Full Opinion

Filed 10/30/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE ASSOCIATION FOR B350110 LOS ANGELES DEPUTY SHERIFFS et al., (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCP05186) Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Real Parties in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of mandate, Stephen I. Goorvitch and Alison M. Mackenzie, Judges. Petition denied. Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Jacob A. Kalinski and Richard A. Levine for Petitioners. No appearance for Respondent. Miller Barondess, Mira Hashmall, Eleanor S. Ruth and Lauren M. Brody for Real Parties in Interest. ____________________________ Petitioners David Jouzi, Benjamin Alvarado, and Dellanira Aragon are former deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (department) who were discharged for alleged misconduct. They appealed their discharges to the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (commission). While their appeals were pending, the former deputies executed settlements with department chiefs that purported to reinstate them to employment. Real party in interest the County of Los Angeles (county) refused to comply with these settlement agreements. Jouzi, Alvarado, Aragon, and a recognized employee organization (petitioner Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs or ALADS) 1 sued the county, seeking enforcement of the settlements through mandamus, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel claims, along with a declaration that the county must comply with settlements executed by the department during the pendency of commission appeals. Initially, the trial court sustained the county’s demurrers to petitioners’ pleading without leave to amend. On appeal, we reversed and instructed the trial court to grant petitioners leave to file an amended pleading identifying the legal basis (if any) for the department’s alleged long-standing view that the Los Angeles County Sheriff (sheriff) and his subordinates are authorized to 1 We refer to Jouzi, Alvarado, and Aragon collectively as “deputy petitioners,” and we refer to the deputy petitioners and ALADS collectively as “petitioners.” 2 settle appeals before the commission without approval of other county officials. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 771–772, 801, 812 (ALADS I).) On remand, petitioners filed several amended pleadings, and the trial court sustained the county’s demurrers to two of them. The court sustained the county’s last demurrer without leave to amend. In particular, the court found petitioners failed to demonstrate that the chiefs executing the settlements were “acting under authority of the board [of supervisors] or authority conferred by law” for the purposes of Government Code section 23005. Petitioners seek appellate review of the dismissal of their claims. As an initial matter, petitioners arguably failed to appeal timely from the trial court’s order of dismissal by instead appealing from a subsequent judgment entered by the court. Assuming arguendo petitioners’ appeal is untimely, we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a writ petition because the trial court’s order sustaining the county’s demurrer to the operative pleading directed the parties to meet and confer and submit a proposed judgment of dismissal, thereby apparently leading petitioners to believe the dismissal order filed concurrently with the demurrer order was issued in error or was otherwise not a final appealable judgment. The trial court’s later issuance of the judgment of dismissal further indicated it may not have intended for the dismissal order to be a final appealable judgment. Accordingly, we conclude under the unique circumstances of this case that the interests of justice would be better served by treating this arguably untimely appeal as a writ petition. 3 On the merits, petitioners have not demonstrated that the sheriff and his subordinates were authorized to bind the county to the settlements that are before us. First, we reject petitioners’ assertion that encompassed within the sheriff’s authority to appoint, suspend, and discharge department personnel is the power to rescind or modify discipline during the pendency of civil service appeals. Petitioners’ expansive interpretation of the sheriff’s power is not consistent with the purpose and structure of the county’s civil service system. That system is designed to ensure that (1) only competent individuals are county employees and (2) favoritism plays no role in the hiring process. Adopting petitioners’ theory of implied authority would undermine those objectives by upsetting the careful balance struck by the civil service system’s delegation of authority to (1) the sheriff, who hires employees from an eligible civil service list; (2) the director of personnel, who maintains that list; and (3) the commission, which reviews employees’ appeals of discipline. Second, we reject petitioners’ argument that the county is bound by a department manual provision they claim confers authority on division chiefs and division directors to settle commission appeals without the approval of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (the board of supervisors or board). Petitioners’ assertion that department management representatives and ALADS executed an agreement requiring the adoption of that manual provision is unavailing because petitioners have not demonstrated that the county authorized those management representatives to execute that alleged agreement. 4 Third, we reject petitioners’ contention the county is bound by its alleged past practice of permitting chiefs and captains to settle commission appeals because they have not demonstrated that practice is subject to the collective bargaining requirements imposed by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA; Gov. Code, § 3500, et seq.). 2 Fourth, we conclude that a prior unpublished appellate decision upholding the validity of a settlement executed by ALADS and a department official concerning the department’s procedures for investigating officer-involved shootings does not collaterally estop the county from contesting the instant settlements. We hold the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer as to the contract and mandamus claims because they are predicated on the validity of the settlements. Petitioners also fail to show that despite this defect, they can recover on their promissory estoppel and declaratory relief causes of action. Lastly, petitioners do not argue the court erred in denying leave to amend their pleading. In sum, we construe petitioners’ appeal as a writ petition and deny it. 2 The MMBA “mutually obligates a public employer and an employee organization to meet and confer in good faith about a matter within the ‘scope of representation’ concerning, among other things, ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment[.]’ [Citation.]” (See Claremont Police Officers Assn. v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th 623, 628 (Claremont Police Officers Assn.).) 5 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 We summarize only those facts pertinent to this review proceeding. 1. The initial trial court proceedings and ALADS I On December 5, 2019, petitioners filed their initial verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint, alleging three causes of action for writ of mandate, three causes of action for breach of contract, three causes of action for promissory estoppel, and one declaratory relief cause of action. (ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 772–773.) 4 Petitioners sought enforcement of the settlements through their mandamus, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel claims. (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 771.) Petitioners also sought a declaration that the county must comply with the department’s settlements of commission appeals. (See id. at pp. 797–798.) 3 We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in part from undisputed aspects of the trial court’s rulings, admissions made by the parties in their filings, and the county’s assertions that petitioners do not dispute in their reply brief. (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 772, fn. 2, 773–774 [employing this approach].) Our Factual and Procedural Background is also based in part on our prior opinion in ALADS I. (See People v. Czirban (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1058, fn. 4 [relying in part on the Court of Appeal’s prior opinion in summarizing the factual and procedural history of that case].) We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of our prior opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) 4 For the sake of clarity and consistency, we refer to petitioners’ initial petition for writ of mandate and complaint and the amendments thereto as petitions. 6 The trial court sustained the county’s demurrer, without leave to amend, as to the writ of mandate causes of action based on the court’s ruling that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to enforce a contractual obligation against a public entity. (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 774.) The trial court later sustained the county’s demurrer to the remainder of the initial petition without leave to amend. (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 774.) The court reasoned that “the settlement agreements are void because county counsel did not approve them, and section 21” of the Los Angeles County Charter (county charter) “confers upon county counsel ‘exclusive charge and control of all civil actions and proceedings in which the County or any officer thereof, is concerned or is a party.’ ” (See id. at pp. 771, 774–775.) On appeal from the judgment of dismissal, we held section 21 of the county charter “does not confer upon county counsel exclusive authority to settle appeals of discipline decisions pending before the commission,” but we also found petitioners had not shown that “the sheriff and his chiefs were authorized to execute on the county’s behalf the settlement agreements at issue here.” (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 775, 777.) We concluded that there was “a reasonable possibility that [the petitioners] could [have] amend[ed] their initial petition[ ] to establish that the sheriff and his subordinates have that authority,” and that the trial court erred in denying leave to amend on petitioners’ mandamus causes of action. (See id. at pp. 778, 806.) We reversed the judgment and instructed the trial court to grant petitioners leave to amend as to most of their claims. (See id. at p. 812.) 7 2. The first amended petition, the second amended petition, the trial court’s order sustaining the county’s demurrer to the second amended petition with leave to amend, the third amended petition, and the court’s order striking the third amended petition On February 1, 2024, petitioners filed their first amended petition. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, petitioners filed a second amended petition on March 26, 2024. On November 25, 2024, the trial court sustained the county’s demurrer to the second amended petition with leave to amend. On January 10, 2025, petitioners filed their third amended petition. The trial court later struck the third amended petition because the pleading did not include the names of the deputy petitioners. 3. The fourth amended petition On March 24, 2025, petitioners filed their fourth amended petition.5 The deputy petitioners are former deputies of the department. ALADS is “a recognized employee organization as defined in the [MMBA] . . . representing sworn non-management peace officers employed by the Department and the County District Attorney’s Office with regard to all matters concerning wages, hours and working conditions. It brings this action on behalf of all of its represented employees.” 5 The remainder of our Factual and Procedural Background, part 3 summarizes certain material and properly pleaded allegations from the fourth amended petition, which we assume to be true for purposes of this review proceeding. (See Standards of Review, post.) We detail additional averments in our Discussion, post. 8 Petitioners name as defendants and respondents the county, the board of supervisors, the department, the sheriff, the county counsel, the director of personnel, and the county’s auditor-controller. Petitioners do not dispute — and thus tacitly agree with — the county’s assertion we should treat this matter as “an official-capacity suit and, therefore, as a suit against the County alone.” (See also ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 795, fn. 29 [concluding petitioners impliedly made a similar admission in ALADS I].) Each of the three deputy petitioners alleges one cause of action for writ of mandate (the first, fourth, and seventh causes of action), one cause of action for breach of contract (the second, fifth, and eighth causes of action), and one cause of action for promissory estoppel (the third, sixth, and ninth causes of action). The tenth cause of action for declaratory relief is brought on behalf of all four petitioners. It appears that in or about 2017, each deputy petitioner was served with a letter of intent to be discharged from employment. They participated in predeprivation hearings held pursuant to Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, and were subsequently discharged from employment for alleged misconduct. 6 Each deputy petitioner filed an appeal of his or her discharge to the commission. 6 “ ‘Skelly [v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 15 Cal.3d 194] requires that civil service employees be given notice of proposed disciplinary action, the reasons for the action, a copy of the charges and the written materials upon which they are based, and an opportunity to respond either orally or in writing. [Citation.] A “Skelly hearing” refers to the employee’s opportunity to respond, and it has been described as an “informal 9 In 2019, while their respective appeals were pending before the commission, each deputy petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with a chief of the department, the terms of which purport to reduce the discipline already imposed and reinstate the deputy petitioner’s employment. With regard to each of these settlements, petitioners aver: “Based on information and belief, the settlement agreement was entered into pursuant to the authority granted in [department manual of policy and procedures or MPP section 3-04/020.80]. All conditions precedent set forth in MPP section [3-04/020.80] were met, including consulting with the constitutional policing adviser and receiving the approval of the Undersheriff.” 7 The county thereafter refused to comply with the terms of the settlements. Although the fourth amended petition does not detail the circumstances under which Jouzi became aware that the county “refused . . . to reinstate [him] to his employment with the County and to provide him with all emoluments of employment,” the pleading alleges that shortly after their settlements were executed, Alvarado and Aragon were “advised” that “County Counsel and/or . . . [the] Director of Personnel and/or . . . [the] Board of Supervisors vetoed” their settlements. In its appellate brief, the county asserts that the settlement “agreements were not approved by the Board of Supervisors . . . .” probable-cause-type proceeding.” ’ ” (ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 773, fn. 4.) 7 Although these paragraphs from the fourth amended petition actually refer to “MPP section 3-04/020.080” rather than MPP section 3-04/020.80, that appears to be a typographical error. We describe MPP section 3-04/020.80 in further detail in our Discussion, part B.2, post. 10 Petitioners tacitly concede this point by failing to dispute it in their reply. (See fn. 3, ante [noting that a party’s failure to dispute in its reply an assertion raised in the opposing party’s appellate brief may be deemed an admission thereto].) 8 4. The trial court’s order sustaining the county’s demurrer to the fourth amended petition without leave to amend and the dismissal of the action On July 7, 2025, the trial court sustained the county’s demurrer to the fourth amended petition without leave to amend. The court remarked, “The dispositive issue in this case is whether the chiefs executing the settlement agreements were acting under the authority of the Board or authority conferred by law for purposes of Government Code section 23005.” According to the court, “Petitioners have still not alleged ‘the legal basis (if any) for the department’s alleged long-standing apparent belief that its personnel have authority to settle commission appeals on their own.’ [Citation.]” (Quoting ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 772.) The court denied leave to amend because “Petitioners have . . . had three opportunities to identify this authority, and they have failed to do so each time,” and “none of the discovery” petitioners obtained from the county “would permit Petitioners to amend the Fourth Amended Petition successfully.” 8 In ALADS I, we noted that petitioners had not “contest[ed the county’s] representation that the deputy [petitioners’] appeals were still pending before the commission when they filed their [initial] petition[ in the trial court.]” (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 774.) In their briefing for the instant review proceeding, petitioners do not address whether the commission appeals were still pending when they filed the initial petition. 11 On July 7, 2025, which is the date of filing of the order sustaining the demurrer to the fourth amended petition, the court also filed an order dismissing the action with prejudice. (See Discussion, part A, post.) On August 11, 2025, the court filed a judgment purporting to dismiss the action. (See ibid.) On October 2, 2025, petitioners filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the dismissal order and the judgment. (See ibid. [explaining that petitioners’ appeal is arguably untimely, but exercising this court’s discretion to treat the appeal as a writ petition].) STANDARDS OF REVIEW In ruling on a demurrer, a court determines whether a party has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 776.) We review the trial court’s ruling de novo and “ ‘ “ ‘treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] . . . .’ [Citation.] . . . . [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] We also consider ‘matters of which judicial notice can and has been taken.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We review a trial court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. (Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 677, 685.) Under this standard, the plaintiff has the burden of proving there exists a reasonable possibility that an amendment would cure the defect. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff fails to meet that burden, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (Ibid.) “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed correct.” (Hernandez v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1190.) To overcome the presumption of correctness, a party must 12 “ ‘ “ ‘ “affirmatively demonstrate error” ’ ” by “ ‘ “supply[ing] the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citations.] . . . ’ [Citation.]” (County of Los Angeles v. Niblett (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454, 462–463 (Niblett).) Furthermore, an error of state law “ ‘generally does not warrant reversal unless there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached.’ [Citation.]” (ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 777.) DISCUSSION A. Assuming Arguendo Petitioners’ Appeal Is Untimely, We Exercise Our Discretion To Treat the Appeal as a Writ Petition The county does not contest the timeliness of petitioner’s appeal. “However, because the timeliness of an appeal poses a jurisdictional issue, we must raise the point sua sponte and must consider that question first.” (See Drum v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 (Drum).) As we explain below, although petitioners’ appeal is arguably untimely, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits by treating the appeal as a writ petition. “[A] notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of: [¶] (A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served; [¶] (B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed- 13 endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or [¶] (C) 180 days after entry of judgment.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1).) On July 7, 2025, the date on which the trial court had filed its order sustaining the demurrer to the fourth amended petition without leave to amend, the court also filed a signed order dismissing the entire action with prejudice. The record contains a certificate of mailing indicating that on July 7, 2025, the trial court clerk served the file-stamped and signed dismissal order on the parties’ counsel. Yet, in the order sustaining the demurrer, the court directed “[t]he parties [to] meet-and-confer and lodge a proposed judgment forthwith.” 9 On August 11, 2025, the trial court filed a judgment purporting to dismiss the action in its entirety and designating the county as the prevailing party “entitled to recover [its] costs from [petitioners] in accordance with law.” 10 On October 2, 2025, petitioners filed a notice of appeal seeking review of a “Judgment entered [on] 9 It is unclear whether the trial court filed the dismissal order before it filed the order sustaining the demurrer to the fourth amended petition. 10 The judicial officer who signed the judgment was not the trial judge who sustained the demurrer to the operative pleading and signed the dismissal order. Additionally, we note that the following documents are attached to the August 11, 2025 judgment: (1) a July 7, 2025 minute order that (inter alia) sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend and directed the parties to meet and confer and lodge a proposed judgment, (2) the signed and file-stamped July 7, 2025 order sustaining the demurrer, and (3) a certificate of mailing showing that the trial court clerk served the July 7, 2025 minute order on counsel for the parties on that date. 14 August 11, 2025 and [an] Order of Dismissal entered [on] August 11, 2025.” 11 The order dismissing the action with prejudice that was signed by the trial court and filed on July 7, 2025 appears to constitute an appealable judgment. (See Roe v. Doe 1 (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 965, 972 [“An order of dismissal is an appealable ‘judgment’ if it is (i) in writing, (ii) signed by the court, and (iii) filed in the action.”].) Because the trial court clerk served the dismissal order on counsel for the parties on July 7, 2025, it appears petitioners had to file their notice of appeal within 60 days of that date, that is, on or before September 5, 2025. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A).) In addition, the trial court’s filing of the judgment on August 11, 2025 does not seem to have extended petitioners’ deadline to appeal from the dismissal order. (See Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 842–843 [indicating that a new appeal period starts to run from service or entry of a revised judgment only if it “ ‘substantial[ly] modifi[es]’ . . . the [original] judgment”].) We may treat an untimely appeal as a petition for writ of mandate “in unusual circumstances” in which “do[ing] otherwise would be unfair.” (See Drum, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 852– 853.) Such is the case here. By (1) filing the dismissal order on the same date on which the trial court had filed an order requiring the parties to meet and confer and submit a proposed judgment and (2) later filing a judgment on August 11, 2025, the trial court appears to have led petitioners to believe the dismissal order was issued in error or was otherwise not a final appealable 11 The case register does not indicate that an order of dismissal was entered on August 11, 2025. 15 judgment. 12 It seems the county had the same belief given that the trial court signed the proposed judgment submitted by the county. Accordingly, assuming for argument’s sake petitioners’ appeal is untimely, we exercise our discretion to construe the appeal as a writ petition. (Cf. Drum, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 847, 851–853 [exercising the reviewing court’s discretion to excuse a party’s failure to file a timely appeal because that party relied on an erroneous published decision to the effect that the orders challenged on appeal were not immediately appealable].) B. The Contract and Mandamus Claims Fail Because Petitioners Do Not Demonstrate that the Sheriff and His Subordinates Were Authorized To Execute the Settlements As we explained in our prior opinion, “Government Code section 23004, subdivision (c) grants the county the power to ‘[m]ake contracts . . . .’ [Citation.] Government Code section 23005 in turn provides: ‘A county may exercise its powers only through the board of supervisors or through agents and officers acting under authority of the board or authority conferred by law.’ [Citation.] [¶] Thus, the validity of the deputy [petitioners’] settlement agreements hinges on whether the chiefs executing them were ‘acting under authority of the board or 12 (See In re The Clergy Cases I (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1233–1234 [“ ‘Generally speaking, only final judgments are appealable . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] . . . ‘If no issues in the action remain for further consideration, the decree is final and appealable. But if further judicial action is required for a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.’ ”].) 16 authority conferred by law’ for the purposes of Government Code section 23005.” (ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 794.) We also noted that petitioners’ contract and mandamus claims fail as a matter of law unless they can show that “the chiefs were authorized to enter into the settlements with the deputy [petitioners] . . . .” (See id. at pp. 795–796.) Petitioners raise four arguments in support of their position the chiefs were authorized to execute the settlements: (1) the sheriff’s power to “settle a disciplinary action that the Sheriff himself previously imposed on an employee under his command” is implicit in this county official’s “undisputed authority . . . to appoint, suspend or discharge his employees,” and the sheriff may delegate this power to his subordinates; (2) MPP section 3-04/020.80 “constitutes the lawful delegation by the Board of Supervisors of authority to the Sheriff [and his subordinates] for executing binding settlement agreements” of commission appeals or is a “law” that confers such authority on department personnel for the purposes of Government Code section 23005; (3) petitioners have alleged a “binding past practice of the sheriff’s department of resolving disciplinary appeals pending civil service commission proceedings” (boldface & capitalization omitted); and (4) an unpublished Court of Appeal decision collaterally estops the county from denying the chiefs’ authority to execute the settlements. We address these contentions seriatim. 17 1. Petitioners fail to demonstrate the department’s authority over personnel decisions includes the power to settle commission appeals “ ‘The same rules of statutory interpretation that apply to statutory provisions also apply to local charter provisions[ ]’ [citation]” (ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 779), Civil Service Rules (see Head v. Civil Service Com. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 240, 243–244), and ordinances (see Zubarau v. City of Palmdale (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 289, 305). “ ‘When construing a statute, “our goal is ‘ “to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.” ’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Put differently, our objective is to ‘ “ ‘arriv[e] at the true [legislative] intent existing at the time the legislation was enacted.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (ALADS I, supra, at p. 779.) “We do not construe th[e] words [of legislation] in a vacuum but rather consider them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.” (See Hirdman v. Charter Communications, LLC (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 376, 384.) Petitioners cite certain provisions of the Government Code, county charter, county code, and Civil Service Rules for the proposition that the “Sheriff and his subordinates [have authority] to take fundamental personnel actions respecting employees in the Sheriff’s Department,” to wit, the authority to “appoint, suspend[,] or discharge [department] employees . . . .” They assert that implicit within those powers to “render fundamental personnel decisions” is “the right to rescind or modify . . . previous disciplinary decision[s] based upon facts discovered during the course of an administrative appeal . . . .” 18 Before addressing this argument, we describe relevant aspects of the county’s civil service system. a. The county’s civil service system is designed to ensure classified employees are competent and not corrupt Our high court recently explained, “[Los Angeles] County’s charter establishes a civil service system and designates all employment positions as ‘unclassified’ or ‘classified.’ [Citations.] Elected officials, heads of County agencies, and other identified executive positions are ‘unclassified,’ with all remaining positions being ‘classified.’[ 13] [Citation.] By charter, the County ‘has a formal civil service system . . . for filling classified positions and fixing the salary and benefits of classified employees.’ [Citation.] Civil service rules . . . . are . . . designed to prevent favoritism or corruption by requiring that all employees are uniformly paid based on their qualifications, job duties, and performance.” 13 Deputy petitioners do not claim to have had “unclassified” county positions. Instead, petitioners assert in their opening brief that the three deputy petitioners were “permanent employees and members of the civil service system of the County” (italics added), thereby suggesting they were classified employees. That deputy petitioners appealed their discharges to the commission further indicates they were “classified” employees. (See Factual & Procedural Background, part 3, ante [noting deputy petitioners appealed to the commission]; see, e.g., L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 18.02(B) [authorizing “a permanent employee” who “is discharged” to “request a hearing before the commission”]; id., rule 2.24 [defining “[e]mployee” for the purposes of the Civil Service Rules as “any person holding a position in the classified service of the county”].) 19 (Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (2026) 20 Cal.5th 292, 314 (Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Assn.).) Indeed, the county charter states the “purpose of [the] civil service system” is, inter alia, to “provide County government with a productive, efficient, stable, and representative work force by: [¶] . . . [r]ecruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge, and skills relevant to the work to be performed[; and] [¶] . . . [r]etaining employees on the basis of the adequacy of their performance, correcting inadequate performance, and separating employees whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected.” (See L.A. Cnty. Charter, art. IX, § 30, capitalization omitted from first quotation.) To that end, section 51 of the charter requires county officers to appoint classified employees “from the eligible civil service list . . . .” (See L.A. Cnty. Charter, art. XII, § 51.) The Civil Service Rules confer upon the director of personnel the responsibility to “[a]dminister the civil service system in accordance with th[e] Civil Service Rules” (see L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 3.01(A)), by, among other things, promulgating and terminating eligible civil service lists (see id., rules 10.01 & 10.05). Civil Service Rules, rule 6.04 permits the director of personnel to “withhold the name of a person from the eligible list” on one of several grounds, including that the person is responsible for “conduct not compatible with the requirements of the position, whether or not it amounts to a crime.” (See L.A. 20 Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 6.04(D).) 14 The director of personnel is also authorized to consider an appeal from “[a]n employee who is suspended for up to five days . . . .” (See L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(C).) Additionally, as we noted in our prior opinion, section 34 of the charter confers upon the commission authority to act as “ ‘an appellate body . . . as provided in the Civil Service Rules . . . .’ ” (See ALADS I, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 789, quoting L.A. Cnty. Charter, art. IX, § 34.) The Civil Service Rules, inter alia, authorize the commission to hear permanent employees’ appeals of discharges and reductions in rank, grade, or compensation. (See L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 18.02(A)–(C).) The rules also indicate that the commission may hear an employee’s challenge to a suspension in excess of five days. (See, e.g., id., rules 4.03(A) & 4.05(A)(1).) b. Petitioners’ implied authority theory is inconsistent with the purpose and structure of the county’s civil service system Petitioners argue that a provision of the County Civil Service Enabling Law (Gov. Code, § 31100 et seq.) requires a county that has adopted a civil service system to enact an ordinance providing that “[a]ny officer or employee in the 14 The version of Civil Service Rules, rule 6.04(D) that was in effect in 2019 (i.e., when each deputy petitioner’s settlement was purportedly executed) likewise authorized the director of personnel to withhold a person’s name from the eligible list if that person was “guilty of conduct not compatible with county employment, whether or not it amounts to a crime.” (See L.A. Cnty. Ord. No. 88-0020 § 1 (part), 1988.) 21 classified civil service may be dismissed, suspended, or reduced in rank or compensation by the appointing authority . . . by a written order, stating specifically the reasons for the action.” (Gov. Code, § 31108, subd. (a)(1).) Petitioners contend that county charter sections 12 and 51; Civil Service Rules, rule 2.03; and county code section 2.02.100 in turn establish that the sheriff is an “appointing power” and “appointing officer” with the power to appoint persons to positions within the department. 15 Petitioners further maintain that Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(A) authorizes the “appointing power” to suspend an employee, and rule 18.02 permits the “appointing power” to discharge subordinates from county service or reduce them in grade or compensation.16 They also assert the 15 Section 12 of the county charter identifies the sheriff as an elective county officer (see L.A. Cnty. Charter, art. IV, § 12), and section 51 provides that a county officer “shall appoint, from the eligible civil service list, for either permanent or temporary service, all . . . deputies . . . and other persons in the office or department of such officer” (see L.A. Cnty. Charter, art. XII, § 51). Civil Service Rules, rule 2.03 defines “ ‘[a]ppointing power’ ” as “the person, board, or commission having authority to make appointments to a position” (see L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 2.03), and county code section 2.02.100 similarly defines “ ‘[a]ppointing officer’ ” as “the officer, board, commission or body having power of appointment to any position in the service of the county” (see L.A. Cnty. Code, § 2.02.100). 16 Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(A) provides in relevant part: “Subject to such appeal right as provided in this Rule, an employee may be suspended by the appointing power for up to and including 30 days, pending investigation, filing of charges and hearing on discharge or reduction, or as a disciplinary 22 following ordinance empowers the sheriff to delegate to his subordinates authority to settle disciplinary appeals pending before the commission: “An appointing officer as defined in Section 2.02.100 of this chapter may delegate to subordinates the exercise of judgment or discretion to impose discipline or take any other personnel action on behalf of the appointing officer.” (L.A. Cnty. Code, § 2.04.070.) Petitioners argue “the ability to settle a disciplinary action that the Sheriff himself previously imposed on an employee under his command . . . is . . . necessarily incidental to powers expressly otherwise granted the Sheriff or his designees under the above-referenced rules and regulations.” They also contend, “[T]here is no reasonable basis for the conclusion that the legislative body of the County has withheld authority from [the] Sheriff to settle disciplinary cases pending Civil Service Commission appeal” because absent that authority, the sheriff could not “rescind or modify his previous disciplinary decision based upon facts discovered during the course of an appeal from such decision.” We acknowledge the facial appeal of petitioners’ position. At first blush, one would expect that a government official measure.” (L.A. Cnty. Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01(A).) As pertinent here, Civil Service Rules, rule 18.02 states, “Before [a] discharge or reduction [of a permanent employee] shall become effective, the employee shall receive a written notice from the appointing power of intent to invoke discharge or reduction, and specific grounds and particular facts therefor. The employee shall then be allowed a reasonable time, not to exceed 10 days, to respond orally or in writing to the appointing power before the