed, for informational purposes, an
amended preclusion order that had previously been issued against Ezekwo in another
case, Civ. No. 21-9936, which states that Ezekwo “routinely and frequently opens new
actions in this District, alleging claims that appear to be duplicative of her numerous,
earlier-filed lawsuits in this District, whether pending or previously adjudicated,” ECF
Doc. 2 at 2, and allows the Court to screen any newly-initiated complaints to ensure they
are not duplicative of the previous ones. Ezekwo filed an amended complaint on
December 1, 2025. On August 14, 2026, the District Court issued a show cause order,
requiring Ezekwo to demonstrate why her complaint should not be dismissed pursuant to
the amended preclusion order. Ezekwo did not respond and, on September 9, 2026, the
District Court dismissed her complaint with prejudice.
Meanwhile, on August 8, 2026, Ezekwo filed a mandamus petition in this Court,
asking us to 1) issue summons to the defendants named in the complaint; 2) recuse and
disqualify the District Court Judge from this and all future cases in which she’s involved ;
and 3) vacate the amended preclusion order. A writ of mandamus is a “drastic remedy”
that may be granted only in “extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting
to a judicial usurpation of power.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372,
378 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). A petitioner must show that she has no other
adequate means to obtain the relief desired, that she has a clear and indisputable right to
the writ, and that the writ would be appropriate under the circumstances. See Haines
v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558
U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam).
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Ezekwo has not met this burden. Since the District Court has now dismissed
Ezekwo’s complaint with prejudice, her request that we order the Court to issue summons
is now moot. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir.
1996) (noting that “[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that . . .
prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed
as moot”). Ezekwo also seeks judicial recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455, arguing, inter alia,
that the amended preclusion order indicates the District Court Judge’s bias against her.
Our mandamus authority includes the power to order a District Court Judge to recuse in
accordance with § 455. See In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1995); see also
Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993). But Ezekwo has
not sufficiently demonstrated that the Judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” § 455(a). Ezekwo’s disagreements with the Judge’s rulings are not a
sufficient basis to indicate bias or warrant recusal. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v.
Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Finally, Ezekwo seeks to have us
vacate the amended preclusion order; however, she has not shown that she is unable to
raise that issue on appeal. See In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that mandamus may not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals
process).
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
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