Tusken v. Rubin CA2/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketB344909
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 Tusken v. Rubin CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MICHAEL TUSKEN, B344909
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
23STCV05441)
JASON RUBIN, as Trustee of the
Cira Ross Qualified Domestic Trust,
and THOMAS K. BOURKE,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael Tusken, Esq., in pro per. for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Law Office of Mark J. Yost, Mark J. Yost for Defendants
and Respondents.
Attorney Michael Tusken seeks a declaratory judgment
stating he has an attorney lien against proceeds recovered by his
former clients. The applicable contingency fee contract includes a
provision that imposes an attorney lien on the clients’ monetary
recovery if the parties initial the paragraph. But the spaces for
initials immediately underneath the paragraph for both the
attorney and client are blank. We must decide whether Tusken
nonetheless holds a valid attorney lien. We conclude that he does
not. The unambiguous terms of the fee agreement—providing
that an attorney lien is created “by initialing this paragraph”—
reflect the parties’ objective intent to require separate assent to
the lien provision, and it is undisputed the parties failed to
execute that provision. The parties’ supposed subjective intent to
the contrary cannot contradict the objective, unambiguous
language of a contract. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Jason Rubin, as trustee of the Cira Ross Qualified Domestic
Trust, and Thomas Bourke (collectively, the judgment creditors)
hold valid judgments against David Ross (the judgment debtor)
based on judgments entered against the judgment debtor in 2007
and 2011, respectively (the judgments).
In 2021, the judgment debtor’s spouse, Leah Ross, along
with her three minor children, filed a lawsuit against their
residential landlord, Ming Lu, and other related parties for
injuries they allegedly sustained as tenants (the Ming Lu action).
Plaintiff and appellant Michael Tusken represented both
David Ross and Leah Ross in the Ming Lu action pursuant to an
Attorney-Client Contingency Fee Agreement (the fee agreement).
The fee agreement provides that both Rosses are “Clients.” It
further provides a formula for calculating the amount of attorney
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fees, if any, Tusken shall recover. Paragraph 8 of the agreement
addressed a potential attorney lien:
8. LIEN. Client hereby grants Attorney a lien on any and
all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the
representation under this Agreement. . . . Because a lien
may affect Client’s property rights, Client may seek the
advice of an independent lawyer of Client’s choice before
agreeing to such a lien. By initialing this paragraph,
Client represents and agrees that Client has had a
reasonable opportunity to consult such an independent
lawyer and-whether or not Client has chosen to consult
such an independent lawyer-Client agrees that Attorney
will have a lien as specified above. [Italics added.]
_______ (Client Initial Here) _______ (Attorney Initial Here)
Neither Tusken nor the Rosses initialed the spaces appearing
immediately below the text of Paragraph 8.
The last page of the fee agreement included an
acknowledgement that the Rosses had an opportunity to seek
independent counsel, that they read and understood the
agreement, and that if one client “signs below, each agrees to be
liable, jointly and severally, for all obligations under this
agreement.” (Original quote in all capital letters.) David Ross,
Leah Ross, and Tusken signed the agreement in the spaces
provided under the acknowledgement.
On October 28, 2022, the parties in the Ming Lu action
notified the court that they had entered into a written settlement
agreement. The settlement agreement provided for payment of
$195,000 to the Rosses and their children, $30,000 of which was
allocated to Tusken.
3
Shortly thereafter, the judgment creditors filed notices of
lien. They also filed a motion seeking an order that the Rosses’
right to any settlement proceeds be applied to satisfy the
judgment creditors’ liens. Of relevance here, the judgment
creditors objected to payment of any of the settlement proceeds to
Tusken because the fee agreement did not grant Tusken an
attorney lien.
The court in the Ming Lu action denied the judgment
creditors’ motion to satisfy the liens as to the settlement proceeds
allocated to Leah Ross. The Ming Lu court also ordered that
Tusken be paid $30,000 of the settlement proceeds.
In 2024, a different panel of this court reversed the Ming
Lu court’s ruling to the extent it denied the judgment creditors’
motion with respect to the settlement funds allocated to Leah
Ross and Tusken. The panel ordered the trial court to enter a
new order directing the plaintiffs in the Ming Lu action to pay
Leah Ross’s portion of the settlement funds to the judgment
creditors. The panel expressed no opinion, however, on the issue
pending in this action regarding Tusken’s purported attorney lien
and his claim to a portion of the settlement funds.
While the Ming Lu action was pending, Tusken filed this
action seeking a declaratory judgment that he has a valid
attorney lien on the settlement proceeds. Tusken alleged his
purported lien has priority over the judgment creditors’ liens and,
therefore, he is entitled to payment of his fee out of the
settlement proceeds.1 He further alleged that nothing in the fee
1 Because Tusken is not a party to the Ming Lu action and has no
right to intervene, the trial court in that action has no jurisdiction to
determine the existence or validity of his alleged attorney lien on the
judgment. (Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th
1168, 1173 (Carroll).)
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agreement conditioned enforcement of the attorney lien provision
on the Rosses having signed their initials to Paragraph 8.
Judgment creditors moved for summary judgment. They
argued the fee agreement did not give rise to an express attorney
lien because the unambiguous terms of the agreement indicated
the parties’ objective intent to require separate assent to, and
execution of, an attorney lien provision, which the parties did not
execute. They further argued the agreement contained no
language giving rise to an implied attorney lien.
In support of his opposition to the motion, Tusken
submitted two separate declarations from David Ross and Leah
Ross. The declarations included the following identical language:
“Although I inadvertently did not initial paragraph 8, at the time
that I signed the Fee Agreement, I fully intended to agree to
grant and to actually grant Michael Tusken an attorney’s lien as
stated in paragraph 8.”
The judgment creditors filed a reply and objected to the
Ross declarations on the grounds that they (1) contradicted the
allegations in the complaint and (2) extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to show subjective intent that contradicts an
unambiguous written contract.
Two days after the judgment creditors filed their reply in
support of their motion for summary judgment, Tusken filed a
motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Tusken also filed
an ex parte application to advance the hearing date for the
motion for leave to amend the complaint. The court denied this
application.
While Tusken’s motion for leave to amend his complaint
was pending, the trial court held a hearing on judgment creditors’
motion for summary judgment. After the hearing, the court
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sustained the judgment creditors’ objections to the Ross
declarations and granted the summary judgment motion. The
court reasoned that the plain language of the fee agreement
reflects an objective intent to require separate assent to the lien
provision, and it is undisputed that Tusken and the Rosses failed
to execute the lien provision. The court also concluded the fee
agreement did not give rise to an implied attorney lien because it
“lack[ed] any language manifesting an intent to grant a security
interest directly upon the recovery.” It further concluded Tusken
did not meet his burden to demonstrate a triable issue of fact
because the Ross declarations both impermissibly contradict the
allegations in the complaint and constitute extrinsic evidence
that contradicts the unambiguous language of the fee agreement.
The trial court then entered judgment in favor of the
judgment creditors, and Tusken timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary
Judgment in Favor of the Judgment Creditors Based
on the Unambiguous Terms of the Fee Agreement
A. Standard of Review
A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no
triable issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A
defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or
more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be
established or that there is a complete defense. (Id., subd. (p)(2).)
If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to present evidence creating a triable issue of material
fact. (Ibid.) A triable issue of fact exists if the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the fact in favor of the
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party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
We review the trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment
motion de novo, liberally construe the evidence in favor of the
party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of the opponent. (Miller v. Department of
Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460.) “We must affirm a
summary judgment if it is correct on any of the grounds asserted
in the trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.”
(Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
631, 636–637 (Grebing).)
We generally review a trial court’s ruling on evidentiary
objections for an abuse of discretion. As to evidentiary rulings
made in connection with a motion for summary judgment,
however, there is a split of authority. Some courts have held
such evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion
(Martin v. Trustees of California State University (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 149, 161; Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
1150, 1169), while other courts have held that some or all written
objections should be reviewed de novo (Pipitone v. Williams
(2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1450–1451; Strobel v. Johnson &
Johnson (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 796, 816–817.) “We will follow
the weight of authority and apply the abuse of discretion
standard.” (Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
1109, 1118.)
B. Contract Interpretation Principles
The interpretation of a written contract is a judicial
function. “In engaging in this function, the trial court ‘give[s]
effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed’ at the
time the contract was executed. [Citation.] Ordinarily, the
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objective intent of the contracting parties is a legal question
determined solely by reference to the contract’s terms.” (Wolf v.
Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107,
1125–1126 (Wolf).)
“ ‘The court generally may not consider extrinsic evidence
of any prior agreement or contemporaneous oral agreement to
vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of a written,
integrated contract. [Citations.] Extrinsic evidence is
admissible, however, to interpret an agreement when a material
term is ambiguous.’ ” (Brown v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
418, 432 (Goldstein).)
When a party offers extrinsic (parol) evidence, the court
engages in a two-step process. “ ‘ “First the court provisionally
receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence
concerning the parties’ intentions to determine ‘ambiguity,’ i.e.,
whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the
interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic
evidence the court decides the language is ‘reasonably
susceptible’ to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is
then admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the
contract.” ’ ” (Goldstein, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 432—433.)
“On appeal, a ‘trial court’s ruling on the threshold
determination of “ambiguity” (i.e., whether the proffered evidence
is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is
reasonably susceptible) is a question of law, not of fact.
[Citation.] Thus[,] the threshold determination of ambiguity is
subject to independent review.’ ” (Goldstein, supra, 34
Cal.App.5th at p. 433.)
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C. The Unambiguous Terms of the Fee Agreement
Demonstrate Neither an Express Nor an
Implied Attorney Lien Was Created
“In California, an attorney’s lien is created only by
contract—either an express provision in the attorney fee contract
[citations] or by implication where the retainer agreement
provides that the attorney is to look to the judgment for payment
for legal services rendered.” (Carroll, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p.
1172.)
We begin by reviewing the plain language of the contract to
ascertain the parties’ intent. (See Civ. Code, § 1639 [“When a
contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be
ascertained from the writing alone, if possible”].) The last
sentence of paragraph 8 (titled “Lien”) states: “By initialing this
paragraph, Client represents and agrees that Client has had a
reasonable opportunity to consult such an independent lawyer
and—whether or not Client has chosen to consult such an
independent lawyer—Client agrees that Attorney will have a lien
as specified above.” (Italics added.)
The plain and express language of the fee agreement
reflects an objective intent to require assent to the lien provision
separate and apart from the signatures following the
acknowledgement at the end of the fee agreement. (See e.g.
Romo v. Y-3 Holdings, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1156,
1158 [employee’s signature at the end of the handbook did not
indicate an intent to be bound by the arbitration provision; rather
the plain language of the agreement—which included blank
spaces for signatures following the arbitration provision—
reflected an intent by the parties to require separate assent to
and execution of the arbitration provision].) Paragraph 8 also
9
indicates that by initialing the paragraph, the parties would have
represented that they had an opportunity to consult an
independent lawyer and they would have agreed to grant Tusken
a lien irrespective of whether they actually consulted another
lawyer. By not executing this provision, no express attorney lien
was created.
Nor does any language in the fee agreement give rise to an
implied attorney lien. “[C]ontingency fee agreements do not
automatically create an attorney’s lien.” (Little v. Amber Hotel
Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 280, 291.) Rather, they impose an
implied lien when “ ‘the retainer agreement provides that the
attorney is to look to the judgment for payment for legal services
rendered.’ ” (Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 476, 494.) Here, paragraph 4 of the fee agreement
calculates the attorneys’ fees based upon the value of the
recovery; it does not, however, include any language providing
that Tusken would be paid directly from any recovery.2
Moreover, the fact the parties included an express attorney lien
provision requiring signatures in the contract—and the parties
failed to execute it—further demonstrates a lack of an objective
2 Paragraph 4 of the fee agreement provides:
(i) If the matter is resolved prior to 180 days before the
date initially set for the trial or arbitration of the
matter, then Attorney’s fee will be as follows:
a. $30,000 of the amount of any recovery amount of
$200,000 or less;
b. Twenty percent (20%) of the net recovery of any
recovery amount over $200,000;
(ii) If the matter is resolved after the time set forth in (i)
above, then Attorney’s fee will be thirty percent
(30%) of the net recovery.
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intent to grant Tusken a lien (whether express or implied). (See
Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development Cal., Inc.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 374 [“[A]s a general matter, implied terms
should never be read to vary express terms”].)
Based on the plain language of the fee agreement, the
judgment creditors met their initial burden on summary
judgment of demonstrating no express or implied attorney lien
exists. The burden thus shifted to Tusken to raise a triable issue
of material fact. Tusken relied on the declarations of David Ross
and Leah Ross, both of which were signed three years after they
entered into the fee agreement with Tusken. According to their
declarations, the Rosses “accidentally neglected to initial the
blank lines” that appeared beneath paragraph 8, and although
they “inadvertently did not initial paragraph 8, at the time that
[they] signed the Fee Agreement, [they] fully intended to agree to
grant and to actually grant [Tusken] an attorney’s lien.”
“Contract formation is governed by objective
manifestations, not the subjective intent of any individual
involved.” (Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1277.)
Thus, extrinsic evidence of a party’s subjective intent raises no
triable issue of fact when it directly contradicts the express
provisions of the contract. (See e.g. Exchequer Acceptance Corp.
v. Alexander (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 1, 13 (Exchequer) [“[Party’s]
statement of the absence of any intention on his part that the
mortgage . . . should constitute security . . . raises no triable issue
of fact because it directly contradicts the amended escrow
instructions . . . and the express provisions in the security
instruments”]; see also Consolidated World Investments, Inc. v.
Lido Preferred Ltd. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 373, 379 [“Parol
evidence is admissible only to prove a meaning to which the
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contractual language is ‘reasonably susceptible’; not to flatly
contradict the express terms of the agreement”].)
In their declarations, the Rosses attempt to flatly
contradict the express language of the fee agreement. As
discussed above, paragraph 8 requires that the parties initial the
paragraph to create an attorney lien and the parties failed to do
so. And paragraph 12 of the fee agreement provided “[t]his
Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties.” The
Rosses now claim that they actually meant to grant Tusken an
attorney lien, and forgot to execute paragraph 8. But the Rosses’
subjective intent directly contradicts the unambiguous
manifestation of objective intent reflected in paragraph 8. The
trial court, therefore, acted well within its discretion by excluding
the declarations, which constituted inadmissible parol evidence.3
Tusken also asserts the trial court improperly made factual
findings. But the court’s 13-page written ruling demonstrates
otherwise. The trial court provisionally received the extrinsic
evidence offered by Tusken, including the declarations. It
concluded, however, that the fee agreement unambiguously
reflected the parties’ objective intent not to create an attorney
lien. Tusken latches on to the trial court’s use of the words
“decide” and “intend” and asserts that the trial court had “no
basis either in law or fact to find that the parties had ‘decided’ or
‘intended’ not to execute the lien provision.” But the trial court is
3 The trial court also excluded the declarations on the ground they
contradict allegations in the complaint. Tusken argues this was an
abuse of discretion. We need not—and do not—address this argument
because the declarations may be excluded on a separate and
independent basis, namely they constitute extrinsic evidence that
contradicts the unambiguous language of the fee agreement.
12
tasked with doing exactly that—it must determine the parties’
objective intent by reference to the contract’s terms. (Wolf, supra,
162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126.) And when the contract’s terms are
unambiguous, and the proffered extrinsic evidence does not
render the language reasonably susceptible to the interpretation
urged by the opposing party—as the trial court found—the “case
is over” and summary judgment is appropriate. (Dore v. Arnold
Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 393.)
Tusken argues that a provision in the settlement
agreement in the Ming Lu action creates a triable issue of
material fact in this case. The agreement provides Tusken shall
be paid directly from the settlement proceeds. Tusken contends
this gives rise to “a competing inference that the Rosses had
intended to grant and did grant [Tusken] an attorney’s lien.” We
reject this argument for two reasons. First, the settlement
agreement was drafted after the fee agreement was executed.
The settlement agreement thus says nothing about whether the
Rosses intended to grant Tusken a security interest in the
recovery at the time they executed the fee agreement. (See Civ.
Code, § 1636 [“A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect
to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of
contracting”].) Second, the two contracts—the fee agreement and
settlement agreement—had different parties and one cannot be
used to interpret the other.
We lastly reject Tusken’s remaining contentions of error
regarding the trial court’s application of rule 1.8.1 of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct (rule 1.8.1) and Code of
Civil Procedure section 1858 (section 1858) because the alleged
errors were not necessary to the trial court’s ultimate ruling.
(See Grebing, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 636–637 [“We must
13
affirm a summary judgment if it is correct on any of the grounds
asserted in the trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated
reasons”].)
After concluding the plain language of paragraph 8 shows
an objective intent to require separate assent to the lien
provision, the trial court went on to note that the judgment
creditors’ “position is also consistent with [r]ule 1.8.1 of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires a
client’s informed written consent to the attorney’s acquisition of
an interest adverse to the client.” Then, in discussing whether
the fee agreement created an implied attorney lien, the trial court
noted that several other provisions in the agreement also support
the reading that the Rosses were responsible for paying Tusken
his fees. Among the authorities the trial court cited in its
analysis was section 1858. Even assuming that the trial court
“misapplied” rule 1.8.1 and section 1858, as Tusken contends, the
summary judgment in favor of the judgment creditors is correct
for the reason we have explained: the unambiguous terms of the
fee agreement indicate the Rosses did not grant Tusken a lien on
their recovery.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Denying Tusken Leave to File an Amended
Complaint
Tusken alternatively contends reversal is required because
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
leave to amend his complaint. The amended complaint,
according to Tusken, established facts that would have raised a
disputed material fact and thus, defeated summary judgment.
We are unpersuaded.
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Tusken waited until two days after the judgment debtors
filed their reply in support of their motion for summary judgment
to seek leave to file a first amended complaint. Although leave to
amend is liberally granted, even when a summary judgment
motion is pending, “when a plaintiff seeks leave to amend his or
her complaint only after the defendant has mounted a summary
judgment motion directed at the allegations of the unamended
complaint, even though the plaintiff has been aware of the facts
upon which the amendment is based, “ ‘[i]t would be patently
unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [the] summary judgment
motion by allowing them to present a ‘moving target’ unbounded
by the pleadings.’ ” (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014)
224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280.)
Here, Tusken sought leave to amend the complaint to: add
allegations that the Rosses failure to initial the attorney lien
paragraph was unintentional; incorporate the Ross declarations
into the complaint; add facts that establish the fee agreement
gave rise to an implied attorney lien; and other facts regarding
the subjective intent of the parties. Tusken argued these
additional facts were necessary to “counter arguments” made by
the judgment creditors’ in their motion for summary judgment.
In other words, Tusken sought to change his legal theory from
one that was premised on the fee agreement reflecting an
unambiguous objective intent to grant him a lien because it
“speaks for itself” to one premised on extrinsic evidence
demonstrating the Rosses’ alleged intent to grant Tusken a lien.4
Yet, the Rosses’ alleged subjective intent was known when
Tusken filed the action, and Tusken provides no justification for
4 The proposed first amended complaint deleted the allegation
that paragraph 8 “speaks for itself.”
15
waiting until after the summary judgment motion was fully
briefed to file his motion for leave to amend his complaint.
In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying leave to amend on the independent ground that
amendment would have been futile. In Mills v. Forestex Co.
(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 641, the court held the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend where it
expressly considered the new theories and facts the plaintiffs
offered in support of their opposition to defendant’s summary
judgment motion, but found as a matter of law that the facts
failed to support the theories. Thus, the Court of Appeal
concluded the plaintiffs “would have gained nothing from the
opportunity to amend their complaint.” (Ibid.)
So too here. Tusken sought leave to add allegations of
extrinsic evidence reflecting the Rosses’ alleged intent to grant
Tusken an attorney lien. But as discussed above, the trial court
considered this evidence and determined the Rosses’ purported
subjective intent directly contradicted the unambiguous
manifestation of objective intent reflected in the fee agreement.
The extrinsic evidence, therefore, did not create a triable issue of
fact. (Exchequer, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d at p. 13.) Accordingly,
Tusken’s proposed amendments would not have cured the legal
defects in his complaint.5
5 We decline Tusken’s invitation to evaluate his new, separate
claim of unjust enrichment, which he concedes “is not technically
before the Court in [sic] instant appeal.”
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
DAUM, J.
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