Moss v. City of Concord
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-82
JudgeJudge Julee Flood
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA26-82
Filed 18 November 2026
Cabarrus County, No. 24CV006213-120
JAYLENE MOSS AND RWJ CONSULTING, INC., Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CONCORD; TAC NIBLOCK, LLC; LANDWORKS DESIGN GROUP,
P.A.; THE ARDENT COMPANIES, LLC; CMG BUILDERS, INC.; AND HUNTON
FOREST HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendants.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 4 June 2025 by Judge William Arnold
Wood in Cabarrus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29
September 2026.
Cranfill Sumner, LLP, by Steven A. Bader and John P. Wright, for defendant-
appellant.
Salter, Shook & Conner, PC, by Joseph R. Pellington, for plaintiff-appellee.
FLOOD, Judge.
Defendant City of Concord appeals from the trial court’s order denying its
motion to dismiss. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that it was not entitled to governmental immunity. Upon careful review,
we affirm the trial court, concluding that Defendant is not entitled to governmental
MOSS V. CITY OF CONCORD
Opinion of the Court
immunity from suit as it was engaged in proprietary functions.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs RWJ Consulting, Inc., and Jaylene Moss, RWJ Consulting’s
principal, own real property located in Concord, North Carolina. Defendant owns an
easement for underground pipes that run through Plaintiffs’ property.
In 2014, Defendant approved a residential development plan south of
Plaintiffs’ property that would consist of the development of 361 large, single-family
homes. Defendant additionally approved phases two and three of the development
plan in 2016. Plaintiffs allege that, in 2019, during construction of the development,
a rainstorm produced a flash flood, which resulted in stormwater that “swamped
Plaintiffs’ property with several feet of brown water from the construction site[,]”
“littered [it] with wood debris and fast food cups from the jobsite[,]” “washed away
sections of Plaintiffs’ fence on the northside[,]” and “destroyed Plaintiffs’ fence on the
southside . . . .” Plaintiffs further allege that the “force of the water, which included
tree debris from the uncontained . . . construction site, also caused one of the
stormwater pipes beneath Plaintiffs’ front yard to buckle and break, creating a two-
foot by two-foot hole in the ground.” According to Plaintiffs, several more flashfloods
occurred between 2020 and 2024.
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Opinion of the Court
In 2022, Plaintiffs sued Defendant1 for negligence, trespass, and nuisance,
alleging that Defendant approved and permitted the stormwater design for the
residential development and failed to ensure that the construction area stormwater
volume and flow rates were adequate, as well as for inverse condemnation, alleging
that Defendant’s actions constituted a taking of Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs
amended their complaint in 2024. In response, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’
complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6), arguing, in relevant part, that it
was protected by governmental immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims. On 4 June 2025,
the trial court entered an order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding
that Plaintiffs’ complaint “states claims against . . . [Defendant] upon which relief can
be granted[.]”
Defendant timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
Defendant contends that, although the order from which it appeals is
interlocutory, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because issues regarding
governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right.
In most instances, a party has “no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory
orders and judgments[,]” Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725 (1990);
1 Plaintiffs also sued Tac Niblock, LLC; Landworks Design Group, P.A.; The Ardent
Companies, LLC; CMG Builders, LLC; and Hunton Forest Homeowner’s Association, Inc.; however,
they are not parties to this appeal.
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Opinion of the Court
however, “immediate review is available where the order affects a substantial
right[,]” Smith v. Polsky, 251 N.C. App. 589, 594 (2017). “In North Carolina, appeals
raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right
sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review.” Lake v. State Health Plan for
Tchrs. & State Emps., 234 N.C. App. 368, 370 (2014) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “[T]his only applies[, however,] for denial of a motion to dismiss
under Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), and 12(c), or a motion for summary judgment under
Rule 56. We cannot review a trial court’s order denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(1).” Hinson v. City of Greensboro, 232 N.C. App. 204, 209 (2014) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Defendant’s challenges to the trial
court’s denial of their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) based on
governmental immunity grounds are properly before us.
Defendant also seeks review of a non-immunity related challenge, specifically,
the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim.
Defendant asserts we may choose to review this issue to prevent fragmentary
appeals. See RPR & Assocs., Inc. v. State, 139 N.C. App. 525, 530–31 (2000), aff’d per
curiam, 353 N.C. 362 (2001) (“Although this question again is interlocutory in nature,
we choose to address it, given that [the] defendants’ sovereign immunity argument is
properly before us. After all, to address but one interlocutory or related issue would
create fragmentary appeals.”). In the alternative, Defendant has filed a petition for
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Opinion of the Court
writ of certiorari (“PWC”), contending our review of Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation
claim will promote “judicial efficiency[.]”
As Plaintiffs correctly argue, however, this Court has previously declined non-
immunity challenges on jurisdictional grounds. See Hinson, 232 N.C. App. at 209
(“Because it is well established that ‘[i]t is not the duty of this Court to construct
arguments for or find support for appellant’s right to appeal from an interlocutory
order’ and that ‘the appellant has the burden of showing this Court that the order
deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a
review prior to a final determination on the merits[,]’ we decline to review the non-
immunity related challenges to the trial court’s denial of [the] defendants’ motions to
dismiss.” (quoting Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380
(1994))). “[I]n most immunity-related interlocutory appeals, we have declined
requests that we consider additional non-immunity-related issues on the merits.”
Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 228 N.C. App. 1, 7 (2013), rev’d in part on other grounds, 367
N.C. 355 (2014) (discussing three cases where this Court reviewed the defendant’s
challenge to the trial court’s immunity-related decision on the merits while
dismissing the remainder of the defendant’s appeal). Accordingly, we decline to
review Defendant’s interlocutory, non-immunity related claim and deny Defendant’s
PWC. See Hinson, 232 N.C. App. at 209; Bynum, 228 N.C. App. at 7.
Thus, we proceed to review solely to the merits of Defendant’s governmental
immunity argument.
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III. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the granting of a motion to dismiss de novo. See Taylor
v. Bank of Am., N.A., 382 N.C. 677, 679 (2022). “[U]nder de novo review, the appellate
court as the reviewing court considers the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss anew: It
freely substitutes its own assessment of whether the allegations of the complaint are
sufficient to state a claim for the trial court’s assessment.” Id. When considering a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the question is
whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the
complaint, treated as true, state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper
when one of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1)
the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the
plaintiff’s claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the
absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the
complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the
plaintiff’s claim. We consider [the] plaintiff’s complaint to
determine whether, when liberally construed, it states
enough to give the substantive elements of a legally
recognized claim.
Allred v. Cap. Area Soccer League, Inc., 194 N.C. App. 280, 282–83 (2008) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. Analysis
On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims due to governmental immunity protection. Specifically,
Defendant argues that it acted within its governmental function by permitting the
residential development. We disagree.
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Opinion of the Court
“[T]o overcome a defense of governmental immunity, the complaint must
specifically allege a waiver of governmental immunity. Absent such an allegation, the
complaint fails to state a cause of action.” Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 47
(2017). “This requirement does not, however, mandate that a complaint use any
particular language. Instead, consistent with the concept of notice pleading, a
complaint need only allege facts that, if taken as true, are sufficient to establish a
waiver by” the local government. Fabrikant v. Currituck Cnty., 174 N.C. App. 30, 38
(2005).
“Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, a county is immune from suit
for the negligence of its employees in the exercise of governmental functions absent
a waiver of immunity.” Evans v. Hous. Auth. of City of Raleigh, 359 N.C. 50, 53 (2004)
(citation omitted). “[G]overnmental immunity [, however,] does not . . . apply when
the municipality engages in a proprietary function.” Smith v. Scotland Cnty., 300
N.C. App. 76, 79 (2025) (citation modified). “In determining whether an entity is
entitled to governmental immunity, the issue turns on whether the alleged tortious
conduct of the county or municipality was a result of an activity that was
governmental in nature or proprietary in nature.” Smith v. Lane, 298 N.C. App. 560,
562 (2025).
A governmental function is one “which is discretionary, political, legislative, or
public in nature and performed for the public good [o]n behalf of the State rather than
for itself[.]” Britt v. City of Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 450 (1952). “In contrast, a
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proprietary function is one that is commercial or chiefly for the private advantage of
the compact community.” Lane, 298 N.C. App. at 563 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has explained that governmental immunity
renders local governments such as counties and municipal
corporations immune from suit for the negligence of [their]
employees in the exercise of governmental functions absent
waiver of immunity. Although [t]he State’s sovereign
immunity applies to both its governmental and proprietary
functions, the more limited governmental immunity covers
only the acts of a municipality or a municipal corporation
committed pursuant to its governmental functions. In
other words, while governmental immunity protects units
of local government from suit for acts committed in [their]
governmental capacity, if the entity in question undertakes
functions beyond its governmental and police powers and
engages in business in order to render a public service for
the benefit of the community for a profit, it becomes subject
to liability for contract and in tort as in case of private
corporations.
Providence Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Town of Weddington, 382 N.C. 199, 211–12
(2022) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In order to determine whether a function is governmental or proprietary,
“[f]irst, in deference to our tripartite system of government, the appellate courts of
this State should consider whether our legislature has designated the particular
function at issue as governmental or proprietary.” Est. of Williams ex rel. Overton v.
Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 200 (2012). If “the
legislature has not directly resolved whether a specific activity is governmental or
proprietary in nature, other factors are relevant.” Id. at 202. Notably, however, as
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Opinion of the Court
our Supreme Court has explained, “[w]e have repeatedly held that if the undertaking
is one in which only a governmental agency could engage, it is perforce governmental
in nature.” Id. But
when the particular service can be performed both
privately and publicly, the inquiry involves consideration
of a number of additional factors, of which no single factor
is dispositive. Relevant to this inquiry is whether the
service is traditionally a service provided by a
governmental entity, whether a substantial fee is charged
for the service provided, and whether that fee does more
than simply cover the operating costs of the service
provider.
Id. at 202–03 (footnotes omitted). “Consequently, the proper designation of a
particular action of a county or municipality is a fact intensive inquiry, turning on
the facts alleged in the complaint, and may differ from case to case.” Id. at 203.
Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Defendant was negligent by granting
permission of the residential development as well as by “failing to monitor [the
construction site’s] stormwater system for adequate maintenance[] and failing to
enforce minimum requirements related to stormwater and sedimentation directed at
Plaintiffs’ property.” Furthermore, Plaintiffs alleged Defendant was trespassing
because its “failure to maintain its stormwater easement interferes with Plaintiffs’
use and enjoyment of their property[,]” such that “[t]he downstream overflows reflect
permanent, continuing, and recurring trespass.” Additionally, for Plaintiffs’ private
nuisance claim, they allege Defendant “created and failed to remediate . . . a
substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of Plaintiffs’
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Opinion of the Court
property.”
Under N.C.G.S. § 160A-311(10), stormwater management is a “public
enterprise.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-311(10) (2025). In Devonwood-Loch Lomond Lake Ass’n,
Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, this Court held that a plaintiff’s negligence, trespass, and
private nuisance claims against the city of Fayetteville for stormwater management
were not barred by governmental immunity because, “[u]nder N.C.G.S. § 160A-311,
stormwater management is a quintessentially proprietary municipal function.” 296
N.C. App. 26, 46–47 (2024). Similarly, here, Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by
governmental immunity because Plaintiffs’ negligence, trespass, and private
nuisance claims are alleged to be caused by Defendant’s engagement with its
proprietary function of stormwater management; thus, “if taken as true,” these facts
“are sufficient to establish a waiver by” the local government, see Fabrikant, 174 N.C.
App. at 38, as they have alleged these claims based on inadequate stormwater
management, see Devonwood-Loch, 296 N.C. App. at 46–47. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, as it was engaged in a
proprietary function and not entitled to governmental immunity.
V. Conclusion
Upon careful review, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied
Defendant’s motion to dismiss because Defendant’s stormwater management was a
proprietary function; thus, Defendant was not entitled to governmental immunity.
AFFIRMED.
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Opinion of the Court
Judges COLLINS and CARPENTER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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