Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 Tusken v. Rubin CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR MICHAEL TUSKEN, B344909 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County v. Super. Ct. No. 23STCV05441) JASON RUBIN, as Trustee of the Cira Ross Qualified Domestic Trust, and THOMAS K. BOURKE, Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Affirmed. Michael Tusken, Esq., in pro per. for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Office of Mark J. Yost, Mark J. Yost for Defendants and Respondents. Attorney Michael Tusken seeks a declaratory judgment stating he has an attorney lien against proceeds recovered by his former clients. The applicable contingency fee contract includes a provision that imposes an attorney lien on the clients’ monetary recovery if the parties initial the paragraph. But the spaces for initials immediately underneath the paragraph for both the attorney and client are blank. We must decide whether Tusken nonetheless holds a valid attorney lien. We conclude that he does not. The unambiguous terms of the fee agreement—providing that an attorney lien is created “by initialing this paragraph”— reflect the parties’ objective intent to require separate assent to the lien provision, and it is undisputed the parties failed to execute that provision. The parties’ supposed subjective intent to the contrary cannot contradict the objective, unambiguous language of a contract. We affirm. BACKGROUND Jason Rubin, as trustee of the Cira Ross Qualified Domestic Trust, and Thomas Bourke (collectively, the judgment creditors) hold valid judgments against David Ross (the judgment debtor) based on judgments entered against the judgment debtor in 2007 and 2011, respectively (the judgments). In 2021, the judgment debtor’s spouse, Leah Ross, along with her three minor children, filed a lawsuit against their residential landlord, Ming Lu, and other related parties for injuries they allegedly sustained as tenants (the Ming Lu action). Plaintiff and appellant Michael Tusken represented both David Ross and Leah Ross in the Ming Lu action pursuant to an Attorney-Client Contingency Fee Agreement (the fee agreement). The fee agreement provides that both Rosses are “Clients.” It further provides a formula for calculating the amount of attorney 2 fees, if any, Tusken shall recover. Paragraph 8 of the agreement addressed a potential attorney lien: 8. LIEN. Client hereby grants Attorney a lien on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the representation under this Agreement. . . . Because a lien may affect Client’s property rights, Client may seek the advice of an independent lawyer of Client’s choice before agreeing to such a lien. By initialing this paragraph, Client represents and agrees that Client has had a reasonable opportunity to consult such an independent lawyer and-whether or not Client has chosen to consult such an independent lawyer-Client agrees that Attorney will have a lien as specified above. [Italics added.] _______ (Client Initial Here) _______ (Attorney Initial Here) Neither Tusken nor the Rosses initialed the spaces appearing immediately below the text of Paragraph 8. The last page of the fee agreement included an acknowledgement that the Rosses had an opportunity to seek independent counsel, that they read and understood the agreement, and that if one client “signs below, each agrees to be liable, jointly and severally, for all obligations under this agreement.” (Original quote in all capital letters.) David Ross, Leah Ross, and Tusken signed the agreement in the spaces provided under the acknowledgement. On October 28, 2022, the parties in the Ming Lu action notified the court that they had entered into a written settlement agreement. The settlement agreement provided for payment of $195,000 to the Rosses and their children, $30,000 of which was allocated to Tusken. 3 Shortly thereafter, the judgment creditors filed notices of lien. They also filed a motion seeking an order that the Rosses’ right to any settlement proceeds be applied to satisfy the judgment creditors’ liens. Of relevance here, the judgment creditors objected to payment of any of the settlement proceeds to Tusken because the fee agreement did not grant Tusken an attorney lien. The court in the Ming Lu action denied the judgment creditors’ motion to satisfy the liens as to the settlement proceeds allocated to Leah Ross. The Ming Lu court also ordered that Tusken be paid $30,000 of the settlement proceeds. In 2024, a different panel of this court reversed the Ming Lu court’s ruling to the extent it denied the judgment creditors’ motion with respect to the settlement funds allocated to Leah Ross and Tusken. The panel ordered the trial court to enter a new order directing the plaintiffs in the Ming Lu action to pay Leah Ross’s portion of the settlement funds to the judgment creditors. The panel expressed no opinion, however, on the issue pending in this action regarding Tusken’s purported attorney lien and his claim to a portion of the settlement funds. While the Ming Lu action was pending, Tusken filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that he has a valid attorney lien on the settlement proceeds. Tusken alleged his purported lien has priority over the judgment creditors’ liens and, therefore, he is entitled to payment of his fee out of the settlement proceeds.1 He further alleged that nothing in the fee 1 Because Tusken is not a party to the Ming Lu action and has no right to intervene, the trial court in that action has no jurisdiction to determine the existence or validity of his alleged attorney lien on the judgment. (Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1173 (Carroll).) 4 agreement conditioned enforcement of the attorney lien provision on the Rosses having signed their initials to Paragraph 8. Judgment creditors moved for summary judgment. They argued the fee agreement did not give rise to an express attorney lien because the unambiguous terms of the agreement indicated the parties’ objective intent to require separate assent to, and execution of, an attorney lien provision, which the parties did not execute. They further argued the agreement contained no language giving rise to an implied attorney lien. In support of his opposition to the motion, Tusken submitted two separate declarations from David Ross and Leah Ross. The declarations included the following identical language: “Although I inadvertently did not initial paragraph 8, at the time that I signed the Fee Agreement, I fully intended to agree to grant and to actually grant Michael Tusken an attorney’s lien as stated in paragraph 8.” The judgment creditors filed a reply and objected to the Ross declarations on the grounds that they (1) contradicted the allegations in the complaint and (2) extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show subjective intent that contradicts an unambiguous written contract. Two days after the judgment creditors filed their reply in support of their motion for summary judgment, Tusken filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Tusken also filed an ex parte application to advance the hearing date for the motion for leave to amend the complaint. The court denied this application. While Tusken’s motion for leave to amend his complaint was pending, the trial court held a hearing on judgment creditors’ motion for summary judgment. After the hearing, the court 5 sustained the judgment creditors’ objections to the Ross declarations and granted the summary judgment motion. The court reasoned that the plain language of the fee agreement reflects an objective intent to require separate assent to the lien provision, and it is undisputed that Tusken and the Rosses failed to execute the lien provision. The court also concluded the fee agreement did not give rise to an implied attorney lien because it “lack[ed] any language manifesting an intent to grant a security interest directly upon the recovery.” It further concluded Tusken did not meet his burden to demonstrate a triable issue of fact because the Ross declarations both impermissibly contradict the allegations in the complaint and constitute extrinsic evidence that contradicts the unambiguous language of the fee agreement. The trial court then entered judgment in favor of the judgment creditors, and Tusken timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of the Judgment Creditors Based on the Unambiguous Terms of the Fee Agreement A. Standard of Review A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no triable issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. (Id., subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence creating a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) A triable issue of fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the fact in favor of the 6 party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) We review the trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo, liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of the opponent. (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460.) “We must affirm a summary judgment if it is correct on any of the grounds asserted in the trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.” (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631, 636–637 (Grebing).) We generally review a trial court’s ruling on evidentiary objections for an abuse of discretion. As to evidentiary rulings made in connection with a motion for summary judgment, however, there is a split of authority. Some courts have held such evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion (Martin v. Trustees of California State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 161; Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1169), while other courts have held that some or all written objections should be reviewed de novo (Pipitone v. Williams (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1450–1451; Strobel v. Johnson & Johnson (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 796, 816–817.) “We will follow the weight of authority and apply the abuse of discretion standard.” (Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1118.) B. Contract Interpretation Principles The interpretation of a written contract is a judicial function. “In engaging in this function, the trial court ‘give[s] effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed’ at the time the contract was executed. [Citation.] Ordinarily, the 7 objective intent of the contracting parties is a legal question determined solely by reference to the contract’s terms.” (Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1125–1126 (Wolf).) “ ‘The court generally may not consider extrinsic evidence of any prior agreement or contemporaneous oral agreement to vary or contradict the clear and unambiguous terms of a written, integrated contract. [Citations.] Extrinsic evidence is admissible, however, to interpret an agreement when a material term is ambiguous.’ ” (Brown v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 432 (Goldstein).) When a party offers extrinsic (parol) evidence, the court engages in a two-step process. “ ‘ “First the court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence concerning the parties’ intentions to determine ‘ambiguity,’ i.e., whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the contract.” ’ ” (Goldstein, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 432—433.) “On appeal, a ‘trial court’s ruling on the threshold determination of “ambiguity” (i.e., whether the proffered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is reasonably susceptible) is a question of law, not of fact. [Citation.] Thus[,] the threshold determination of ambiguity is subject to independent review.’ ” (Goldstein, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) 8 C. The Unambiguous Terms of the Fee Agreement Demonstrate Neither an Express Nor an Implied Attorney Lien Was Created “In California, an attorney’s lien is created only by contract—either an express provision in the attorney fee contract [citations] or by implication where the retainer agreement provides that the attorney is to look to the judgment for payment for legal services rendered.” (Carroll, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) We begin by reviewing the plain language of the contract to ascertain the parties’ intent. (See Civ. Code, § 1639 [“When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible”].) The last sentence of paragraph 8 (titled “Lien”) states: “By initialing this paragraph, Client represents and agrees that Client has had a reasonable opportunity to consult such an independent lawyer and—whether or not Client has chosen to consult such an independent lawyer—Client agrees that Attorney will have a lien as specified above.” (Italics added.) The plain and express language of the fee agreement reflects an objective intent to require assent to the lien provision separate and apart from the signatures following the acknowledgement at the end of the fee agreement. (See e.g. Romo v. Y-3 Holdings, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1156, 1158 [employee’s signature at the end of the handbook did not indicate an intent to be bound by the arbitration provision; rather the plain language of the agreement—which included blank spaces for signatures following the arbitration provision— reflected an intent by the parties to require separate assent to and execution of the arbitration provision].) Paragraph 8 also 9 indicates that by initialing the paragraph, the parties would have represented that they had an opportunity to consult an independent lawyer and they would have agreed to grant Tusken a lien irrespective of whether they actually consulted another lawyer. By not executing this provision, no express attorney lien was created. Nor does any language in the fee agreement give rise to an implied attorney lien. “[C]ontingency fee agreements do not automatically create an attorney’s lien.” (Little v. Amber Hotel Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 280, 291.) Rather, they impose an implied lien when “ ‘the retainer agreement provides that the attorney is to look to the judgment for payment for legal services rendered.’ ” (Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 494.) Here, paragraph 4 of the fee agreement calculates the attorneys’ fees based upon the value of the recovery; it does not, however, include any language providing that Tusken would be paid directly from any recovery.2 Moreover, the fact the parties included an express attorney lien provision requiring signatures in the contract—and the parties failed to execute it—further demonstrates a lack of an objective 2 Paragraph 4 of the fee agreement provides: (i) If the matter is resolved prior to 180 days before the date initially set for the trial or arbitration of the matter, then Attorney’s fee will be as follows: a. $30,000 of the amount of any recovery amount of $200,000 or less; b. Twenty percent (20%) of the net recovery of any recovery amount over $200,000; (ii) If the matter is resolved after the time set forth in (i) above, then Attorney’s fee will be thirty percent (30%) of the net recovery. 10 intent to grant Tusken a lien (whether express or implied). (See Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development Cal., Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 374 [“[A]s a general matter, implied terms should never be read to vary express terms”].) Based on the plain language of the fee agreement, the judgment creditors met their initial burden on summary judgment of demonstrating no express or implied attorney lien exists. The burden thus shifted to Tusken to raise a triable issue of material fact. Tusken relied on the declarations of David Ross and Leah Ross, both of which were signed three years after they entered into the fee agreement with Tusken. According to their declarations, the Rosses “accidentally neglected to initial the blank lines” that appeared beneath paragraph 8, and although they “inadvertently did not initial paragraph 8, at the time that [they] signed the Fee Agreement, [they] fully intended to agree to grant and to actually grant [Tusken] an attorney’s lien.” “Contract formation is governed by objective manifestations, not the subjective intent of any individual involved.” (Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1277.) Thus, extrinsic evidence of a party’s subjective intent raises no triable issue of fact when it directly contradicts the express provisions of the contract. (See e.g. Exchequer Acceptance Corp. v. Alexander (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 1, 13 (Exchequer) [“[Party’s] statement of the absence of any intention on his part that the mortgage . . . should constitute security . . . raises no triable issue of fact because it directly contradicts the amended escrow instructions . . . and the express provisions in the security instruments”]; see also Consolidated World Investments, Inc. v. Lido Preferred Ltd. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 373, 379 [“Parol evidence is admissible only to prove a meaning to which the 11 contractual language is ‘reasonably susceptible’; not to flatly contradict the express terms of the agreement”].) In their declarations, the Rosses attempt to flatly contradict the express language of the fee agreement. As discussed above, paragraph 8 requires that the parties initial the paragraph to create an attorney lien and the parties failed to do so. And paragraph 12 of the fee agreement provided “[t]his Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties.” The Rosses now claim that they actually meant to grant Tusken an attorney lien, and forgot to execute paragraph 8. But the Rosses’ subjective intent directly contradicts the unambiguous manifestation of objective intent reflected in paragraph 8. The trial court, therefore, acted well within its discretion by excluding the declarations, which constituted inadmissible parol evidence.3 Tusken also asserts the trial court improperly made factual findings. But the court’s 13-page written ruling demonstrates otherwise. The trial court provisionally received the extrinsic evidence offered by Tusken, including the declarations. It concluded, however, that the fee agreement unambiguously reflected the parties’ objective intent not to create an attorney lien. Tusken latches on to the trial court’s use of the words “decide” and “intend” and asserts that the trial court had “no basis either in law or fact to find that the parties had ‘decided’ or ‘intended’ not to execute the lien provision.” But the trial court is 3 The trial court also excluded the declarations on the ground they contradict allegations in the complaint. Tusken argues this was an abuse of discretion. We need not—and do not—address this argument because the declarations may be excluded on a separate and independent basis, namely they constitute extrinsic evidence that contradicts the unambiguous language of the fee agreement. 12 tasked with doing exactly that—it must determine the parties’ objective intent by reference to the contract’s terms. (Wolf, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126.) And when the contract’s terms are unambiguous, and the proffered extrinsic evidence does not render the language reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged by the opposing party—as the trial court found—the “case is over” and summary judgment is appropriate. (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 393.) Tusken argues that a provision in the settlement agreement in the Ming Lu action creates a triable issue of material fact in this case. The agreement provides Tusken shall be paid directly from the settlement proceeds. Tusken contends this gives rise to “a competing inference that the Rosses had intended to grant and did grant [Tusken] an attorney’s lien.” We reject this argument for two reasons. First, the settlement agreement was drafted after the fee agreement was executed. The settlement agreement thus says nothing about whether the Rosses intended to grant Tusken a security interest in the recovery at the time they executed the fee agreement. (See Civ. Code, § 1636 [“A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting”].) Second, the two contracts—the fee agreement and settlement agreement—had different parties and one cannot be used to interpret the other. We lastly reject Tusken’s remaining contentions of error regarding the trial court’s application of rule 1.8.1 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct (rule 1.8.1) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1858 (section 1858) because the alleged errors were not necessary to the trial court’s ultimate ruling. (See Grebing, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 636–637 [“We must 13 affirm a summary judgment if it is correct on any of the grounds asserted in the trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons”].) After concluding the plain language of paragraph 8 shows an objective intent to require separate assent to the lien provision, the trial court went on to note that the judgment creditors’ “position is also consistent with [r]ule 1.8.1 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires a client’s informed written consent to the attorney’s acquisition of an interest adverse to the client.” Then, in discussing whether the fee agreement created an implied attorney lien, the trial court noted that several other provisions in the agreement also support the reading that the Rosses were responsible for paying Tusken his fees. Among the authorities the trial court cited in its analysis was section 1858. Even assuming that the trial court “misapplied” rule 1.8.1 and section 1858, as Tusken contends, the summary judgment in favor of the judgment creditors is correct for the reason we have explained: the unambiguous terms of the fee agreement indicate the Rosses did not grant Tusken a lien on their recovery. II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying Tusken Leave to File an Amended Complaint Tusken alternatively contends reversal is required because the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint. The amended complaint, according to Tusken, established facts that would have raised a disputed material fact and thus, defeated summary judgment. We are unpersuaded. 14 Tusken waited until two days after the judgment debtors filed their reply in support of their motion for summary judgment to seek leave to file a first amended complaint. Although leave to amend is liberally granted, even when a summary judgment motion is pending, “when a plaintiff seeks leave to amend his or her complaint only after the defendant has mounted a summary judgment motion directed at the allegations of the unamended complaint, even though the plaintiff has been aware of the facts upon which the amendment is based, “ ‘[i]t would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [the] summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a ‘moving target’ unbounded by the pleadings.’ ” (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280.) Here, Tusken sought leave to amend the complaint to: add allegations that the Rosses failure to initial the attorney lien paragraph was unintentional; incorporate the Ross declarations into the complaint; add facts that establish the fee agreement gave rise to an implied attorney lien; and other facts regarding the subjective intent of the parties. Tusken argued these additional facts were necessary to “counter arguments” made by the judgment creditors’ in their motion for summary judgment. In other words, Tusken sought to change his legal theory from one that was premised on the fee agreement reflecting an unambiguous objective intent to grant him a lien because it “speaks for itself” to one premised on extrinsic evidence demonstrating the Rosses’ alleged intent to grant Tusken a lien.4 Yet, the Rosses’ alleged subjective intent was known when Tusken filed the action, and Tusken provides no justification for 4 The proposed first amended complaint deleted the allegation that paragraph 8 “speaks for itself.” 15 waiting until after the summary judgment motion was fully briefed to file his motion for leave to amend his complaint. In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend on the independent ground that amendment would have been futile. In Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 641, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend where it expressly considered the new theories and facts the plaintiffs offered in support of their opposition to defendant’s summary judgment motion, but found as a matter of law that the facts failed to support the theories. Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded the plaintiffs “would have gained nothing from the opportunity to amend their complaint.” (Ibid.) So too here. Tusken sought leave to add allegations of extrinsic evidence reflecting the Rosses’ alleged intent to grant Tusken an attorney lien. But as discussed above, the trial court considered this evidence and determined the Rosses’ purported subjective intent directly contradicted the unambiguous manifestation of objective intent reflected in the fee agreement. The extrinsic evidence, therefore, did not create a triable issue of fact. (Exchequer, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d at p. 13.) Accordingly, Tusken’s proposed amendments would not have cured the legal defects in his complaint.5 5 We decline Tusken’s invitation to evaluate his new, separate claim of unjust enrichment, which he concedes “is not technically before the Court in [sic] instant appeal.” 16 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS TAMZARIAN, J. We concur: ZUKIN, P. J. DAUM, J. 17