Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1456-24 DOMINIC R. BERRY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent-Respondent. _________________________ Argued October 6, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026 Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Jablonski. On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the Treasury, PFRS No. xx0784. Stuart J. Alterman argued the cause for appellant (Alterman and Associates LLC, attorneys; Stuart J. Alterman, on the brief). Nels J. Lauritzen, Legal Affairs Deputy Director, argued the cause for respondent (Nels J. Lauritzen, attorney; Thomas R. Hower, Staff Attorney, on the brief). PER CURIAM Dominic R. Berry appeals from a final agency decision (FAD) of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) denying his request to reopen applications for ordinary disability retirement benefits (ODRB) and accidental disability retirement benefits (ADRB) after his employment with the Atlantic City Fire Department (ACFD) ended in 2018. The Division of Pensions and Benefits (Division) administratively closed Berry's ODRB application based on his failure to submit required documentation, and closed his application for ADRB because he was not a member in service at the time he applied. After Berry unsuccessfully sought to revive the applications before the Board, he appealed. Having reviewed the facts and pertinent legal principles, we affirm. I. In 2008, after serving in the Army Reserve, Berry became a firefighter with the ACFD. Throughout his life, Berry contends he experienced intellectual challenges, compounded by struggles stemming from exposure to traumatic events during both his military service and his service as a firefighter. Specifically, he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder A-1456-24 2 (PTSD), tinnitus, migraines, and headaches related to his military service. During his service as a firefighter, Berry experienced flashbacks and disturbing dreams arising from traumatic workplace incidents, including a motor vehicle accident in 2011 and an elevator accident in 2018. Following the 2018 incident, Berry entered inpatient treatment at the International Association of Fire Fighters Center of Excellence, where he was treated for PTSD for one month. His treating physician reported Berry met the criteria for PTSD and that a return to first-responder duties could trigger or destabilize his condition. A psychiatrist likewise opined Berry's symptoms at the time were causally related to his work as a firefighter and that he should not return to first-responder employment. On June 8, 2018, after returning from treatment, Berry and his brother met with Chief Scott Evans of the ACFD. The Chief informed Berry he could not return to work and was "deemed retired." After that meeting, Berry, accompanied by his brother, went to another room in City Hall, where an unidentified city employee assisted him in completing a retirement application. Berry's brother wrote his resignation letter in the presence of that employee. Berry's resignation became effective on June 30, 2018. A-1456-24 3 That same day, Berry's initial retirement application was submitted through the Member Benefits Online System. In the application, he sought ODRB, identified PTSD as the disabling condition, and requested a retirement date of July 1, 2018. Berry later testified he did not personally select ordinary disability retirement and that no one explained to him the distinction between ordinary and accidental disability retirement. After his application was filed, the Division requested supporting documentation on several occasions. It sent letters to Berry in June, July, and September 2018, requesting medical support and treating-physician forms. In November 2018, the Division sent a final notice advising, if the requested materials were not submitted within thirty days, the file would be closed. Berry did not comply with this requirement. Consequently, the Division closed the file in January 2019. In October 2019, Berry submitted a second retirement application, this time seeking ADRB. In that application, he described the March 2018 incident and requested a retirement date of November 2019. Berry later testified, when he submitted the 2019 application, he believed he was merely "changing wording" on the earlier application rather than filing a new one. A-1456-24 4 Following the October 2019 filing, the psychiatrist who previously examined Berry completed a pension medical form reiterating Berry was totally and permanently disabled and unable to perform the duties of a firefighter. The Division again requested supporting documentation. It sent letters in October and November 2019 requesting medical records and related employer information. In December 2019, the Division sent a final notice requesting proof of Berry's date of birth and an accident report. An Atlantic City human resources staff member emailed the Division, transmitted the requested information, and advised that the employer had completed Berry's salary certification. In January 2020, the Division advised Berry he was not a member "in service" when he filed the 2019 ADRB application because his employment had ended on the date of his resignation—June 30, 2018. The Division further advised that he might still be considered "in service" if he had received periodic workers' compensation benefits through the filing date. The record neither reflected Berry supplied any documentation nor otherwise established in-service status following the January 2020 letter. A-1456-24 5 In May 2020, the Division sent Berry a final notice affording him an additional thirty days to comply and reiterating he was required to establish he remained in service as of October 2019. The Division further advised that if the requested information was not received, the matter would be closed. Berry again failed to comply, and in September 2020, the Division closed his 2019 application. Berry retained counsel in June 2022. In May 2023, he submitted a certification in support of his request to reopen his disability retirement application. In that certification, Berry stated the COVID-19 pandemic had severely affected his family, numerous relatives and close friends had died from COVID-related complications, and depression and anxiety had delayed his efforts to pursue the retirement matter. The Division denied the request, concluding Berry had neither submitted the required medical documentation nor remained in service at the time he filed the 2019 application. Berry appealed to the Board in June 2023. At its July 2023 meeting, the Board denied his request to pursue ADRB, concluding Berry was not a member in service when the second application was filed. In September 2023, however, the Board granted Berry's request for a hearing and transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case. A-1456-24 6 The hearing was held in January 2024 before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Berry was the sole witness. He testified he received the Division's letters, read them, understood they requested information from him, and submitted "some, but not all" of the requested materials. Berry also testified he never contacted the Division regarding his pension. The ALJ later found Berry neither revoked, nor attempted to revoke, the 2018 ODRB application. In October 2024, the ALJ issued an initial decision concluding Berry failed to demonstrate either good cause or reasonable diligence sufficient to warrant reopening the matter. The ALJ also held Berry was not an active member of PFRS when the ADRB application was filed. The ALJ therefore dismissed the case. The Board adopted the ALJ's initial decision and issued its FAD consistent with the ALJ's determination. On appeal, Berry contends the ALJ applied the wrong standard of review in considering his motion and, if the correct standard had been employed, the October 10, 2019 ADRB application would have been reopened and he would have been deemed in service as of the filing date. He further asserts the record demonstrates he misunderstood the retirement process through no fault of his own, and this misunderstanding warrants relief. At a minimum, Berry argues, A-1456-24 7 his ODRB application should be reopened because equitable considerations weigh strongly in his favor. II. Our review of a final agency decision is limited. We defer to the agency's fact-finding when it is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, and we will reverse only if the decision is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or inconsistent with governing law. See Russo v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011); In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). That deference is particularly appropriate in pension matters, although questions of law remain subject to de novo review. See Piatt v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015); A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 407 N.J. Super. 330, 340 (App. Div. 2009). Berry bears the burden of proving that an agency's action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable is on the challenger. Bueno v. Bd. of Trs. of the TPAF, 422 N.J. Super. 227, 234 (App. Div. 2011) (citing McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)). Having reviewed the pertinent facts and controlling law, we conclude Berry has not met his burden to show the FAD was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. A-1456-24 8 A. Berry contends the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard because the initial decision states his applications "were not closed out for any arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable reason." Instead, he argues the governing inquiry was whether he demonstrated "good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence" sufficient to warrant reopening. Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., TPAF, 240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019). We are unpersuaded. The dispositive issue before the ALJ was whether Berry's previously closed disability applications could be reopened. In addressing that issue, the ALJ expressly acknowledged Berry's argument that reopening was appropriate upon a showing of good cause and reasonable diligence, and discussed the equitable principles set forth in the authority on which Berry relied. The decision therefore demonstrates the ALJ's awareness of the correct standard governing reopening. Although the ALJ later observed that petitioner's applications "were not closed out for any arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable reason," we do not read that statement, in context, as a substitution of a different legal test. Rather, the ALJ was explaining why Berry's equitable claim for relief lacked merit, emphasizing the applications were closed only after Berry repeatedly A-1456-24 9 failed to provide required documentation despite multiple notices and extensions of time. Significantly, the ALJ did not end the analysis there. The ALJ expressly found Berry did not "demonstrate[] good cause"; "exercise[] reasonable diligence"; or show "he was an active member of PFRS at the time of the second application." Moreover, the record supports the ALJ's factual findings, adopted by the Board, both as to the denial of reopening of the ODRB application and the determination that Berry was not a member "in service" when he filed the 2019 ADRB application. See Thurber v. City of Burlington, 191 N.J. 487, 501-02 (2007) (upholding an agency determination where the record supported the Board's factual findings and legal conclusions). Viewed as a whole, the decision makes plain the ALJ applied the proper standard and the Board correctly adopted the ALJ's initial decision. We therefore discern no error in that analysis. B. We conclude the Board's decision declining to reopen Berry's ODRB and ADRB applications was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We "intervene in an agency decision only in those rare circumstances where the action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other State A-1456-24 10 policy." Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Fireman's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995). Although judicial review is often framed in terms of whether the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, our role is generally confined to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, whether the agency followed the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. [Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)).] The record is clear the FAD satisfies each of the Stallworth inquiries. The Board followed the governing law, relied on substantial credible evidence in the record, and reasonably applied the pertinent pension statutes and regulations to the facts presented. Regarding Berry's 2018 ODRB application, the Board reasonably applied the governing standard for reopening to the facts of record. Although the application was timely filed while Berry remained employed, that A-1456-24 11 circumstance did not relieve him of the independent obligation to provide the medical documentation necessary for the Division to process the claim. See N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.26(a)(1) (requiring submission of all necessary documentation within six months of filing a disability retirement application to avoid cancellation). After the application was filed, the Division sent multiple written requests for the required supporting materials and expressly advised Berry the application would be closed if he failed to comply. The ALJ found unpersuasive Berry's contention he had demonstrated good cause or reasonable diligence. In particular, the ALJ noted Berry reviewed the application after it was prepared, did not contact PFRS for clarification, guidance, or assistance, did not seek counsel either before or after filing, and acknowledged he received the requests for additional documentation and understood the consequences of failing to respond. The Board reasonably concluded, despite clear notice of the applicable requirements and repeated opportunities to comply, Berry failed to pursue the 2018 ODRB application with the diligence necessary to warrant reopening. Accordingly, as to the 2018 application, the Board's final decision satisfie d the Stallworth standard. A-1456-24 12 The Board likewise had two independent and sufficient grounds to deny relief on Berry's 2019 ADRB application. First, Berry was no longer a member "in service" when that application was filed. Second, even if that threshold defect were disregarded, the record supported the Board's determination that Berry failed to satisfy the standards governing reopening. Under N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.7(a)(1), an applicant for disability retirement must be a member "in service" at the time the application is filed. As pertinent here, the requirement is satisfied only if the member or employer is making pension contributions on the filing date, unless the member falls within a recognized exception, such as an approved leave status, continued workers' compensation status, or timely instituted wrongful-termination litigation. Here, the employer certification reflected Berry resigned effective June 30, 2018, and his last pension deduction was for July 2018. Berry nevertheless filed the 2019 ADRB application seeking a retirement date of November 2019. In January 2020, and again in May 2020, the Division advised him in writing that he was not considered "in service" when he filed that application unless he could demonstrate continued qualifying workers' compensation benefits or some other recognized basis for preserving that status. The ALJ found Berry established no such exception, specifically noting he was not receiving A-1456-24 13 workers' compensation benefits and was not involved in qualifying litigation resolved within thirty days of filing. We are satisfied the Board followed the governing regulation, relied on substantial evidence in the record, and reasonably concluded Berry was not a member "in service" when he filed the 2019 ADRB application. Even assuming Berry could be deemed "in service," the Board still had ample support for denying reopening. Berry was required to demonstrate good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence. Minsavage, 240 N.J. at 109. Although the Board may apply equitable principles where justice so requires, Sellers v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 399 N.J. Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 2008), and although "good cause" is a flexible concept, In re Van Orden, 383 N.J. Super. 410, 421 (App. Div. 2006), the record supported the Board's determination that Berry failed to act with reasonable diligence. After the 2019 ADRB application was filed, the Division sent repeated written requests for supporting documentation in October 2019, November 2019, December 2019, January 2020, and May 2020. Berry admitted he received and read those letters, understood they sought additional information, and understood the application would be closed if he failed to respond. He further admitted he never called or emailed the Division to seek clarification, request an extension, A-1456-24 14 or explain any inability to provide the requested materials. The ALJ expressly found Berry failed to respond to the Division's repeated requests and failed to prosecute the application with reasonable diligence. Under our deferential standard of review, those findings furnished an independent and sufficient basis for the Board's refusal to reopen the 2019 ADRB application. To the extent not addressed, Berry's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-1456-24 15