Dominic R. Berry v. Board of Trustees, Etc.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA-1456-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1456-24
DOMINIC R. BERRY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POLICE AND FIREMEN'S
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
_________________________
Argued October 6, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police
and Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the
Treasury, PFRS No. xx0784.
Stuart J. Alterman argued the cause for appellant
(Alterman and Associates LLC, attorneys; Stuart J.
Alterman, on the brief).
Nels J. Lauritzen, Legal Affairs Deputy Director,
argued the cause for respondent (Nels J. Lauritzen,
attorney; Thomas R. Hower, Staff Attorney, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Dominic R. Berry appeals from a final agency decision (FAD) of the
Board of Trustees (Board) of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System
(PFRS) denying his request to reopen applications for ordinary disability
retirement benefits (ODRB) and accidental disability retirement benefits
(ADRB) after his employment with the Atlantic City Fire Department (ACFD)
ended in 2018.
The Division of Pensions and Benefits (Division) administratively
closed Berry's ODRB application based on his failure to submit required
documentation, and closed his application for ADRB because he was not a
member in service at the time he applied. After Berry unsuccessfully sought to
revive the applications before the Board, he appealed. Having reviewed the
facts and pertinent legal principles, we affirm.
I.
In 2008, after serving in the Army Reserve, Berry became a firefighter
with the ACFD. Throughout his life, Berry contends he experienced
intellectual challenges, compounded by struggles stemming from exposure to
traumatic events during both his military service and his service as a
firefighter. Specifically, he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder
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(PTSD), tinnitus, migraines, and headaches related to his military service.
During his service as a firefighter, Berry experienced flashbacks and
disturbing dreams arising from traumatic workplace incidents, including a
motor vehicle accident in 2011 and an elevator accident in 2018.
Following the 2018 incident, Berry entered inpatient treatment at the
International Association of Fire Fighters Center of Excellence, where he was
treated for PTSD for one month. His treating physician reported Berry met the
criteria for PTSD and that a return to first-responder duties could trigger or
destabilize his condition. A psychiatrist likewise opined Berry's symptoms at
the time were causally related to his work as a firefighter and that he should
not return to first-responder employment.
On June 8, 2018, after returning from treatment, Berry and his brother
met with Chief Scott Evans of the ACFD. The Chief informed Berry he could
not return to work and was "deemed retired." After that meeting, Berry,
accompanied by his brother, went to another room in City Hall, where an
unidentified city employee assisted him in completing a retirement application.
Berry's brother wrote his resignation letter in the presence of that employee.
Berry's resignation became effective on June 30, 2018.
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That same day, Berry's initial retirement application was submitted
through the Member Benefits Online System. In the application, he sought
ODRB, identified PTSD as the disabling condition, and requested a retirement
date of July 1, 2018. Berry later testified he did not personally select ordinary
disability retirement and that no one explained to him the distinction between
ordinary and accidental disability retirement.
After his application was filed, the Division requested supporting
documentation on several occasions. It sent letters to Berry in June, July, and
September 2018, requesting medical support and treating-physician forms. In
November 2018, the Division sent a final notice advising, if the requested
materials were not submitted within thirty days, the file would be closed.
Berry did not comply with this requirement. Consequently, the Division
closed the file in January 2019.
In October 2019, Berry submitted a second retirement application, this
time seeking ADRB. In that application, he described the March 2018 incident
and requested a retirement date of November 2019. Berry later testified, when
he submitted the 2019 application, he believed he was merely "changing
wording" on the earlier application rather than filing a new one.
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Following the October 2019 filing, the psychiatrist who previously
examined Berry completed a pension medical form reiterating Berry was
totally and permanently disabled and unable to perform the duties of a
firefighter.
The Division again requested supporting documentation. It sent letters
in October and November 2019 requesting medical records and related
employer information. In December 2019, the Division sent a final notice
requesting proof of Berry's date of birth and an accident report. An Atlantic
City human resources staff member emailed the Division, transmitted the
requested information, and advised that the employer had completed Berry's
salary certification.
In January 2020, the Division advised Berry he was not a member "in
service" when he filed the 2019 ADRB application because his employment
had ended on the date of his resignation—June 30, 2018. The Division further
advised that he might still be considered "in service" if he had received
periodic workers' compensation benefits through the filing date. The record
neither reflected Berry supplied any documentation nor otherwise established
in-service status following the January 2020 letter.
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In May 2020, the Division sent Berry a final notice affording him an
additional thirty days to comply and reiterating he was required to establish he
remained in service as of October 2019. The Division further advised that if
the requested information was not received, the matter would be closed. Berry
again failed to comply, and in September 2020, the Division closed his 2019
application.
Berry retained counsel in June 2022. In May 2023, he submitted a
certification in support of his request to reopen his disability retirement
application. In that certification, Berry stated the COVID-19 pandemic had
severely affected his family, numerous relatives and close friends had died
from COVID-related complications, and depression and anxiety had delayed
his efforts to pursue the retirement matter. The Division denied the request,
concluding Berry had neither submitted the required medical documentation
nor remained in service at the time he filed the 2019 application.
Berry appealed to the Board in June 2023. At its July 2023 meeting, the
Board denied his request to pursue ADRB, concluding Berry was not a
member in service when the second application was filed. In September 2023,
however, the Board granted Berry's request for a hearing and transmitted the
matter to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case.
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The hearing was held in January 2024 before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ). Berry was the sole witness. He testified he received the
Division's letters, read them, understood they requested information from him,
and submitted "some, but not all" of the requested materials. Berry also
testified he never contacted the Division regarding his pension. The ALJ later
found Berry neither revoked, nor attempted to revoke, the 2018 ODRB
application.
In October 2024, the ALJ issued an initial decision concluding Berry
failed to demonstrate either good cause or reasonable diligence sufficient to
warrant reopening the matter. The ALJ also held Berry was not an active
member of PFRS when the ADRB application was filed. The ALJ therefore
dismissed the case. The Board adopted the ALJ's initial decision and issued its
FAD consistent with the ALJ's determination.
On appeal, Berry contends the ALJ applied the wrong standard of review
in considering his motion and, if the correct standard had been employed, the
October 10, 2019 ADRB application would have been reopened and he would
have been deemed in service as of the filing date. He further asserts the record
demonstrates he misunderstood the retirement process through no fault of his
own, and this misunderstanding warrants relief. At a minimum, Berry argues,
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his ODRB application should be reopened because equitable considerations
weigh strongly in his favor.
II.
Our review of a final agency decision is limited. We defer to the
agency's fact-finding when it is supported by substantial credible evidence in
the record, and we will reverse only if the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, or inconsistent with governing law. See Russo v. Bd. of Trs.,
PFRS, 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011); In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).
That deference is particularly appropriate in pension matters, although
questions of law remain subject to de novo review. See Piatt v. Bd. of Trs.,
PFRS, 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015); A.B. v. Div. of Med.
Assistance & Health Servs., 407 N.J. Super. 330, 340 (App. Div. 2009).
Berry bears the burden of proving that an agency's action is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable is on the challenger. Bueno v. Bd. of Trs. of the
TPAF, 422 N.J. Super. 227, 234 (App. Div. 2011) (citing McGowan v. N.J.
State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)). Having
reviewed the pertinent facts and controlling law, we conclude Berry has not
met his burden to show the FAD was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
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A.
Berry contends the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard because the
initial decision states his applications "were not closed out for any arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable reason." Instead, he argues the governing inquiry
was whether he demonstrated "good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable
diligence" sufficient to warrant reopening. Minsavage v. Bd. of Trs., TPAF,
240 N.J. 103, 109 (2019). We are unpersuaded.
The dispositive issue before the ALJ was whether Berry's previously
closed disability applications could be reopened. In addressing that issue, the
ALJ expressly acknowledged Berry's argument that reopening was appropriate
upon a showing of good cause and reasonable diligence, and discussed the
equitable principles set forth in the authority on which Berry relied. The
decision therefore demonstrates the ALJ's awareness of the correct standard
governing reopening.
Although the ALJ later observed that petitioner's applications "were not
closed out for any arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable reason," we do not
read that statement, in context, as a substitution of a different legal test.
Rather, the ALJ was explaining why Berry's equitable claim for relief lacked
merit, emphasizing the applications were closed only after Berry repeatedly
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failed to provide required documentation despite multiple notices and
extensions of time. Significantly, the ALJ did not end the analysis there. The
ALJ expressly found Berry did not "demonstrate[] good cause"; "exercise[]
reasonable diligence"; or show "he was an active member of PFRS at the time
of the second application."
Moreover, the record supports the ALJ's factual findings, adopted by the
Board, both as to the denial of reopening of the ODRB application and the
determination that Berry was not a member "in service" when he filed the 2019
ADRB application. See Thurber v. City of Burlington, 191 N.J. 487, 501-02
(2007) (upholding an agency determination where the record supported the
Board's factual findings and legal conclusions). Viewed as a whole, the
decision makes plain the ALJ applied the proper standard and the Board
correctly adopted the ALJ's initial decision. We therefore discern no error in
that analysis.
B.
We conclude the Board's decision declining to reopen Berry's ODRB and
ADRB applications was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We
"intervene in an agency decision only in those rare circumstances where the
action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other State
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policy." Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Fireman's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25
(1995). Although judicial review is often framed in terms of whether the
agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, our role is generally
confined to three inquiries:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, whether the
agency followed the law;
(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support the findings on which the agency based its
action; and
(3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the
facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a
conclusion that could not reasonably have been made
on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191
N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)).]
The record is clear the FAD satisfies each of the Stallworth inquiries. The
Board followed the governing law, relied on substantial credible evidence in
the record, and reasonably applied the pertinent pension statutes and
regulations to the facts presented.
Regarding Berry's 2018 ODRB application, the Board reasonably
applied the governing standard for reopening to the facts of record. Although
the application was timely filed while Berry remained employed, that
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circumstance did not relieve him of the independent obligation to provide the
medical documentation necessary for the Division to process the claim. See
N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.26(a)(1) (requiring submission of all necessary documentation
within six months of filing a disability retirement application to avoid
cancellation). After the application was filed, the Division sent multiple
written requests for the required supporting materials and expressly advised
Berry the application would be closed if he failed to comply.
The ALJ found unpersuasive Berry's contention he had demonstrated
good cause or reasonable diligence. In particular, the ALJ noted Berry
reviewed the application after it was prepared, did not contact PFRS for
clarification, guidance, or assistance, did not seek counsel either before or
after filing, and acknowledged he received the requests for additional
documentation and understood the consequences of failing to respond. The
Board reasonably concluded, despite clear notice of the applicable
requirements and repeated opportunities to comply, Berry failed to pursue the
2018 ODRB application with the diligence necessary to warrant reopening.
Accordingly, as to the 2018 application, the Board's final decision satisfie d the
Stallworth standard.
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The Board likewise had two independent and sufficient grounds to deny
relief on Berry's 2019 ADRB application. First, Berry was no longer a
member "in service" when that application was filed. Second, even if that
threshold defect were disregarded, the record supported the Board's
determination that Berry failed to satisfy the standards governing reopening.
Under N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.7(a)(1), an applicant for disability retirement
must be a member "in service" at the time the application is filed. As pertinent
here, the requirement is satisfied only if the member or employer is making
pension contributions on the filing date, unless the member falls within a
recognized exception, such as an approved leave status, continued workers'
compensation status, or timely instituted wrongful-termination litigation.
Here, the employer certification reflected Berry resigned effective June
30, 2018, and his last pension deduction was for July 2018. Berry nevertheless
filed the 2019 ADRB application seeking a retirement date of November 2019.
In January 2020, and again in May 2020, the Division advised him in writing
that he was not considered "in service" when he filed that application unless he
could demonstrate continued qualifying workers' compensation benefits or
some other recognized basis for preserving that status. The ALJ found Berry
established no such exception, specifically noting he was not receiving
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workers' compensation benefits and was not involved in qualifying litigation
resolved within thirty days of filing. We are satisfied the Board followed the
governing regulation, relied on substantial evidence in the record, and
reasonably concluded Berry was not a member "in service" when he filed the
2019 ADRB application.
Even assuming Berry could be deemed "in service," the Board still had
ample support for denying reopening. Berry was required to demonstrate good
cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence. Minsavage, 240 N.J. at
109. Although the Board may apply equitable principles where justice so
requires, Sellers v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 399 N.J. Super. 51, 62 (App. Div. 2008),
and although "good cause" is a flexible concept, In re Van Orden, 383 N.J.
Super. 410, 421 (App. Div. 2006), the record supported the Board's
determination that Berry failed to act with reasonable diligence. After the
2019 ADRB application was filed, the Division sent repeated written requests
for supporting documentation in October 2019, November 2019, December
2019, January 2020, and May 2020. Berry admitted he received and read those
letters, understood they sought additional information, and understood the
application would be closed if he failed to respond. He further admitted he
never called or emailed the Division to seek clarification, request an extension,
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or explain any inability to provide the requested materials. The ALJ expressly
found Berry failed to respond to the Division's repeated requests and failed to
prosecute the application with reasonable diligence. Under our deferential
standard of review, those findings furnished an independent and sufficient
basis for the Board's refusal to reopen the 2019 ADRB application.
To the extent not addressed, Berry's remaining arguments lack sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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