Kehs, S. v. Means, N.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket840 EDA 2026
JudgeKing
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
SHAWN PATRICK KEHS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
NAOMI LEE MEANS : No. 840 EDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered February 26, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Domestic Relations at
No(s): 2019DR00042,
PACSES: 586117427
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2026
Appellant, Shawn Patrick Kehs, appeals pro se from the order entered
in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his motion for child
support following a de novo hearing. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
Father and Appellee, Naomi Lee Means, are the parents of three minor
children, O.B.K. (born May 2008), S.I.L.K. (born July 2009), and O.A.K. (born
August 2014) (collectively, “Children”). Mother and Father were previously
married but divorced in December 2018. In June 2025, Father filed a
complaint for child support.
On October 21, 2025, the court held a support hearing, during which
Father represented himself. Father testified that he had lost his job at a snack
food company in June 2024 and that he was unemployed, although he had
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held a part-time job that summer. Father agreed that he had the ability to
earn between $18 and $20 an hour. As well, Father testified that the family
home had burned down in a house fire.
Mother testified that she had been unemployed since 2023. Mother had
been unable to work due to medical reasons since September 2024.
Specifically, Mother suffered from unspecified psychosis and generalized
anxiety disorder.1 Mother lives in San Diego and receives housing assistance
from the State of California, as well as food stamps and cash assistance.
Mother stated she did not receive Social Security Disability, as she needs
assistance to file a claim.
Father told the court that he believed Mother did not really suffer from
anxiety, and that she had received a windfall of $155,000.00. Mother
explained that the $155,000.00 that Father was referencing was her portion
of the equity in the marital home. Mother stated that, after the house fire,
Father made an insurance claim. With the proceeds, he offered to buy Mother
out as part of a post-divorce settlement agreement, and she accepted the
offer. As well, the parties set aside $10,000.00 per child from the insurance
proceeds for their future benefit.
When Father’s questioning of Mother became argumentative, the court
limited the questions he could ask. At the close of the hearing, the court found
____________________________________________
1 Mother provided documentation signed by Sarah Pai, psychiatric mental
health nurse practitioner, stating that the onset of Mother’s mental illness
began on September 7, 2024, and, although Mother is seeking treatment for
her mental illness, the condition is chronic and affects her ability to work.
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that Mother could not work because of mental illness and denied Father’s
request for child support.2
On October 26, 2025, Father filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
that the court erred when it did not consider Mother’s home equity buyout as
income; the evidence did not support a finding of disability; the court
wrongfully curtailed his cross examination of Mother; and the court erred in
both rejecting Father’s testimony as not credible and by concluding that
Mother was unable to work. On November 7, 2025, the court entered an order
granting the motion for reconsideration.
On February 19, 2026, the court convened an evidentiary hearing. At
____________________________________________
2 The trial court noted, during the hearing:
I feel as though—and I want to state for the record, first of
all, that I can hear in Mom’s voice the tenuous nature of her
responses, the emotion in her voice, the fear in her voice,
the psychological trauma that she’s undergoing right now
by answering these questions.
And I will state for the record that I believe that Dad is
asking these questions—some of them are relevant, but he’s
doing it more for the purposes of creating pain in Mom than
in raising actually any legitimate issues for this [c]ourt’s
consideration.
So I have an obligation to respect the defendant in this case
and her psychological needs. And so I’m going to say to
you, sir, you need to wrap this up. I’ve given you plenty of
time to pursue the issues. You have three more questions.
You’ll ask them of me and then I’ll ask them of the
defendant.
(See N.T. Hearing, 10/21/25, at 24-25).
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the hearing, the court heard additional testimony concerning Father and
Mother’s employment history, and Mother’s disability and treatment, as well
as information about Mother’s receipt, as part of their divorce settlement, of
a $155,000.00 fire insurance payment in exchange for her equity in the
marital residence.
The court noted on the record that the original marital settlement
agreement had ordered that Father buy out Mother’s interest in the home,
which he had not done. On June 5, 2025, on the divorce docket, the court
approved a post-divorce stipulation agreement between the parties regarding
the marital property. The stipulation indicated that $155,000.00 had been
paid to Mother, and she had signed the deed of the home over to Father.
Ultimately, the court concluded that Mother was presently unable to
work, such that the state of California determined that Mother was entitled to
a housing subsidy, food subsidy and cash assistance; Mother’s earning
capacity was low or non-existent. As such, the court found that there was no
competent evidence upon which it could find in favor of Father. On February
24, 2026, the court entered an order denying Father’s complaint for support.
On March 17, 2026, Father timely filed a notice of appeal. On March
24, 2026, the court ordered Father to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of
errors complained of on appeal. On April 7, 2026, Father timely complied.
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for review:
1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and
abused its discretion by concluding Mother was presently
unable to work and by assigning zero earning capacity,
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where the court relied heavily on California welfare-related
paperwork and benefits, used only an illustrative wage
allocation, and did not conduct a disciplined Pa.R.C.P.
1910.16-2(d)(4) analysis of Mother’s education, skills, work
history, assets, and commercial activity.
2. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and
abused its discretion by treating Mother’s $155,000 post-
fire/equitable-distribution payment as effectively outside
meaningful support analysis, and by comparing that
payment to an incomplete and inaccurate premise that
Father received approximately $93,000 available for
discretionary use.
3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and
abused its discretion by dismissing Father’s Complaint for
Support and imposing no support obligation on Mother
despite Father’s primary physical custody, Father’s
overwhelming financial burden for the parties’ three
children, and the court’s own illustrative guideline
assumptions.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
minimizing admitted impeachment evidence and material
inconsistencies concerning Mother’s Facebook account,
work-history representations, Etsy activity, and sound-
healing related activity when evaluating credibility and
earning capacity.
5. Whether the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion improperly
attempted to cure underlying legal and factual errors by
attacking Father’s credibility and motives, minimizing
Mother’s material inconsistencies, and recasting Father’s
support claim as punitive rather than addressing the
deficiencies in the court’s support analysis.
(Father’s Brief at 3-4) (unpaginated). 3
Preliminarily, we recognize:
____________________________________________
3 Mother did not file a responsive brief.
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[A]ppellate briefs and reproduced records must materially
conform to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. This Court may quash
or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to conform to the
requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Id. Although this Court is willing to
liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se
status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the
contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal
proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his
lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.
In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 610
Pa. 600, 20 A.3d 489 (2011) (some internal citations omitted). See also
Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119 (addressing specific requirements for appellate briefs).
Instantly, Father’s brief is inadequate as the issues raised do not match
the argument section of the brief, and the brief lacks any citation or discussion
of relevant authority to support his conclusory assertions on appeal. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a) (discussing required content of appellate briefs). Indeed,
Father fails to cite to, quote, or discuss a single case, even while listing the
suggested scope and standard of review. See also Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d
943 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding appellant waived claim where she failed to set
forth adequate argument concerning her claim on appeal; appellant’s
argument lacked meaningful substance and consisted of mere conclusory
statements; appellant failed to cogently explain or even tenuously assert why
trial court abused its discretion or made error of law). See also Lackner v.
Glosser, 892 A.2d 21 (Pa.Super 2006) (explaining appellant’s arguments
must adhere to rules of appellate procedure, and arguments which are not
appropriately developed are waived; arguments not appropriately developed
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include those where party has failed to cite relevant authority in support of
contention); Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86 (Pa.Super. 2005) (explaining
failure to argue and cite to supporting relevant authority constitutes waiver of
issue on appeal). Nevertheless, because the trial court has addressed Father’s
issues at length, we decline to find waiver in this instance despite the
inadequacy of Father’s brief.
In Father’s first, third, and fourth issues, which we address together as
they are interrelated, he argues that the court erred and abused its discretion
by refusing to impose a child support obligation on Mother and concluding she
has no earning capacity. First, Father asserts that the court applied an
inconsistent and incomplete earning capacity analysis, relied upon
inappropriate evidence including Mother’s application for California public
assistance, and disregarded evidence Father introduced. As well, Father
contends that Mother is able to work part-time, remote, or self-directed, and
that the court ignored evidence of this ability. Father further maintains,
without citation to supporting authority, that the court should have conducted
an “actual Rule 1910.16-2(d)(4) analysis.” Father also claims that the court
incorrectly refused to order Mother to pay child support where he has primary
physical custody of Children and the “overwhelming financial burden” for
Children. Father concludes the court erred by denying him relief, and this
Court must grant relief. We disagree.
Our standard of review of child support orders is well settled:
When evaluating a support order, this Court may only
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reverse the trial court’s determination where the order
cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We will not
interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court
absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to
sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion,
the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment
exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly
unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or
ill will, discretion has been abused.
Summers v. Summers, 35 A.3d 786, 788 (Pa.Super. 2012). As well,
it is not an appellate court’s duty to create the record or
assess credibility, we must nevertheless examine the
existing record to ascertain whether sufficient facts are
present to support the trial court’s order. If sufficient
evidence exists in the record to substantiate the trial court’s
action, and the trial court has properly applied accurate case
law to the relevant facts, then we must affirm.
Hibbitts v. Hibbitts, 749 A.2d 975, 976-77 (Pa.Super. 2000) (citations
omitted).
Pursuant to Section 4322(a) of the Domestic Relations Code:
Child and spousal support shall be awarded pursuant to a
Statewide guideline as established by general rule by [our]
Supreme Court, so that persons similarly situated shall be
treated similarly. The guideline shall be based upon the
reasonable needs of the child or spouse seeking support and
the ability of the obligor to provide support. In determining
the reasonable needs of the child or spouse seeking support
and the ability of the obligor to provide support, the
guideline shall place primary emphasis on the net incomes
and earning capacities of the parties, with allowable
deviations for unusual needs, extraordinary expenses[,] and
other factors, such as the parties’ assets, as warrant special
attention. The guideline so developed shall be reviewed at
least once every four years.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4322(a). Pursuant to the support guidelines, a support
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obligation is based upon the parties’ monthly net incomes, based on “at least
a six-month average of a party’s income,” and includes gross income from any
source, including but not limited to wages, net income from a business, rents,
pension plan distributions, Social Security disability benefits, awards and
verdicts, et cetera. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(a). To calculate the monthly net
income, the court will then deduct certain withholdings and payments from
the gross income. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(c)(1).
Additionally, a party’s net income will not be downwardly adjusted if the
trier-of-fact finds that “the party voluntarily assumed a lower paying job, quit
a job, left employment, changed occupations, changed employment status to
pursue an education, or employment is terminated due to willful misconduct.”
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(1)(ii). “When a party willfully fails to obtain or
maintain appropriate employment, the trier-of-fact may impute to the party
an income equal to the party’s earning capacity.” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-
2(d)(4)(i). See also Dennis v. Whitney, 844 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Pa.Super.
2004) (stating, “[w]here a party willfully fails to obtain appropriate
employment, his or her income will be considered to be equal to his or her
earning capacity”); Woskob v. Woskob, 843 A.2d 1247, 1254 (Pa.Super.
2004) (stating that “[w]here a party assumes a lower paying job or willfully
fails to obtain appropriate employment, the support obligation is determined
by his, or her, assessed earning capacity”).
Regarding earning capacity, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
provide, in relevant part:
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Rule 1910.16-2. Support Guidelines. Calculation of
Monthly Net Income
* * *
(d) Reduced Income or Fluctuating Earnings.
* * *
(4) Earning Capacity--Initial Orders and Modifications.
(i) When calculating an initial order or modifying an
existing order, if a party fails to obtain or maintain
appropriate employment, the trier-of-fact shall impute to
the party an income equal to the party’s earning
capacity.
(A) Earning Capacity Limitation. The trier-of-fact:
(I) shall not impute income to the party
based on an earning capacity that exceeds
the amount the party could earn from one
full-time position; and
(II) shall determine a reasonable work
regimen based upon the party’s relevant
circumstances, including the jobs available
within a particular occupation, working hours
and conditions, and whether a party has
exerted substantial good faith efforts to find
employment.
(B) The trier-of-fact shall base the party’s earning
capacity on the subdivision (d)(4)(ii) factors.
(C) After assessing a party’s earning capacity, the
trier-of-fact shall state the reasons for the
assessment in writing or on the record.
(D) When the trier-of-fact determines an earning
capacity for a party who would incur child care
expenses if the party were employed, the trier-of-
fact shall consider reasonable child care
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responsibilities and expenses for the purpose of
discretionary allocation pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.
1910.16-6(a)(1)(ii).
(ii) Factors. In determining a party’s earning capacity,
the trier-of-fact shall consider the party’s:
(A) child care responsibilities and expenses that
would actually be incurred by the party if
employed;
(B) assets;
(C) residence;
(D) employment and earnings history;
(E) job skills;
(F) educational attainment;
(G) literacy;
(H) age;
(I) health;
(J) criminal record and other employment barriers;
(K) record of seeking work;
(L) local job market, including the availability of
employers who are willing to hire the party;
(M) local community prevailing earnings level; and
(N) other relevant factors.
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4). When considering health-related concerns,
medical expert testimony is not required to prove that a party is incapable of
working full time. See Malenfant v. Malenfant, 639 A.2d 1249, 1251
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(Pa.Super. 1994). See also Hesidenz v. Carbin, 512 A.2d 707, 711
(Pa.Super. 1986) (holding testimony concerning wife’s physical condition was
sufficient to support trial court’s finding that wife was physically incapable of
working full time). In summary, regarding earning capacity and support
calculation:
a person’s support obligation is determined primarily by the
parties’ actual financial resources and their earning
capacity. Although a person’s actual earnings usually reflect
his earning capacity, where there is a divergence, the
obligation is determined more by earning capacity than
actual earnings. Earning capacity is defined as the amount
that a person realistically could earn under the
circumstances, considering his age, health, mental and
physical condition, training, and earnings history.
Woskob, supra at 1251 (citations omitted).
Instantly, the trial court explained:
In some cases, a party in a child support action does not
have any substantial earning capacity. Such is the case
here. In the present case, Mother’s earning capacity was
determined pursuant to the Support Guidelines expressed
by Rule 1910.16-2. Most notably, evidence was received
and admitted which indicated that Mother is presently
unable to work. As mentioned previously, Mother
presented evidence from her medical care provider in
California asserting that Mother presently suffers from
unspecified psychosis, not due to substance abuse, and
generalized anxiety disorder. This medical documentation
goes on to state that these conditions severely affect
Mother’s ability to secure and/or maintain gainful
employment. M-1 indicates that the onset of Mother’s
mental illness began on September 7, 2024, that the
condition is chronic in nature, but that she is actively
seeking treatment. M-1 is signed by Nurse Practitioner
Sarah Pai of Heartland Wellness and Recovery Center in El
Cajon, California. Mother stated in her testimony that Nurse
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Practitioner Pai is a psychiatrist. Mother stated she meets
with her psychiatrist every three months to discuss the
efficacy of her medications, and that she does therapy for
one hour either weekly or biweekly. Testimony was also
taken from Mother that she presently takes three (3)
psychotropic medications, and that she has been taking
mental health medications since 2019. Mother stated that
she has talked to her doctor about working part-time but
that she was told she doesn’t have the capacity to do so
right now. When asked if she was hopeful that she might
be able to work in the future, Mother stated that she did not
know.
The diagnosis expressed by Mother’s healthcare provider in
M-1 and Mother’s testimony as to her own mental health
condition directly implicate the “health” factor the trier-of-
fact must consider when determining a party’s earning
capacity. Such medical documentation is not required for
determining whether a party presently suffers from an
ailment affecting their earning capacity .... Where such
evidence exists, it is quite persuasive. Here, Mother’s
medical documentation is supported by her testimony that
she is mentally unwell and unable to pursue gainful
employment.
For all practical purposes, analysis of Mother’s present
ability to pay support could end here .... Under these
circumstances testified to by Mother and documented by M-
1, Mother has no meaningful earning capacity.
Despite finding Mother has no earning capacity because of
her mental condition, the [c]ourt elicited testimony
regarding her prior employment history, record of seeking
work, educational attainment and other relevant factors.
Mother testified that her last day of gainful employment was
in 2023, when she tried to work for an online reading
program but was let go after only a month. She testified
that between 2018 when the parties separated and her 2023
stint with the reading program, she only worked for the
reading program seasonally. Mother testified that she never
made more than $4,000.00 per year during those years.
Beginning with the birth of the parties’ first child and
throughout the parties’ marriage, Mother claims she was a
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stay-at-home parent. Father disputes this and claims
Mother made $40,000.00 working for the Wellness Center.
Mother claims that she only made approximately $6,000.00
from her time at the Wellness Center in or around 2016
because she only worked one or two days per week and was
only there for three or four months. Father also claims that
he and Mother were business partners in multiple
establishments between 2008 and 2018.
Father also disputes Mother’s claim that she only worked for
the reading program since their divorce; he claims there are
social media posts which indicate she was earning income.
Father admitted screenshots from what is purported to be
Mother’s Facebook profile which seemingly indicate Mother
is currently a sound therapist. Mother asserted this
evidence is not credible, called into question whether the
screenshot actually came from her Facebook account, and
that the screenshot does not reflect any actual earned
income. Father’s second piece of evidence, marked F-2, is
a screenshot of an Etsy shop purportedly owned and
operated by Mother. Mother initially denied that it was her
Etsy shop, but later indicated that she did have an Etsy shop
but had abandoned it years prior, had not realized any
business profits, and had not sold anything. Father’s last
piece of evidence, marked F-3, were screenshots of a social
media account purportedly belonging to Mother which
Father claims show she was assisting her husband in his
sound-therapy-healing. Mother claims that these sound-
therapy-healing sessions were her current husband’s and
that she only helped him one time back in 2018. She
acknowledges that the evidence depicts her and her
husband but asserts that the pictures were taken in 2018
prior to being posted in 2024.
During the first hearing on October 21, 2025, Mother
testified that she receives a housing subsidy, cash
assistance, and food stamps from the state of California, but
that she has not applied for any federal disability benefits.
Testimony was also heard at both Hearings that Mother
earned an associate’s degree online from the American
College of Health Care Sciences.
All of these factors, when weighed in conjunction with
Mother’s medical documentation, still indicate that she is
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present[ly] unable to work. Mother’s work history since
2018 has been nearly nonexistent. Father believes Mother
should be assigned a minimum part-time earning capacity
of $40,000.00, even after accounting for her disability.
However, this [c]ourt does not agree. Even if Mother was
not medically disabled, there is insufficient evidence that
she ever had a yearly earning capacity in excess of
$10,000.00. Given Mother’s medical documentation and
testimony that she is unfit to work, and in consideration of
her exceedingly sporadic, nearly nonexistent work history,
this Court determined after the Reconsideration Hearing
that Mother has no earning capacity.
(Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/26, at 10-14) (citations and some footnotes
omitted) (emphasis in original). Regarding the inconsistencies in evidence
and testimony, the court observed:
While Mother’s testimony regarding the use of an Etsy
account (“the Account”) to sell items online was
inconsistent, the evidence of Record fails to establish that
any income was derived from this source. Mother states
that the Account is old and out of use, and that she never
made any sales through the Account. Absent a transaction
history of the account indicating Mother’s receipt of income
from sales through the Account, the evidence of Record
cannot establish any ability to work. Mother’s sworn
testimony regarding the Account is credibly consistent with
the evidence presented by Father.
Notably, Mother raised her own concerns regarding the
credibility of the Exhibits presented by Father. While
Father’s Exhibits were admitted as relevant, their probative
value is marginal at best. There is no evidence that Mother
actually earned any income as a result of any conduct
documented by Father’s Exhibits. This [c]ourt did not abuse
its discretion by finding Mother’s testimony to be credible
and father’s Exhibits to lack probative value.
(Id. at 19).
The record supports the trial court’s analysis and determination that
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Mother has no earning capacity due to her disability, as well as the court’s
finding that Mother’s documentation and testimony were credible. On this
record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying Father relief.
See Summers, supra; Woskob, supra; Hibbetts, supra. To the extent
that Father asks us to re-weigh the court’s credibility determinations, and the
weight afforded to certain pieces of evidence, we decline to do so. See id.
Father is not entitled to relief on these issues.
In Father’s second and fifth issues on appeal, which we address together
as they are related, he contends that the court erred by treating Mother’s
$155,000.00 payment as an equitable distribution payout and not a windfall.
Father acknowledges that Miller v. Miller, 783 A.2d 832, 835 (Pa.Super.
2001) “presents a significant obstacle to classifying the $155,000.00 payment
as statutory income in the narrow sense.” (Father’s Brief at 13)
(unpaginated). Nevertheless, Father states (without citation to any authority)
that “Miller did not relieve the trial court of confronting the actual post-fire
allocation of liquid resources or the practical premise of its own fairness
analysis.” (See id. at 13).4 As well, Father argues that the court
inappropriately discussed Father’s “agenda” and challenges the trial court’s
credibility determinations in Mother’s favor. (Id. at 18-19). Father concludes
he is entitled to relief on these grounds. We disagree.
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4 As best we can discern, Father appears to argue that, regardless of the fact
that marital assets are not considered income for purposes of support, the
court should have crafted some kind of equitable remedy for him. (Id. at 13-
14) (unpaginated).
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This Court has stated:
It is settled law that “money included in an individual’s
income for the purpose of calculating support payments may
not also be labeled as a marital asset subject to equitable
distribution.” Rohrer v. Rohrer, 715 A.2d 463, 465
(Pa.Super. 1998) .... [T]he reverse is also true. Money
received from the sale of an asset awarded in equitable
distribution may not be included in an individual’s income
for [the] purposes of calculating support payments. The
single caveat to this rule is that any gain realized in the sale
of the asset may, indeed must, be included in the calculation
of income.
Miller, supra at 835 (footnote omitted). See also Hess v. Hess, 212 A.3d
520, 524 (Pa.Super. 2019) (observing that this Court has repeatedly held that
marital assets may not be included in income for purposes of calculating
support payments).5
Here, the trial court observed:
While the asset subject to the parties’ Equitable Distribution
order (the marital residence) was not sold in the case at bar,
the holding of Miller is still applicable. After Mother left the
marital residence, the marital residence burned down. The
fire insurer servicing the marital residence was set to pay a
lump sum to rebuild the house but would not do so without
both owners’ consent. Mother used this arrangement to
leverage a buyout of her equity in the marital residence
through Equitable Distribution. In an effort to begin
rebuilding the residence after the fire, and to settle Mother’s
claims in Equitable Distribution, it was arranged that
$155,000.00 of the fire insurance proceeds were to be paid
to Mother to buy her out of her equity in the marital
residence, thereby removing her as an owner and
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5 Equitable distribution is “merely a division of the marital property of each
spouse,” and a property settlement agreement disposing of marital assets
may also be considered in the same category as property subject to equitable
distribution proceedings. In re Ware, 814 A.2d 725, 738 (Pa.Super. 2002).
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permitting Father to proceed with the rebuild. While the
circumstances of Father buying Mother out of the marital
residence are unfortunate, especially given the
displacement of Father and the children, the law is clear that
the funds Father requests be considered income for purpose
of child support are expressly excluded from the definition
of income. Given the factual circumstances of this payment
to Mother, the sole exception to the Miller rule stated above
is inapplicable because this transaction represented the fair
market value of the asset at the time of Equitable
distribution, not a gain. In the simplest terms, Father is
wrong, and the lump sum $155,000.00 paid Mother in
Equitable Distribution, while derived from the insurance
proceeds related to the burning down of the marital
residence, is not permitted to be used to calculate Mother’s
income for the purposes of child support.
(Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/26, at 17-18) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
in original). The court further noted:
Lastly, the [c]ourt expresses concerns about Father’s
credibility and what seems to be his agenda in this matter.
At the initial hearing and now in this Appeal, Father is fixated
on what seemingly is an intent to punish Mother for
perceived wrongs against him. Father was not completely
forthcoming about the funds he received from the fire
insurance proceeds. Father did not want to discuss his
receipt of proceeds and never, of his own volition, brought
that to the [c]ourt’s attention. Father improperly attempted
to frame the fire insurance payment to Mother as an
undeserved windfall. It must be emphasized that both
Mother and Father’s share of the insurance proceeds were
enumerated in the parties’ Post-Divorce Stipulation
Agreement which was approved and made an Order of this
[c]ourt on June 5, 2025. See 2/19/26 Hearing Exs. Crt-6.
Father agreed to pay Mother $155,000.00, accepted
$93,383.50 for himself, and put $10,000.00 for aside for
each of the parties’ three (3) children[.] Mother did not
receive a windfall, but rather Father agreed to pay Mother
for her equity in the couple’s marital residence in Equitable
Distribution. Furthermore, Father attacks Mother’s failure
to work as if it were a character defect while he, himself has
not been working.
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J-S33027-26
(Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/26, at 18-19) (emphasis in original).
The record supports the trial court’s analysis. The $155,000.00, as a
marital asset subject to equitable distribution, was appropriately excluded
from income. See Miller, supra. Additionally, we see no reason to disturb
the court’s credibility determinations. See Hibbitts, supra. Based upon the
foregoing, the court did not err in determining that Mother has no earning
capacity and refusing to impose a support obligation. See Summers, supra.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Date: 11/18/2026
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