Full Opinion

Elham Amini-Nejad, et al. v. Ellahe Amini-Nejad, No. 857, September Term, 2025. Opinion by Graeff, J. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH EXPECTED INHERITANCE — BURDEN OF PROOF — PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE — JURY INSTRUCTIONS The Supreme Court of Maryland first recognized the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance in Barclay v. Castruccio, 469 Md. 368 (2020). It was not necessary to determine the burden of proof to prevail on such a claim in that case. In this case, we hold that the burden of proof for a claim of intentional interference with an inheritance is preponderance of the evidence. The circuit court erred in instructing the jury that appellants had to prove their claim by clear and convincing evidence. The erroneous jury instruction imposed upon appellants a higher burden of proof than the law requires, and we cannot determine if the jury may have reached a different result if it had been told to apply the proper burden of proof. The instruction was prejudicial and warrants reversal of the judgment. Circuit Court for Howard County Case No. C-13-CV-24-000064 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 857 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ ELHAM AMINI-NEJAD, ET AL. v. ELLAHE AMINI-NEJAD ______________________________________ Graeff, Nazarian, Wright, Alexander, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Graeff, J. ______________________________________ Filed: October 28, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.10.28 '00'04- 15:35:31 Gregory Hilton, Clerk This case arises from a dispute between sisters regarding testamentary documents in the name of their father, Seyedkazem Amini-Nejad (“Decedent”). Elham Amini-Nejad and Eman Amini-Nejad, appellants, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Howard County, requesting that Decedent’s trust be voided and Ellahe Amini-Nejad, appellee, compensate them for interference with their expected inheritance of Decedent’s estate. After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee. It determined that appellants had a reasonable expectation of receiving an inheritance, but it found that appellee did not intentionally interfere with that reasonable expectation by engaging in wrongful conduct with the purpose of interfering with that expectation. On appeal, appellants present the following questions for this Court’s review, which we have rephrased slightly, as follows: 1. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that appellants were required to prove their claim for intentional interference with an expected inheritance by clear and convincing evidence? 2. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in admitting the remote deposition testimony of Kooresh Sobhani, the attorney who drafted the trust? 3. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in excluding appellants’ handwriting expert? For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Decedent spent most of his life in Iran. He owned a shipping company with two partners, and he traveled to the United States to visit his family and obtain medical treatment. Decedent had three daughters, all of whom lived in the United States. In March 2019, Decedent was in the United States for a visit. Appellee testified that Decedent asked her to make an appointment with Mr. Kooresh Sobhani, Decedent’s attorney, for estate planning. On March 22, 2019, Decedent executed a Last Will and Testament (the “Will”). The Will stated: “I hereby bequeath and devise all my cash, liquid assets, interests, stocks, shares, bank accounts, life insurance policies, and my retirement benefits from any prior employer, provider or source, and interest to, my eldest daughter, Ms. Ellahe Amini- Nejad.” Appellee was the only one of the three sisters that Decedent provided for in the Will. Decedent named appellee as the Will’s “Executrix/Personal Representative.” On March 22, 2019, the same day Decedent executed the Will, Decedent executed a Declaration of Irrevocable Trust titled “Chilren of Glenelg.” On March 26, 2019, the Decedent executed another Declaration of Irrevocable Trust titled “S.K. Amini’s Trust of Maryland” (the “Trust”). The only notable change from the “Chilren of Glenelg” trust to the Trust, in addition to the name, was the addition of language granting appellee, the Trust’s Trustee,1 the ability to name a substitute Trustee if she was unable or unwilling to perform as Trustee. Decedent transferred $3,199,794 from the “Chilren of Glenelg” trust account to the S.K. Amini Maryland Trust account. Appellee was the only beneficiary named in the Trust. The Trust did not mention appellants. The Trust listed multiple assets of the Trust, including: all bank accounts, 1 Appellee was listed as the primary and only trustee in both the “Chilren of Glenelg” trust and the “S.K. Amini’s Trust of Maryland” trust. 2 stocks, bonds, accounts receivable, business assets, real estate, motor vehicles, personal property, and assets of any kind wherever located. In August 2021, Decedent transferred the deed of the family home in Tehran, Iran, to his three daughters. On May 23, 2023, at the age of 95, Decedent died. Appellants and appellee travelled to Iran for his funeral. They stayed at Decedent’s residence and searched for Decedent’s personal documents. Eman found a folder, containing a will, trust, power of attorney, bank documents, and emails, and she gave it to Elham.2 When Elham reviewed the Will, it had a piece of paper attached to it with words written in Farsi.3 She recognized the handwriting as appellee’s handwriting. The note stated: “The will, while living and in the presence of three children, and must be in accordance to the law, inheritance and so on. Again, according to the available documents, Ellahe Amini-Nejad will be responsible for these affairs in every respect with the heirs and so on.”4 Elham also found a document titled “Trustee’s Acceptance of the Trust Appointment,” with a note written in Farsi in appellee’s handwriting on top. The note stated: “Duly authorized representative is Ellahe Amini-Nejad in every respect who has accepted this responsibility. The name of the trust has been changed to S.K. Amini Trust 2 Because appellants and appellee have the same last name, we refer to the parties by their first name. In doing so, we mean no disrespect. Farsi is “the modern Persian language that is the official language of Iran.” Farsi, 3 New Oxford Dictionary 628 (3d ed. 2010). 4 The court admitted a certified English translation of the note written in Farsi. 3 of Maryland.”5 The folder also contained a “Declaration of Irrevocable Trust” for S.K. Amini’s Trust of Maryland, with a handwritten Farsi note attached. In English, the note read “The regulations for doing all affairs (both enter and exit) must be done. The name of the trust has been changed to S.K. Amini Trust of Maryland.” On January 24, 2024, appellants filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Howard County. They alleged that Decedent’s trust was void ab initio due to appellee’s fraud and undue influence on Decedent, that appellee interfered with appellants’ right to inherit from Decedent’s estate, and that appellee exploited Decedent in violation of Maryland’s Statute Against Financial Exploitation (SAFE) Act by intentionally converting Decedent’s assets for appellee’s sole benefit. That same day, the court issued a scheduling order assigning the case to the expedited track. The parties were required to identify their experts, with the substance of their opinions, by June 23, 2024. The court ordered that discovery conclude by August 22, 2024. On June 21, 2024, appellants filed a designation of expert witnesses, identifying Marc Levine, Esq., Rob Lesnevich, and Professional Language Solutions. Regarding Mr. Lesnevich, appellants stated that he would “review and analyze the handwriting on the testamentary documents and other handwritten materials associated” with the case that were created by appellee or Decedent. Appellants noted that Mr. Lesnevich had not yet issued a report, and they would timely amend the designation. 5 The court admitted a certified English translation of the note written in Farsi. 4 On August 9, 2024, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that there was no dispute that Decedent possessed testamentary capacity and was not subject to undue influence, and appellants had no “right” to inherit property from a parent who exercised free choice with respect to his Estate plan. Appellee attached, among other things: (1) an affidavit from Decedent’s doctor stating that Decedent did not have diminished capacity during his medical visits; and (2) an affidavit from Mr. Sobhani, the attorney who drafted Decedent’s will. In his affidavit, Mr. Sobhani stated that he “provided legal estate planning services” for Decedent, and he believed the Will and Trust were created based on Decedent’s own intent and wishes. Mr. Sobhani stated that he believed Decedent had the requisite legal capacity to execute the Will and Trust, Decedent knew of the contents of the Estate Plan, he spoke to Decedent both in Farsi and English in their discussions of the Estate Plan, he met with Decedent alone “several times” throughout the estate planning services, Decedent signed the Estate Plan freely and voluntarily in the presence of Mr. Sobhani and two witnesses, he believed Decedent was not “susceptible to the influence” of appellee or others, and Decedent’s intentions to grant his property to only appellee seemed “deliberate and clear.” He stated that there were no “material changes” from the first trust to the second trust, and the main purpose of the creation of the second trust was to change the name. On April 29, 2025, the court denied the motion. It found that the case presented a genuine dispute of material fact as to the capacity of Decedent and the issue of undue influence. 5 On August 22, 2024, appellants filed a motion to extend discovery, alleging that appellee had failed to produce bank statements needed to show that she used money belonging to Decedent during his lifetime, and they needed to depose Mr. Sobhani, who recently had been added as a witness for appellee. Appellee filed a response in opposition to the appellants’ motion to extend discovery, arguing that appellants delayed in executing a confidentiality agreement to protect the sensitive financial records appellants requested, and appellee had earlier made clear to appellants that Mr. Sobhani would be a material witness. On September 6, 2024, the court denied appellants’ motion to extend discovery. On March 21, 2025, appellee filed a motion for remote appearance of Mr. Sobhani for trial, stating that Mr. Sobhani was domiciled in Florida, and he had a preplanned visit from an immediate out-of-state family member during the week of trial. Appellee noted that appellants opposed Mr. Sobhani being permitted to testify remotely. In appellants’ opposition to the motion, appellants alleged that Mr. Sobhani displayed evasive behavior when their counsel spoke with him prior to the filing of the complaint, and they had attempted to depose him, but they could not obtain service at his listed place of employment in Virginia. They argued that appellee did not list Mr. Sobhani as a witness until August 9, 2024, which was close to the discovery deadline of August 22, 2024. They were willing to work with opposing counsel to have Mr. Sobhani scheduled for a particular time to testify. 6 On March 28, 2025, a judge denied appellee’s motions.6 That same day, March 28, 2025, appellees transmitted a Notice of Videotaped Deposition De Bene Esse of Mr. Sobhani.7 On April 4, 2025, appellants filed a motion to strike the notice regarding Mr. Sobhani’s de bene esse deposition, alleging that Mr. Sobhani had “been (at best) squirrely,” and his behavior “should not be rewarded with the convenience of remotely testifying.” Appellants argued that appellee was “attempting to skirt the rules of evidence to have Mr. Sobhani’s testimony presented at” trial, noting that the notice was filed approximately five hours after the court denied appellee’s motion to permit Mr. Sobhani to testify remotely. On April 11, 2025, appellee filed an opposition to appellants’ motion to strike. She alleged that appellants were on notice that appellee intended to call Mr. Sobhani as a witness because it was discussed during appellee’s deposition on June 11, 2024.8 A judge, different from the trial judge, issued an order granting the motion to strike the deposition. The date on the order is April 26, 2025, but it was not entered until May 2, 2025, after the trial court heard argument on the issue and granted the motion to allow the deposition to be admitted at trial. 6 This was not the judge who presided over the trial. 7 “De bene esse is defined: ‘[a]s conditionally allowed for the present; in anticipation of a future need.’” Shannon v. Fusco, 438 Md. 24, 34 n.14 (2014) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 430 (8th ed. 2009)). 8 Appellee stated at her deposition that Mr. Sobhani was a prime witness, and it was an oversight not to name him as a witness, but she did not need to name him because appellants were “going to probably bring him in.” 7 I. Trial The court held a four-day jury trial, beginning on April 29, 2025. A. De Bene Esse Deposition At the beginning of trial, the court noted that there was an outstanding issue regarding a de bene esse deposition.9 Counsel for appellants argued that appellee’s notice for a de bene esse deposition was an attempt to allow remote testimony, which the court had previously denied in March 2025, and it was a “non-request to extend discovery,” which was denied in 2024. Counsel noted that the de bene esse deposition was completed remotely, and Maryland Rule 2-418 required either the consent of both parties or an order of the court, neither of which occurred. Counsel also alleged that appellee changed the date of Mr. Sobhani’s deposition without inquiring regarding appellants’ availability and proceeded to complete the deposition when appellants were not available. Counsel for appellee argued that the case involved exceptional circumstances and the deposition was admissible pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(3)(e).10 Mr. Sobhani 9 It appears that neither the court nor the parties were aware of the order by a different judge on the issue, presumably because it was not entered on the docket until May 2, 2025. 10 Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(3) provides: (3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose against any other party who was present or represented 8 was in Florida, more than 1,000 miles away, and counsel argued that there was no way to procure Mr. Sobhani’s appearance by subpoena. Although appellee did not supplement her answers to interrogatories until near the end of discovery, she stated in her deposition, taken in June 2024, that Mr. Sobhani was a key witness in the case. Appellee argued that the de bene esse deposition was “an attempt to preserve testimony for a witness that’s crucial, really, to the [appellants’] case . . . [because] [t]his is a case where the [appellants] have to set aside a document that’s facially presumed valid until they meet their burden of proof.” Counsel stated that, on March 28, 2025, he sent an email to counsel for appellants, stating that Mr. Sobhani’s deposition was tentatively set for April 23, 2025, but he would work with opposing counsel on a date. He did not receive a response. On April 22, counsel advised appellants that the remote deposition de bene esse would commence on April 24 at 1:00. A couple of minutes later, counsel for appellants responded that they did not consent to a remote deposition, and the court denied a remote proceeding for trial, so they would not attend the deposition. The court ruled that Mr. Sobhani’s de bene esse deposition could be presented to the jury. It found that appellants’ counsel was on notice of the date and time of the at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, if the court finds: * * * (E) upon motion and reasonable notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used. 9 deposition, and they had the opportunity to attend, but they chose not to for strategic reasons. The court noted, however, that counsel still had the opportunity to make specific objections to the content of portions of the deposition. B. Testimony of the Sisters Each of the three sisters testified. We discuss each sister’s testimony in turn. 1. Ellahe Appellee was the oldest of the three sisters. When Decedent would visit appellee, she made medical appointments for him. Appellee also assisted Decedent with some financial matters. Decedent created a trust during his lifetime, with the help of his lawyer, Mr. Sobhani. Appellee drove Decedent to Mr. Sobhani’s office in Virginia in March 2019. Appellee did not know what Decedent intended to do in his meetings with Mr. Sobhani, and she did not learn of Decedent’s intentions until sometime after the first meeting. Appellee described herself as “only a vehicle for transportation to and from the lawyer of his choosing.” Appellee was present at some of the meetings, for exchanges of pleasantries. She was present at the March 22, 2019, meeting at which she wrote her address on the “Chilren of Glenelg” trust document. Appellee identified the signature on page 15 of the trust titled “S.K. Amini’s Trust of Maryland,” dated March 26, 2019, as Decedent’s signature. Appellee testified that she 10 did not take any action as trustee for the trust during Decedent’s lifetime without discussing the action with him. 2. Elham Elham testified that she was very close with her father, and there had been no issues between them that would lead to disinheritance. All three sisters were involved in taking Decedent to appointments when he visited the United States. Leading up to Decedent’s execution of the testamentary documents that disinherited Elham and Eman, the family met up for normal, happy visits with each other. Elham asserted that Decedent spoke only broken English. Based on her experience with Decedent, he did not have a strong enough understanding of English to read the relevant legal and testamentary documents written in English.11 Elham learned of the will and trusts in May 2023. Neither appellee nor Decedent informed Elham about the will and trust. On May 23, 2023, when Decedent died, all three sisters flew to Iran together. She learned of the will and trusts a few days after Decedent’s burial. The sisters looked for Decedent’s testamentary documents while in Iran, and Eman found a folder of documents, including a will, trust, power of attorney, bank documents, Elham testified that he could not have read the will, power of attorney, medical 11 power of attorney, or other legal documents admitted into evidence. 11 and documents that originated from appellee’s email account.12 Attached to the Will was a note written in Farsi, which Elham was a “hundred percent sure” was written in appellee’s handwriting. Elham also found a document titled “Trustee’s Acceptance of the Trust Appointment,” and she again identified the handwriting on an attached note, written in Farsi, as belonging to appellee. 3. Eman Eman described her relationship with Decedent as “extremely close.” She testified that he cared about unity, the three sisters supporting each other, and he hated division between them. Appellee was in charge of Decedent’s finances. Eman received significant financial support from Decedent, but she was not involved in Decedent’s finances. Eman was also “extremely close” with appellee, as she provided appellee with mental support. She described herself as “like a mother” to appellee’s daughter. Eman observed “serious arguments” between appellee and Decedent on multiple occasions. When the three sisters were in Iran after Decedent’s passing, Eman and appellee argued about Decedent’s money, appellee’s involvement in his finances, and Decedent buying Eman a house. She had a conversation with appellee about stopping Decedent from buying a house for Eman. Appellee told Eman that Eman did not “deserve anything good in life.” The emails originating from appellee’s email account were regarding transfers of 12 money from banks. 12 C. Handwriting Expert On the second day of trial, appellants attempted to call Rob Lesnevich as a witness. Appellee’s counsel objected, noting that he received Mr. Lesnevich’s report, which was dated September 5, 2024, within the last week.13 Counsel stated that the scheduling order required the identification of the substance of an expert’s findings, as well as the production of any reports, by June 23, 2024. Although appellants noted Mr. Lesnevich as a handwriting expert in June 2024, they failed to provide his report in a timely manner. The court sustained the objection based on the scheduling order, stating: Well, I’m not altogether sold on the idea of handwriting experts, period. And I’m not quite certain that if there was a Daubert hearing on that, that he would withstand scrutiny on the issue of handwriting analysis. But the scheduling order clearly says that your designation shall include the subject matter on which he’s expected to testify, the substance of the findings and the opinions which he is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion and the production of any written report by the expert concerning those findings. That would all be due by [June] 23rd of 2024, not April of 2025. Appellants argued that appellee had “to show some level of prejudice” with respect to the late disclosure, and appellee had made no argument in that regard. Counsel for appellants stated that he turned over the report as soon as he received it. In ruling that appellants could not call Mr. Lesnevich as a witness, the court stated: Well, but as a practical matter, you or he, waited to the last possible minute to turn over the report. And that, I find, is prejudicial to the defense, in terms of the time that they then have to respond to the report with an expert of their 13 Appellee also noted concerns regarding whether opinions on handwriting analysis met the Daubert standard. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020). 13 own and/or have an expert of their own review the report. I find that it is prejudicial and I find that it’s not in compliance with the scheduling order. And I sustain the objection. It’s also -- they could have asked for a Daubert hearing on the reliability of the factual basis, and the whole idea of this handwriting analysis issue is marginal. * * * It’s marginal anyway in terms of somebody’s ability to analyze handwriting. I’ve always been a bit of a skeptic. But my problem with it is that this late disclosure of the report violates the scheduling order, and I sustain the objection. D. Defense Witnesses Appellee called several witnesses on her behalf. Those witnesses included Dr. Bahador Momeni, Mr. Richard Abraham, and Mr. Sobhani. Dr. Bahador Momeni, Decedent’s doctor, testified that, in March 2019, when he signed the testamentary documents, he had no concern about Decedent’s capacity. Appellee also played Mr. Sobhani’s de bene esse deposition over appellants’ objection. The court noted appellants’ objection and allowed the deposition to be played for the jury. Mr. Sobhani testified that he began providing estate planning services to Decedent in early 2019. Mr. Sobhani estimated that he met with Decedent for estate planning purposes approximately five to six times. Based on his interactions with Decedent, Mr. Sobhani believed that Decedent had the capacity to execute testamentary documents. Mr. Sobhani ensured that Decedent understood the testamentary documents by 14 speaking to him in both Farsi and English, interchangeably.14 Mr. Sobhani believed Decedent understood the nature and objects of his bounty due to the specificity with which Decedent spoke of the objects of his bounty. Mr. Sobhani believed Decedent possessed the requisite capacity to sign a will and trust as of March 22 and 26, 2019. Decedent informed Mr. Sobhani that he had three daughters, and he specified that his eldest daughter, appellee, would be the sole beneficiary and executor of the will and trust.15 Decedent chose to designate appellee as the sole beneficiary and executor of the will and trust because he trusted her judgment. Mr. Sobhani met with Decedent both alone and with appellee present at points throughout the estate planning process. When appellee was present at meetings, it was per Decedent’s express request. Appellee did not interfere with Decedent’s meetings with Mr. Sobhani. Mr. Sobhani did not have any concerns regarding undue influence on Decedent from any third party, including appellee, because Decedent was clear, competent, and alert in his conversations with Mr. Sobhani.16 Mr. Sobhani also did not believe Decedent was acting under duress, noting that what Decedent told Mr. Sobhani alone in his office did not 14 Mr. Sobhani testified that he speaks both English and Farsi fluently, and he has represented many clients who speak Farsi. Mr. Sobhani testified that appellee did not translate the testamentary documents from English to Farsi at the time of execution. 15 Mr. Sobhani testified that Decedent stated he was not “close” with his other two daughters, and he expressed uncertainty about their involvement in his personal affairs. Mr. Sobhani also asserted that appellee was never allowed to assist in drafting 16 Decedent’s testamentary documents. 15 differ from what Decedent said in front of others or the language he ultimately included when he executed the testamentary documents. Mr. Richard Abraham, an attorney whose practice includes estate planning, testified as an expert witness in estate planning practice, procedure, and interpretation. Mr. Abraham testified that, in his opinion, Decedent’s estate planning documents were not procured by appellee’s undue influence, and Decedent did not act under duress in executing the documents. He testified that Mr. Sobhani’s testimony, as the drafting attorney, was “extremely valuable” in forming his opinion regarding undue influence. E. Jury Instructions/Verdict At the close of the evidence, the court and counsel discussed proposed jury instructions. The court then instructed the jury. Relevant to this case, it gave the following instruction: Ladies and gentlemen, the [appellants] have asserted the claim of fraud in this case. A party who contends fraud on the part of another has the burden of proving the claim by clear and convincing evidence. This burden of proof requires more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To be clear and convincing, evidence should be clear in the sense that it is certain, plain to the understanding, and unambiguous, and convincing in the sense that it is so reasonable and persuasive as to cause you to believe it. At the conclusion of the instructions, in response to the court’s question whether there were any objections to the instructions, counsel for appellants stated: “Just what we mentioned in chambers, the objection about removing the preponderance of the evidence instruction.” The court then asked if there were any other instructions that the parties 16 wanted the court to give, “other than preponderance” that appellee requested. The parties responded in the negative. At 10:49 a.m., the jury began deliberations. By 2:43 p.m., the jury had a verdict.17 The jury found that appellants had a reasonable expectation of receiving an inheritance, but that appellee did not intentionally interfere with that reasonable expectation by engaging in wrongful conduct with the purpose of interfering with the expectation. II. Post-Trial Motions On May 9, 2025, appellants filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that Mr. Sobhani’s de bene esse deposition was admitted because of a clerical mistake or irregularity, noting that an order granting their motion to strike the deposition was entered on the same day the judgment was entered. They argued that, because the deposition should have been excluded, “the matter should be considered a mistrial.” In her opposition, appellee argued that the trial judge was in a better position than the “motions judge to assess the admissibility of evidence because of trial events that have occurred since the motions judge made his or her ruling.” Appellee noted that the trial judge heard appellants’ case-in-chief, the first two witnesses for the defense, and arguments 17 Although the complaint raised three counts, and the parties’ proposed verdict sheets included questions about all three counts, i.e., undue influence or fraud, intentional interference of an inheritance, and violations of the SAFE ACT, the final verdict sheet limited the questions to ones regarding intentional interference of an inheritance. The record does not reflect why the other two counts were not sent to the jury. It appears that some proceedings, such as the discussion regarding proposed jury instructions, took place in chambers, not on the record. 17 from each party before it ultimately admitted the deposition into evidence. Appellee requested the court to strike the May 2, 2025 order. On June 2, 2025, the court denied appellants’ motion for a new trial. It granted appellee’s motion to strike the May 2, 2025 order. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION Appellants contend that the circuit court erred by instructing the jury that they had to prove their claim of intentional interference with an expected inheritance by clear and convincing evidence. They argue that this was a higher burden of proof than the actual standard applicable, i.e., preponderance of the evidence. Appellants assert that civil claims involving a loss of money require proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and the instruction forcing them to meet a higher evidentiary burden than required unfairly prejudiced them as a matter of law. Appellee contends that the circuit court properly instructed the jury that appellants were required to prove their claim of intentional interference with an expected inheritance by clear and convincing evidence because the wrongful conduct that appellants sought to prove was “[a]ppellee’s deceit or fraud towards the Decedent.” Appellee asserts that claims seeking damages for fraud or deceit must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Appellee additionally argues that, even if the court erred in its instruction, appellants failed to show prejudice. She asserts that appellants “cannot show that the verdict turned on the burden of proof rather than on credibility determinations and weight of the evidence.” 18 I. Standard of Review “The court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding.” Md. Rule 4-325(c). When we review a circuit court’s grant or denial of a requested jury instruction, we typically apply the abuse of discretion standard. Woolridge v. Abrishami, 233 Md. App. 278, 305, cert. denied, 456 Md. 96 (2017). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider: “(1) whether the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law; (2) whether it was applicable under the facts of the case; and (3) whether it was fairly covered in the instructions actually given.” Id. (quoting Keller v. Serio, 437 Md. 277, 283 (2014)). Here, the question is whether the instruction was a correct statement of the law. For that specific inquiry, the proper standard of proof is a question of law, which we review de novo. Howling v. State, 478 Md. 472, 493, cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 428 (2022); Hayes v. State, 247 Md. App. 252, 288 (2020). II. Intentional Inference with Expected Inheritance The Supreme Court of Maryland first recognized the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance in Barclay v. Castruccio, 469 Md. 368, 374-76, 390 (2020). In Barclay, the Court adopted the standard set forth in Section 19 of the Third Restatement of Torts, as follows: 19 (1) A defendant is subject to liability for interference with an inheritance or gift if: (a) the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of receiving an inheritance or gift; (b) the defendant committed an intentional and independent legal wrong; (c) the defendant’s purpose was to interfere with the plaintiff’s expectancy; (d) the defendant’s conduct caused the expectancy to fail; and (e) the plaintiff suffered injury as a result. (2) A claim under this Section is not available to a plaintiff who had the right to seek a remedy for the same claim in a probate court. Id. at 377, 390. The Court did not discuss in Barclay the burden of proof required to prevail on such a claim. There was no need to reach that issue in Barclay because the Court held that Ms. Barclay failed to include sufficient allegations in her complaint to support such a claim. Id. at 388-90. In determining whether the trial court here properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof, we note that the law recognizes three different standards for proving an allegation: proof by preponderance of the evidence, proof by clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Weisman v. Connors, 76 Md. App. 488, 502 (1988), cert. denied, 314 Md. 497 (1989). In Maryland, the standard of proof applicable in civil actions typically is preponderance of the evidence. Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 659 (2003). Accord In re Blair by Blair v. Austin, 469 Md. 1, 21 (2020). To prove something by a preponderance of the evidence, a party must prove that “something is more likely so 20 than not so.” Mathis v. Hargrove, 166 Md. App. 286, 310 n.5 (2005) (quoting Coleman v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Police Dep’t, 369 Md. 108, 127 n.16 (2002)); Weisman, 76 Md. App. at 502. To be sure, some civil cases “require a more exacting standard because of the seriousness of the allegations.” Coleman, 369 Md. at 129 (quoting Everett v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 301 (1986)). The intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence is applicable when the individual interests at stake “are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’” Shurupoff, 372 Md. at 651 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)). For example, when the State seeks to terminate a person’s parental rights to his or her child, the preponderance of the evidence standard is inadequate, but the clear and convincing standard satisfies due process. Id. at 651-53. Simila