Full Opinion

J-A18011-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 DEBORAH A. REDMAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JOHN DOE : No. 480 WDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered March 30, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County Civil Division at No(s): A.D. 2025 - 446 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: October 20, 2026 Deborah A. Redman appeals from the order entered by the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas on March 30, 2026, denying Redman’s petition to acquire title by adverse possession, and dismissing the case. As the trial court properly found Redman does not meet the requirements for adverse possession of the property at issue, we affirm. On June 20, 2025, Redman filed a pro se “Petition to Acquire Title by Adverse Possession (action to quiet title),” regarding a 50’ by 80’ parcel of land bordering her property in Meadville, Pennsylvania. Redman named the respondent as “John Doe,” noting the parcel has been abandoned, i.e., ownerless, for a century. Specifically, Redman asserted Vernon Township had planned to build a lane in the 1920s on the parcel, but canceled the plans, and the parcel thereafter became ownerless. See Petition, 6/20/25, at ¶ 2. J-A18011-26 Redman claimed she met all of the requirements for adverse possession of the parcel pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5527.1, including actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct, and hostile possession of the parcel. See id. at ¶ 8. On the same date, Redman filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 240. On June 26, 2025, the court entered an order denying the petition to proceed in forma pauperis, “based upon the conflicting information contained in the [petition],” and directed Redman to pay costs to continue the case. Order, 6/26/25. Redman filed a reply, requesting that the court clarify how her petition “contains conflicting information,” noting that it was clear that her only source of income is social security. Reply to Order Dated 26 June 2025, 7/14/25, at 1. Nevertheless, Redman attached a check to cover costs, as directed by the court. On September 11, 2025, the court ordered Redman to make service of process by publication of the petition to acquire title, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 430(b)(1). Redman filed a reply, in which she asserted publication under Rule 430(b)(1) was not required, because the purpose of Rule 430(b)(1) was to determine whether there are any heirs and assigns to the parcel, and that has already been determined because the parcel is ownerless. Redman also asserted that she had recently had a land survey of her property completed, and in addition to the parcel described in her petition, she learned that the -2- J-A18011-26 land at the back of her property is an extension of the parcel, and made clear that she is claiming rights to both the parcel and extension. On November 10, 2025, Redman filed a motion to resume proceedings, explaining that she had since followed the court’s direction to make service by publication by placing a “Notice of Action to Quiet Title” in the Meadville Tribune on October 15, 2025, and that no reply had been received. Redman attached proof of the publication to the motion. Following a status conference, the court entered an order on March 30, 2026, dismissing the petition. This timely appeal followed. Redman raises the following issues on appeal: 1. Did the [trial court] err in dismissing [Redman]’s petition to acquire title by adverse possession and abuse [its] discretion by holding that [Redman] had to sue the owner of the abandoned land she was trying to acquire when the land is ownerless?[a] [a] This question could be stated alternatively this way: Can one acquire abandoned land that is ownerless under the Pennsylvania adverse possession law, 42 Pa. C.S.A § 5527.1? 2. Did the [trial court] err in denying [Redman] in forma pauperis status and abuse [its] discretion when her income is well below federally established standards for poverty? Appellant’s Brief, at 1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). “When reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding an action to quiet title, we are limited to determining whether the findings of fact that led to the trial court’s conclusions of law are supported by competent evidence. Ordinarily, an appellate court will not reverse a determination of the trial court in a quiet -3- J-A18011-26 title action absent an error of law or capricious disregard of the evidence.” Moore v. Duran, 687 A.2d 822, 827 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To succeed on a claim of title by adverse possession, one must prove: actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land for twenty-one years. Each of these elements must exist; otherwise, the possession will not confer title. A sporadic use of land, by one without title to it, will not operate to give him a title, no matter how often repeated[.] It is true that residence is not necessary to make an adverse possession within the statute of limitation; the possession may be adverse by enclosing and cultivating the land; but nothing short of an actual possession, permanently continued, will take away from the owner the possession which the law attaches to the legal title; temporary acts on the land, without an intention to seat and occupy it for residence and cultivation or other permanent use consistent with the nature of the property, are not the actual possession required[.] Such occupation must be exclusive, and of such a character as compels the real owner to take notice of the possession of the disseisor[.] In other words, only acts signifying permanent occupation of the land and done continuously for a twenty-one year period will confer adverse possession. The burden of proving adverse possession rests upon the claimant by credible, clear and definitive proof. Johnson v. Tele-Media Co. of McKean Cnty., 90 A.3d 736, 740-41 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). While the standard occupation period for adverse possession is 21 years, Section 5527.1, as relied on by Redman, provides a reduced period of 10 years that applies to single- -4- J-A18011-26 family residential lots measuring one-half acre or less. See 42 Pa. C.S.A § 5527.1(a)-(b). Here, the trial court concluded that Redman did not have a justiciable cause of action for adverse possession “because there is not a named defendant and no party is asserting rights to the parcel adverse to [Redman] ….” Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/26, at 1-2; see also id. at 3 (reasoning that “A person claiming ownership of the parcel is an indispensable party to this lawsuit … The failure to join an indispensable party is a non-waivable defect regarding the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, the court found Redman could not provide the required notice: [Redman] cites to 42 Pa.C.S.A § 5527.1 in her complaint. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1065.1 governs an action to quiet title of property pursuant to § 5527.1. The rule makes it clear that the plaintiff must “provide to the defendant the notice set forth in subdivision (d) of this rule”. The rule defines defendant as "the owner, the owner's heirs, successors, and assigns, of the real property recorded in the most recent deed filed in the Recorder of Deeds Office at the courthouse in the county in which the real property is located." In this case, [Redman] has not named a defendant. Pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 410 in actions involving title to property, original process shall be served in the manner provided by Pa.R.Civ.P. 400. That could not occur because [Redman] has not named a defendant. To assist the appellant in finding someone who claimed ownership of the parcel the court ordered [Redman] to make service of process by publication as provided by Pa.R.Civ.P. 430(b)(1). [Redman] complied, but no one came forward claiming ownership of the parcel. Id. at 2. Finally, the court concluded that even if Redman could prove that her possession was actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct -5- J-A18011-26 and hostile, she could not show she had done so for 21, or even 10, years. See id. at 3. Specifically, Redman admitted in her petition that she only purchased the property in 2021, and the court found “she cannot rely on the possession of [the] prior owner or [a] neighbor because she makes no claim that prior owners ever claimed or even possessed the property.” Id. We were unable to find any case law regarding whether a named defendant is required in an adverse possession action. While the trial court’s reasoning is persuasive, we need not reach a definitive conclusion on this finding, as we agree with the trial court that Redman has not met the time frame requirement for acquiring adverse possession of property. Redman has only owned her property for around 5 years. Redman makes no assertion that the prior owners, or any neighbors, claimed possession of the parcel, other than claiming the prior owners occasionally attempted to tend to the weeds. See Petition, 6/20/25, at ¶ 5 (“For roughly a century, the parcel was neglected[;]” “In addition to its blighted condition, the landowners adjacent to the property used it as their garbage dump.”); see id. ¶ 8.2 (stating she was tacking on the time of ownership from the previous owners, based only on her assertion that the previous owners “clearly sought to control the encroaching vegetation form the parcel, but used very ineffective methods.”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding Redman did not meet the requirements for adverse possession. -6- J-A18011-26 We acknowledge that Redman indicates that the property she seeks title to is ownerless as it is a “paper street,” and therefore she could not name a defendant. Petition, 6/20/25, at ¶ 4; see also Appellant’s Brief, at 2, 4, 9-10, 18 n.10. While case law in our Court is sparse on the issue of paper streets, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has explained: A paper street refers to a street indicated on a planning or zoning map of a municipality or on other publicly recorded documents. Where such a street has never been opened by the municipality or used by the public, it has no existence except on paper, and is therefore referred to as a paper street. Bailey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 780 A.2d 809, 814 n. 5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (citation omitted). Title to paper streets is governed by 8 Pa.C.S.A. § 1724. As the Commonwealth Court has recently stated: It is evident, from a plain reading of the statute, that Section 1724 of the Borough Code sets forth two different procedures for quieting title to an unopened paper street, based on the length of time that has passed since the street was first laid out. Subsection (a) provides that after 10 or more years have passed, a landowner whose property abuts an unopened street and who owns at least 50% of the frontage thereof may petition the Borough to cancel the unopened street. However, subsection (b) – which the Borough completely omits from its appellate brief – provides that after 21 years have passed, the Borough must receive the consent of a majority of the adjacent landowners to open a previously laid out street. Importantly, unlike subsection (a), subsection (b) does not require an adjacent landowner to file a petition with the Borough. In other words, under subsection (b), the Borough effectively forfeits its right to open a previously laid out street to the public after 21 years have passed, unless it obtains the consent of 51% of the adjacent landowners. This reading of the statute is also consistent with established Pennsylvania precedent interpreting the Borough Code’s predecessor statutes, which contained substantially similar language as Section 1724(b). [The Commonwealth] Court has -7- J-A18011-26 stated that “[f]ollowing the dedication of a street, there must be an acceptance by the municipality or use by the public within [21] years; otherwise, the land reverts to the abutting landowners.” Pawlowski v. Borough of Barnesboro, 545 A.2d 965, 966 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (emphasis added). “A street becomes public when it is (1) dedicated to public use and (2) accepted by the municipality.” Leininger v. Trapizona, 645 A.2d 437, 440 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). If the street is not accepted within 21 years, “ ‘[t]he land is discharged from such servitude[,] and the dedicated portion of it has entirely lost its character as a public street.’ ” Rahn v. Hess, 106 A.2d 461, 463-64 (Pa. 1954) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).7 After the expiration of 21 years, the only way a borough may open the street is by obtaining the consent of a majority of “the abutting lot owners” who “acquired the fee in the street[ ].” Id. at 464. Kowalczyk v. Borough of Portage, 295 A.3d 752, 2022 WL 4100974, at *3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).1 According to Redman, Vernon Township took the parcel to build a lane in 1924 but subsequently abandoned its plans to do so. Based on the above guidance, the proper course of action for acquiring title to the paper street abutting Redman’s property would be an action to quiet title against the ____________________________________________ 1 Both the Superior Court and the Commonwealth Court have implemented internal operating procedures that allow reliance on unreported decisions filed after a certain date for their persuasive value. See Superior Court I.O.P. 65.37(B) (Superior Court may rely on unpublished memorandum decisions filed after May 2, 2019 for their persuasive value); Commonwealth Court I.O.P. 69.414(a) (Parties may cite to unreported Commonwealth Court panel decisions filed after January 15, 2008 for their persuasive value). This Court is not bound by the decisions of the Commonwealth Court, but “such decisions provide persuasive authority, and we may turn to our colleagues on the Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate.” Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 590 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Instantly, in order to provide clarity on Redman’s attempt to gain title to a paper street, we turn to our Commonwealth Court colleagues for guidance. -8- J-A18011-26 municipality that failed to open the street after its dedication. As that is not the action currently before us, we are constrained to agree, for the above stated reason, that the instant action to quiet title by adverse possession cannot go forward. In her second issue, Redman argues the court erred in denying her request for in forma pauperis status. Our Supreme Court has determined the practical consequence of an order denying in forma pauperis status is to effectively put the party out of court and that, accordingly, such an order falls within the definition of a final order. See Grant v. Blaine, 868 A.2d 400, 403 (Pa. 2005). Accordingly, it expressly held that “an order denying in forma pauperis status is a final, appealable order.” Id. at 402; see also Crosby Square Apartments v. Henson, 666 A.2d 737, 738 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1995) (“An order denying a petition to proceed in forma pauperis is a final, appealable order since the appellant is effectively out of court due to the claimed inability to provide costs and fees necessary to pursue the action in the trial court.”). Here, the court denied Redman’s request for in forma pauperis status, based on “conflicting information” in her petition. Redman filed a response with the court seeking clarification on what information was conflicting. The court did not respond to Redman’s response. In its opinion on appeal, the trial court admits that it did not realize Redman had filed a response, and therefore did not grant Redman a hearing regarding the denial, noting the oversight -9- J-A18011-26 “may have been a procedural error.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/26, at 3. However, the record clearly shows that Redman never appealed the court’s denial of in forma pauperis status, and further, that she paid the costs associated with this matter. Since Redman never filed an appeal from the order denying her in forma pauperis status, the propriety of that determination cannot be entertained in this appeal. We note, “[t]he purpose of granting in forma pauperis status to indigent litigants is to enable them to access the court system without having to pay the costs normally associated with court proceedings. As society grows more litigious and economic resources become more scarce, it is increasingly important that both litigants and courts act responsibly.” Conover v. Mikosky, 609 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa. Super. 1992). While Redman’s issue is effectively moot at this point, we nevertheless caution the trial court to be more careful in the future to stay abreast of important filings, such as Redman’s response to the order denying her in forma pauperis status. Reasoning belatedly that the oversight “may have been a procedural error” is simply not sufficient where there is a possibility that “the practical consequence ... is effectively to put an appellant ‘out of court’.” Grant, 868 A.2d at 403. Nevertheless, Redman did not timely file an appeal from the order denying her in forma pauperis status. - 10 - J-A18011-26 As Redman is due no relief on either of her issues, we affirm the order denying Redman’s petition to acquire title by adverse possession, and dismissing the case. Order affirmed. DATE: 10/20/2026 - 11 -