AGAPION v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 19-1596 Filed: June 10, 2026 ) BASIL AGAPION, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ) TRIAL OPINION & ORDER This case marks the third set of plaintiffs in this “rails-to-trails” saga that have proceeded to trial seeking just compensation for the value of their property that was taken when a 3.1-mile railroad corridor was converted for public recreational trail use. The government does not dispute that the plaintiffs here collectively own 21 parcels of land adjacent to and underlying the former railroad right-of-way in Greensboro, North Carolina. See United States’ Post-Trial Br., ECF No. 280 at 1. Because liability is undisputed, the Court must determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled to just compensation and, if so, the amount of compensation. See Agapion v. United States, Case No. 19-1596, ECF No. 20 (Agapion); Chapman Spring/Garden v. United States, Case No. 19-1942, ECF No. 11 (Chapman); Goodhue Partners, LLC et al. v. United States, Case No. 21- 87, ECF No. 10 (Goodhue); Mohorn et al. v. United States, Case No. 21-546, ECF No. 12 (Mohorn); Helen C. Wood, LLC et al. v. United States, Case No. 21-2143, ECF No. 17 (Wood); Matthew K. Black et al. v. United States, Case No. 22-10, ECF No. 19 (Black). Plaintiffs seek $10,747,334 in compensation, plus delay damages, attorneys’ fees, and litigation expenses. See Agapion, Pls.’ Post-Trial Br., ECF No. 277 at 13–15. 1 By contrast, the government contends that plaintiffs are owed nothing for the value of their land that was taken to construct public recreational trails. See Agapion, United States’ Pre-Trial Br., ECF No. 195; United States’ Post-Trial Br. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to $8,914,102 in just compensation for the taking of their property. 1 Plaintiffs’ pre-trial submission estimated the total damages as $10,757,218. See Pls.’ Am. Mem. of Contentions of Fact and Law, ECF No. 241-1 at 15, 96. However, plaintiffs’ post-trial brief requests a $10,747,334 in total damages. See Pls.’ Post-Trial Br. at 13–15. The Court resolves the difference in the amount of damages requested by considering the total amount set forth in plaintiffs’ post-trial brief.  I. Background A. The Rail-Banking Program Rails-to-trails cases are governed by the National Trails System Act (“Trails Act”), Pub. L. No. 90-543 § 8(d), 82 Stat. 919, 925 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d)). Under the Trails Act’s rail-banking program, the government may preserve historic railroad corridors for potential reactivation following a railroad company’s decision to abandon the rail line. See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1990) (Preseault I). In the interim, these corridors are converted into recreational trails for the public. Id.; see also 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(2)–(3). To transfer control of the rail corridor, a railroad must notify the federal Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) when it intends to abandon a rail line. See 49 U.S.C. § 10903(a); 49 C.F.R. §§ 1152.20–1152.22. When the railroad notifies the STB of its intent to abandon, a qualified “trail sponsor”—usually a county, city, or qualifying non-profit organization—may notify the STB of its interest in managing the railroad right-of-way for public recreational purposes under the rail-banking program. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a). If the railroad agrees to negotiate transfer of the right-of-way with the prospective trail sponsor, the STB then issues a Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”). Id. § 1152.29(d)(1). A NITU is the governmental action that stays railroad abandonment while a sponsor uses a railroad right-of-way for trail use and blocks the vesting of state reversionary interests in the right-of-way. Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006), holding modified by Hardy v. United States, 965 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). After the STB issues the NITU, the railroad and trail sponsor enter into a negotiated trail- use agreement, which defines the transfer and future operation of the rail corridor for recreational purposes and potential reactivation. Id. The rail-banking process under section 8(d) prevents state property laws that would otherwise take effect upon abandonment—i.e., the extinguishment of the railroad easement for railroad purposes and the reversion of rights of way to abutting landowners— and creates a new easement that is legally distinct from the original easement granted to the railroad. Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1229; Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Preseault II). The new easement lasts in perpetuity or until the trail is no longer used for recreation or rail-line reactivation. Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1234. The federal government’s takings liability for rail-banking transfers under section 8(d) is well-settled. See Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360, 1364 (2020) (citing Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 11-17). If an adjacent landowner owns property underlying the right-of-way in fee simple, the federal government is liable for a taking when it prevents the property owner from asserting its state law reversionary rights once the railroad abandons the easement. Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that the STB’s “issuance of the NITU is the ... government action in the rail-banking process that operates to ... preclude the vesting of state law reversionary interests in the right-of-way,” thus denying the landowners possession of their property unencumbered by the easement). In the classic rails-to-trails case, a “Fifth Amendment taking occurs if the original easement granted to the railroad under state property law is not broad enough to encompass a recreational trail.” Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1552). In 2 many instances, the original easement granted to the railroad was limited to “railroad purposes only.” Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1543–44. If limited to railroad purposes, the original easement would cease to exist under state property laws once the railroad abandons the line and the landowner takes exclusive possession of its fee simple property. See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 8. Under section 8(d)’s rail-banking program, however, federal law prevents extinguishment of the railroad easement when the STB issues the NITU and destroys state law reversionary interests. See Caquelin, 959 F.3d at 1364 (citing Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1525). This is a taking for which the Fifth Amendment requires “just compensation.” Id; Ladd, 630 F.3d at 1025. B. Findings of Fact This case concerns a 3.1 mile stretch of railroad corridor formerly operated by Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) between Milepost CF-65.6 and Milepost CF- 68.7 near downtown Greensboro, North Carolina. See Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 1. The original easement granted to Norfolk Southern was for “railroad purposes” only. See J. Stips. of Facts for Trial, ECF No. 228 ¶ 1. In April 2019, Norfolk Southern agreed to transfer its interest in the railroad to the City of Greensboro (the “City”) as a trail sponsor under section 8(d). See Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. at 79; PX 178. On October 11, 2019, the STB issued a NITU to facilitate the transfer of the easement. See Norfolk Southern Railway Company—Abandonment Exemption—in the City of Greensboro, N.C., 2019 WL 5099688 (S.T.B.) (Oct. 11, 2019); PX 171. Thereafter, the City and Norfolk Southern executed a non-warranty deed transferring the corridor to the City for $8,500,000. See PX 177; J. Stips. of Facts for Trial, ¶ 7. Accompanying the deed was a survey map illustrating the geographic dimensions of the railroad corridor conveyed as 200-feet wide and extending 100-feet from each side of the centerline. See PX 177 Ex. B. at 1626. Norfolk Southern conveyed the entirety of its interests in the corridor to the City. See PX 177–78. The City acquired the railroad corridor to build out an existing network of publicly-owned recreational trails in downtown Greensboro known as the “Downtown Greenway.” See Pls.’ Pre- Trial Mem. ¶ 11. In this trial and related cases, documentary evidence and testimony demonstrates that the City believes it owns the easement described in the survey, acts as though it owns the easement, and the City’s course of conduct after entering the trail-use agreement reflects that understanding. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 15, 17; Agapion v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 761, 774 (2023) (Agapion I); PX 144.1. The 20 plaintiffs here owned property in fee simple that abuts and underlies portions of the 3.1 mile stretch of rail line that was encumbered by the trail use easement in 2019. See Pls.’ Post- Trial Br. at 1–2; United States’ Post-Trial Br. at 1. The parcels of land and the owner of each parcel as of October 11, 2019—the date that the STB issued the NITU—are detailed below: 1. 1007 Battleground Avenue (Parcel No. 4079). This parcel was owned by JESC, LLC on October 11, 2019. See PX 1 at 3; PX 64. The total parcel size is 0.931-acre or 40,554 square feet (“SF”) and is zoned for commercial and multi-family residential uses. Id. at 16, 21– 22. Before the taking, the highest and best use of this property was commercial development as either office or multi-family residential space. Id. The highest and best use after the taking remains 3 the same. Id. at 22. The area of parcel number 4079 encumbered by the trail-use easement is roughly 10,602 SF. Id. at 33; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 34. 2. 2419 Lawndale Drive (Parcel No. 15313). This parcel was owned by GCP Real IV, LLC on October 11, 2019. See PX 2; PX 65. The total parcel size is 2.84-acres or 123,710 SF and is zoned for commercial and multi-family residential uses. PX 2 at 8. The property also contains a one-story commercial building totaling 12,202 SF, which has been utilized as a Golden Corral restaurant. Id.; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 43. Before the taking, the highest and best use of this property was commercial use. PX 2 at 15. After the taking, the highest and best use remains commercial use. Id. at 16. The area of parcel number 15313 encumbered by the trail-use easement is 19,073 SF. Id. at 37; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 45–47. 3. 1621 Battleground Avenue (Parcel No. 12257). This parcel was owned by Guilford Builders Supply Co on October 11, 2019. See PX 3 at 3; PX 36. The total parcel size is 1.77-acres or 77,101 SF and is zoned for commercial use. PX 3 at 17–18. The property supports, among other things, a 11,529 SF multi-tenant retail building, numerous covered areas, canopies, loading platforms, a 2,400 SF equipment shed, and a 50,000 SF of concrete paving. Id.; Pls.’ Pre- Trial Mem. ¶ 54. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was commercial and residential uses. PX 3 at 24. The highest and best use after the taking remains the same. Id. The area of parcel number 12257 encumbered by the trail-use easement is 39,947 SF. Id. at 44–45; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 56–58. 4. 2309 Lawndale Drive (Parcel No. 15151). This parcel was owned by Emily Elizabeth Owen on October 11, 2019. See PX 4 at 3; PX 67; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 64. The total parcel size is 0.22-acre or 9,583 SF and is zoned for single-family residential use. PX 4 at 15, 19. The property contains a two-bed, one-bath single-family residence totaling 966 SF, along with a one-car detached garage. Id. at 17. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was residential use. Id. at 20. After the taking, the highest and best use remains residential use. Id. The area of parcel number 15151 encumbered by the trail-use easement is 3,876 SF. Id. at 29–30. 5. 1705 Battleground Avenue (Parcel No. 12253). This parcel was owned by Goodhue Partners LLC on October 11, 2019. See PX 6 at 7; PX 69; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 75. The total parcel size is 0.39-acre or 16,988 SF and is zoned for commercial and multi-family residential uses. PX 6 at 22, 28. The property contains a single-story building totaling 5,164 SF with a partially completed paved parking lot and a cell tower valued by the County at $112,500. Id. at 22–23. The building has a wood frame with brick siding on a concrete slab with “above average” finishes and currently houses an interior decorator’s offices and showroom. Id. at 23; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 76. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was commercial development. PX 6 at 29. After the taking, the highest and best use remains commercial development. Id. The area of parcel number 12253 encumbered by the trail-use easement is 10,693 SF. Id. at 48; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 78–80. 6. 410 Hillside Drive (Parcel No. 4063). This parcel was owned by William and Dora Nelson on October 11, 2019. See PX 7 at 3. The total parcel size is 0.30-acre or 13,068 SF and is zoned for single-family residential use. Id. at 15–16, 20. The property contains a single-family residence totaling 1,000 SF, which includes a basement, porches, a detached garage, and a 4 driveway. Id. at 15, 17. Before the taking, the highest and best use was low-density, single-family residential use. Id. The highest and best use of the property after the taking remains single-family residential use. Id. at 21. The area of parcel number 4063 encumbered by the trail-use easement is 6,200 SF. Id. at 29; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 89–91. 7. 2311 Lawndale Drive (Parcel No. 15150). This parcel was owned by Darlene R. Stanley on October 11, 2019. See PX 8 at 3. The total parcel size is 0.23-acre or 10,019 SF and is zoned for residential use. Id. at 3, 15–16. The property contains a single-story resident totaling 1,314 SF with three bedrooms, one full bath, a basement, and porches. Id. at 16–17. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was single-family residential use. Id. at 20. After the taking, the highest and best use of the property remains single-family residential use. Id. The area of parcel number 15150 encumbered by the trail-use easement is 3,512 SF. Id. at 29; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 100–02. 8. 414 Hillside Drive (Parcel No. 4065). This parcel was owned by Kenneth Plott and Cynthia Toy on October 11, 2019. See PX 9 at 3. The total parcel size is 0.18-acre or 7,841 SF and is zoned for single-family residential use. Id. at 3, 16. The property contains a single- family residence totaling 1,245 SF, which includes three bedrooms, one full bath, a basement, a driveway, an enclosed porch and wood deck, and a detached garage in the northwest corner of the backyard. Id. at 15, 17. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was single- family residential use. Id. at 21. After the taking, the highest and best use of the property would be low-density, single-family residential development. Id. at 20. The area of parcel number 4065 encumbered by the trail-use easement is roughly 2,750 SF. Id. at 29–30; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 111–13. 9. 2317 Lawndale Drive (Parcel No. 15147). This parcel was owned by H. Wayne and Faye Mohorn on October 11, 2019. See PX 18 at 3. The total parcel size is 0.28-acre or 12,297 SF and is zoned for single-family residential use. Id. at 3, 16; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 120. The property supports a single-story residence totaling 1,470 SF, which includes three bedrooms, one full bath, an enclosed porch, an open porch, an attached storage room, and a driveway. PX 18 at 17. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was residential use. Id. at 20. After the taking, the highest and best use remains residential use. Id. The area of parcel number 15147 encumbered by the trail-use easement is 3,466 SF. Id. at 31–32; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 122–24. 10. 2205 and 2207 Fernwood Drive (Parcel Nos. 15157 and 15143). These abutting parcels were owned by Dr. Robert Tury on October 11, 2019. The size of the parcels and the area of take remain a source of continued confusion with none of the experts correctly calculating the areas. For instance, Mr. Hickerson’s estimates of the area of take and the parcel size of 2207 Fernwood Drive conflict with his own map. DX 6327 at 7, app.B fig. 3. Ms. Straup incorrectly depicts the area of take as wider than the parcel at 2207 Fernwood Drive. PX 258; DX 931 at 5; DX 1879 at 1,8. Dr. Kilpatrick accepts a measurement error in the plat and misinterprets another measurement, thereby inflating the size of the parcels. DX 257 at 8 fig. 6, 17; DX 1879 at 1, 8. Finally, Mr. Kimmel uses multiple, mutually inconsistent estimates. DX 47 at 18–19, 21, 34. 5  Relying on deed descriptions of the parcels and the survey map’s description of the easement width, the Court finds as follows: the parcel sizes of 2205 and 2207 Fernwood Drive are 10,148.25 SF and 10,460.33 SF, respectively. Thus, the total size of the parcels is 20,608.58 SF. The area of take is 10,390.45 SF, and it lies entirely within 2207 Fernwood Drive. Nevertheless, both appraisers correctly assumed that the “larger parcel” consists of both two parcels. PX 257 at 16; DX 47 at 36. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the parcels was to support an office building. After the taking, the highest and best use of the parcels would be commercial development of the remainder property. See PX 257 at 44; DX 47 at 45. 11. 1707-A Battleground Avenue (Parcel No. 12252). This parcel was owned by Mary Anton on October 11, 2019. See PX 19 at 7. The total parcel size is 0.34-acre or 14,810 SF and is zoned for commercial use. Id. at 7, 26. The property supports a retail building totaling 2,608 SF that is used as an auto service garage, along with parking spaces and a paved driveway totaling 6,000 SF. Id. at 20. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was in its “as-is” developed state. Id. at 26–27. After the taking, the highest and best use is commercial re- development. Id. The area of parcel number 12252 encumbered by the trail-use easement is roughly 8,400 SF. Id. at 45; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 144–46. 12. 1707-B Battleground Avenue (Parcel No. 12256). This parcel was also owned by Mary Anton on October 11, 2019. See PX 20 at 7. The total parcel size is 0.22-acre or 9,583 SF and is zoned for commercial use. Id. at 7, 20–21, 25. The property supports a single-story building totaling 1,495 SF that houses a salon called the “Brow Lounge,” which provides manicure and pedicure services. Id. at 20, 22. The property also contains paving and thirteen parking spaces totaling 5,200 SF. Id. at 22; DX 48 at 25. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was commercial development. PX 20 at 26. After the taking, the highest and best use remains the same. Id. at 27. The area of parcel number 12256 encumbered by the trail-use easement is roughly 6,300 SF. Id. at 46–47; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 155–57. 13. 1013 Battleground Avenue (Parcel No. 4072). This parcel was owned by Davenport Energy, Inc. on October 11, 2019. See PX 23 at 7. The total parcel size is 1.22-acres or 53,143 SF and is zoned as “light industrial.” Id. at 7, 20; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 164. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was commercial development. PX 23 at 25. After the taking, the highest and best use remains the same. Id. The area of parcel number 4072 encumbered by the trail-use easement is 36,441.10 SF. Id. at 33; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 166–68. 14. 623 Eugene Court (Parcel No. 1442). This parcel was owned by One Step Further, Inc. on October 11, 2019. See PX 24 at 3, 15; PX 88. The total parcel size is 0.36-acre or 15,682 SF and is zoned as “central business” with a downtown development overlay. PX 24 at 15. The property contains a one-story office building totaling 5,038 SF (along with a parking lot and wooden fence) and houses a not-for-profit entity. Id. at 14, 16. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was Class B office space. Id. at 3, 16, 19. After the take, there is no highest and best use for the parcel as it is “effectively useless” for practical future development. Id. at 41. The area of parcel number 1442 encumbered by the trail-use easement is 17,041 SF. Id. at 39–40; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 175–77. 6  15. 2204 Battleground Avenue (Parcel No. 15300). This parcel was owned by Sam’s Commercial Properties, LLC on October 11, 2019. PX 25 at 7; PX 89.2 The total parcel size is 1.498-acres or 65,176.10 SF and is zoned as “commercial medium.” PX 25 at 7, 19. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was as a vacant parcel with the potential for future commercial development. Id. at 24–25. After the taking, the highest and best use of the property would be commercial development. Id. at 25. The area of parcel number 15300 encumbered by the trail-use easement is approximately 18,684 SF. Id. at 33–34; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 183–85. 16. 1450 Open Whilden Place (Parcel No. 60078). This parcel was owned by Whilden Place Homeowner’s Association on October 11, 2019. See PX 26 at 3; PX 90; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 191. The total parcel size is 8.53-acres or 371,567 SF and is zoned for multi-family residential use with a downtown development overlay. PX 26 at 3, 14–15, 18. The parcel supports a neighborhood of 63 single-family condominium homes but can support a total of 153 units. Id. at 10, 14, 16, 20. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was for multi-family residential development. Id. at 18–19. After the taking, the highest and best use remains the same. Id. at 19. The area of parcel number 60078 encumbered by the trail-use easement is approximately 103,200 SF. Id. at 38–29; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 194–96. 17. 1304 Whilden Place (Parcel No. 6664). This parcel was owned by Helen C. Wood, LLC on October 11, 2019. See PX 27, 91; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 202. The total parcel size is 0.34-acre or 14,810 SF and is zoned for multi-family residential use. See PX 27 at 16–18. The property also supports a single-family residence totaling 1,424 SF, which previously functioned as a duplex. Id. at 17–18. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was for use as a single-family residence. Id. at 21–22. After the taking, the highest and best use would be low- and medium-density residential development. Id. The area of parcel number 6664 encumbered by the trail-use easement is approximately 8,000 SF. Id. at 30–31; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 205– 07. 18. 2300 Battleground Avenue (Parcel No. 15297). This parcel was owned by Joseph Campbell on October 11, 2019. See PX 28 at 8; PX 92; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 213. The total parcel size is 0.81-acre or 35,284 SF and is zoned as “commercial medium.” PX 28 at 26. The property also contains a specialty auto service facility and an automatic carwash and storage areas. Id. at 22. Before the taking, continued use of the parcel in the “as is” condition would be the highest and best use of the property. Id. at 27–28. After the taking, the highest and best use of the parcel would be high-end commercial development. Id. The area of parcel number 15297 encumbered by the trail-use easement is approximately 17,631 SF. Id. at 30–31; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 216–18. 19. 1420 Whilden Avenue (Parcel No. 60069). This parcel was owned by Colleen McNickle on October 11, 2019. See PX 29 at 3; PX 93; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 224. The total parcel size is 0.14-acre or 5,898 SF and is zoned for medium-density residential development. PX 2 There is a discrepancy between plaintiffs’ statements and those of their expert, Dr. Kilpatrick, regarding the identity of the owner of 2204 Battleground Avenue. Compare Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 180 (identifying the owner as “Sam’s Commercial Properties, LLC”), with PX 25 at 7 (listing the “owner of record” as Battleground Storage Associates LLC.”). The Court resolves any discrepancy regarding ownership in favor of representations contained in plaintiffs’ pre-trial memorandum of facts and law. 7 29 at 3, 17. The property supports a single-story condominium unit totaling 744 SF. Id. at 16–18. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the property was in its “as-is” state for use supporting a single-family condominium residence. Id. at 22. After the taking, the highest and best use will be for residential development. Id. The trail-use easement encumbers the entirety of the condominium unit, thereby constituting a “total taking” of the parcel. Id. at 30–32; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 227–29. 20. 416 Hillside Drive (Parcel No. 4066). This parcel was owned by Charissa R. Raynor on October 11, 2019. See PX 30 at 3; PX 94; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 235. The total parcel size is 0.21-acre or 9,148 SF and is zoned for low-density, single-family residential development. PX 30 at 15–16. A one-story residential structure totaling 1,059 SF sits on the property, along with a driveway on the southern side of the property. Id. at 17. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the parcel was in its “as-is” state supporting a single-family residence. Id. at 20. This highest and best use remains the same after the taking. Id. at 21. The area of parcel number 4066 encumbered by the trail-use easement is approximately 2,831 SF. Id. at 29; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 238–40. 21. 404 Hillside Drive (Parcel No. 4060). This parcel was owned by Matthew Black on October 11, 2019. See PX 31 at 3; PX 95; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶ 246. The total parcel size is 0.23-acre or 10,019 SF and is zoned for low-density, single-family residential development. PX 31 at 15–16. The property also supports a single-story home totaling 1,063 SF, along with a 500 SF unfinished basement and a driveway on the northern part of the property. Id. at 15, 17–18. Before the taking, the highest and best use of the parcel was in its “as-is” statute for use as a single- family residence. Id. at 21. After the taking, the highest and best use remains the same. Id. The area of parcel number 4060 encumbered by the trail-use easement is approximately 6,060 SF. Id. at 30–31; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 249–51. C. Procedural History The 20 plaintiffs across these six cases filed their operative complaints between 2020 and 2023. See Agapion, ECF No. 21; Chapman, ECF No. 7; Goodhue, ECF No. 9; Mohorn, ECF No. 152; Wood, ECF No. 15; Black, ECF No. 12. At varying points in 2020 and 2021, the parties jointly stipulated to each plaintiffs’ ownership of the properties at issue. See Agapion, ECF No. 20; Chapman, ECF No. 11; Goodhue, ECF No. 10; Mohorn, ECF No. 12; Wood, ECF No. 17; Black, ECF No. 19. 3 Although the claims of other landowners were settled, settlement of these cases did not occur. See Agapion, ECF No. 48 at 1; Goodhue, ECF No. 104; Mohorn, ECF Nos. 92, 99. 4 Ultimately, the parties requested that a trial be held to determine the amount of just compensation owed to plaintiffs for the government’s taking of their property. See Pls.’ Status Report, ECF No. 208; United States’ Statement Proposing Trial Date, ECF No. 209. In April 2023, the Court issued an order and set trial for late September 2023. See Apr. 11, 2023 Order, ECF No. 215. 3 The government submitted a filing that partially revoked its earlier stipulation to the parties’ title. See Mohorn, ECF No. 62. The government’s revocation, however, does not implicate any of the properties at issue in the cases covered by this opinion. 4 The cases of other landowners were dismissed with prejudice following the September 2023 trial in this case. See Agapion, J. Stip. of Dismissal with Prejudice for Certain Claims, ECF No. 304. 8  Before the damages trial, the parties filed pre-trial briefs setting forth their proposed findings of fact and law. See United States’ Pre-Trial Br.; Pls.’ Am. Memorandum of Contentions of Facts and Law, ECF No. 241-1. 5 The Court held a damages trial via remote videoconference from September 27 through September 29, 2023. 6 After the trial, the parties submitted post-trial briefs in late 2023 and early 2024. See Pls.’ Post-Trial Br., ECF No. 277; United States’ Post- Trial Br.; Pls.’ Reply Br., ECF No. 282. On April 23, 2024, the Court held closing arguments at the courthouse in Washington, D.C. See Apr. 23, 2024 Order. II. Overview of Trial Testimony The four-day damages trial consisted of testimony from five witnesses. Plaintiffs presented testimony from three expert witnesses: (1) Cynthia Straup; (2) Dr. John Kilpatrick; and (3) Charles Matthews. Ms. Straup is the managing director of Straup Solutions, a geographic information systems (“GIS”) mapping company. See Trial Tr. 44–46; PX 163. Ms. Straup testified to a series of maps created by her firm that depicted the geographic dimensions of the properties and the easement obtained by the City from Norfolk Southern. See Trial Tr. 45–46, 59:8–20. She noted that her maps and analysis were based on the survey attached to the non-warranty deed and valuation charts filed with the county. Id. 45:3–23, 54:4–24. Based on these maps, Ms. Straup offered her opinions regarding the portions of plaintiffs’ properties that are now encumbered by the City’s trail-use easement. Id. 63:19–98:16; PX 90–98. Plaintiffs also offered the testimony of Dr. Kilpatrick regarding his valuation of the twenty- one affected properties. Trial Tr. 172:12–15. Dr. Kilpatrick possesses over 40 years of professional experience in the real estate industry and is a certified appraiser in forty-nine states, including in North Carolina. See PX 162; Pls.’ Pre-Trial Mem. ¶¶ 19–21. Dr. Kilpatrick offered testimony regarding his valuation opinions for each of the affected properties, which were also set forth in a series of appraisal reports. See PX 1–6, 7–9, 18–20, 23–31. In his appraisal reports, Dr. Kilpatrick compared the “before” value of each property—the value of the property if owned in fee simple—against the “after” value of the property—the value of the property subject to the trail-use easement. See Trial Tr. 172:3–8. To value each property in the “before” condition, Dr. Kilpatrick used three well-established appraisal methodologies to determine fair market value: (1) the “sales comparison” approach; (2) the “income” approach; and (3) the “cost” approach. See, e.g., PX 2 at 18–33. Dr. Kilpatrick then weighed these competing valuation approaches to arrive at a reconciled value for each property. Id. at 33. To value each property in the “after” condition, Dr. Kilpatrick subtracted the entire value of the land that was 5 Plaintiffs filed an earlier pre-trial memorandum of facts and law in January 2023 (at ECF No. 186) but later submitted an updated memorandum to reflect certain changes that occurred in the intervening period. See Pls.’ Consent Motion for Leave to Amend Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Contentions of Facts and Law, ECF No. 241. The Court granted leave for plaintiffs to file this updated memorandum. See Sept. 11, 2023 Order, ECF No. 243. 6 The Court resumed the valuation trial on October 4, 2023 to hear the testimony of Charles David Matthews and Dr. John Kilpatrick. See Oct. 4, 2023 Order. Mr. Matthews and Dr. Kilpatrick both testified remotely. 9 subject to the new easement from the “before” value. Id. at 38. Dr. Kilpatrick then added the costs to build a 10-foot privacy wall to finalize his just compensation figures. Id. at 40; Trial Tr. 199– 201. In Dr. Kilpatrick’s opinion, the costs associated with building a privacy wall served as a reasonable proxy for the severance damages to each plaintiffs’ unencumbered land. Plaintiffs also offered rebuttal testimony by Charles Matthews. See generally Trial Tr. 915–991. Mr. Matthews attacked the reliability of the valuation and methodology employed by the government’s appraisal witness, Matthew Kimmel. See PX 244–45. Mr. Matthews possesses over 50 years of real estate appraisal and teaching experience, including experience with appraising properties subject to a trail-use easement. See PX 261; Trial Tr. 937:4–938:11. A licensed appraiser in North Carolina, Mr. Matthews testified that Mr. Kimmel incorrectly valued plaintiffs’ property in the “before” condition by assuming that the property remained encumbered by the original rail easement rather than valuing each property as unencumbered by the rail easement. Id. 945:7–946:7. Mr. Matthews also testified that Mr. Kimmel’s “after” valuations failed to meet the standard methodology used in a rails-to-trails appraisal because Mr. Kimmel assumed that the City would not use the full extent of its trail-use easement. Id. 954:14–18. Based on his analysis, Mr. Matthews claimed that Mr. Kimmel significantly undervalued the loss to plaintiffs’ property resulting from the trail-use easement. Id. 964:17–25. The government offered testimony from two expert witnesses: (1) Glen Hickerson; and (2) Mr. Kimmel. Mr. Hickerson served as the government’s GIS-mapping expert. See United States’ Post-Trial Br. at 14; Trial Tr. 498:1–3. At trial, Mr. Hickerson testified that he calculated the geographic boundaries of plaintiffs’ properties by relying on the 2019 and 2022 Guilford County GIS parcel maps as base layers. See Trial Tr. 499:18–22, 501:21–22. He then overlayed the county parcel maps with aerial photographs and a valuation map prepared by the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) in 1927 that reflected the railroad’s easement interests along the corridor. Id. 521–525; PX 187. Mr. Hickerson summarized his calculations and findings in a series of expert reports submitted to the Court. See DX 6327–30. Based on his analysis, Mr. Hickerson concluded that Ms. Straup inflated the size of plaintiffs’ properties because she relied on the 2019 survey map attached to the non-warranty deed—a map which Mr. Hickerson claims is inaccurate—rather than the 1927 maps prepared by the ICC. See Trial Tr. 535:14–536:15. Specifically, Mr. Hickerson testified that the geographic dimensions of the trail-use easement reflected in the 2019 survey map are larger than Norfolk Southern’s actual easement ownership interests. Id. 535:14–18. In Mr. Hickerson’s view, the 1927 valuation maps are more reliable sources for determining the extent of the original easement than the 2019 survey. Id. 537–38, 540. The government also offered Mr. Kimmel’s testimony regarding the value of plaintiffs’ properties. A significant portion of Mr. Kimmel’s testimony focused on perceived legal errors underlying Dr. Kilpatrick’s valuation analysis. Mr. Kimmel testified that he reviewed Dr. Kilpatrick’s appraisal reports and created his own valuations of these properties when necessary. Id. 593:1–7. Mr. Kimmel testified that he believed Dr. Kilpatrick incorrectly applied the “before- and-after” methodology by failing to complete a true “after” valuation. Id. 427:15–428:15. In Mr. Kimmel’s opinion, plaintiffs’ properties suffered no diminution in value resulting from the trail- use easement because the “before” condition of each property should have been valued as though it was already subject to the railway easement. Id. 631:7–23; DX 2–5, 19–20, 31–34, 46–52, 59– 61. Thus, Dr. Kilpatrick should have concluded that the “before” condition of each property—the 10 value of the property subject to the railway easement—was identical to the “after” condition—the value of the property subject to the new trail-use easement. Trial Tr. 631:14–25. Mr. Kimmel also criticized the methodologies employed by Dr. Kilpatrick to determine the “before” condition of the property. Mr. Kimmel testified that the use of the three valuation approaches was fundamentally flawed because Dr. Kilpatrick relied on unrepresentative comparative properties and offered almost no information in support of his application of each method. Id. 715:10–17, 738:1–12, 742–743; DX 1 at 47. III. Discussion The sole issue that must be resolved is the amount of just compensation owed to plaintiffs. See Pls.’ Post-Trial Brief at 18 (“Whether Plaintiffs are owed compensation in these matters is not open for debate: liability in these matters has been established.”); United States’ Post-Trial Br. at 7 (recognizing plaintiffs’ ownership of the “property adjacent to a 3.1-mile railroad corridor” and that the issue before the Court is the amount of just compensation owed for the rail-corridor conversion). The Court draws its factual findings from the complete record in this case and from related litigation. A. Legal Standard for Just Compensation The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the federal government from taking private property for public use without paying the owner just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This Court has jurisdiction over takings claims against the United States, including those that occur under section 8(d) of the Trails Act. See 28 U.S.C § 1491; Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 11–17. If the government is found liable for the taking, the Court must determine the just compensation owed to the plaintiff. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147 (2021) (“When the government physically acquires private property for a public use, the Takings Clause imposes a clear and categorical obligation to provide the owner with just compensation.”) (citation omitted); see also Castillo v. United States, 952 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he government must provide just compensation to the owner of the reversionary rights eliminated by a Trails Act conversion.”) (citation omitted). The prevailing benchmark for just compensation is the “fair market value” for the “highest and best use” of the property. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); Rasmuson v. United States, 807 F.3d 1343, 1346, n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Generally, this is measured by the “price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller” that are both “reasonably informed as to all relevant facts.” Julius Goldman’s Egg City v. United States, 697 F.2d 1051, 1054 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Egg City II) (quoting Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). The constitutional mandate to pay just compensation—and the use of fair market value to establish the amount owed—is to ensure that the owner of the condemned property is made whole and no more. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516 (1979). If the taking is caused by the burden of an easement,