In Re: Avery, M.

J-A28009-25 2026 PA Super 124 IN RE: MARY D. AVERY, AN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: JIMMY DORSEY AND : KAREN L. DORSEY : No. 191 MDA 2025 Appeal from the Order Entered January 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 88000 BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J. OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: JUNE 16, 2026 I. Introduction In this guardianship proceeding, Jimmy Dorsey and his wife, Karen L. Dorsey (“the Dorseys”), appeal from an order denying their petition to charge the Estate of Mary D. Avery (the Dorseys’ Ward and Mr. Dorsey’s mother) $79,790.99 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Before addressing the merits of that order, we must determine whether New York, Pennsylvania, or South Carolina had jurisdiction over Ms. Avery’s status and estate on the date the Dorseys commenced this proceeding. As explained below, that jurisdictional question is non-waivable, and this Court may raise it sua sponte. However, to decide it, we require the orphans’ court to develop a record and make findings of fact. Thus, we remand for an evidentiary hearing. II. Factual & Procedural Background Ms. Avery has two adult children, Mr. Dorsey and Kecia Dorsey-Rosa. Her son lives in Harrisburg, and her daughter lives in the Bronx, New York. Around 2000, after Ms. Avery’s husband died, she moved to South Carolina J-A28009-25 and purchased a home, where she lived with her partner, Edna,1 for 19 years. See The Dorseys’ 7/12/22 Hearing Ex. 1 at 2. In 2010, Ms. Avery’s relationship with her son soured. He ended all contact with his mother “for 10 to 12 years, up until she called [him] in May of 2021.” N.T., 7/12/22, at 86. Ms. Avery was “crying, saying that she needed help,” and said, “I can’t take it anymore . . . I don’t want any responsibility. I need somebody to take charge.” Id. at 86-87. Ms. Avery was living by herself at that point, because Edna “was in the hospital.” Id. at 129. On May 19, 2021, the Dorseys drove to South Carolina to “see what [they] could do to help.” Id. at 87; see also id. at 138. Ms. Avery showed signs of confusion, poor hygiene, and malnutrition; her house and finances were in disarray. See id. at 88-90. The Dorseys “stayed for about a week.” They decided that they needed to take Ms. Avery home with them, because she could not stay in South Carolina alone. Id. at 89. Mr. Dorsey told Ms. Avery the move was “temporary until we can get your affairs squared away.” Id. at 91. Around May 26, 2021, they “brought her to Pennsylvania” to stay with them. Id. A few weeks later, on June 14, Edna died. See The Dorseys’ 7/12/22 Hearing Ex. 1 at 2. Three days after that, Ms. Avery signed a power of attorney in favor of the Dorseys as her plenary agents. During that same time, Ms. Avery underwent cognitive exams. A psychiatrist “determined that ____________________________________________ 1 The record does not appear to contain Edna’s last name. -2- J-A28009-25 [she] suffer[ed] from Alzheimer’s disease, anxiety, and sleep disturbances.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/22, at 2. The Dorseys used their power of attorney to sell Ms. Avery’s South Carolina home for $168,082.08. See The Dorseys’ Petition for the Appointment of Emergency Co-Guardians Ex. D at 1.2 After having Ms. Avery in their home for three-and-a-half months, on September 13, 2021, the Dorseys used their power of attorney to move her into Phoebe Berks, an assisted-living facility near Reading, Pennsylvania. Two months and one week later, on November 20, 2021, Ms. Avery left Phoebe Berks with her daughter, Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa, and went with her to New York. Thus, Ms. Avery was in Pennsylvania for approximately 178 days (from about May 26 through November 20), i.e., five months and three weeks. An administrator for Phoebe Berks, Michele Butch, expected Ms. Avery’s trip to last a week, because the Dorseys, using their power of attorney, had only authorized Ms. Avery to leave the facility for a Thanksgiving visit. See N.T., 7/12/22, at 50, 95. However, on November 27, 2021, Ms. Avery called Phoebe Berks and told an employee that “she would not be returning.” Id. at 52. She also called Mrs. Dorsey and informed her that she had moved in with Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa. See id. Mrs. Dorsey told Ms. Avery “she had to return” because of the Dorseys’ “agreement” with Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa that she could only “take [Ms. Avery] for the holiday.” Id. ____________________________________________ 2 Ms. Avery had a combined monthly income of $3,601.00 from Social Security and her pension, as well as $164,500.00 in checking and various investments. -3- J-A28009-25 The following day, Ms. Butch called Ms. Avery. Ms. Avery again said she would not return to Pennsylvania. See id. at 53. Ms. Butch told her “she could not make that decision on her own, [because] she was deemed incapacitated by her doctor to make these decisions and that she needed to return.” Id. Then, Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa got on the phone and said the power of attorney in favor of the Dorseys “was revoked.” Id. The next day, on November 29, 2021, Ms. Avery faxed letters to the Dorseys, which showed her address as 1850 Patterson Ave., Bronx, New York. Ms. Avery wrote, “This is notice to you that I have formally revoked the Power of Attorney given to you in June, 2021. You no longer have the authority to act for me.” The Dorseys’ Petition for the Appointment of Emergency Co- Guardians Ex. C at 1-2. Ms. Avery also “signed a new power of attorney in favor of [Mrs. Dorsey- Rosa].” The Dorseys’ Petition for the Appointment of Emergency Co- Guardians at 2; see also Dorsey-Rosa’s Response to Petition for Appointment at 1. Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa therefore “refused to return [Ms. Avery] to Phoebe [Berks], and that went on for several weeks.” N.T., 7/12/22, at 96. On December 10, 2021, the Dorseys petitioned the Orphans’ Court of Berks County to adjudicate Ms. Avery’s capacity status and for the Dorseys to be appointed as co-guardians of her person and estate. See id. The orphans’ court assigned the petition to Judge Jeffrey K. Sprecher, who scheduled a hearing on Ms. Avery’s capacity status for December 21, 2021. Five days later, counsel for the Dorseys sent notice of the hearing “via overnight -4- J-A28009-25 delivery” to Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa and to Phoebe Berks, the business entity. Certificate of Service, 12/15/21, at 1. Phoebe Berks did not file a responsive pleading or participate in the orphans’ court proceedings. Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa and Ms. Avery did not appear at the December 21, 2021 hearing. The court issued a bench warrant for Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa’s arrest, and, on December 22, 2021, she returned Ms. Avery to Phoebe Berks. See N.T., 7/12/22, at 51. Ms. Avery spent a total of 32 days in New York. See id. at 54. In the words of the Dorseys’ counsel, “Judge Sprecher ordered [her] back into the Commonwealth.” N.T., 11/19/24, at 10. Or, as Mr. Dorsey described the situation, Ms. Avery “was brought back to Phoebe [Berks] after the Judge ordered [Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa] to bring her back to Phoebe.” N.T., 7/12/22, at 96. On December 27, 2021, the orphans’ court vacated its bench warrant. Next, Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa filed a Response to the petition for the appointment of emergency co-guardians, wherein she admitted most of the allegations. She denied that Ms. Avery was incapacitated. Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa alternatively pleaded that, if the orphans’ court found Ms. Avery to be incapacitated, then the court should appoint Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa or a third-party to serve as her guardian. Three months later, the orphans’ court appointed counsel to represent Ms. Avery. Her counsel did not file a responsive pleading to the petition. On July 12, 2022, the orphans’ court held a hearing on the Dorseys’ emergency petition, after which the court declared Ms. Avery’s status to be an incapacitated person. Curiously, the court granted the status of permanent -5- J-A28009-25 Co-Guardians of Ms. Avery’s estate and her person to the Dorseys, even though they had not sought a permanent guardianship. Ms. Avery moved for reconsideration of the order. The orphans’ court granted reconsideration and “scheduled a hearing on the matter for August 11, 2022[, which] was continued to October 18, 2022.” In re M.D.A., 2023 WL 8370234 at *4 (Pa. Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision). On the same day, Ms. Avery appealed to this Court. Following briefing and argument, we quashed her appeal as premature. See id. Meanwhile, Judge Sprecher retired, and the orphans’ court reassigned this case to Judge James E. Gavin. He eventually denied reconsideration and denied a separate petition by Ms. Avery to have Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa substituted as her guardian. Thereafter, the Dorseys petitioned for permission to charge Ms. Avery’s estate $79,790.99. They sought reimbursement for all the “legal work that counsel has provided, first in pursuing the initial appointment of [the Dorseys] as Co-Guardians, and then in defending their appointment against a variety of ineffective challenges.” The Dorseys’ Petition for Payment of Attorneys’ Fees at 5. Ms. Avery filed an Answer and New Matter denying most allegations in the petition. She contended that the fees were “excessive and patently unreasonable” and she “does not have the financial means to pay such exorbitant fees as a result of [the Dorseys] using her financial resources in Phoebe Berks.” Id. at 4. In New Matter, Ms. Avery averred that Pennsylvania law does not compel a ward to pay for her guardians’ legal fees; the fees were -6- J-A28009-25 excessive; they were duplicative; and the petition was untimely, waived, and barred under the doctrine of laches. See id. at 5-7. The Dorseys filed a response denying Ms. Avery’s New Matter. On November 19, 2024, the orphans’ court conducted a hearing on the petition for attorneys’ fees and costs. Thad Gelsinger, Esq. testified that his former firm, Leisawitz Heller, represented the Dorseys when they commenced this proceeding. That firm assigned him as chief litigator and then merged with Barley Snyder LLP. See N.T., 11/19/24, at 7. Attorney Gelsinger moved to Barley Snyder and continued representing the Dorseys. He explained how the firms calculated billable hours using software and indicated that the firms worked in teams of lawyers. This resulted in multiple billable hours for the same periods of time. He considered the hourly rates to be in the average range for the Berks County market. The court admitted the bills from the firms into evidence, and the Dorseys rested. Ms. Avery offered no evidence and called no witnesses. Following briefing by the parties, the court denied the Dorseys’ petition. This timely appeal followed. Upon review of the Dorseys’ docketing statement, this Court issued a rule to show cause, asking them why this appeal should not be quashed as interlocutory. See Superior Court Order, 3/12/25, at 1. In the Dorseys’ reply, they conceded the appealed-from order was interlocutory, but they contended it was appealable under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 342(a)(5) (“An appeal may be taken as of right from . . . orders of the orphans’ court . -7- J-A28009-25 . . determining the status of . . . creditors in an estate, trust, or guardianship . . . .”). This Court discharged its show-cause order and deferred the issue of appellate jurisdiction to this panel. The parties filed briefs on our appellate jurisdiction and on the merits of the appeal. After reviewing those briefs and the record, we noticed a potential issue as to whether South Carolina, Pennsylvania, or New York has jurisdiction over Ms. Avery’s capacity status and guardianship. Of particular concern was the fact that the orphans’ court imposed a permanent guardianship, when the Dorseys only petitioned for a temporary one, and Ms. Avery was not present in Pennsylvania when this proceeding commenced. See N.T., 7/12/22, at 95. Nor did she consider herself to be a Pennsylvanian, given her desire to remain with Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa in New York.3 ____________________________________________ 3 See In re Edmundson, 167 A. 502, 503 (Pa. Super. 1933) (holding that “jurisdiction of the lower court depended on where [the respondent] ‘resided’ at the time the petition was presented and the proceedings were begun.” (emphasis added)). When we reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we thought the law to be correctly stated as follows: The residence of an incompetent person generally controls jurisdiction to appoint a guardian over his or her person . . . Residence or legal settlement within the county or other territorial jurisdiction of the court is necessary for the appointment of a guardian over his or her person. Jurisdiction for this purpose cannot be exercised, by a local court, over a resident of another county or state, even though such person may have property within the jurisdiction of the court. The alleged incompetent person must be [(1)] actually within the jurisdiction and [(2)] an actual resident (Footnote Continued Next Page) -8- J-A28009-25 In light of a potential jurisdictional conflict among the three states, on January 12, 2026, we ordered supplemental briefing on whether “the Orphans’ Court of Berks County lacks in rem jurisdiction over the incapacity status of Mary D. Avery to impose a plenary guardianship over the person of Ms. Avery . . . .” Superior Court Order, 1/12/26, at 1. ____________________________________________ thereof . . . a mere temporary presence or sojourn, particularly where the presence is involuntary, is insufficient. However, confinement of the incompetent person in an institution in another county or state does not change his or her domicile or residence and, therefore, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court of his or her actual domicile or residence over the appointment of a guardian. The terms ‘residence’ and ‘domicile,’ with respect to the court’s jurisdiction, are synonymous. 57 C.J.S. Mental Health § 127 (March 2026 Update) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also C.J.S., Domicile § 4 (accord). “Domicile within the county is a jurisdictional prerequisite to such a proceeding” regarding capacity status. In re DuPuy’s Est., 96 A.2d 318, 320 (Pa. 1953) (emphasis added). Thus, “The court, upon petition and . . . presentation of clear and convincing evidence, may find a person domiciled in the Commonwealth to be incapacitated and appoint a guardian or guardians of his person or estate.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(a). See In re Nicholls’ Guardian, 86 Pa. Super. 38 (1925) (holding that the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a woman’s status and impose a guardianship upon her, because she was domiciled with her husband in Allegheny County). “The court may find a person not domiciled in the Commonwealth, having property in the Commonwealth, to be incapacitated and may appoint a guardian of his estate.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(b) (emphasis added). “The court may also appoint an emergency guardian of the person [for 30 days] pursuant to this section for an alleged incapacitated person who is present in this Commonwealth but is domiciled outside of this Commonwealth . . . .” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5513 (emphasis added). -9- J-A28009-25 On February 10, 2026, the Dorseys filed a supplemental brief addressing the issue, statutes, and cases mentioned in our order. Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa filed a supplemental brief responding to the Dorseys’ arguments. Ms. Avery joined Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa’s brief. See Avery’s 3/24/26 Letter to Superior Court. Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa’s supplemental brief raised a new issue: whether the Orphans’ Court of Berks County lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (“UAGPPJA”). See 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5901-5992. The Dorseys filed a reply brief to address Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa’s claim that the UAGPPJA deprives the orphans’ court of subject-matter jurisdiction. III. Analysis This appeal raises the following issues: 1. Whether an orphans’ court order denying a petition for reimbursement of legal fees from a ward’s estate is immediately appealable as of right. 2. Whether the orphans’ court lacks jurisdiction over this proceeding and, thus, all the orders it entered are void ab initio. 3. Whether the orphans’ court erred by denying the Dorseys’ petition for payment of attorneys’ fees and costs. See Superior Court Orders, 3/12/25 & 1/12/26; Dorsey-Rosa’s Supplemental Brief at 1; and Dorseys’ Brief at 4-5.4 ____________________________________________ 4 The Dorseys’ Statement of Questions Involved in their initial brief raises a host of sub-issues regarding the denial of the petition for reimbursement of (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 10 - J-A28009-25 A. Appellate Jurisdiction First, we consider whether this Court has appellate jurisdiction over the order denying the Dorsey’s petition for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and costs out of Ms. Avery’s guardianship estate. In their response to our rule to show cause, the Dorseys admitted the appealed-from order is interlocutory. However, they indicated that in Est. of A.J.M., 308 A.3d 844 (Pa. Super. 2024), appeal denied, 325 A.3d 1024 (Pa. 2024), we deemed such an order to be immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(5). Ms. Avery disagrees. She acknowledges that Rule 342(a)(5) allows a party to appeal an orphans’ court order determining someone’s status as a fiduciary, beneficiary, or creditor of an estate, trust, or guardianship. See Avery’s Brief at 7. However, she thinks it is “problematic” that the Dorseys “suddenly characterize themselves as ‘creditor[s]’ of [her estate,] while they are serving as her financial guardian[s].” Id. at 8. This places the Dorseys in “incompatible positions.” Id. Ms. Avery chiefly relies on In re Est. of Liverant, 2021 WL 630981 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision), where this Court quashed a cross-appeal from an orphans’ court order refusing to award attorneys’ fees and costs as a sanction against an opposing party. ____________________________________________ attorneys’ fees and costs out of Ms. Avery’s estate. We do not list those sub- issues here, because the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs is not pertinent to the jurisdictional question presently before us or our decision to remand this case. Still, we will retain jurisdiction over the Dorseys’ appeal and may address the attorneys’-fees-and-costs issue and sub-issues, if necessary, after the orphans’ court conducts an evidentiary hearing and returns the record to this Court. - 11 - J-A28009-25 Ms. Avery’s argument focuses on the merits of whether the Dorseys may (or, on policy grounds, should) be both her guardians and her creditors. That merits-based argument is irrelevant to the appealability of an order. Under Rule 342(a)(5), in considering appellate jurisdiction, we must decide whether the appealed-from order determined that the Dorseys were or were not creditors of Ms. Avery’s estate, not whether they are (or should be) creditors. Thus, Ms. Avery’s public-policy concerns are unrelated to the question of an order’s appealability. The question of “appealability of an order goes to the appellate court’s jurisdiction . . . .” Whittaker v. Lu, 323 A.3d 871, 874 (Pa. Super. 2024). “We may raise issues concerning our appellate jurisdiction sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Gaines, 127 A.3d 15, 17 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). Jurisdiction is “a question of law; the appellate standard of review is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary.” Crespo v. Hughes, 292 A.3d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 2023). This Court’s “appellate jurisdiction extends to (1) a final order or an order certified by the trial court as a final order; (2) an interlocutory order as of right; (3) an interlocutory order by permission; (4) or a collateral order.” Whittaker, 323 A.3d at 874–75. Under prior versions of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, a court’s order was treated as final if “it effectively put the plaintiffs out of court, so far as their present claim is concerned.” Goldman v. McShain, 247 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. 1968) (cleaned up). In 1992, the Supreme Court of - 12 - J-A28009-25 Pennsylvania changed the definition of a final order “to make clear that, as a general rule, a final order is an order that ends a case as to all claims and all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 342 Note (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that an order put a party out of court no longer allowed the party to take an immediate appeal. That change limited piecemeal appeals in most civil actions, which move naturally to final judgments. However, experience soon demonstrated that the new “final order” definition was unworkable in orphans’ court divisions. See id. Because “administration of a trust or an estate continues over a period of time . . . traditional notions of finality that are applicable in the context of ongoing civil adversarial proceedings do not correspond to litigation in orphans’ court.” Id. A dispute may arise at any time “during the administration, and when it does arise, the dispute needs to be determined promptly and with finality, so that the guardianship or the estate or trust administration can then continue properly and orderly.” Id. To facilitate orderly and continuous administration of estates and trusts, the Supreme Court promulgated Rule of Appellate Procedure 342(a) which dictates, in pertinent part, as follows: An appeal may be taken as of right from the following orders of the orphans’ court division: * * * (5) An order determining the status of fiduciaries, beneficiaries, or creditors in an estate, trust, or guardianship; - 13 - J-A28009-25 (6) An order determining an interest in real or personal property . . . . Pa.R.A.P. 342(a) (some capitalization omitted). As Ms. Avery observes, in Liverant, supra, we stated that, “the order, which . . . denied the [cross-appellants’] requests for counsel fees associated with [opposing party’s] attempt to remove their counsel, is not appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(1)-(7).” Id., 2021 WL 630981 at *7. However, Liverant is a non-precedential decision, and its holding is not binding upon this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 126. Moreover, Liverant involved an attempt to get attorney’s fees from an opposing party, personally, and not from an estate or trust. Thus, the appealed-from order was procedurally distinct from the one presently before us, because the order in Liverant did not determine the petitioners’ status as a creditor of an estate or trust. By contrast, A.J.M. involved an appealed-from order that determined that a law firm lacked status as a creditor of an estate. There, Mr. and Mrs. Madia hired The Lynch Law Group, LLC, because their adult sons were trying to sell the Madias’ home under a power of attorney. When the sons learned the law firm was representing their parents, the sons petitioned the orphans’ court to appoint them as guardians of Mr. Madia and his estate. The orphans’ court granted the petition and allowed the sons to sell their parents’ home. Lynch Law Group petitioned the orphans’ court for allowance of legal fees and costs out of Mr. Madia’s estate. The orphans’ court denied the petition, and the law firm appealed. - 14 - J-A28009-25 Based on Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(5), this Court concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction. We explained, “an orphans’ court order determining if an individual or entity is a fiduciary, beneficiary or creditor, such as an order determining if the alleged creditor has a valid claim against the estate, is immediately appealable as of right.” A.J.M., 308 A.3d at 850 (emphasis in original) (some punctuation omitted) (quoting Pa.R.A.P. 342(a) Note). The order “determined that [the law firm did] not have a valid claim regarding the legal fees and costs it allegedly incurred through its representation of [the Madias] in the guardianship proceedings.” Id. Hence, the interlocutory order was immediately appealable, because it determined that the firm lacked legal status as a creditor of Mr. Madia’s estate. Here, as in A.J.M., the appealed- from order is immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(5). Additionally, the appealed-from order is immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(6). “An order [of the orphans’ court] determining an interest in real or personal property” is immediately appealable. Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(6) (emphasis added). The phrase “personal property, when used in its ordinary (as well as in its legal) sense and meaning includes . . . cash.” In re Lewis’ Est., 180 A.2d 919, 921 (Pa. 1962). The Dorseys’ petition asserted a right to $79,790.99 in cash from Ms. Avery’s estate accounts. By denying the Dorseys’ petition, the orphans’ court determined that they had no “interest in [the] personal property” – the cash – in Ms. Avery’s accounts. Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(6). Hence, the order is also appealable under Rule 342(a)(6). Thus, this Court has appellate jurisdiction - 15 - J-A28009-25 over an orphans’ court order denying reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and costs from an estate or trust. B. Jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court Next, we turn to the issue of whether the Orphans’ Court of Berks County has jurisdiction over Ms. Avery’s capacity status and estate. The record suggested that Ms. Avery was not domiciled or present in Pennsylvania when the Dorseys filed their emergency petition for temporary guardianship. See Footnote 3, supra. 1. The Parties’ Arguments In the Dorseys’ supplemental brief, they agree with our understanding that 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(a) requires a person, over whom an orphans’ court imposes a permanent guardianship, to be domiciled in this Commonwealth. See Dorseys’ Supplemental Brief at 8. They contend that Ms. Avery changed her domicile to Pennsylvania in May of 2021 when they moved her here from South Carolina. See id. at 10. Although, before leaving South Carolina, Mr. Dorsey told Ms. Avery the move was “temporary,” the Dorseys claim he meant “temporary” in regards to Ms. Avery’s “residence with [the Dorseys] and did not reflect any expectation or intent that Ms. Avery would return to South Carolina.” Id. 10-11. Furthermore, the Dorseys believe the July 17, 2021 power of attorney in their favor “evince[s Ms. Avery’s] intent to reestablish her permanent residence in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 12. Additionally, the Dorseys claim Ms. Avery chose to move into Phoebe Berks. See id. at 12. They argue that, on September 13, 2021, “she retained - 16 - J-A28009-25 capacity and therefore could have declined to move to the facility.” Id. They state, “She could have selected a different retirement or assisted-living facility, or she could have chosen to return to South Carolina.” Id. Finally, the Dorseys claim, if Ms. Avery remained a South Carolinian, then she waived any challenge to the orphans’ court’s in rem jurisdiction over her capacity status by failing to raise the jurisdictional issue below. See id. at 25-26 (quoting Sippel Development Co., Inc. v. Charter Homes at Hastings, Inc., 1485 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 4233848 at *3 (Pa. Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision) (“Whether a court has in rem jurisdiction is a question of personal jurisdiction, not subject-matter jurisdiction.”)). In the Dorseys’ view, Ms. Avery entered a general appearance when she attended the hearing on their emergency petition for guardianship in July of 2022. Therefore, they believe we may not consider whether the orphans’ court lacked in rem jurisdiction over her status and estate. Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa’s supplemental brief (in which Ms. Avery has joined) asserts that the Dorseys’ reliance upon common-law rules of domicile and their allegations of waiver are misplaced. Instead, Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa purports to challenge the subject-matter jurisdiction of the orphans’ court under the UAGPPJA. She claims that that Act “expressly provides the ‘exclusive jurisdictional basis’ for adult-guardianship proceedings . . . .” Dorsey-Rosa’s Supplemental Brief at 7 (quoting 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5912). Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa argues that the UAGPPJA, a statutory mandate, is a legislatively imposed restriction on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the orphans’ court. “A court - 17 - J-A28009-25 that fails to satisfy the UAGPPJA’s requirements has no judicial authority over the class of proceedings, regardless of the parties’ conduct.” Id. at 12. Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa asserts that, the UAGPPJA has radically altered the jurisdictional landscape of adult-guardianship proceedings by “mov[ing] away from domicile as the jurisdictional touchstone” and replacing it with a tiered system of shared jurisdiction among enacting states. Id. at 17. In particular, Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa claims that South Carolina retained “home state jurisdiction” over Ms. Avery’s status, because Ms. Avery was not present in Pennsylvania long enough to make Pennsylvania her home. In support of that contention, she indicates that the Dorseys only petitioned for a temporary guardianship, under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5513, based on a person being present in this Commonwealth but being domiciled in another state. Thus, Mrs. Dorsey- Rosa contends that the Dorseys conceded in their pleadings that Pennsylvania is not Ms. Avery’s “home state.” See id. at 18-22. In the Dorseys’ reply brief, they do not contest the assertion that the UAGPPJA governs the nonwaivable, subject-matter jurisdiction of orphans’ courts over adult guardianship proceedings. Instead, the Dorseys argue that Pennsylvania has “home state jurisdiction” over Ms. Avery’s status, because they filed their petition for guardianship on December 10, 2021, i.e., more than six months after they moved Ms. Avery to Pennsylvania. See Dorseys’ Reply Brief to Supplemental Brief at 2. They contend that, prior to leaving for New York in November of 2021, Ms. Avery “had resided in Pennsylvania for approximately six months,” and they intended for her trip to New York to be - 18 - J-A28009-25 temporary. Id. at 3. The Dorseys assert that “Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa should not be permitted to create Ms. Avery’s absence from the Commonwealth and then rely on it to claim Ms. Avery’s absence from Pennsylvania was intended to be permanent.” Id. at 4. Thus, the Dorseys believe that the time Ms. Avery spent in New York should count towards the six-month period necessary to make Pennsylvania Ms. Avery’s home state. If Pennsylvania lacks “home state jurisdiction,” then the Dorseys assert that Ms. Avery had no “home state” under the UAGPPJA. Consequently, the Dorseys offer “significant-connection-state jurisdiction” as an alternative basis to uphold the orders of the orphans’ court and imposition of this guardianship. They observe that, under that portion of the Act, an objection is specifically required to defeat jurisdiction. Because no one objected to the proceeding below, and because Pennsylvania is an “appropriate forum,” as that phrase is used in the UAGPPJA, the Dorseys claim Pennsylvania is, at least, a significant- connection state. Id. at 8. 2. Review of In Rem and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Typically, “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). An exception to Rule 302(a) is jurisdiction, because “this Court can raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Valentine, 928 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. Super. 2007). However, that exception depends on the category of jurisdiction at issue. A court may raise certain jurisdictional issues sua sponte; others are waivable. - 19 - J-A28009-25 Mrs. Dorsey-Rosa contends the UAGPPJA implicates subject-matter jurisdiction, because it statutorily limits the various classes of adult-incapacity cases that orphans’ courts may entertain. We, on the other hand, raised this jurisdictional inquiry over the orphans’ court’s lack of in rem jurisdiction,5 due to the res6 (namely, Ms. Avery’s capacity status) being outside the territorial confines of Pennsylvania on the day the Dorseys commenced this proceeding. Thus, we begin with the threshold question of whether this Court may, sua sponte, raise the categories of jurisdiction at issue, because, as a general rule, “one may with impunity disregard the law pronounced by a magistrate beyond his [or her] territory.” Joseph Story, J., COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, ETC. § 8 at 8 (1834). The various jurisdictional categories arose from the need of courts’ to ascertain the enforceability of judgments, especially against persons or things outside the territorial confines of the courts that issued them. See id. In its broadest sense, “Jurisdiction relates to the court’s power to hear and decide the controversy presented.” Commonwealth v. Gross, 101 A.3d 28, 32 (Pa. 2014). Jurisdiction is divided into four overarching categories: ____________________________________________ 5 Latin, literally translating to “jurisdiction on the thing.” A more idiomatic translation is “jurisdiction over the thing.” 6 Latin, literally translating to “the thing.” - 20 - J-A28009-25 subject-matter jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction,7 in rem jurisdiction, and quasi in rem jurisdiction.8 See 1 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2d. §§ 2:84 – 2:119. “Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question that is not waivable and may be raised by a court on its own motion.” Domus, Inc. v. Signature Bldg. Sys. of PA, LLC, 252 A.3d 628, 636 (Pa. 2021). “The assessment of whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction inquires into the competency of the court to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for consideration belongs.” Id. By contrast, in personam jurisdiction (a.k.a. personal jurisdiction) “is readily waivable.” In re Est. of Forte, 352 A.3d 1024, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2026), reargument denied (Apr. 7, 2026) (quoting Grimm v. Grimm, 149 A.3d 77, 83 (Pa. Super. 2016), disapproved of on other grounds by Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., 288 A.3d 76 (Pa. 2023)). Personal jurisdiction is a “court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process; jurisdiction over a defendant’s personal rights, rather than merely over property interests. — Also termed in personam jurisdiction . . . .” Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). ____________________________________________ 7 Latin, literally translating to “jurisdiction on the person.” A more idiomatic translation would be “jurisdiction over the person.” The “courts may exercise two types of in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant:” general and specific in personam jurisdiction. Mar-Eco, Inc. v. T & R & Sons Towing & Recovery, Inc., 837 A.2d 512, 515 (Pa. Super. 2003). 8 Latin, literally translating to “jurisdiction as if jurisdiction were on the thing.” A more idiomatic translation would be “pretend jurisdiction is over the thing.” - 21 - J-A28009-25 As for in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, our research reveals no precedential decision where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or this Court has held that a party’s failure to raise the lack of in rem jurisdiction, in the court purportedly lacking such jurisdiction, results in waiver of the jurisdictional defect. In rem jurisdiction is generally defined as a “court’s power to adjudicate the rights to a given piece of property, including the power to seize and hold it. — Also termed jurisdiction in rem.” In Rem Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Quasi in rem jurisdiction is “[j]urisdiction over a person but based on that person’s interest in property located within the court’s territory. — Also termed jurisdiction quasi in rem.” Quasi in Rem JURISDICTION, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Unlike in rem judgments, an in personam judgment, arising from the in personam jurisdiction of the court over the parties before it, adjudicates the rights and obligations of only those parties. See, e.g., Bank of Pennsylvania v. G/N Enterprises, Inc., 463 A.2d 4, 6-7 (Pa. Super. 1983) (holding that “a proceeding by confession of judgment on the bond . . . is to obtain judgment against the obligor of the bond. This is a proceeding in personam;” thus, “judgment confessed on the bond, being in personam against the obligor, does not bind strangers to the [underlying action].”) By contrast, an in rem judgment, arising from the in rem jurisdiction of a court over the res, adjudicates “forever the status of a thing, and [is] binding upon all the world.” In re Clark’s Est., 119 A. 590, 591 (Pa. 1923); see also 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 163 (February 2026 Update) (accord). - 22 - J-A28009-25 “The best-known form of the judgment in rem is a judgment declaring the status of an individual: as that such and such persons are married, or that [a person] is the administrator of the estate of a deceased person.” Sir Francis Piggott, 4 FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND JURISDICTION: JUDGMENTS IN REM § 1 at 6 (1908-1910) (footnote omitted). Determinations of a person’s status “are for the most part . . . of absolute obligation everywhere, when they have once attached upon the person by the law of his domicile.” Story, supra § 51 at 51. Simply put, “a Frenchman is a Frenchman all the world over,” because the “laws of [a] state affecting the personal status of [its citizen