Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 547 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-26-483 MATTHEW ROSS AND LINDSEY ROSS Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 43JV-24-102] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE BARBARA ELMORE, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE CHILDREN APPELLEES AFFIRMED BART F. VIRDEN, Judge The Lonoke County Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of appellants, Matthew Ross and Lindsey Ross, to their two minor children, MC1 and MC2. They bring separate appeals from the decision. Matthew raises several points: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it barred as irrelevant the introduction of family photos; (2) the trial court improperly applied the “golden rule” standard; (3) the trial court improperly decided best interest before he had a chance to present his evidence; (4) the evidence was insufficient to prove any of the statutory grounds as to him; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to show that termination of his rights was in the children’s best interest. Lindsey raises only one point on appeal: the trial court erred in finding that termination was in her children’s best interest—specifically, that continued contact with her will result in the risk of potential harm to MC1 and MC2. We affirm the trial court’s decision as to both parents. I. Background On June 28, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for ex parte emergency custody and dependency-neglect after Matthew refused to pick up then twelve-year-old MC1 and ten-year-old MC2 from a family member’s home. In an affidavit attached to the petition, a family social worker (FSW) averred that Matthew had left the children without notice, and the family member was sick and could not care for them any longer. MC1 and MC2 were essentially left without shelter. Matthew told the FSW that he had a home but that it was empty. While Matthew claimed that he had items for the home stored in a shed, he had excuses for why he could not get those items to furnish the home. DHS placed a seventy-two-hour hold on MC1 and MC2. Matthew and Lindsey later stipulated to the children’s adjudication as dependent-neglected based on inadequate shelter because they were homeless. The goal was reunification with a concurrent goal of permanent relative placement. The trial court ordered DHS to provide reunification services and required Matthew and Lindsey to attend parenting classes, submit to a psychological evaluation and drug-and-alcohol assessment, participate in individual and family counseling, maintain stable housing and income, attend Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (AA/NA) meetings, submit to random drug screens and a hair-follicle drug test, and attend visitation with the children. 2 The case was reviewed in November 2024. Matthew and Lindsey were found to have partially complied with the case plan, and the trial court withheld a reasonable-efforts finding as to DHS because it had failed to make referrals and communicate with the parents. The parents’ visitation was amended from four hours of weekly supervised visitation to two hours supervised and two hours unsupervised weekly visitation. The goal remained reunification with a concurrent goal of relative placement. Later that same month, DHS and the attorney ad litem (AAL) jointly moved to suspend visitation as to both parents because Lindsey had submitted cold urine for a drug screen and then refused to submit a second sample. Also, she had an empty pill bottle that had been filled five days earlier. DHS and the AAL also alleged that Lindsey had become irate to the point that 911 was called. The trial court granted the motion but only as to Lindsey’s visitation—not Matthew’s—and ordered Lindsey to submit to the psychological evaluation, counseling, and outpatient drug treatment. In March 2025, the case was reviewed again. Both Matthew and Lindsey were found to be in partial compliance with the case plan. Both parents were ordered to attend AA/NA meetings and provide proof to DHS. Also, they were permitted to have one supervised visit with MC1, who had been diagnosed with cancer, while he was having chemotherapy treatments at the hospital. The goal remained reunification with a concurrent goal of relative placement. At the permanency-planning hearing held in June, the trial court specifically found that Matthew and Lindsey did not have a home appropriate for the children; they had not 3 complied with counseling services; they had not complied with drug treatment; and they continued to test positive for THC. The goal was changed to adoption. In July, DHS and the AAL filed a joint motion to terminate Matthew’s and Lindsey’s parental rights based on grounds listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Repl. 2020), including the following: (i)(a) & (b) (failure to remedy); (vii)(a) (subsequent factors or issues); and (ix)(a)(3)(A) & (B)(i) (aggravated circumstances—little likelihood).1 The termination hearing was scheduled but continued several times. It was eventually held on March 16, 2026. The witnesses who testified were FSW Sharese Handie; adoption specialist Candace White; Lindsey; Matthew; MC1; MC2; and Tinisa Lipsie, a DHS employee. II. Termination-Hearing Testimony Handie testified that Matthew and Lindsey’s housing situation was unstable throughout the case. In November 2024, they were living in a motel, and in March 2025, they moved to a two-bedroom apartment but were evicted after a month or so for failing to pay the rent. Handie said that they lived in another motel for a while and that Lindsey went to jail on criminal charges. Matthew gave Handie the address where he was staying, but the address did not exist. In November 2025, when Lindsey was released from jail, she and Matthew lived in a motel again. They claimed to have moved to a new apartment in early February 2026 but did not give Handie that address until four days before the termination 1 The Arkansas Juvenile Code was subsequently repealed by Act 518 of 2025, § 2, effective August 5, 2025, and is presently codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-35-101 et seq. (Supp. 2025). 4 hearing. Handie said that she had not been able to walk through the apartment and that she had concerns because the photos showed that the home was not fully furnished. With regard to Matthew’s and Lindsey’s employment, Handie said that Matthew had obtained employment a few months into the case at a truck wash and had provided her with paystubs. She said that Lindsey claimed to be self-employed and cleaning houses. Handie said that the only proof of income that Lindsey had provided was a screenshot of her “CashApp” from December 2025. Handie stated that both Matthew and Lindsey had submitted to psychological evaluations but had not complied with the recommendations as ordered. Specifically, Lindsey had not completed a medication-management assessment. Handie said that Matthew was assigned a therapist but failed to attend therapy and was discharged and that Lindsey claimed to be attending counseling on her own but would not allow DHS access to those records. Handie testified that family counseling never began because the parents failed to comply with individual counseling. Handie stated that both parents submitted to a drug- and-alcohol assessment from which outpatient drug treatment was recommended. Specifically, the report recommended that Matthew and Lindsey complete nine group and three individual sessions. She said that Matthew continued to test positive for THC and refused drug screens at times. Handie said that Lindsey, who completed only two group and two individual sessions, continued to test positive for illegal substances. As recently as January 22, 2026, Lindsey tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamines, 5 benzodiazepine, and THC. On that same date, Matthew tested positive for THC. Handie testified that neither parent had attended AA/NA meetings or provided sign-in sheets. Handie testified that Matthew and Lindsey completed parenting classes. She said that she had observed only a couple of their visits with the children and did not think that Matthew interacted with MC1 and MC2. Handie said that both parents missed visits with MC1 and MC2 and sometimes switched the visits to Zoom, which upset the boys. White testified that she had identified at least twenty-five possible family matches for MC1 and MC2 to be adopted together, taking into consideration their characteristics and history. She said that the children are highly adoptable with no barriers to adoption. White said that the children’s current foster mother had also expressed interest in adopting them. Matthew testified that he moved into a new apartment on February 3, 2026, but that he had not set up beds for MC1 and MC2 yet. He said that he had not contacted Handie about the apartment because she is rude and “comes at [him].” Matthew said that he gave Handie the wrong address for where he was staying during Lindsey’s incarceration—he was staying with his mother during that time. Matthew stated that Handie could visit the new apartment anytime—even after court that day. Matthew testified that he has worked at Truckomat since August 2024 and that he works six days a week. He testified that his income is sufficient to pay the rent at the new apartment. Matthew testified that he had been testing positive for marijuana because that is his medicine. He said that he had gotten a medical-marijuana card a couple of weeks before the hearing because he does not like pills or alcohol. When counsel told him that the medical- 6 marijuana card is not recognized by the court and that he could not smoke marijuana during the pendency of the case, Matthew said that he understood but that several people at DHS had told him to get a medical-marijuana card to protect himself. He said that he uses marijuana to treat his PTSD and ADHD. Matthew initially said that he had been clean since September 2025 but finally conceded that he had “relapsed” in January 2026 when he tested positive for THC. Matthew testified that he had done everything asked of him except family counseling and that it had just not gotten set up for him. Lindsey testified that she was not present when MC1 and MC2 were removed from her and Matthew—she was in the hospital with a serious infection, and Matthew was with her. She said that she and Matthew were going through a “small separation” at the time and that the children were living with Matthew and his parents. Lindsey testified that she could not answer any financial questions or questions about the couples’ joint tax return because Matthew handled that. Lindsey said that she has been self-employed since 2021 and that her business is called “Get It Done Professional Housecleaning.” She says that she earns less than Matthew, so she buys things like gas and groceries. When asked why she had not complied with the case plan, she explained that both she and Matthew worked all the time, that it takes money to move, and that they were just concentrating on getting a home for the children. She said reunification services were “done.” Lindsey testified that she went to jail from mid-July to mid-November 2025 for fraudulent use of a credit card and explained that she was in the wrong place at the wrong 7 time with the wrong people. She said that she was placed on probation for a period of ten years. Lindsey was asked whether there were two other charges when she went to jail, but she said that she did not remember. She eventually admitted that she was also found guilty of or pled no contest to theft of property and financial identity fraud. Lindsey said that while she was in jail, she completed an anger-management class that was not required, that she participated in a faith-based substance-abuse program, and that she attended AA meetings. When she was asked about the failed drug test in January 2026, Lindsey said that she was not proud of it. Lindsey provided prescriptions for amphetamine salts (Adderall) and alprazolam. She maintained that amphetamine salts caused her to test positive for methamphetamine, insisting that “[she doesn’t] do meth.” When asked whether she would take a hair-follicle test, she said, “I’m not okay with that.” Lindsey admitted that MC1 and MC2 had already been traumatized, and the trial court said that Lindsey was already on the record stating that she wanted them to stay in the courtroom and hear the testimony. Lindsey was asked how many children she has, and she pointed to MC1 and MC2. She was asked about MC3 and MC4, but she did not want to discuss them. Lindsey insisted that she did not “lose” MC3 and MC4 and that she did not “give [them] up,” either. Lindsey identified photos she had sent to her lawyer the day before the hearing of the apartment that she and Matthew had moved into in February. Lindsey had also taken photos of her and Matthew with MC1 and MC2. She said, “That was pictures I just wanted the Court to see that, I mean, this is real. This is—the bond is real. It is there. It’s not fake.” The 8 AAL made a relevance objection to the photos, and the trial court said that photos would not show a bond. MC1 testified, “I don’t really want to be with [Matthew and Lindsey], no.” MC1 said that he had concerns about his parents’ financial issues and their instability. He stated that he wanted to be adopted. MC1 said on cross-examination, however, that the visits with Matthew and Lindsey had gone well and that he would like to continue a relationship with them but that he did not know what that relationship would look like. MC2 testified that, if it was possible, he would like to be adopted by his current foster mother and that this was probably in his best interest. Tinisa Lipsie testified that she had supervised visits between Matthew and Lindsey and the children for a year. She said that the visits had gone well but that MC1 and MC2 were upset when the parents missed their visits. Lipsie agreed that the family is bonded. She said that she did not see any parenting issues during the visits but that they last only one hour. Lipsie concluded by saying that she did not see anything that concerned her. III. Trial Court’s Ruling The trial court found that the evidence supported terminating Matthew’s and Lindsey’s parental rights on the following grounds listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35- 325(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2025): (i)(a)(1) & (2) (failure to remedy); (vii)(a) (subsequent factors or issues); and (ix)(a)(3)(A) & (B)(i) (aggravated circumstances—little likelihood). The trial court found that Matthew and Lindsey’s home was no more stable now than it was when the children came into care and that the parents had not remedied the conditions that caused 9 the removal of MC1 and MC2. The trial court pointed out that Matthew and Lindsey had been provided more than eighteen months of services but that things had gotten worse, not better. The trial court also expressed doubt whether the photos depicted the parents’ current home and concluded that the parents had not maintained stable housing during the case. The trial court further found that Matthew’s and Lindsey’s drug use was a subsequent factor or issue and that the parents continued to test positive for drugs, refused drug screens, and failed to attend AA/NA meetings. The trial court noted that Lindsey, who had tested positive for methamphetamine in January, had not completed drug treatment. The trial court found that it would be detrimental to the children’s health and safety to be returned to the parents given their drug use and inappropriate lifestyle, especially with MC1’s medical condition. Moreover, the trial court found that the parents’ failure to comply with court orders was a subsequent factor or issue: they had not fully complied with drug treatment, attended AA/NA meetings, participated in individual and family counseling, obtained stable housing, and followed the recommendations of their psychological evaluations. Also, the trial court noted that Lindsey had obtained criminal charges during the case and that she had gone to jail for several months. The trial court further found that the parents had missed a lot of visits with MC1 and MC2 and that it had not been possible to increase their visitation. In addition, the trial court found that DHS had done all it could to help Matthew and Lindsey but that they had chosen not to comply with services that could have helped, such as counseling. The trial court noted that, while Matthew had completed more services, 10 he had not learned anything from them. The trial court concluded that there were no additional services that could have been provided and that there was little likelihood continued services would result in successful reunification. Finally, the trial court found that termination of Matthew’s and Lindsey’s parental rights was in the best interest of MC1 and MC2 because they need permanency and stability. The trial court noted that the children were thriving in their current foster home and that Matthew and Lindsey were not able to give them stability and permanency in a time frame appropriate for the children given their developmental needs. The trial court noted that there was a risk of harm given the parents’ housing instability and continued drug use. The trial court also found that the children are highly adoptable with no barriers to their adoption. The trial court noted that, while the current foster mother was considering adopting both boys, there were also twenty-five possible adoptive matches for the children. IV. Standard of Review This court’s review of cases involving the termination of parental rights is de novo. Brown v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 370, 584 S.W.3d 276. Grounds for termination must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is a degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Id. Our inquiry is whether the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. Credibility determinations are left to the fact-finder. Id. 11 Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a determination that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3). The first step requires proof of one or more statutory grounds for termination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B). The second step, the best-interest analysis, includes consideration of the likelihood the juvenile will be adopted and of the potential harm caused by returning custody of the child to the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35- 325(b)(3)(A). V. Discussion A. Matthew’s Parental Rights 1. Family photos The trial court ruled that photos depicting Matthew and Lindsey with MC1 and MC2 in which they are smiling with arms around each other were irrelevant to show a bond. “Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ark. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Ark. R. Evid. 402. A trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Hopkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 79 Ark. App. 1, 83 S.W.3d 418 (2002). Matthew argues that the trial court erred in not admitting family photos for the purpose of showing the bond that he and Lindsey shared with MC1 and MC2 because their bond is highly relevant to one of the best-interest factors: potential harm. He asserts that the 12 photos were also relevant to the aggravated-circumstances ground—specifically, the question of the likelihood of successful reunification. According to Matthew, the photos show that the children are interested in reuniting and do not fear him or Lindsey. Matthew argues that the prejudice is clear because the trial court did not see that MC1 and MC2 obviously love their parents and that he and Lindsey love them. Matthew’s argument is not preserved. Matthew, who was represented by separate counsel below, was not the proponent of the photos and made no argument for their admission into evidence when the AAL objected to them as irrelevant. Cf. Rockett v. State, 319 Ark. 335, 891 S.W.2d 366 (1995) (holding that a codefendant must make his own timely and complete objections and cannot benefit from objections made by another defendant). Matthew’s counsel sat by silently during the exchange about the photos and made no attempt to join Lindsey’s counsel in arguing for their admission or with proffering them. Even assuming that Matthew’s argument was sufficiently preserved through Lindsey’s counsel, we have said that the existence of a bond may not be sufficient to prevent termination of parental rights when weighed against other facts in the case. Rice v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 278, 688 S.W.3d 491. In other words, even if the photos were admissible to prove the existence of a bond, it may not have been enough to prevent termination of Matthew’s parental rights in light of, for example, Matthew’s instability in terms of housing and his continued use of THC. In any event, there was no prejudice by excluding the photos 13 given that there was testimony regarding that bond by Lindsey and Lipsie.2 While the trial court may have found Lindsey generally not credible, it could have believed her when it came to the existence of a bond that both parents share with MC1 and MC2. The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony. Gibby v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 145, 643 S.W.3d 479. To the extent Matthew contends that a bond impacts the sufficiency of the evidence, that will be discussed below. 2. Golden rule A “golden rule” argument suggests to jurors that they place themselves in the position of a party or victim. Puckett v. State, 324 Ark. 81, 88, 918 S.W.2d 707, 711 (1996) (citing King v. State, 317 Ark. 293, 293, 877 S.W.2d 583, 586 (1994)). Such an argument is impermissible because it tends to subvert the objectivity of the jury. Id. It is seen as an attempt to dissuade the jurors from their duty to weigh the evidence and instead to view the case from the standpoint of a litigant or party. Id. The golden rule is applied to criminal cases as well as civil cases. Id. Matthew argues that the trial court, as the fact-finder, placed itself in the position of the parents in stating from the bench the following: There’s just no way in the world that if I have one hour a week to be with my kids twice a week or whatever it is, that I would miss any time. I don’t even miss with my grandchildren. And I have to work too. So there’s no way that that would happen. 2 Handie’s testimony was somewhat confusing on this topic, but even she admitted that there was a bond between the parents and children. Handie seemingly stated that she did not see a bond between Matthew and Lindsey because “they’re usually just talking to the children.” 14 Speaking specifically to Matthew, the trial court also said, “There’s no way that I—that anybody would ever test me and I would have drugs in my system.” Matthew argues that a circuit court judge and a blue-collar worker employed washing diesel trucks are not—and never will be—in the same shoes. Matthew asserts that he does not have the luxury of setting his own schedule, as most circuit court judges do. Even assuming arguendo that the golden rule applies to bench trials, Matthew’s argument is not preserved. To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must object at the first opportunity. Waller v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 113, 686 S.W.3d 15. Matthew claims in his reply brief that he had no opportunity to object, but the trial court made the objectionable statements from the bench with counsel present. Moreover, this is not an argument going to the sufficiency of the evidence, which can be raised for the first time on appeal following a bench trial. See Terry v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 591, 591 S.W.3d 824. 3. Prejudgment about best interest Matthew argues that, when MC2 testified that it was in his best interest to be adopted, the trial court said, “I agree. There we go.” Matthew contends that DHS and the AAL had not rested their case at that point, yet the trial court had already determined best interest. He argues that courts warn jurors all the time about not making up their minds before all of the evidence is introduced. Matthew argues that he suffered prejudice because when fact- finders make up their minds prematurely, the party against whom they have decided has been deprived of a fair trial. 15 We first note that Matthew raised no objection to the trial court’s comment during MC2’s testimony. Despite the trial court’s remark, its written order demonstrates that the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Matthew’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest was based on all of the evidence in the record rather than on MC2’s statement that adoption was in his best interest. To the extent that the trial court left the impression that it had prejudged the best-interest finding, thus creating a conflict or discrepancy with its subsequent written order, the written order generally controls over oral pronouncements. Martin v. Higgins, 2024 Ark. App. 1, at 4 n.3, 682 S.W.3d 357, 359 n.3. 4. Sufficiency of evidence as to grounds Matthew discussed each of the three grounds found by the trial court to support its decision, but we will address only the failure-to-remedy ground, Ark. Code Ann. 9-35- 325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(1), given that only one ground is needed to support the termination of his parental rights. Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918. Section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) provides that a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued to be out of the custody of the parent for twelve months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent. Matthew argues that he remedied the conditions that caused removal: his refusal to pick up his children and his homelessness. He argues that he was no longer abandoning his children and that he has a home—whether it was with his mother, in a hotel, or in an 16 apartment. Although the argument was made with respect to the subsequent-factors-or-issues ground, Matthew contends that just because someone moves does not mean his housing is unstable. He relies on Strickland v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 103 Ark. App. 193, 287 S.W.3d 633 (2008), in which the mother’s rights were terminated due, in part, to her unstable housing given that she had moved eight times in twenty-one months. We said that the trial court erred in finding that the mother’s housing was unstable because she always maintained housing; the residences were not shown to be inappropriate; and she had reasonable excuses for many of the moves. Matthew was homeless in the beginning of the case; he then lived in various hotels; he moved in with his mother; and he stayed in an apartment but was evicted after a month. At a minimum, a hotel room is inappropriate housing for two children. A child suffers harm from the lack of stability in a permanent home. Brumley v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. 356. While Matthew claimed to have found an apartment in early February, he did not share the address with DHS until four days before the termination hearing. Handie testified that she had not been shown a copy of the lease or seen the home for herself. Handie noted that the apartment had very little furniture, and Matthew admitted that, although he had beds for MC1 and MC2, he had not yet set them up because he did not want to see the beds set up and then be disappointed if the boys were not returned to his custody. Because Matthew’s housing was unstable and sometimes inappropriate, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the failure-to- remedy ground supports the termination of Matthew’s parental rights. 17 5. Best interest Matthew raises four points in challenging the trial court’s best-interest finding. First, he argues that the trial court made no findings “specifically addressing the effect on the children’s health and safety” that would result from returning the children to his custody. In Crawford v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2019 Ark. App. 474, 588 S.W.3d 383, the mother failed to preserve an argument that the trial court was required to make specific findings of fact in its written order in support of its best-interest finding given that the mother did not request specific findings, and she failed to cite any authority for the proposition that the trial court is otherwise obligated to expressly make specific factual findings to support its best-interest finding absent a request to do so. Matthew did not request specific findings and thus failed to preserve this argument. Second, Matthew argues that the family bond—as shown by the excluded photos—is relevant to best interest, citing Richie v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2023 Ark. App. 219. In Richie, we reversed the termination of a father’s parental rights because, due to his compliance, progress, and bond with his children, we could not say that the father’s past relationship with the children’s mother necessarily justified severing his parental rights. Here, Matthew did not comply with or make substantial progress with the case plan, and his relationship with Lindsey had no bearing on the termination of his rights. Despite the existence of a bond, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination was in MC1’s and MC2’s best interest given the other facts in this case. 18 Matthew’s third and fourth points address severed relationships caused by termination of his parental rights. He argues that MC1 testified that he wants a continued relationship with him and Lindsey but that termination will end their relationship. He also argues that the court-appointed special advocate (CASA) recommended that the children stay in touch with their grandparents but that termination severs that relationship, too, because an adopted individual becomes a stranger to his blood relations, except for sibling visitation. Clark v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 223, 575 S.W.3d 578. Parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child and must give way to the best interest of the child when the natural parents fail to provide reasonable care for their minor children. Spencer v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 96, 426 S.W.3d 494. Here, Matthew failed to provide the most basic of needs: stable housing. MC1 and MC2 both testified about the instability and uncertainty they felt with their parents, and they wanted permanency through adoption. We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred with its best-interest finding. B. Lindsey’s Parental Rights Lindsey does not challenge the adoptability prong of the best-interest analysis; rather, she argues that the trial court erred in finding that MC1 and MC2 would be at risk of potential harm if returned to her custody. In assessing the potential-harm factor, the court is not required to find that actual harm would ensue if the child were returned to the parent nor to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Rice v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 278, 688 S.W.3d 491. The potential-harm analysis is to be conducted in broad terms. 19 Id. Past actions of a parent over a meaningful period of time are good indicators of what the future may hold. Id. Lindsey contends that, by the time of the termination hearing, she had made significant progress and was ready for the children to be placed in her custody. Lindsey argues that she and Matthew had a home and income. She points to the fact that the visitations went well and that there was obviously a strong family bond. Lindsey asserts that, while MC1 and MC2 expressed an interest in adoption, they also said that they wanted to continue to have a relationship with her and Matthew. She argues that she completed her psychological evaluation, the drug-and-alcohol assessment, and parenting classes. She says that she also completed a faith-based substance-abuse program and anger-management classes and attended AA/NA meetings while incarcerated. Lindsey asserts that, while she missed some therapy sessions, her absence was due to illness. As for her positive drug screen, Lindsey denies use of methamphetamine and reiterates her argument that her prescription for amphetamine salts caused the positive test result. Lindsey points out that flawless compliance is not required to avoid termination of parental rights. Citing Mason v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2022 Ark. App. 124, 642 S.W.3d 260, she argues that she does not have to prove she is the perfect parent but points out that she was hospitalized when the children were removed from her custody. She says that her past behavior should not necessarily dictate her future. Lindsey believes that she achieved the intended result of being a better parent and that she benefited from the services. 20 Lindsey’s parental rights were terminated on three separate grounds that she does not challenge on appeal. Factual findings that support the statutory grounds may also provide evidence pertaining to the potential-harm prong of the best-interest determination. Minchew v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 95, 660 S.W.3d 909. Lindsey’s housing situation remained unstable throughout the case: she was homeless; she stayed at various hotels; she resided in jail for a few months; and she lived in an apartment from which she was evicted after only one month for failing to pay rent. Although Lindsey claimed she had a home at the time of the termination hearing, she had provided DHS with the address only four days earlier, and Handie testified that she had not gained access to see the apartment for herself. Although Lindsey asserts that she benefited from the services, the trial court clearly disagreed. In Mason, we reversed the termination of a father’s parental rights because, among other things, his daughter was not at any real risk of potential harm through the father’s “slight lapses in judgment.” Mason, 2022 Ark. App. 124, at 18, 642 S.W.3d at 270. Lindsey has had more than slight lapses in judgment with her continued drug use, and she has not shown that she can provide a permanent home for her children. We have held that both of these circumstances represent a risk of potential harm. See Furnish v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 511, 529 S.W.3d 684; Carpenter v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 21, 592 S.W.3d 718. We are simply not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in finding that terminating Lindsey’s parental rights was in MC1’s and MC2’s best interest. Affirmed. 21 BARRETT and WOOD, JJ., agree. Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, for separate appellant Matthew Ross. Jennifer Oyler Olson, Ark. Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant Lindsey Ross. Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee. Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children. 22