Full Opinion

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 25-AA-0233 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, et al., PETITIONERS, V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT, and BURNICE STACKHOUSE, INTERVENOR. On Petition for Review of an Order of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services Compensation Review Board (2024-CRB-00052) (Argued June 10, 2026 Decided October 22, 2026) Lucy E. Pittman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Thais- Lyn Trayer, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the briefs, for petitioners. Krista N. DeSmyter, with whom Kevin H. Stillman was on the brief, for intervenor. Benjamin E. Douglas filed a brief on behalf of Teamsters Local 639 as amicus curiae. Before MCLEESE and SHANKER, Associate Judges, and RUIZ, Senior Judge. 2 SHANKER, Associate Judge: When a workplace injury leaves a District of Columbia government employee permanently and totally disabled, the workers’ compensation provisions of the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA) ensure that the employee is duly compensated. These awards take one of two forms: wage-loss awards under D.C. Code § 1-623.05, which provide a percentage of the employee’s wages at the time of injury for as long as the employee remains unable to work, and schedule awards under D.C. Code § 1-623.07, which provide that same percentage of wages for a fixed number of weeks when the disability involves the permanent loss or loss of use of a body part listed in the statutory schedule, regardless of when—or whether—the employee is able to return to work. This appeal tasks the court with resolving an ambiguity as to the compensation available under the CMPA to an employee who is permanently and totally disabled by an injury to a scheduled body part. Specifically, it presents the question whether such an employee may receive a wage-loss award or whether the schedule is exclusive and precludes any other form of compensation. In 1993, Burnice Stackhouse injured his right ankle when he stepped into an uncovered sewer drain while working as a sanitation worker for the District of Columbia. He applied for and received temporary disability benefits from the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Program. In 2020, after Mr. Stackhouse was informed that his temporary benefits were going to expire, he filed 3 for a hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to determine whether he had a permanent disability warranting a permanent disability award under the public sector workers’ compensation regime. After reviewing medical evidence and testimony, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a compensation order awarding Mr. Stackhouse a schedule award under D.C. Code § 1-623.07(c)(4) for a 20% impairment of Mr. Stackhouse’s right ankle. The Compensation Review Board (CRB) reversed and remanded with instructions to apply a wage-earning capacity test to determine Mr. Stackhouse’s compensation rather than using the schedule. The OAH ultimately awarded Mr. Stackhouse a wage-loss award under D.C. Code § 1-623.05(a), which the CRB affirmed. The Office of Risk Management (ORM) and Department of Public Works (DPW) then timely petitioned this court for review, requesting that we reverse with instructions for the CRB to reinstate the ALJ’s initial compensation order. We vacate the order of the CRB and remand for the ALJ to determine whether Mr. Stackhouse is statutorily eligible for a wage-loss award consistent with this opinion. 4 I. Factual and Procedural History A. Mr. Stackhouse’s Injury and Subsequent Claims for Disability Benefits In 1990, Mr. Stackhouse was hired by the DPW as a sanitation worker assigned to a garbage truck. In 1993, while he was on the job, Mr. Stackhouse stepped away from his truck for a restroom stop at a McDonald’s. On his way out, he tripped on an uncovered drain, injuring his right ankle and lower back. Unable to work due to these injuries, Mr. Stackhouse filed a workers’ compensation claim and, as relevant here, was awarded temporary total disability benefits. 1 These temporary benefits were paid on-and-off over the following years for reasons that do not require discussion here. In 2020, the ORM notified Mr. Stackhouse that he was approaching the 500- week statutory cap on temporary disability benefits. 2 The notice explained that while he would no longer be eligible for temporary benefits once he reached the cap, he 1 As explained further below, these benefits were “equal to 66 2/3 percent” of Mr. Stackhouse’s monthly pay. D.C. Code §§ 1-623.05(a), 1-623.14(c). 2 For claimants like Mr. Stackhouse who were already receiving benefits when the Council added the 500-week cap, ORM started the clock for temporary benefits on September 24, 2011. D.C. Code § 1-623.06(a) (500-week cap “shall apply one year after September 24, 2010”). 5 could seek a hearing before the OAH to determine whether he had a permanent disability that might entitle him to further benefits. The OAH held that hearing in early 2022. Mr. Stackhouse testified that he experienced “throbbing pain” in his right ankle; arthritis and pain in his left ankle and both knees; and “constant,” “often severe,” back pain. Mr. Stackhouse argued that he was entitled to a permanent total disability award because these complaints were the “direct[ ] and natural[ ]” result of his 1993 workplace injury to his right foot and that the combined effect of these impairments resulted in “total wage loss.” The parties submitted several medical evaluations and reports, and the OAH heard testimony from Mr. Stackhouse, an ORM supervisor, and several physicians. This evidence conflicted on two points: (1) whether Mr. Stackhouse’s complaints at the time, which he claimed prevented him from returning to full duty as a sanitation worker, were caused by the original workplace injury, and (2) the degree of his impairment. The evidence submitted by ORM reflected the consistent view of multiple physicians over nearly two decades that Mr. Stackhouse’s complaints were not causally related to the original workplace injury and attributed his ongoing problems instead to aging, obesity, and independent degenerative processes. All told, the evidence and testimony ORM presented reflected a consensus that the original 6 workplace injury had resolved and that any current impairment or restrictions on Mr. Stackhouse’s ability to return to work stemmed from unrelated causes. Mr. Stackhouse, by contrast, offered evidence from his treating physicians supporting a causal chain running from the original ankle injury to his broader physical decline, reasoning that the workplace injury altered his gait and shifted stress onto other joints and his spine, producing the arthritis and disability he was complaining about. The parties’ medical evidence was similarly divided on the appropriate impairment rating, with four physicians offering ratings at different points over an eighteen-year span that varied widely in both the overall percentage of impairment and the portion attributable to the workplace injury versus preexisting or unrelated conditions. B. The First Compensation Order In 2022, after weighing the evidence presented at the hearing, the ALJ issued a compensation order determining that Mr. Stackhouse had proven a permanent disability to his right ankle only, rejecting his claim that his knee, back, and left ankle 7 conditions likewise arose from the original workplace injury and should factor into his qualification for permanent disability benefits. Having found that Mr. Stackhouse had proven a permanent disability to his right ankle, the ALJ turned to the benefits to which he was entitled as a result. The ALJ explained that the CMPA authorizes two types of permanent disability benefits—schedule awards (D.C. Code § 1-623.07) and wage-loss awards (D.C. Code §§ 1-623.05, 1-623.06)—that differ in kind: a schedule award is available when the disability involves a body part listed on the statutory schedule and consists of a lump sum representing a portion of the claimant’s salary (paid out over a fixed period of weeks) regardless of actual wage loss, whereas a wage-loss award is calculated based on the claimant’s actual wage loss and paid out for the duration of the disability. According to the ALJ, the type of award available to a claimant depends on whether the disability is to a scheduled body part: a claimant with a disability limited to a scheduled body part is entitled only to a schedule award, whereas a claimant with disabilities to both scheduled and nonscheduled body parts may recover both types of benefits, but only upon proof that the nonschedule disability caused wage loss. Mr. Stackhouse had sought a wage-loss award, arguing that he was permanently totally disabled and that his right ankle injury directly and naturally led 8 to the left leg and lower back injuries, such that the combination of these injuries resulted in total wage loss. The ALJ rejected this argument, determining instead that Mr. Stackhouse was entitled only to a schedule award, because the right foot is a scheduled body part and he had proven a permanent disability to his right ankle. Although the ALJ acknowledged the impact of Mr. Stackhouse’s degenerative spinal condition on his ability to return to work, they concluded that he was not entitled to an additional wage-loss award because he failed to prove both that his back condition arose from the original workplace injury and that he suffered wage loss attributable to his back condition independent of his right ankle injury. Similarly, the ALJ concluded that while the left ankle and knee are scheduled body parts, Mr. Stackhouse was not entitled to additional schedule awards for those conditions because he had not proven that they arose from the workplace accident. C. Mr. Stackhouse’s Appeal to the Compensation Review Board Mr. Stackhouse appealed to the CRB, arguing that he was entitled to the permanent total disability award he had asked for and not the schedule award that he received. He alleged that the ALJ made two errors in issuing his award: first, concluding that a nonschedule disability, independent of his schedule disability, “had to exist” for him to be “eligible for permanent total disability benefits,” i.e., a wage-loss award; and second, finding that his lower back complaints were unrelated 9 to the workplace injury. The CRB agreed in part with Mr. Stackhouse, reasoning that he was eligible for a wage-loss award notwithstanding his schedule disability because, taking a comprehensive view of Mr. Stackhouse’s disability, he was permanently totally disabled. Accordingly, the CRB vacated and remanded the matter. More specifically, first, the CRB held that OAH applied the “incorrect test for permanent total disability.” The CRB’s core objection was one of fit: Morrison v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs. 736 A.2d 223 (D.C. 1999), and Brown v. D.C. Dep’t Emp. Servs., 83 A.3d 739 (D.C. 2014)—two private-sector cases that the ALJ had relied on—concerned permanent partial disability claims, not a permanent total disability claim like Mr. Stackhouse’s, and thus, in the CRB’s view, were inapposite. Morrison allowed a worker to recover both permanent partial disability (i.e., wage-loss) and schedule-loss benefits for multiple disabilities arising from the same injury. 736 A.2d at 225-26. Brown addressed two separate permanent partial disability claims— one for wage loss and one for a scheduled member—and held that because a worker cannot be more than totally disabled, “awards for permanent partial disability schedule benefits and for permanent partial wage loss benefits are payable consecutively.” 83 A.3d at 756. The CRB reasoned that because the holdings in both cases concerned the “interaction of two permanent partial disability claims sourced in one injury—not permanent total disability claims,” they could not be read to 10 “convincingly support a conclusion that permanent total disability . . . must nonetheless be proven by a non-scheduled disability that, on its own, leads to total disability.” On that basis, the CRB rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Stackhouse could not recover a wage-loss award without first proving a permanent total disability attributable exclusively to a nonscheduled body part (i.e., his back), entirely independent of his schedule disability to his right foot. Having rejected that framework, the CRB settled on a different one: because Mr. Stackhouse’s case concerns permanent total disability, Logan v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 805 A.2d 237 (D.C. 2002), sets forth the governing test. The Logan inquiry asks whether the claimant can, overall, return to work, not whether one or more nonscheduled body parts alone prevent that return. It does not require disregarding how a disabled scheduled body part affects the claimant’s “overall ability to return to work”; total disability is a “comprehensive” assessment of the claimant’s disability, meant to capture the full impact of a workplace accident regardless of which body part was injured. As such, the CRB concluded that the ALJ erred by “siloing the sites of Mr. Stackhouse’s complaints” when resolving his claim for permanent total disability benefits, and it ordered the ALJ to conduct the analysis anew and take the “comprehensive view” of Mr. Stackhouse’s disability required under Logan. Relatedly, the CRB also concluded that the ALJ exceeded their 11 authority by “go[ing] beyond Mr. Stackhouse’s claim for permanent total disability [and] awarding—over his objection—permanent partial schedule loss benefits.” DPW and ORM moved for reconsideration, faulting the CRB both for failing to interpret D.C. Code § 1-623.07 as barring a wage-loss award where the disability is caused by a scheduled body part and for incorrectly concluding that the ALJ erred by considering a schedule loss award that Mr. Stackhouse had not sought and to which he objected. The CRB denied the motion. As relevant here, according to the CRB, “the plain language of D.C. Code § 1-623.07 does not limit a claimant to schedule loss awards when the situs of the disability is to a scheduled body part.” Instead, the CRB reasoned, the statute explains that schedule-loss benefits are available under the CMPA and describes how they interact with other workers’ compensation benefits; “[n]one of the language suggests that schedule loss benefits eliminate or limit an injured workers’ entitlement to [wage-loss] permanent total disability benefits.” The alternative interpretation proposed by DPW and ORM, the CRB concluded, is “so narrow that it actively works against the statute’s goal of facilitating a fair evaluation of a claimant’s disability.” D. The Subsequent Compensation Orders The ALJ issued two additional, revised compensation orders in response to remands by the CRB. We summarize only the relevant determinations made in those 12 orders. In 2023, the ALJ issued a second compensation order, adopting their factual findings from the initial compensation order. Addressing the legal standard for permanent disability awards, the ALJ explained that their prior determination on the exclusivity of the schedule award was based on the language of D.C. Code § 1-623.07, which states that “compensation ‘as provided in the schedule’ should be awarded ‘[i]f there is permanent disability involving the . . . loss of use . . . of a member or function of the body.’” The ALJ noted that they also relied on cases under the private sector Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) holding that “employees are not eligible for wage-loss [benefits] if their injuries are limited to scheduled body parts.” But, recognizing that the “CRB disagreed” with its analysis, the ALJ applied Logan as directed. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Stackhouse had “presented a prima facie case of total disability . . . by proving that he could not return to his original job,” finding persuasive the “evidence that the work-related injury to [Mr. Stackhouse’s] right ankle prevented him from returning to work” while rejecting consideration of Mr. Stackhouse’s impairments to his knees, left ankle, and back because they “did not arise from the [workplace accident].” Under Logan, the ALJ explained, the burden then shifted to ORM and DPW to “prove that suitable work was available to” Mr. Stackhouse. The ALJ found that the agencies failed to carry that burden: although the record contained evidence “that suitable jobs may have 13 been available 15 years” ago, there was “no witness or report to show that appropriate work was presently available.” Accordingly, the ALJ awarded Mr. Stackhouse wage-loss benefits pursuant to D.C. Code § 1-623.05. In 2024, following another remand by the CRB on an issue not pertinent here, the ALJ issued their third and final compensation order, reaffirming their conclusion that Mr. Stackhouse was entitled to a permanent total disability award. In 2025, the CRB issued its final decision, affirming OAH’s wage-loss award. This petition for review followed. II. Analysis DPW argues that the CRB erred when it reversed the ALJ’s decision awarding Mr. Stackhouse permanent disability benefits in the form of a schedule award for a 20% impairment to his right foot. DPW’s argument proceeds along two lines. First, it contends that the plain language of D.C. Code § 1-623.06a empowers an ALJ to issue “any” permanent disability award warranted by a finding of compensable permanent disability, and that the CRB erroneously limited that authority by holding that the ALJ could not issue a schedule award where the claimant sought permanent total disability. This limitation, DPW argues, conflicts with the plain and expansive language of 14 Section 1-623.06—which the CRB failed to consider—and with the CMPA’s humanitarian purpose, because it leaves a claimant with nothing when he asks for more than he can prove; and, contrary to the CRB’s suggestion, allowing Mr. Stackhouse to prevail on a lesser award raises no due process concerns. Second, DPW contends that because Mr. Stackhouse’s established disability is to a scheduled body part and he proved no other permanent disability, he is “entitled to” only a schedule award. The plain language of Section 1-623.07, DPW says, entitles claimants with schedule disabilities to the compensation the schedule sets forth, and this court’s WCA case law confirms that such a claimant may not instead opt for a wage-loss award. The CRB’s insistence that the ALJ apply the wage-loss test from Logan, DPW asserts, contravenes both the statute’s plain language and this court’s precedent and disregards the critical differences between the private sector WCA (at issue in Logan) and the CMPA. Finally, DPW faults the CRB’s policy rationale—that the ALJ should weigh individualized economic impact—for ignoring that schedule awards already presume wage loss and thus already account for the disability’s economic impact. In response, Mr. Stackhouse first argues that because he sought a wage-loss award, he cannot be awarded anything else. He faults DPW for ignoring the “due process concern” the CRB raised and contends that DPW has failed to explain what 15 authority it had to “require [him] to accept a benefit he [did] not claim entitlement to,” or what gave it “standing to say [he was] seeking that benefit.” Second, Mr. Stackhouse argues that wage-loss benefits are “not the same” as schedule awards, and that he, like other injured workers with schedule disabilities, remain entitled to seek the former. He asserts that nothing in the CMPA or this court’s case law forecloses such a claim, particularly where, as here, his work injury has worsened since he received the schedule award. This recovery, he reasons, is not “double- dipping,” because he would not be receiving the same benefit twice. Amicus supporting Mr. Stackhouse, Teamsters Local 639, makes a similar argument, emphasizing that no authority supports DPW’s position that a worker who suffers a schedule disability can never receive a wage-loss award, especially where, as here, the injury leaves him unable to work in any capacity (for which he is qualified) for life. We agree with Mr. Stackhouse and conclude that the schedule is not exclusive where a claimant with a scheduled disability can prove a permanent total disability. Because we resolve the case on this ground, we do not reach the question whether the ALJ had the authority to issue a schedule award here. 16 A. Standard of Review “We review a decision of the CRB to determine whether the decision is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Perry v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 288 A.3d 300, 303 (D.C. 2023) (quoting Reyes v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 48 A.3d 159, 164 (D.C. 2012)). When reviewing “a decision of the CRB,” this court “cannot ignore” the ALJ’s factual findings. Alston v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 314 A.3d 58, 63-64 (D.C. 2024) (citation modified). “We may not review the factual findings de novo and ‘substitute our view of the facts for that of the ALJ,’ but we ‘will not defer’ to the ALJ’s factual findings if they are not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Reyes, 48 A.3d at 164). “Although our review of agency decisions is deferential, it is by no means toothless. Our principal function in reviewing administrative action is to assure that the agency has given full and reasoned consideration to all material facts and issues.” Id. at 64 (quoting Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 916 A.2d 149, 151 (D.C. 2007)). “This court reviews questions of law—including questions of statutory interpretation—de novo.” D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Reg. Affs. v. A&A Rest. Grp., Inc., 232 A.3d 149, 153 (D.C. 2020) (citing Washington v. D.C. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 954 A.2d 945, 948 (D.C. 2008)). Ordinarily, we “accord[ ] deference to an agency’s 17 interpretation of a statute that the agency administers, unless the interpretation is unreasonable or inconsistent with the statutory language or purpose.” Lecea v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 301 A.3d 734, 738 (D.C. 2023). While we “have often given deference to the CRB’s reasonable interpretations of workers’ compensation statutes” in the past, Perry, 288 A.3d at 303 (citing Howard Univ. Hosp. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 267 A.3d 1068, 1070-71 (D.C. 2022), our more recent decisions “have raised questions about the extent to which the CRB is entitled to deference in its interpretation of workers’ compensation statues,” id.; see, e.g., Lecea, 301 A.3d at 739-40; Frazier v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 229 A.3d 131, 148 (D.C. 2020) (McLeese, J., dissenting) (noting that “under the federal workers’ compensation system, the Supreme Court has indicated that special deference was not owed to the analogue of the CRB” (citing Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 278 n.18 (1980) (PEPCO))). Regardless, we owe no deference, and no remand for further CRB analysis of the statutory language is required, where, as here, there is no “real ambiguity deserving of CRB analysis” and we articulate “the only correct interpretation” of the statute as 18 a matter of law. Young v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 241 A.3d 826, 833 n.25 (D.C. 2020). B. Additional Legal Background Under the workers’ compensation provisions of the CMPA, the District of Columbia government must “pay compensation . . . for the disability . . . of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his or her duty,” absent any applicable exception. D.C. Code § 1-623.02(a). Workers’ compensation benefits typically begin as “temporary,” and are awarded on either a total or partial basis, depending on the employee’s remaining ability to earn wages. Temporary disability benefits. A claimant who can still work but whose wage-earning capacity falls below their pay at the time of their injury receives temporary partial disability benefits. See 7 D.C.M.R. § 199.1 (“Temporary partial disability payment [means] wage-loss compensation payable to a claimant, who has a wage-earning capacity and has not reached maximum medical improvement.”). Compensation for partial benefits is “66 2/3 percent of the difference between [the claimant’s] monthly pay and [their] monthly wage-earning capacity.” D.C. Code § 1-623.06(a). A claimant who is completely unable to work receives temporary total disability benefits. See 7 D.C.M.R. § 199.1 (“Temporary total disability payment [means] wage-loss compensation payable to a claimant, who has a complete loss of 19 wage-earning capacity and has not reached maximum medical improvement.”). Compensation for total disability is “equal to 66 2/3 percent of [a claimant’s] monthly pay.” D.C. Code § 1-623.05(a); see id. § 1-623.14(c) (“monthly pay” is the claimant’s monthly pay at the time of the injury). A claimant’s wage-earning capacity is typically determined by their actual earnings. But if a claimant’s actual earnings do not fairly or reasonably represent their wage-earning capacity, or if they have no actual earnings, their wage-earning capacity is determined based on the following factors set out in Section 1-623.15: (1) The nature of his or her injury; (2) The degree of physical impairment; (3) His or her usual employment; (4) His or her age; (5) His or her qualifications for other employment; (6) The availability of suitable employment; and (7) Other factors or circumstances which may affect his or her wage-earning capacity as a worker with a disability. 20 Id. § 1-623.15(a). 3 In addition to being capped at 500 weeks, id. § 1-623.06a(a), temporary benefits are designed to change as the claimant’s condition changes over time. For example, benefits may be reduced from total to partial, or even terminated altogether, as a claimant increases their wage-earning capacity or returns fully to work. Id. § 1-623.24(d)(3), (4). Before payment of temporary benefits stops at 500 weeks, however, claimants are “entitled to a hearing before an Office of Administrative Hearings judge for purposes of determining whether [they] have a permanent disability.” Id. § 1-623.06a(a). Claimants are entitled to a written decision within thirty days of their hearing detailing any award issued and explaining OAH’s rationale. Id. Permanent disability benefits. Claimants who are completely disabled and adjudged as unable to work on a permanent basis by a qualified physician are entitled to permanent disability benefits. See 7 D.C.M.R. § 199.1. Permanent disability awards fall into two categories: wage-loss awards and schedule awards. Wage-loss awards “involve[ ] compensation for disability to a part of the body not specified in the schedule award list” and are “calculated by reference to the 3 As explained further below, Section 1-623.15 does not apply to schedule disabilities that are governed by Section 1-623.07. D.C. Code § 1-623.15(a). 21 [claimant’s] actual wage loss.” Dent v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 158 A.3d 886, 894 (D.C. 2017). These awards are also subcategorized as either total or partial, using the same wage-earning-capacity distinction described above for temporary benefits. See D.C. Code §§ 1-623.05 (total), -623.06 (partial), -623.15 (wage-earning capacity factors). Schedule awards compensate for permanent disabilities to parts of the body listed in the statutory schedule. Id. § 1-623.07(a). Such disabilities include the loss of use of an arm, leg, eye, or thumb, as well as hearing or vision loss. Id. § 1-623.07(c)(1), (2), (5), (6), (13), (14). Unlike nonschedule awards, see id. § 1-623.15, schedule awards (at least for total loss 4) are not based on evidence of wage loss; instead, “compensation for schedule awards is based on a one-time prospective assessment of economic impact over the life of the injured worker,” Dent, 158 A.3d at 894; see D.C. Code § 1-623.07(a), (c). Also relevant is the private-sector workers’ compensation statute, the WCA, D.C. Code §§ 32-1501 et seq. Enacted in 1980, the WCA “provides benefits for temporary and permanent disability that results from workplace injuries.” Dent, 158 4 “Compensation for permanent partial loss of use of a member may be for proportionate loss of use of the member.” D.C. Code § 1-623.07(c)(19). We do not address here how such proportionate loss is determined. Cf. Dent, 158 A.3d at 894 (interpreting the WCA). 22 A.3d at 894. Like the CMPA, temporary benefits, whether total or partial, are calculated by reference to the claimant’s actual wages. Id. (citing D.C. Code § 32-1508(2), (5)). Claimants may also be entitled to permanent disability benefits, the calculation of which “depends on whether the worker is eligible for one of two types of awards: schedule or non-schedule.” Id. (citing D.C. Code §§ 32-1508(3)(A)-(U) (schedule awards), -1508(3)(V) (nonschedule awards)). Although the WCA’s definitions of schedule and wage-loss (i.e., nonschedule) awards track those in the CMPA, the WCA addresses both types of awards in a single disability compensation provision, whereas the CMPA sets out schedule awards and wage-loss awards in separate provisions. Compare D.C. Code § 32-1508(3)(A)-(U) (defining schedule disabilities and corresponding compensation) and § 32-1508(3)(V) (creating a catch-all for “other cases” falling outside the preceding schedule) with D.C. Code § 1-623.07 (creating the schedule) and D.C. Code §§ 1-623.05, -623.06 (defining nonschedule disabilities, i.e., those entitling employees to a wage-loss award). And, as important to DPW’s argument here, this court has previously held that under the WCA, schedule awards are the exclusive award for a permanent partial disability to a body part on the schedule. See Lenaerts v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 545 A.2d 1234, 1235, 1248 (D.C. 1988) (explaining that, in the context of permanent partial disability, a claimant “who suffers a ‘schedule award’ disability partial in character but permanent in quality” 23 may not “opt to recover [the claimant’s] actual lost wages . . . in lieu of the fixed amount of compensation provided in the act for such disability” (citing PEPCO, 449 U.S. at 283 (explaining the rationale of the exclusivity of the schedule benefits))); see also Morrison, 736 A.2d at 225 (“A worker who suffers a schedule disability, i.e., one for which the statute provides a fixed payment in terms of weeks of compensation, may not opt to recover actual lost wages in lieu of the fixed amount available for such a disability.”). C. Exclusivity of Schedule Awards The question presented by this appeal is whether a claimant who proves permanent total disability, where the situs of that disability happens to be a scheduled member, can receive wage-loss benefits under Section 1-623.05, or whether the mere availability of a schedule award necessarily forecloses a wage-loss award. We have not previously resolved this question. Our closest precedents address only the 24 WCA and concern claims for permanent partial, not permanent total, disability.5 With no controlling authority directly on point, we turn to the statute itself. “When deciding issues of statutory interpretation, we first look to see whether the statutory language at issue is plain and admits of no more than one meaning.” D.C. Ret. Bd. v. Off. of Emp. Appeals, 352 A.3d 1214, 1219 (D.C. 2026) (citation modified) (quoting In re Macklin, 286 A.3d 547, 553 (D.C. 2022)). Because “[s]tatutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor,” we refrain from reading “statutory words in isolation” as “the language of surrounding and related paragraphs may be instrumental to understanding them.” Id. “Generally, we will give effect to the plain meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous and does not produce an absurd result, although the plain meaning may not be controlling when there is a 5 The distinction between total and partial disability is important. An employee who is totally disabled (whether temporarily or permanently) has a “complete loss of wage earning capacity,” see 7 D.C.M.R. § 199.1, while an employee who is partially disabled (whether temporarily or permanently) is still capable of earning some amount of wages, compare D.C. Code § 1-623.06 (benefits equal a claimant’s “monthly monetary compensation equal to 66 2/3 percent of the difference between his or her monthly pay and his or her monthly wage-earning capacity after the beginning of the partial disability”) with § 1-623.05 (benefits equal a claimant’s “monthly monetary compensation equal to 66 2/3 percent of the difference between his or her monthly pay”). See also id. § 1-623.24(4)(C) (explaining that “an award for compensation may not be modified because of a change to the claimant’s condition” except in certain instances, including when that condition “has changed from a total disability to a partial disability”). 25 clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary.” Id. (citation modified) (citing Yazam, Inc. v. D.C. Dep’t of For-Hire Vehicles, 310 A.3d 616, 623 (D.C. 2024)). Section 1-623.05(a) provides that, “[i]f the disability is total . . . the District government shall pay the employee during the disability monthly monetary compensation equal to 66 2/3 percent of his or her monthly pay.” “Total disability” is an economic concept—“a claimant suffers from total disability if his injuries prevent him from engaging in the only type of gainful employment for which he is qualified,” Logan, 805 A.2d at 241 (emphasis omitted)—and can be either temporary, see 7 D.C.M.R. § 199.1, or permanent, see D.C. Code § 1-623.05(b) (creating a prima facie standard of permanent total disability); see also Logan, 805 A.2d at 241 (“A disability is permanent if it has continued for a lengthy period, and it appears to be of lasting or indefinite duration, as distinguished from one in which recovery merely awaits a normal healing period.” (citation modified)). Under Section 1-623.05(a), once a claimant has established that they are totally disabled, the District must pay the claimant the compensation set forth in the statute for the duration of the disability. Compare this with Section 1-623.07(a), which provides that “[i]f there is a permanent disability involving the loss, or loss of use, of a member or function of the body or disfigurement, the employee is entitled to basic compensation for the disability, as provided by the schedule . . . at the rate 26 of 66 2/3 percent of his or her monthly pay.” Although both provisions include variations of mandatory language, rather than being in tension with one another, these provisions can be read in harmony as internally consistent. Section 1-623.05 says that the District government “shall pay,” indicating that this is a duty that the government has under the statute. See Parrish v. District of Columbia, 718 A.2d 133, 136 (D.C. 1998) (“It is well established that the word ‘shall’ is ‘a term which creates a duty, not an option.’” (quoting Riggs Nat’l Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1257 (D.C. 1990))); see also Leonard v. District of Columbia, 801 A.2d 82, 84-85 (D.C. 2002) (“[T]he normal rule is that verbs such as ‘must’ or ‘shall’ denote mandatory requirements . . . unless such construction is inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute.” (citation modified)). Section 1-623.07 says that the claimant is “entitled to” a schedule award, suggesting that the claimant has the right to a schedule award, but not an obligation to accept one. Put another way, one provision uses restrictive mandatory language requiring the District to do something, and the other uses rights-granting language allowing an injured worker to obtain something else. DPW’s counterargument that priority must be given to Section 1-623.07 as the more specific of the two provisions thus runs contrary to the plain meaning of 27 the statutory text. According to DPW, Section 1-623.05 is a general provision governing total disability (both temporary and permanent) while Section 1-623.07 applies to a narrow subset of permanent disabilities and prescribes a corresponding compensation schedule. And to the extent that these provisions conflict, DPW contends that Section 1-623.07 must control—meaning that whenever the disability involves a scheduled member, whether total or partial, the claimant can recover only the compensation set forth in the schedule. See District of Columbia v. Gould, 852 A.2d 50, 55 (D.C. 2004) (explaining that in the event of conflict between provisions, “the more specific statute governs the more general one” (quoting George Wash. Univ. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 831 A.2d 921, 943 (D.C. 2003))). We do not agree. Rather than clearly demonstrating that Section 1-623.07 must govern, DPW’s proposed reading creates confusion and manufactures tension between otherwise harmoniou