Full Opinion

For Publication IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS IN S. Ct. Crim. No. 2025-0207 THE INTEREST OF: J.C Re: Super. Ct. No. ST-2025-JD-00029 On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Thomas & St. John Superior Court Judge: Hon. Debra S. Watlington Filed: September 24, 2026 Cite as: 2026 VI 21 BEFORE MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice, IVE ARLINGTON SWAN Associate Justice; and HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS, Associate Justice APPEARANCES Darren John-Baptiste, Esq Darren John-Baptiste, PLLC St. Thomas, V.I. 00802 Attorney for Appellant/Defendant Gordon C. Rhea, Esq Pamela R. Tepper, Esq Daniel Morris, Esq V.I. Department of Justice St. Thomas, V.1. 00802 Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff. OPINION OF THE COURT WILLOCKS, Associate Justice qi Appellant J.C. (“J.C.”) appeals from two August 8, 2025 orders entered by the Family Division of the Virgin Islands Superior Court (“Family Division”): {i) an order denying without prejudice his August 7, 2025 motion for a stay of proceedings to obtain a competency evaluation filed pursuant to 5 V.ILC. § 2509(b) (“Stay/Competency Order”); and (ii) an order mandating the transfer of the matter from the Family Division to the Criminal Division of the Virgin Islands People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: J.C. 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 2 of 11 Superior Court pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 2508(b)(4) (“Transfer Order’). For the reasons that follow, we affirm both orders I. BACKGROUND 42 In August 2025, the People of the Virgin Islands (“People”) filed an initial juvenile complaint, subsequently amended, charging J.C.—‘who at the time of the alleged offense was 16 years old”—-with the following offenses: Counts I and Il-Aggravated rape in the second degree, in violation of 14 V.L.C. § 1700a(a); Count HI-Unlawful sexual contact in the first degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1708(a)(1); Count [V-Obscene internet contact with a minor, in violation of 14 V.LC. § 490(a); Count V-Visual medium depicting sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 14 V.1.C. § 488(a)(1); Count VI-Computer pornography, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 489(b)(1)(B) Counts VII and VIII-Child abuse, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 505; and Count [X-Aggravated child abuse, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 506(2) q3 Contemporaneously with the filing of the juvenile complaint and amended juvenile complaint, the People filed a motion for mandatory transfer and an amended motion for mandatory transfer, respectively. In their amended motion for mandatory transfer, the People argued that “fpjursuant to... 5 V.L.C. § 2508(b), the court shall order that the juvenile be transferred to a court of competent criminal jurisdiction for proper criminal proceedings when that juvenile is alleged to have committed any of the crimes enumerated in 5 V.LC. § 2508(b)(4), including Aggravated Rape.”! ' Title 5, section 2508(b)(4) of the Virgin Islands Code provides (b) Ifa child or adult is charged with an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the child or adult was fourteen years of age or older at the time of the alleged offense, the Family Division of the Superior Court, after a determination of probable cause, People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: J.C. 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 3 of 11 44 Thereafter, on August 7, 2025, J.C. filed a motion for a stay of proceedings to obtain a competency evaluation (“Stay/Competency Motion”) pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 2509(b), which provides in pertinent part that “[w]hen there are grounds to believe the child is substantially retarded or mentally ill, the court shall stay the proceedings for the purpose of obtaining an examination.” q5 On August 8, 2025, the Family Division held a hearing at which the court and the parties addressed, inter alia, J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion before turning to the People’s amended motion for mandatory transfer. After denying J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion from the bench, the court proceeded with the transfer hearing and—upon finding probable cause as to Counts I through VII and Count [X? (J.A. 078)—concluded that the transfer of the matter from the Family Division to the Criminal Division of the Virgin Islands Superior Court (“Criminal Division”) was mandatory under 5 V.1.C. § 2508(b)(4). The court subsequently memorialized its rulings in two separate orders entered that same day: (i) the Stay/Competency Order, which denied without shall transfer the person for proper criminal proceedings to a court of competent criminal jurisdiction when (4) the offense now charged is one of the following offenses, which would be a felony if committed by an adult: murder in the first degree or an attempt to do so; rape in the first degree or an attempt to do so; aggravated rape or an attempt to do so; possession or use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence irrespective of whether the minor has been previously adjudicated to be a delinquent 5 V.LC. § 2508(b)(4) 2 At the hearing, the court indicated that it did not “see the difference between Count VII and Count VIII, and so I only find one count, probable cause for one count of child abuse under Count VII” and did not “find the basis for Count VIII which appears to be the same as Count VII and just seems duplicative People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: J.C 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 4 of 11 prejudice J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion “for failure to establish good cause under 5 V.I.C. § 2509(b)”; and (ii) the Transfer Order, which transferred the matter to the Criminal Division 46 On August 10, 2025, J.C. filed a timely notice of appeal from “the two orders of the...Family [] Division dated and entered on August8, 2025.” See V.I. R. App. P. 5(d) (“Appeals in juvenile matters to the Supreme Court from the Superior Court may be taken as a matter of right The time to appeal and related procedures are governed by Rule 5(b), Appeals in Criminal Cases...”); V.I. R. App. P. 5(b)(1) (“In a criminal case, a defendant shall file the notice of appeal in the Supreme Court within 30 days after the entry of (i) the judgment or order appealed from or (11) a notice of appeal by the Government.”) If. DISCUSSION A. Jurisdiction {7 The Revised Organic Act of 1954 provides this Court with appellate jurisdiction over “all appeals from the decisions of the courts of the Virgin Islands established by local law ” 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d). Title 4, section 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code vests this Court with jurisdiction over “all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court [of the Virgin Islands], or as otherwise provided by law.” 4 V.LC. § 32(a). “An order transferring a juvenile from the Family Division to the Criminal Division of the Superior Court is a final appealable order.” Jn re S.T., 51 V.I. 420, 422 (V.I. 2009) (citing 5 V.LC. § 2508(d); In re A.M., 30 V.1. 442 (3d Cir. 1994)) 48 | Because the Family Division denied J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion and thereafter entered the Transfer Order mandating the transfer of the matter from Family Division to the Criminal People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: LC. 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 5 of 11 Division pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 2508(b)(4)—-which constitutes a final appealable order—this Court has jurisdiction over J.C.’s appeal B. Overview of Issues 4? In his appellant’s brief, J.C. argues that the Family Division erred in denying his Stay/Competency Motion but advances no independent argument that the court erred in entering the Transfer Order. Nevertheless, J.C. seeks reversal of both the Stay/Competency Order and the Transfer Order, thereby indicating that his challenge to the Transfer Order is premised solely on his contention that the court should have granted his Stay/Competency Motion and stayed the proceedings for a competency evaluation rather than mandating transfer. Accordingly, any challenge to the Transfer Order is implicit, derivative of, and limited to his argument concerning the denial of the Stay/Competency Motion C. Standard of Review 910 The standard of review for examining the Superior Court's application of law—including constitutional questions and statutory interpretation—is plenary, while factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See St. Thomas-St. John Bd. of Elections v. Daniel, 49 V.I. 322, 329 (V.I 2007); see also, Lopez v. People, 60 V.1. 534, 536 (V.I. 2014) (citing Shoy v. People, 55 V.1. 919 925 (V.I. 2011)). “Clear error is a very deferential standard; an appellate court should only reverse a factual determination as being clearly erroneous if it is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support or ... bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” Jn re Estate of Small, 57 V.1. 416, 430 (V.1. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 411 “Because the decision to transfer a juvenile for prosecution as an adult is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, we review that decision only for an abuse of discretion.” /n re People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: J.C. 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 6 of 11 S.T., 51 V.L at 422 (V.I. 2009) (quoting United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 702 (3d Cir. 1994)) “(A]buse of discretion is evaluated ‘on the reasonableness of the trial court [ruling]. If the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and the ruling is one based on sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances, it will not be disturbed absent a showing that some facet on the ruling is arbitrary or capricious.’” Faustin v. People, 2024 VI 23, | 24 (quoting Milligan v. People, 69 V.I. 779, 805 n.4 (V.I. 2018) (Swan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Emerson v. State, 2016 WY 44, 371 P.3d 150, 153 (Wyo. 2016)). “A trial court acts in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner if its ruling is founded upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law[,] or an improper application of law to fact or if its actions were clearly contrary to reason and not justified by the evidence. Faustin, | 24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Appleton vy. Harrigan, 61 V.1. 262, 268 (V.1. 2014) (quoting Stevens v. People, 55 V.1. 550, 556 (V.I. 2010)) D. The Stay/Competency Order: Whether the Family Division Erred in Denying J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion 412 The crux of J.C.’s argument on appeal is that the record established ‘‘grounds to believe the child is substantially retarded or mentally ill,” thereby requiring the Superior Court, under 5 V.LC. § 2509(b), to stay the proceedings to obtain a competency examination. In support of his argument, J.C. points to the following evidence: (i) Detective Jernings Abraham’s affidavit in support of an arrest warrant, which indicated that “A.B. reported that although she had no prior contact with [J.C.] he allegedly said he was getting revenge on her” and that “[J.C.] also told [A.B.] that someone was doing to him what he was doing to her”; and (11) J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion, which his counsel “‘averred that fafter] subsequent meetings with [J.C.], counsel has unresolved People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: J.C. 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 7 of 11 concerns about his mental health” and that “[J.C.’s} family has revealed challenges and concerns going back approximately six (6) years.” Thus, J.C. concludes that the Family Division erred in denying his Stay/Competency Motion and requests that this Court “reverse...the transfer order...and direct that the matter be stayed and an evaluation be conducted.” 413 In response, the People argues that the Family Division did not err in denying J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion because “it properly found it had no grounds to believe J.C. was mentally ill.” In support, the People note that J.C.’s motion was “unsupported by medical documentation or sworn statement and relied almost entirely on unsworn attorney representations” and that the Family Division “had directly observed and interacted with J.C. in open court.” Accordingly, the People request that this Court affirm the Family Division’s Stay/Competency Order and Transfer Order 414 In its Stay/Competency Order, the Family Division denied without prejudice J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion, explaining that the Motion was not supported by any factual affidavit, medical documentation, or even swom statements from the parents to corroborate the existence of a mental illness or intellectual disability.'! The Motion consisted of a single page of conclusory assertions and did not establish a sufficient basis to invoke the mandatory stay provisions of 5 V.I.C. § 2509(b). Accordingly, the Court found no good cause to delay the proceedings and denied the Motion to Stay 'See VI. R. Civ. P. 6-1(d)(1) 415 Although the Family Division referenced Rule 6-1(d)(1) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure, the procedural requirements governing J.C.’s motion are set forth in the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Family Division Procedure provides that ‘“[u]nless the court orders the use of other procedures, prehearing motions shall be governed by the provisions of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: J.C. 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 8 of 11 6-4, 6-5 and, in delinquency, abuse and neglect proceedings, by the provisions of Virgin Islands Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, adapted as necessary.” V.I. R. FAM. P. 11. Because this matter involves a delinquency proceeding, Rule 12 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Criminal Procedure Rule 12”) applies. Criminal Procedure Rule 12 provides that “[a] party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits” and further states that “Rule 47 applies to a pretrial motion.” V.I. R. CRIM. P 12(b)(1). In turn, Rule 47 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Criminal Procedure Rule 47”) sets forth the procedural requirements governing motions, including that a motion must “state the grounds on which it is based, the legal authorities upon which it relies, and the relief or order sought,” V.I. R. CRIM. P. 47(b), and “[t]he moving party must serve any supporting affidavit with the motion,” V.I. R. CRIM. P. 47(d) {16 In his two-page Stay/Competency Motion, J.C. asserts several conclusory statements? but provides no legal analysis or authority explaining how those assertions established “grounds to believe [J.C.] is substantially retarded or mentally ill” within the meaning of 5 V.LC. § 2509(b) See 5 V.LC. § 2509(b) (“When there are grounds to believe the child is substantially retarded or mentally ill, the court shall stay the proceedings for the purpose of obtaining an examination.”) 3 Specifically, J.C. asserted in his Stay/Competency Motion In support hereof, counsel shows that after reviewing the Affidavit submitted in support of the arrest warrant in the above captioned matter which provides in paragraph 39 that “A.B conveyed that {J.C.] claimed that he was also being blackmailed by his friend; the unknown individual who operated the three Snapchat accounts and subsequent meetings with [J.C.], counsel has unresolved concerns about his mental health. Moreover, further discussions with [J.C.’s] family has revealed challenges and concerns going back approximately six (6) years.” (J.A. 147) People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: IC. 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 9 of 11 Moreover, although J.C.’s motion relied on counsel’s “unresolved concerns about [J.C.’s} mental health” and J.C.’s family’s unspecified “challenges and concerns going back approximately six (6) years,” those claims were unsupported by affidavits 417 At the August 8, 2025 hearing, J.C. merely “proffer[ed] to the [cJourt the same facts that [he] set forth in the motion,” (J.A. 013), but likewise failed to provide any legal analysis or authority explaining how those assertions established “grounds to believe the child is substantially retarded or mentally ill” within the meaning of 5 V.I.C. § 2509(b). As the Family Division pointed out at the hearing, J.C. provided “nothing in support of this motion... [t}here is no affidavit, no sworn statement, no medical records, nothing 418 In summary, J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion lacked legal analysis, citation to authority, and evidentiary support as required under Criminal Procedure Rule 47. See V.I. R. CRIM. P. 47(b), (d). J.C. cannot—and should not—expect the Family Division to “make a movant's arguments for him when he has failed to do so.” Joseph v. Joseph, 2015 V.1. LEXIS 43, *5 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr 23, 2015) (citations omitted)); see Encarnacion v. Testamark, 78 V.1. 541, 548-49 (V.I. 2023) (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that our adversarial system of justice is premised on the parties presenting facts and legal arguments before a neutral and relatively passive judge, and that it is extraordinarily disfavored for courts to forsake their roles as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them and instead sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Joseph v. Legislature of the V.1., 2017 V.I. LEXIS 175, *4 n.3 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2017) (“As the Court is not required to make arguments for parties this alone is enough for this Court to deny this claim.” (citations omitted)). “The rules that require a litigant to brief and support his arguments before the People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: J.C. 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 10 of 11 Superior Court, are not mere formalistic requirements. They exist to give the Superior Court the opportunity to consider, review, and address an argument[.]” Simpson v. Golden, 56 V.I. 272, 280 (V.1. 2012) q 19 Although the Family Division referenced Rule 6-1(d)(1) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure* rather than Criminal Procedure Rule 47 in denying J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion, it nevertheless did not err in denying the motion. “It is well established that, under the ‘right result, wrong reason’ doctrine, where the record otherwise supports the trial court's judgment, an appellate court may affirm that judgment for reasons other than those relied upon by the trial court, even if the trial court's reasons are erroneous.” Antilles School v. Lembach, 64 V.I 400, 438 n.23 (V.L. 2016) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the Stay/Competency Order E. The Transfer Order: Whether the Family Division Erred in Mandating the Transfer of the Matter to the Criminal Division 420 As noted above, J.C.’s challenge to the Transfer Order is wholly dependent on his contention that the Family Division erred in denying his Stay/Competency Motion. Because we conclude that the Family Division did not err in denying that motion, we likewise conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion and therefore did not err in transferring the matter to the Criminal Division. See In re S.T., 51 V.I. at 422 (“Because the decision to transfer a juvenile for * Rule 6-1(d)(1) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure provides When allegations of fact not appearing of record are relied upon in support of a party's motion, response, or reply, unless the court grants permission for a different schedule for the filing of supporting materials: all then-available affidavits and other documents supporting the party's position shall be filed simultaneously with the motion, response or reply V.I. R. Civ. P. 6-1(d)(1) People of the Virgin Islands in the Interest of: LC. 2026 VI 21 SCT-CRIM-2025-0207 Opinion of the Court Page 11 of 11 prosecution as an adult is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, we review that decision only for an abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted); see also Faustin, J 24 (“[A]buse of discretion is evaluated ‘on the reasonableness of the trial court [ruling]. If the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and the ruling is one based on sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances, it will not be disturbed absent a showing that some facet on the ruling is arbitrary or capricious.’”’) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the Transfer Order lI. CONCLUSION 421 The Family Division did not err in denying J.C.’s Stay/Competency Motion and mandating the transfer of the matter to the Criminal Division. Thus, we affirm the Family Division’s Stay/Competency Order and Transfer Order Dated this 24" day of September, 2026 BY THE COURT aeOTD W.L. WILLOCKS Associate Justice ATTEST DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ Clerk "OLE 1 By ZA Deputy Clerk Il es %, _~ Dated \ YY y YO INS