In Re: Estate of Charlotte Chonko, Appeal of: Miller, A.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket114 WDA 2026
JudgeKing
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ESTATE OF CHARLOTTE JANE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CHONKO, DECEASED : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: ANN ELIZABETH MILLER :
:
:
:
: No. 114 WDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered December 17, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 115-E 2024
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: November 19, 2026
Appellant, Ann Elizabeth Miller, appeals from the order entered in the
Somerset County Court of Common Pleas, Orphansâ Court, which denied
Appellantâs request for removal of Andrew Chonko as the Executor of the
Estate of the Decedent, Charlotte Jane Chonko (âDecedentâ), Appellantâs
mother. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Decedent executed a will on June 10, 2021, designating her son, Andrew
Chonko, as Executor (âExecutorâ); bequeathing Executor real estate; and
bequeathing the residue of her estate to Holy Trinity Lutheran Church in
Berlin, Pennsylvania. Decedent died on February 25, 2024, and on March 12,
2024, Executor submitted the June 10, 2021 will to probate and petitioned for
letters testamentary, which the court granted. On March 28, 2024, the
Department of Human Services (âDHSâ) sent a letter to the Estate explaining
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that the Estate was liable for a $218,891.16 debt to DHS for Decedentâs care.
The letter specifically provided that â[a]lthough the amount in the estate may
be considerably less than that which is owed to [DHS], our claim is against
the estate, no one else.â (Petition for Omnibus Relief, at Exhibit A, DHS letter,
dated 3/28/24).
On May 30, 2025,1 Appellant filed a petition for omnibus relief,2 alleging
that Executor breached his fiduciary duty by selling Decedentâs properties for
below market value, and that he was engaged in self-dealing and withholding
information and personal property of Decedentâs other children. Appellant
argued there was a chance that she and her other siblings may become liable
for the $218,891.16 debt to DHS. Ultimately, Appellant requested that the
Executor be removed as executor of the estate.
On June 23, 2025, the Estate filed an answer and counterclaim denying
Appellantâs allegations of breach of Executorâs fiduciary duty and referencing
the letter from DHS which made clear that its claim was solely against the
Estate. On that same date, the Estate filed a motion to quash the petition for
omnibus relief, and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that
Appellant had no standing to file the omnibus petition because neither she nor
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1 This petition was amended on June 3, 2025.
2 The petition for omnibus relief states that it was filed by Appellant on behalf
of herself and her brothers, William Lewis Chonko, David Andrew Chonko, and
Timothy Gene Chonko; however, Appellant is the only listed party.
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her siblings were beneficiaries under Decedentâs will.
The court held a hearing on June 30, 2025, considering the Estateâs
motion for judgment on the pleadings and the standing issue raised therein.
After hearing from the parties, the court requested further briefing on whether
there was any challenge to Decedentâs testamentary capacity, and whether
Decedentâs children faced any financial risk regarding the DHS claim. (See
N.T. Hearing, 6/30/25, at 10-11).
On July 21, 2025, the Estate submitted a statement to the court in lieu
of a brief. Attached to the statement was a letter dated July 10, 2025, from
DHS stating that DHS would accept payment of $40,037.19 from the Estate
to satisfy the lien. The Estate stated that it had forwarded payment to DHS
via check in that amount and requested that the litigation be dismissed as
soon as possible.
Appellant filed a brief alleging that under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4603, governing
relativesâ liability, Decedentâs children could be liable for the DHS debt and,
therefore, she had standing to raise her claims. Appellant acknowledged that
DHS had accepted payment from the Estate to satisfy the lien, but she
suggested that if DHS later discovered that Executor had engaged in
misconduct, DHS could move to strike the agreement. Appellant further
claimed that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed
the will based on a diagnosis of dementia-related illnesses, prescribed
medication, and Appellantâs personal observations of Decedent at that time.
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On August 25, 2025, the court conducted a status conference during
which Appellant requested to conduct discovery. Appellant argued that she
was entitled to conduct discovery to uncover whether there were other assets
undisclosed by the Estate because, if there were, Appellant argued that DHS
could request additional money. The court issued an order allowing 90 days
for discovery.
The court held an additional status conference on November 19, 2025,
wherein Appellant sought an extension of the courtâs discovery deadline. At
the conference, Appellantâs counsel explained that counsel had taken ten
depositions and was making headway concerning Decedentâs competency to
execute the will and the potential for undue influence. (See N.T. Hearing,
11/19/25, at 4-5). The court granted Appellantâs request for a 60-day
extension of the discovery deadline, âsubject to [its] continuation of the review
of the underlying issue of the standing.â (Id. at 10).
On December 17, 2025, the court issued a memorandum opinion and
order denying Appellantâs petition for omnibus relief and dismissing
Appellantâs claim for lack of standing. The court concluded that the issue of
whether Decedent had testamentary capacity to execute the will was not
raised within one year of when the will was accepted for probate, and
therefore, under the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code (âPEF Codeâ),
Appellantâs challenge to Decedentâs testamentary capacity, initially raised on
May 30, 2025, was untimely under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a) (governing
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challenges to probate of will).
The court further concluded that Appellant lacked standing to remove
Executor based on her potential liability for the DHS debt. Specifically, the
court explained that DHS settled its outstanding claim for $40,037.19, the
amount that was remaining in the Estate, noting that although the amount
was less than that which was owed to DHS, its claim was solely against the
Estate. (See Orphansâ Court Opinion, dated 12/17/25, at 4-5). The court
rejected Appellantâs claims that Decedentâs children could still be liable under
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4603, explaining that because DHS stated that it was satisfied
with the amount paid by the Estate, it would be unlikely that DHS would
pursue a case against Decedentâs relatives. Thus, the court concluded that
Appellant did not have standing to seek the relief requested and dismissed
Appellantâs petition for omnibus relief.
On January 12, 2026, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.3
Pursuant to the courtâs order, Appellant filed a timely concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal on February 9, 2026.
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3 On the day that she filed the notice of appeal, Appellant also filed a motion
for reconsideration. Attached to the motion for reconsideration, Appellant
included an exhibit concerning a vehicle, which Appellant alleged that Executor
had omitted from the Estateâs assets. Appellant claimed the vehicle was worth
at least $30,000. The Estate responded to the motion for reconsideration,
suggesting that in its run-down condition, the vehicle was likely worth $800.
The Orphansâ Court took no action on Appellantâs motion for reconsideration.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. The Orphansâ Court committed an error of law, equity,
abuse of discretion and or violation of due process in ruling
that Appellant, an omitted heir and or child of [D]ecedent,
lacked standing when petitioning for omnibus relief seeking
protection from personal liability under the Pennsylvania
Filial Support Law, when alleging, among other
wrongdoings, executor fraud on the estate, fraud on the
Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, concealment
of estate assets, and self-dealing.
2. The Orphansâ Court committed an error of law, equity,
abuse of discretion and or violation of due process by
denying standing to Appellant, an omitted heir and or child
of [D]ecedent, after expressly authorizing court ordered
discovery into executor wrongdoing, fraud, self-dealing,
testamentary capacity and then reversing its prior discovery
ruling stopping discovery without notice before the
expiration of the court-ordered discovery deadline; and it is
an error when the court was on notice that the authorized
discovery was in progress and actively uncovering material
evidence of executor fraud, asset concealment, self-dealing
and or incapacity, and not affording findings of fact or
allowing for an evidentiary hearing denying a meaningful
opportunity to develop the evidentiary record and or present
the case.
3. The Orphansâ Court committed an error of law, equity,
abuse of discretion, and or violation of due process by
resolving disputed issues related to executor fraud, self-
dealing, asset concealment and testamentary capacity
against Appellant by finding no standing, and without notice,
while the court relied upon and or referenced and or
____________________________________________
We note that âthe filing of an appeal generally divests the trial court of
jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter[.]â U.S. Bank Tr. Natâl Assân
as Tr. for HOF Grantor Tr. 1 v. Puleo, 355 A.3d 433, 438 n.7 (Pa.Super.
2026) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a)). Moreover, âa trial court may also properly
refuse to consider new evidence presented for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration.â Bollard & Assocs., Inc. v. H & R Indus., Inc., 161 A.3d
254, 256 (Pa.Super. 2017). Thus, like the Orphansâ Court, we give this claim
no further attention.
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incorrectly referenced the evidence of record and or
incorrectly referenced government entities in the orders or
decision that was presented by the executor against the
Appellant all while the Appellant was not permitted by the
court to complete discovery.
4. The Orphansâ Court committed an error of law, equity,
abuse of discretion, and or violation of due process by
declining to exercise Appellantâs standing to establish
fiduciary misconduct and failure to protect the estate and or
Appellant where the Appellant alleged concealment,
fraudulent transfer of vehicles, self-dealing, fraud on the
estate, fraud on the DHS and or whether the Orphansâ Court
failed to apply the applicable law by insulating fiduciary
misconduct from judicial review through a premature
standing determination and whether the cumulative effect
of the Orphansâ Courtâs rulings; in example, authorizing
discovery, terminating it mid-stream, denying standing,
dismissing the petition without a hearing, pointing to limited
facts of record, denied Appellant a required full and fair
adjudication.
5. The Orphansâ Court committed an error of law, equity,
abuse of discretion, and or violation of due process when
pointing to and or relying on evidence of record that a
government entity made a statement to the estate that their
claim is against the estate and no one else, does said
statement then legally preclude or bar the government or
entities with authority through the government from
pursuing claims against omitted heirs or children of
[D]ecedent if it is, or could be, later learned of said fraud on
behalf of the executor or estate; and how does that affect
standing of parties, people or entities of or with interest in
said matters.
6. The Orphansâ Court committed an error of law, equity,
abuse of discretion, and or violation of due process when
put on notice of a discovery rule regarding capacity of a
[D]ecedent, and not authorizing and or then stopping the
completion of discovery prior to scheduled close date, and
having limited facts of record of testator capacity, in
example, the executorâs attorney, met alone with a testator,
and the test he or she used for lucidity and or capacity to
create a will, was asking the testator twice âis this what you
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wantâ, and it is an error to then prevent the omitted heirs
or children of [D]ecedent from having standing to challenge
capacity issues pursued within the statutory time from
discovery or within the discovery rule.
7. The Orphansâ Court committed an error of law, equity,
abuse of discretion, and or violation of due process for the
[c]ourt to hold or reason that an executor has the ability to
sell estate property or estate assets to whoever he wants,
and even if conducting fraud in said sales, the only person
to have standing would be the defrauded tax payers under
the Medicaid lien.
(Appellantâs Brief at 10-13).
For purposes of disposition, we address Appellantâs first, fifth, and
seventh issues together on appeal. In these issues, Appellant claims that the
trial court erred when it determined that she did not have standing to proceed
in this matter based on potential liability she might face for the DHS debt
against the Estate. Appellant argues that she has standing because she has
a direct and immediate interest based on potential liability for Decedentâs DHS
debt. Appellant claims that standing requires only that a party will be
adversely affected and she insists that Executorâs fraud, concealment of
assets, and depletion of Estate assets increases the risk of DHS potentially
seeking to recover the remainder of Decedentâs debt from her children.
Furthermore, Appellant alleges that DHSâs statement that it would only seek
to recover from the Estate was made before Appellant alleged that Executor
concealed assets and engaged in self-dealing. Appellant concludes that she
has standing in this matter and the Orphansâ Court erred by concluding
otherwise. We disagree.
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When reviewing an order from the Orphansâ Court:
[O]ur standard is narrow: we will not reverse unless there
is a clear error of law or an abuse of discretion. Our scope
of review is also limited: we determine only whether the
courtâs findings are based on competent and credible
evidence of record.
In re Est. of Westin, 874 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal citations
omitted). âAn abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in
reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the
judgment exercised is shown by the record to be ... manifestly unreasonable
or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been
abused.â Silver v. Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284, 291 (Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc)
(quoting Mencer v. Ruch, 928 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa.Super. 2007)).
It is well settled that âa party must have standing to contest probate of
a decedentâs will.â In re Est. of Morante, 344 A.3d 383, 389 (Pa.Super.
2025) (citation omitted). âThreshold issues of standing are questions of law;
thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.â
Id. (citation omitted).
Section 908 of the PEF Code governs a partyâs right to appeal from the
probate of a will and states:
§ 908. Appeals
(a) When allowed.--Any party in interest seeking to
challenge the probate of a will or who is otherwise aggrieved
by a decree of the register, or a fiduciary whose estate or
trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom to the court
within one year of the decree: Provided, That the executor
designated in an instrument shall not by virtue of such
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designation be deemed a party in interest who may appeal
from a decree refusing probate of it. The court, upon
petition of a party in interest, may limit the time for appeal
to three months.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a).
In In re Est. of Briskman, 808 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal
denied, 574 Pa. 769, 833 A.2d 140 (2003), this Court considered whether an
appellee had standing to challenge a will where that appellee was not named
as a beneficiary in the decedentâs will, but would have been an heir at law had
the decedent died intestate. The court reasoned that based on Section 908,
even though the appelleeâs interest was substantial, it was neither direct nor
immediate, but was a contingent interest that would arise only under certain
circumstancesâin that case either as a successor trustee or an intestate heir
if both wills were deemed invalid. Thus, this Court concluded that the
appelleeâs interest was too remote to confer standing to challenge the probate
of the decedentâs will. Id. at 933.
Additionally, the statutory authority under which DHS is entitled to seek
reimbursement from Decedentâs Estate arises from 62 P.S. § 1412, which
states:
§ 1412. Repayment from probate estates
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act or any
other law, the department shall establish and implement an
estate recovery program to recover medical assistance paid
with respect to individuals who were fifty-five years of age
or older at the time that assistance was received. Under
this program, the department shall recover from the
probate estate of an individual the amount of medical
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assistance paid for all nursing facility services, home- and
community-based services and related hospital and
prescription drug services. With the approval of the
Governor, the department may expand the estate recovery
program by regulation to include medical assistance for
services other than those listed in this section and to recover
against other real and personal property in which an
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death.
The departmentâs claim shall have the priority of a debt due
the Commonwealth.
(a.1) Liability for debt shall be as follows:
(1) If property subject to the departmentâs claim is
transferred without the departmentâs claim being satisfied,
then the executor or administrator transferring such
property, if there is one, shall become liable to pay the
departmentâs claim.
(2) If property subject to the departmentâs claim is
transferred to the extent that the transfer is made without
valuable and adequate consideration in money or something
worth money at the time of the transfer and without the
departmentâs claim being satisfied, then the executor or
administrator transferring such property, if there is one, and
the person receiving such property shall become liable to
pay the departmentâs claim.
(b) The executor or administrator of the estate of a decedent
who attained fifty-five years of age shall ascertain whether
the decedent received medical assistance during the five
years preceding death and, if so, shall give notice to the
department to secure from the department a statement of
the departmentâs claim for medical assistance consistent
with 20 Pa.C.S. § 3392(3) and (6) (relating to classification
and order of payment). The department must submit its
claim to the executor or administrator within forty-five days
of receipt of notice or the claim shall be forfeited.
(c) This section shall apply notwithstanding the provisions
of section 447.
62 P.S. § 1412 (emphasis added).
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Pennsylvaniaâs Filial Support Law is set forth at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4603,
and provides in relevant part:
(a) Liability.â
(1) Except as set forth in paragraph (2), all of the
following individuals have the responsibility to care for
and maintain or financially assist an indigent person,
regardless of whether the indigent person is a public
charge:
(i) The spouse of the indigent person.
(ii) A child of the indigent person.
(iii) A parent of the indigent person.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply in any of the
following cases:
(i) If an individual does not have sufficient
financial ability to support the indigent person.
(ii) A child shall not be liable for the support of
a parent who abandoned the child and persisted
in the abandonment for a period of ten years
during the childâs minority.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4603(a).
Instantly, the Orphansâ Court explained that Appellantâs claim of
standing was based on potential liability for a large debt, $218,891.16, owed
to DHS for Decedentâs care, which amount would not be covered by the Estate.
The court noted, however, that DHS had agreed to recover considerably less
than that which was owed, and that its claim was against only the Estate. The
Orphansâ Court explained that the Estate sent a check to DHS for the
negotiated amount of $40,037.19, which was the amount remaining in the
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Estate, and that DHS was merely waiting for final approval of the account from
the court to consider the debt satisfied. The court found that Appellantâs
insistence that she could be liable for the remaining debt based on the
potential for DHS seeking further recovery under the Filial Support law was
merely speculative. Ultimately, the court concluded that because Appellant
was not named in the will and faced no identifiable financial risk regarding the
debt to DHS, she lacked standing to seek the relief requested. (See Orphansâ
Court Opinion at 6).
Upon review, we agree that Appellant lacks standing to proceed in the
instant action. Appellantâs claim of standing based on potential liabilityâif
DHS withdraws acceptance of payment from the Estate and instead seeks
payment for Decedentâs care under Pennsylvaniaâs Filial Support Lawâis not
substantial, direct, or immediate enough to confer standing. See Est. of
Briskman, supra. Although DHS originally had a large claim against the
Estate, the record makes clear that DHSâs claim was against only the Estate.
(See DHS Letter, dated 3/28/24). See also 62 P.S. § 1412. Furthermore,
as the court noted, DHS agreed to accept a smaller amount from the Estate
in satisfaction of the claim. Appellantâs assertion that she may be able to
uncover some hidden assets of the Estate, which if presented to DHS may
result in DHS attempting to seek more funds, and then if DHS unable to recoup
those funds from the Estate it chooses to attempt to recover the additional
funds from Decedentâs children, is too attenuated to confer standing and
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speculative at best. See Est. of Briskman, supra. Therefore, the Orphansâ
Court properly dismissed Appellantâs petition for omnibus relief for lack of
standing, and Appellantâs first, fifth and seventh issues are meritless.
We next turn to Appellantâs sixth issue, wherein she argues that the
Orphansâ Court erred by sua sponte considering whether Appellantâs challenge
to Decedentâs testamentary capacity was timely presented. Appellant
contends that the Orphansâ Court was aware that discovery was ongoing
concerning testamentary capacity, and that discovery may have revealed
whether equitable tolling of the one-year time frame in which to challenge the
probate of a will should apply. Appellant concludes that the court erred in
deciding that her challenge to Decedentâs probated will was untimely, and this
Court must grant relief. We disagree.
Initially, as previously stated, standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
a will contest. See Morante, supra; 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a). Therefore,
because Appellant did not establish that she had standing, she is not permitted
to challenge Decedentâs testamentary capacity. Moreover, even if Appellant
did have standing, her challenge was barred by the statute of limitations.
â[W]hether the statute of limitations has run on a claim is generally a
question of law for the trial judgeâŚ. Additionally, the interpretation and
application of a statute is a question of law that compels plenary review to
determine whether the court committed an error of law.â Wilson v. Transp.
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Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 570 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Under Section 908, an interested party who is challenging probate has
only one year to challenge a will after the date upon which the will was
probated. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a). As this Court has explained, if a will is
not challenged within this statutory time limit, the presumption that it is valid
becomes conclusive: âOnly an appeal [within the statutory time period] from
the decree of probate can properly bring the validity of the will within the
jurisdiction of the Orphansâ Court.â In re Est. of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 208
(Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 724, 69 A.3d 603 (2012) (citing In
re Millerâs Est., 166 Pa. 97, 31 A. 58 (1895); Bunce v. Galbrath, 268 Pa.
389, 392, 112 A. 143, 144 (1920)).
Furthermore, the Orphansâ Court may not set aside the one-year time
limit for an appeal from the probate of a will absent âa fraud on the court or
the Register of Wills.â Dempsey v. Figura, 542 A.2d 1388, 1390-91
(Pa.Super. 1988) (citing In re Kirkanderâs Est., 490 Pa. 49, 415 A.2d 26
(1980)). In re Kirkanderâs Est. involved a challenge to a will that had been
probated but was alleged to be a forgery. See Kirkanderâs Est., supra at
51, 415 A.2d at 27. There, our Supreme Court held that âwhere fraud had
been practiced upon the register of wills, an appeal could be taken attacking
probate after the time fixed by the statute for an appeal had passed.â Id. at
52, 415 A.2d at 27. The Court ârecognized that the jurisdiction of the register
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is limited to a determination of the validity of the paper presented as the will
of the deceased, âand, if his action has been induced by fraud, the order
following is void and may be set aside.ââ Id. at 52, 415 A.2d at 28 (quoting
In re Culbertsonâs Est., 301 Pa. 438, 446, 152 A. 540, 543 (1930)).
Instantly, the Orphansâ Court concluded that because Decedentâs will
was accepted for probate on March 12, 2024, the one-year statutory period in
which to challenge the validity of the will expired before Appellant filed her
petition for omnibus relief on May 30, 2025. Hence, any claims regarding the
validity of the will were barred by the statute of limitations. (See Orphansâ
Court Opinion, dated 12/17/25, at 3).
Our review of the record supports the courtâs analysis. Appellant does
not assert that Executor committed a fraud upon the register of wills, that the
document purporting to be the will of the Decedent was fraudulent, or that
Appellant did not have notice that the will had been admitted to probate.
Compare Kirkanderâs Est., supra. Thus, even if she did have standing to
challenge Decedentâs will, Appellantâs claim that the court should have tolled
the one-year statute of limitations while she continued discovery is meritless.
Finally, in Appellantâs second, third and fourth issues presented, she
claims that the Orphansâ Court erred when it dismissed her petition for
omnibus relief prior to the completion of discovery. Appellant insists that the
courtâs termination of discovery without notice prevented her from developing
evidence of fraud, concealment, and Decedentâs incapacity, which resulted in
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the court resolving the matter on an incomplete record.4 Appellant maintains
that she was actively developing the record, and the courtâs ruling was
premature. We disagree.
Here, in August 2025, the Orphansâ Court gave Appellant 90 days to
conduct discovery in support of her claims. Appellant requested an extension
of the discovery deadline on November 19, 2025, which the trial court granted,
but with the express caveat that it would still revisit the issue of standing. At
the time, Appellantâs counsel explained that the ongoing discovery concerned
Decedentâs testamentary capacity and potential undue influence. (See N.T.
Hearing, 11/19/25, at 4-5). Despite having granted an extension of the
discovery deadline, the Orphansâ Court issued its ruling dismissing Appellantâs
petition based on lack of standing on December 17, 2025.
Although the Orphansâ Court issued its ruling prior to the conclusion of
the extended discovery period, any error in curtailing the period for extended
discovery was harmless. As Appellantâs counsel noted, the ongoing discovery
concerned the validity of the will. The Orphansâ Court concluded that
Appellantâs challenge to the validity of the will was not raised within the one-
year period following probate. See Est. of Whitley, supra. Thus, nothing
that Appellant would have discovered concerning Decedentâs testamentary
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4 Within these issues, Appellant again claims that she has standing under
Pennsylvaniaâs Filial Support Law. As we have already addressed and rejected
Appellantâs standing claims, we do not readdress them here.
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capacity or undue influence tainting execution of the will would alter the fact
that her challenge to the validity of the will was untimely. Therefore, to the
extent that the court committed any error in issuing its ruling while the
extended discovery period was ongoing, such error was harmless.
Accordingly, Appellantâs final issues merit no relief, and we affirm.
Order affirmed.
DATE: 11/19/2026
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