Full Opinion

Filed 11/3/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TIMOTHY S., D087153 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FLRI2402499) v. SARAH H., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Natalie Lough, Judge. Affirmed. Horvitz & Levy, Bradley S. Pauley and Sheridan L. Caldwell, for Defendant and Appellant. Lord & Brooker, Michelle M. Brooker; Arias & Lockwood, and Christopher D. Lockwood, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Timothy S. filed a petition seeking court-ordered visitation with his two grandchildren. Sarah H., the children’s mother, opposed the request and sought attorney’s fees and costs for opposing Timothy’s petition. The trial court entered an interim order allowing Timothy a five-minute phone call with the children once a month. The court later set a trial date on a long- term order and denied Sarah’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, Sarah contends the trial court should have awarded her attorney’s fees and costs under Family Code 1 section 7605, subdivision (a), because Timothy’s petition was a proceeding to establish visitation under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), section 7600 et seq. Alternatively, Sarah argues that the proceeding on Timothy’s petition “is a ‘proceeding subsequent to’ the earlier UPA judgments” entered in a prior juvenile dependency case. We disagree with both theories. Thus, we find no error and affirm the order denying Sarah’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We summarize only the facts relevant to our resolution of the issues on appeal. S.S. and J.S. were born to Sarah and T.S., 3 Timothy’s son, in 2018 and 2021, respectively. Sarah and T.S. were never married. In September 2019, when S.S. was approximately 17 months old, the County removed her from Sarah and T.S.’s custody and placed her with Timothy and his wife. In August 2021, Sarah regained custody of S.S. When the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, it entered a final custody and visitation order in 2021 regarding J.S. and in 2022, regarding S.S. The orders noted that the parents are Sarah and T.S. and referenced 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 2 Timothy moves to dismiss the appeal pursuant to a stipulation and order in which he and Sarah agreed to a visitation schedule. Timothy contends the stipulation and order resolves “ ‘all issues’ between the parties,” including the instant appeal. Sarah disagrees and opposes dismissal. Because the stipulation and order is silent on fees and costs and does not mention this appeal, we are not convinced the issue presented in this appeal is moot. The motion is denied. 3 T.S. is not a party to the proceedings. 2 juvenile court orders declaring T.S. the presumed father of S.S. and J.S. in 2019 and 2021, respectively. The juvenile court granted Sarah sole physical custody of J.S. and shared legal custody with T.S. It issued the same order for S.S. and granted T.S. supervised visitation with the children. In April 2024, Timothy filed a petition requesting court-ordered visitation with both children under section 3104, seeking one weekend and two dinnertime visits each month, as well as weekly video calls. Timothy alleged Sarah refused to allow him to visit the children, even though he had “a very established relationship with [S.S.]” due to having cared for her for almost two years. Sarah opposed the petition, alleging that Timothy had no substantial relationship with the children. The trial court entered an interim order allowing Timothy one phone call per month with the children and set a trial date on a long-term order. Sarah filed a request that Timothy pay $17,193 in attorney’s fees and costs to cover the expenses of opposing his petition. Sarah paid $7,193 in attorney’s fees and costs as of the date of her request and estimated she would incur an additional $10,000 in attorney’s fees for continued preparation of the case. The trial court denied Sarah’s request, deciding it did not have the statutory authority to order attorney’s fees in a petition for grandparent visitation. The court explained that sections 2030, 2031, 4 and 7605, 5 which 4 Sections 2030 and 2031 are fee-shifting provisions applicable in nullity, dissolution, and legal separation proceedings. Sarah does not assert any error relating to those sections. 5 We assume the two references to section 7603 in the settled statement were typographical errors because section 7603 is not pertinent to the issues before us and the trial court’s minute order refers to section 7605 and not 3 allow awards of attorney’s fees, did not apply. The court reasoned that the omission of similar fees provisions in the statutes governing grandparent visitation was evidence the Legislature did not intend to provide for attorney’s fees in petitions for grandparents’ rights. DISCUSSION A. Legal Principles “We review the denial of fees under section 7605 for abuse of discretion but apply de novo review to questions of statutory interpretation.” (N.S. v. D.M. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1053 (N.S.).) When we interpret a statute, we begin by looking at the language of the statute itself, giving its words “ ‘a plain and commonsense meaning’ absent a special meaning provided by the statute itself.” (Menezes v. McDaniel (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 340, 348.) “If the statutory text ‘is unambiguous and provides a clear answer, we need go no further.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “ ‘If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ [Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–990.) section 7603. We, therefore, proceed as if the settled statement referenced section 7605. 4 B. Timothy’s Petition Does Not Fall Under the UPA Sarah first argues that section 7605’s fee-shifting provision applies to Timothy’s petition for grandparent visitation because it involved a “proceeding to establish a visitation order under the UPA.” We disagree. Section 7605, subdivision (a), provides as follows: “In any proceeding to establish physical or legal custody of a child or a visitation order under this part, and in any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related judgment, the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay to the other party . . . for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.” (Ibid., italics added.) By its reference to proceedings “under this part,” section 7605 specifies that it applies to proceedings under the UPA. (Id., subd. (a)) Indeed, it is well established that “section[] 7605 . . . of the UPA governs attorney fee awards in UPA cases.” (Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 633, 638–639 (Kevin Q.).) As a grandparent, Timothy initiated this action by filing a petition to establish visitation under section 3104. The right of a grandparent to petition for visitation is covered by Division 8, Part 2, Chapter 5 of the Family Code, which includes section 3104. Section 3104 is not part of the UPA (§§ 7600–7730). Because Timothy’s petition is under section 3104, the underlying proceedings to establish visitation with his grandchildren were not under the UPA. (See Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 [when the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning rule applies]; Kevin Q., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 641 [“section[] 7605 . . . appear[s] in the UPA which deals with the parent and child relationship”].) 5 Nevertheless, Sarah claims “UPA actions are ‘the only method’ of resolving visitation issues where the parents of children were never married.” In her view, Timothy’s petition is thus considered an action under the UPA. We disagree. The existence of a separate statutory vehicle for grandparents to establish visitation with their grandchildren refutes Sarah’s argument that an action under the UPA is “the only method” to do the same. Indeed, section 3104, found in Family Code Division 8, “permits grandparents to petition for visitation if the grandchild’s parents are not married or if certain other conditions are met.” (In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 220, italics added; see § 3104, subd. (b) [“A petition for visitation under this section shall not be filed while the natural or adoptive parents are married”].) Sarah’s reliance on Robert J. v. Catherine D. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1399–1400 (Robert J.), and N.S., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at page 1053, is misplaced. Robert J. and N.S. do not involve a grandparent’s right to visitation. In Robert J., the court considered a mother’s request to modify custody and visitation orders after paternity was established and explained that “[f]or parents who are neither married nor in domestic partnerships, petitions to establish parentage under the [UPA] represent the only method for resolution of child custody, visitation, and support issues, even if there is no controversy about parentage.” (Robert J., at pp. 1399–1400.) Similarly, the court in N.S., relying on Robert J., explained that although “the [parents] stipulated to paternity in 2012, subsequent proceedings on custody, visitation, and support are considered part of an action under the UPA for purposes of a fee request.” (N.S., at p. 1053.) Robert J. and N.S. are distinguishable. Although petitions under the UPA might be the only vehicle for unmarried parents to resolve child custody, visitation, and support issues 6 as between them, those cases are not instructive here because Timothy is a grandparent. (See Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1377 (Noreen G.) [“Cases are not authority for propositions not considered in the opinions”].) Because the Legislature created a separate vehicle for grandparents to initiate proceedings to establish visitation with children whose parents are unmarried, we disagree with Sarah’s suggestion that the UPA is the exclusive way for Timothy to establish visitation with his grandchildren. The flawed rationale does not provide us with reasons to deviate from the plain language of the statute. We thus conclude that Timothy’s petition for grandparent visitation does not arise under the UPA. C. Timothy’s Petition Is Not Subsequent to a Related UPA Judgment Because the Juvenile Court’s Parentage, Custody, and Visitation Determinations are Not UPA Judgments Alternatively, Sarah argues that section 7605 applies because Timothy’s petition “is a ‘proceeding subsequent to’ the earlier UPA judgments” entered in a prior juvenile dependency case. Sarah maintains that the juvenile court’s earlier parentage, custody, and visitation determinations for her children were “part of a UPA action” and thus were “UPA judgments.” 6 We disagree. For four reasons, we are unconvinced that the Legislature intended that we conflate juvenile dependency proceedings with UPA proceedings, two fundamentally different types of proceedings, for the purpose of awarding Sarah attorney’s fees and costs under section 7605. First, the dependency proceedings were not initiated under the UPA. A UPA judgment within the meaning of section 7605 results from “a case 6 The juvenile court’s final custody and visitation orders are the only documents in the record on appeal from S.S. and J.S.’s dependency proceedings. 7 brought under the Uniform Parentage Act.” (See C.T. v. K.W. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 679, 684 (C.T.); see also, N.S., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1055 [results from “a family law action”]; § 7605, subd. (a).) A dependency action, however, is initiated when the state files a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition with the clerk of the juvenile court to declare a child a dependent of the court. 7 (In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1615, 1623 (Jody R.); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 325; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.670; see e.g., In re S.V. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1042.) Thus, the dependency proceedings involving S.S. and J.S. were not part of a UPA action. 8 Second, the final custody and visitation orders in S.S. and J.S.’s dependency case are not UPA judgments because they are made under juvenile law. A juvenile court’s jurisdiction in a dependency case is special and limited, arising from sections 300 through 399 of the Welfare and 7 Any person can apply to the social worker to commence dependency proceedings with Judicial Council form JV-210. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 329, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.520(c).) 8 If an alleged father files an action under Family Code section 7630 during a pending dependency case, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear it. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (e); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(a); In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 620 (Jesusa V.).) The juvenile court “shall determine if he is the father” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (d)) and may “enter a judgment of parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(a)). The filing of a UPA action is one of two ways a juvenile court may proceed to determine the identity of a child’s presumed father if no prior determination has been made. (Jesusa V., at p. 620.) Here, however, the record does not disclose that anyone filed an action under Family Code section 7630. We cannot infer that a UPA action was filed because “the juvenile court itself ‘may make such a determination’ even if no action is filed under Family Code section 7630.” (Jesusa V., at p. 620.) 8 Institutions Code. (In re Alexandria M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098; Jody R., supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1623; In re Marriage of Seaman & Menjou (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1497 (Menjou); In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 200, 206 (Chantal S.) [“A ‘juvenile court’ is a superior court exercising limited jurisdiction arising under juvenile law”].) “ ‘Dependency proceedings in the juvenile court are special proceedings governed by their own rules and statutes.’ ” (Chantal S., at p. 206, quoting In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711.) Family Code sections do not apply unless the Welfare and Institutions Code expressly incorporates a specific provision or part of the Family Code. (See Chantal S., at pp. 206–207; Alexandria M., at p. 1098.) Because of the special and limited nature of a juvenile court’s jurisdiction, it cannot make certain orders that otherwise are authorized in UPA actions. For instance, a juvenile court cannot make child support determinations because the “Welfare and Institutions Code does not give a juvenile court authority to make orders concerning child support issues.” (Alexandria M., at p. 1098.) By contrast, a family court in a UPA action is authorized to enter a judgment directing a parent to pay child support. (§ 7637; In re Marriage of Wilson & Bodine (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 768, 776 (Bodine) [In a UPA action, “the court may enter a judgment determining each party’s separate rights and liabilities for custody and support”].) A family court can handle litigation arising under the UPA because it “is not a separate court with special jurisdiction, but is instead the superior court performing one of its general duties.” (See Chantal S., at p. 201.) The juvenile court’s jurisdiction, however, is limited to the authority provided under juvenile law. When a juvenile court terminates jurisdiction and issues a final custody order, commonly referred to as an “exit order” (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 9 Cal.App.4th 251, 269), it does so under Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4, subdivision (a), which provides that “the juvenile court on its own motion, may issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child” when it “terminates its jurisdiction over a minor who has been adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4, subd. (a).) “Any custody or visitation order issued by the juvenile court at the time the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction pursuant to [Welfare and Intuitions Code] [s]ection 362.4 . . . shall be a final judgment and shall remain in effect after that jurisdiction is terminated.” (Id., § 302, subd. (d).) By not including express language in Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4 that provisions of the UPA apply, we can infer that the Legislature did not intend for the UPA to govern juvenile dependency exit orders. (See id., § 362.4; see generally In re C.M. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 101, 109 [there is a “long line of precedent that . . . Family Codes are not applicable in dependency cases unless expressly stated”]; In re J.T. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 953, 962 [Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4 “allows the court, on its own motion, to make visitation orders . . . without any mention of presumptions contained in the Family Code that apply to a family court’s custody or visitation determinations”].) Thus, the juvenile court’s exit orders regarding S.S. and J.S. are not UPA judgments. Third, the juvenile court’s parentage determinations for S.S. and J.S. are not UPA judgments because they were made under juvenile law. Sarah points to the part of the exit orders entitled “parentage,” which indicates T.S. was declared or adjudged the presumed parent of the children by order of the juvenile court. A juvenile court’s authority to make a finding of presumed father status comes from Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2, which directs the court to inquire “of the mother and any other appropriate person 10 as to the identity and address of all presumed or alleged fathers.” (Id., § 316.2, subd. (a); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.668(b).) The inquiry shall include, in pertinent part, “[w]hether any man otherwise qualifies as a presumed father pursuant to [Family Code] [s]ection 7611, or any other provision, of the Family Code.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (a)(7).) Because the Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2 directs a juvenile court to use the UPA framework, the UPA supplies the standard to determine whether someone is a presumed parent in a dependency case. As explained in In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, the Legislature “borrowed the categories of men who are ‘presumed to be the natural father[s]’ of children under Family Code section 7611” (id at p. 802, italics added) to assist juvenile courts in determining “whether the alleged father has demonstrated a sufficient commitment to his parental responsibilities to be afforded rights . . . to reunification services and custody of the child” (id. at p. 804). In this way, the UPA “governs” judicial determinations of parentage in dependency proceedings. (See In re N.J. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 461, 469; In re D.A. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 811, 824; In re M.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 197, 211.) However, simply because a juvenile court borrows the UPA framework to identify a presumed parent does not mean the resulting parentage finding is a UPA judgment within the meaning of section 7605. Ultimately, a juvenile court’s jurisdiction to apply the UPA arises under juvenile law. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2; see also, Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206.) Fourth, because a finding of presumed father status in the dependency context serves a special purpose, we are not convinced that the Legislature intended that we consider it a “UPA judgment” within the meaning of Family Code section 7605. The purpose of juvenile dependency law is to protect 11 children at risk of harm (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.2, subd. (a); In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 537) “by the state acting as parens patriae; and to safeguard the parents’ or guardians’ rights to raise their children by providing services to help them overcome problems which created the need for a dependency adjudication” (Jody R., supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1623). “The proceeding may ultimately result in parents’ loss of custody and parental rights and the governing statutes accordingly set out careful protections including notice and a due process hearing for parents . . . periodic reviews of the children’s status (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366) and mandatory services aimed at reunification of the family (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5) which are not required in superior court proceedings.” (Menjou, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.) “Moreover, inasmuch as a dependency action could eventually result in the termination of parental rights, a court needs first to know the identities of the parents. The legal parents must be identified so that they may receive notice of the hearing; be provided counsel, if necessary; and be accorded a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 620.) By contrast, the family court “is established to provide parents a forum in which to resolve, inter alia, private issues relating to the custody of and visitation with children.” (Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 201.) Accordingly, “parents and other interested parties invoke the court’s jurisdiction to determine rights to custody and visitation.” (Menjou, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.) In addition to establishing a parent’s rights, UPA actions, like dissolution actions, may involve a determination of the “liabilities of parents for their children.” (Bodine, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 777.) One overarching policy goal of the UPA is to “ ‘ “ensur[e] that a child will be cared for, financially and otherwise, by two parents.” ’ ” (Mamer v. 12 Weingarten (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 169, 175.) A judgment of paternity in a UPA action “is designed primarily to settle questions of biology and provides the foundation for an order that the father provide financial support.” (In re E.O. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 722, 727.) Judicial parentage determinations thus serve a different purpose in a family court matter than in a dependency action. Sarah’s contention that the juvenile court’s presumed father status finding for S.S. and J.S. are UPA judgments ignores the fundamental differences discussed above between a dependency case and a UPA action involving the issues of custody, visitation, and support of minor children. (See Menjou, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497 [because fundamental differences exist, no attorney’s fees awarded under Fam. Code § 2030, formerly Civ. Code § 4370, in a marital dissolution action for fees incurred in dependency proceedings].) Sarah suggests courts recognize that cases with parentage issues are UPA actions, whether family courts or juvenile courts resolve those issues. We have not found any cases recognizing that point. Sarah cites C.T., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 679 and Robert J., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th 1392, but a juvenile court was not involved in those cases. In C.T., the mother initiated a claim with the local child support agency in Los Angeles, which filed a child support action against the father. (C.T., at p. 681.) An action for child support cannot be handled by a juvenile court. (Alexandria M., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098.) Because C.T. and Robert J. did not involve a juvenile dependency proceeding, those cases do not support Sarah’s contention. (See Noreen G., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.) In sum, section 7605’s fee-shifting provision does not apply to Timothy’s petition for court-ordered visitation. Because the trial court did not err in 13 concluding that section 7605 does not apply here, it did not abuse its discretion by denying Sarah’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. 9 (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156 [abuse of discretion occurs when the court bases its decision on impermissible factors or an incorrect legal standard].) DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. BERMÚDEZ, J. WE CONCUR: DO, Acting P. J. RUBIN, J. 9 Because we conclude the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we decline to address whether there are policy-related arguments that might support a different conclusion. 14