Full Opinion

26CA0333 Montrose Memorial v ICAO 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 26CA0333 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 26041-2025 Montrose Memorial Hospital, Petitioner, v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondent. ORDER AFFIRMED Division V Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Freyre and Lum, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Bechtel & Santo, Michael Santo, Keely McCabe, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Petitioner No appearance for Respondent ¶1 Montrose Memorial Hospital (Employer) appeals from an order awarding its former employee, Pamela Hightower, unemployment benefits. We affirm the order. I. Background ¶2 Hightower worked for Employer as a medical records and health information technician until separating from Employer in August 2025. A deputy for the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied Hightower’s claim for unemployment benefits. The deputy found that Hightower resigned her position for personal reasons and was therefore disqualified from receiving benefits, pursuant to section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XXII), C.R.S. 2026. Hightower appealed that decision to the Division, which held an evidentiary hearing regarding the reasons for Hightower’s job separation. ¶3 Two witnesses testified at the hearing — Hightower and Erin Skees, Employer’s Chief Human Resources Officer. They both testified that (1) Hightower worked for Employer in Colorado from November 2022 until early August 2025; (2) Hightower relocated to Wisconsin in or around early August 2025; (3) before Hightower 1 relocated, her direct supervisor1 agreed that she could work remotely from Wisconsin; and (4) Hightower then worked for Employer remotely, from Wisconsin, from early August until August 22, 2025. They also both testified that on August 22, 2025, Skees emailed Hightower informing her that Employer would not allow her to continue working remotely from Wisconsin. Skees testified that Hightower’s employment “had to end at that time . . . unless she was going to move back and work for us in Colorado.” Hightower declined to return to Colorado and was therefore terminated. ¶4 The hearing officer found that Hightower’s supervisor and director authorized her to work remotely from Wisconsin. The hearing officer then found that Employer “separated [Hightower] because her permission to work remotely was revoked after she had already relocated out of state.” The hearing officer also found that Employer’s “abrupt revocation of [Hightower’s] pre-approved remote work arrangement (after she had already moved to another state) was a substantial change in [her] working conditions that was 1 In addition, Hightower testified that her department director, Bev Roth, also authorized her to work remotely from Wisconsin. Employer did not contradict this testimony. 2 substantially less favorable to [her].” The hearing officer further found that “[t]he conditions resulting from the change were not generally prevailing for other workers performing the same or similar work.” Based on the foregoing, the hearing officer concluded that Hightower was entitled to benefits under section 8- 73-108(4)(d) based on “[a] substantial change in the worker’s working conditions” that was “substantially less favorable to the worker.” ¶5 Employer appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel), which affirmed. II. Standard of Review ¶6 We may not disturb administrative factual findings “supported by substantial evidence.” § 8-74-107(4), C.R.S. 2026. Substantial evidence is “probative, credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory testimony or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). ¶7 We may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was 3 procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74- 107(6). III. Applicable Legal Principles ¶8 Whether a worker is entitled to unemployment benefits depends on the reason for the worker’s job separation, which is a factual matter for the hearing officer to resolve. Debalco Enters., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 32 P.3d 621, 623 (Colo. App. 2001); see Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989). ¶9 An objective standard applies in analyzing whether a change in working conditions was substantial and, if so, whether it was substantially less favorable under section 8-73-108(4)(d). See Wargon v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 787 P.2d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 1990). A change shall not be considered substantial if “the conditions prevailing after the change are those generally prevailing for other workers performing the same or similar work.” § 8-73- 108(4)(d). ¶ 10 In determining the reasons for the employment separation, the hearing officer exercises their sound discretion. Keil v. Indus. Claim 4 Appeals Off., 847 P.2d 235, 239 (Colo. App. 1993). We may not disturb the hearing officer’s determinations concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, and the resolution of evidentiary conflicts. See Tilley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). IV. Analysis ¶ 11 The hearing officer found (and the Panel affirmed) that Hightower’s job separation occurred because Employer arbitrarily revoked her authorization to work remotely from Wisconsin. (More precisely, the hearing officer found that “[t]here is no credible evidence as to why the employer allowed [Hightower] to work remotely and then abruptly revoked her permission.”) This finding is supported by substantial evidence. During the hearing, the hearing officer asked Skees if Hightower “was allowed to work remotely” for the first couple of weeks in August. Skees replied, “Yes, there was a brief period where she did work remotely.” Hightower testified that both her direct supervisor and her department director authorized her to work remotely from Wisconsin; Skees agreed that Hightower’s direct supervisor had issued such authorization. Skees and Hightower testified that 5 Skees contacted Hightower via email on August 22 and told Hightower that she was not so authorized. ¶ 12 Employer argues that the hearing officer erred in finding that “[t]here [was] no credible evidence as to why [Employer] allowed [Hightower] to work remotely and then abruptly revoked her permission.” Employer contends that it offered substantial credible evidence on this issue during the hearing. For instance, Employer provided testimony and documentary evidence demonstrating that Hightower’s supervisor and director could not authorize remote work in Wisconsin without approval from the Human Resources department, which they did not request. Employer asserts that this testimony and evidence also proved that, while Employer’s Human Resources department facilitates remote work from certain states, Wisconsin is not among them, and this was the reason the Human Resources department, through Skees, revoked Hightower’s remote work authorization. According to Employer, because Hightower provided no evidence directly discrediting — or conflicting with — this evidence, the hearing officer erred in determining that “no credible evidence” established a reason why Employer ultimately disallowed Hightower from working remotely from Wisconsin. 6 ¶ 13 We are not persuaded. The hearing officer exercises broad discretion in weighing the evidence and determining credibility, and we may not second-guess those determinations. Hoskins v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2014 COA 47, ¶ 10. Moreover, it is well-settled that “a hearing officer is not required to address specific evidence or testimony he or she does not find persuasive.” Tilley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). Thus, we may not disturb the hearing officer’s determination that employer’s evidence was not credible. ¶ 14 Second, Employer argues that the hearing officer erred in determining that Employer substantially changed Hightower’s working conditions. Employer notes that, per its written remote work policy, employees must obtain authorization from Human Resources, as well as their supervisors, and Employer does not guarantee remote work opportunities. Because Human Resources never authorized Hightower’s remote work arrangement, Employer argues, its ultimate decision to forbid that arrangement could not constitute a substantial change in Hightower’s working conditions. Further, it argues that because Hightower was on notice that Employer could forbid her from working remotely from Wisconsin, 7 and the fact that it ultimately did so, could not constitute a substantial change in working conditions. ¶ 15 Again, we are not persuaded. As discussed above, the hearing officer found that Employer, through Hightower’s supervisor, authorized her to work remotely; the hearing officer implicitly did not find it credible that Hightower’s supervisor lacked the authority to authorize this arrangement on Employer’s behalf. We do not disturb these determinations. Nor do we conclude that Employer’s general discretion over remote work arrangements precludes determining that Employer substantially changed Hightower’s working conditions. Whether an employee has notice that an employer may use its discretion to change her working conditions is not dispositive under section 8-73-108(4)(d). ¶ 16 Employer also argues that the hearing officer legally erred in determining that Hightower was entitled to benefits under section 8-73-108(4)(d), because Hightower testified that she would have moved to Wisconsin regardless of whether Employer had authorized her to work remotely there. Therefore, Employer asserts, by moving to Wisconsin and foreclosing her ability to work in person, 8 Hightower is responsible for any subsequent change in her working conditions. ¶ 17 We disagree. The hearing officer did not find that Hightower would have relocated regardless of Employer’s representations, nor was she required to make such a finding. The hearing officer acted within her discretion in evidently assigning little or no weight to that testimony. See Tilley, 924 P.2d at 1177. We may not reweigh it. Id. V. Disposition ¶ 18 We affirm the Panel’s order. JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE LUM concur. 9