Mattew Ross and Lindsey Ross v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 547
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-26-483
MATTHEW ROSS AND LINDSEY ROSS Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 43JV-24-102]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE BARBARA ELMORE,
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILDREN
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
The Lonoke County Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of appellants,
Matthew Ross and Lindsey Ross, to their two minor children, MC1 and MC2. They bring
separate appeals from the decision. Matthew raises several points: (1) the trial court abused
its discretion when it barred as irrelevant the introduction of family photos; (2) the trial court
improperly applied the “golden rule” standard; (3) the trial court improperly decided best
interest before he had a chance to present his evidence; (4) the evidence was insufficient to
prove any of the statutory grounds as to him; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to show
that termination of his rights was in the children’s best interest. Lindsey raises only one point
on appeal: the trial court erred in finding that termination was in her children’s best
interest—specifically, that continued contact with her will result in the risk of potential harm
to MC1 and MC2. We affirm the trial court’s decision as to both parents.
I. Background
On June 28, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
petition for ex parte emergency custody and dependency-neglect after Matthew refused to
pick up then twelve-year-old MC1 and ten-year-old MC2 from a family member’s home. In
an affidavit attached to the petition, a family social worker (FSW) averred that Matthew had
left the children without notice, and the family member was sick and could not care for them
any longer. MC1 and MC2 were essentially left without shelter. Matthew told the FSW that
he had a home but that it was empty. While Matthew claimed that he had items for the
home stored in a shed, he had excuses for why he could not get those items to furnish the
home.
DHS placed a seventy-two-hour hold on MC1 and MC2. Matthew and Lindsey later
stipulated to the children’s adjudication as dependent-neglected based on inadequate shelter
because they were homeless. The goal was reunification with a concurrent goal of permanent
relative placement. The trial court ordered DHS to provide reunification services and
required Matthew and Lindsey to attend parenting classes, submit to a psychological
evaluation and drug-and-alcohol assessment, participate in individual and family counseling,
maintain stable housing and income, attend Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous
(AA/NA) meetings, submit to random drug screens and a hair-follicle drug test, and attend
visitation with the children.
2
The case was reviewed in November 2024. Matthew and Lindsey were found to have
partially complied with the case plan, and the trial court withheld a reasonable-efforts finding
as to DHS because it had failed to make referrals and communicate with the parents. The
parents’ visitation was amended from four hours of weekly supervised visitation to two hours
supervised and two hours unsupervised weekly visitation. The goal remained reunification
with a concurrent goal of relative placement.
Later that same month, DHS and the attorney ad litem (AAL) jointly moved to
suspend visitation as to both parents because Lindsey had submitted cold urine for a drug
screen and then refused to submit a second sample. Also, she had an empty pill bottle that
had been filled five days earlier. DHS and the AAL also alleged that Lindsey had become
irate to the point that 911 was called. The trial court granted the motion but only as to
Lindsey’s visitation—not Matthew’s—and ordered Lindsey to submit to the psychological
evaluation, counseling, and outpatient drug treatment.
In March 2025, the case was reviewed again. Both Matthew and Lindsey were found
to be in partial compliance with the case plan. Both parents were ordered to attend AA/NA
meetings and provide proof to DHS. Also, they were permitted to have one supervised visit
with MC1, who had been diagnosed with cancer, while he was having chemotherapy
treatments at the hospital. The goal remained reunification with a concurrent goal of relative
placement.
At the permanency-planning hearing held in June, the trial court specifically found
that Matthew and Lindsey did not have a home appropriate for the children; they had not
3
complied with counseling services; they had not complied with drug treatment; and they
continued to test positive for THC. The goal was changed to adoption.
In July, DHS and the AAL filed a joint motion to terminate Matthew’s and Lindsey’s
parental rights based on grounds listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Repl. 2020),
including the following: (i)(a) & (b) (failure to remedy); (vii)(a) (subsequent factors or issues);
and (ix)(a)(3)(A) & (B)(i) (aggravated circumstances—little likelihood).1 The termination
hearing was scheduled but continued several times. It was eventually held on March 16,
2026. The witnesses who testified were FSW Sharese Handie; adoption specialist Candace
White; Lindsey; Matthew; MC1; MC2; and Tinisa Lipsie, a DHS employee.
II. Termination-Hearing Testimony
Handie testified that Matthew and Lindsey’s housing situation was unstable
throughout the case. In November 2024, they were living in a motel, and in March 2025,
they moved to a two-bedroom apartment but were evicted after a month or so for failing to
pay the rent. Handie said that they lived in another motel for a while and that Lindsey went
to jail on criminal charges. Matthew gave Handie the address where he was staying, but the
address did not exist. In November 2025, when Lindsey was released from jail, she and
Matthew lived in a motel again. They claimed to have moved to a new apartment in early
February 2026 but did not give Handie that address until four days before the termination
1
The Arkansas Juvenile Code was subsequently repealed by Act 518 of 2025, § 2,
effective August 5, 2025, and is presently codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-35-101 et seq.
(Supp. 2025).
4
hearing. Handie said that she had not been able to walk through the apartment and that she
had concerns because the photos showed that the home was not fully furnished.
With regard to Matthew’s and Lindsey’s employment, Handie said that Matthew had
obtained employment a few months into the case at a truck wash and had provided her with
paystubs. She said that Lindsey claimed to be self-employed and cleaning houses. Handie
said that the only proof of income that Lindsey had provided was a screenshot of her
“CashApp” from December 2025.
Handie stated that both Matthew and Lindsey had submitted to psychological
evaluations but had not complied with the recommendations as ordered. Specifically,
Lindsey had not completed a medication-management assessment. Handie said that
Matthew was assigned a therapist but failed to attend therapy and was discharged and that
Lindsey claimed to be attending counseling on her own but would not allow DHS access to
those records. Handie testified that family counseling never began because the parents failed
to comply with individual counseling. Handie stated that both parents submitted to a drug-
and-alcohol assessment from which outpatient drug treatment was recommended.
Specifically, the report recommended that Matthew and Lindsey complete nine group and
three individual sessions. She said that Matthew continued to test positive for THC and
refused drug screens at times. Handie said that Lindsey, who completed only two group and
two individual sessions, continued to test positive for illegal substances. As recently as
January 22, 2026, Lindsey tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamines,
5
benzodiazepine, and THC. On that same date, Matthew tested positive for THC. Handie
testified that neither parent had attended AA/NA meetings or provided sign-in sheets.
Handie testified that Matthew and Lindsey completed parenting classes. She said that
she had observed only a couple of their visits with the children and did not think that
Matthew interacted with MC1 and MC2. Handie said that both parents missed visits with
MC1 and MC2 and sometimes switched the visits to Zoom, which upset the boys.
White testified that she had identified at least twenty-five possible family matches for
MC1 and MC2 to be adopted together, taking into consideration their characteristics and
history. She said that the children are highly adoptable with no barriers to adoption. White
said that the children’s current foster mother had also expressed interest in adopting them.
Matthew testified that he moved into a new apartment on February 3, 2026, but that
he had not set up beds for MC1 and MC2 yet. He said that he had not contacted Handie
about the apartment because she is rude and “comes at [him].” Matthew said that he gave
Handie the wrong address for where he was staying during Lindsey’s incarceration—he was
staying with his mother during that time. Matthew stated that Handie could visit the new
apartment anytime—even after court that day. Matthew testified that he has worked at
Truckomat since August 2024 and that he works six days a week. He testified that his income
is sufficient to pay the rent at the new apartment.
Matthew testified that he had been testing positive for marijuana because that is his
medicine. He said that he had gotten a medical-marijuana card a couple of weeks before the
hearing because he does not like pills or alcohol. When counsel told him that the medical-
6
marijuana card is not recognized by the court and that he could not smoke marijuana during
the pendency of the case, Matthew said that he understood but that several people at DHS
had told him to get a medical-marijuana card to protect himself. He said that he uses
marijuana to treat his PTSD and ADHD. Matthew initially said that he had been clean since
September 2025 but finally conceded that he had “relapsed” in January 2026 when he tested
positive for THC. Matthew testified that he had done everything asked of him except family
counseling and that it had just not gotten set up for him.
Lindsey testified that she was not present when MC1 and MC2 were removed from
her and Matthew—she was in the hospital with a serious infection, and Matthew was with
her. She said that she and Matthew were going through a “small separation” at the time and
that the children were living with Matthew and his parents.
Lindsey testified that she could not answer any financial questions or questions about
the couples’ joint tax return because Matthew handled that. Lindsey said that she has been
self-employed since 2021 and that her business is called “Get It Done Professional
Housecleaning.” She says that she earns less than Matthew, so she buys things like gas and
groceries. When asked why she had not complied with the case plan, she explained that both
she and Matthew worked all the time, that it takes money to move, and that they were just
concentrating on getting a home for the children. She said reunification services were
“done.”
Lindsey testified that she went to jail from mid-July to mid-November 2025 for
fraudulent use of a credit card and explained that she was in the wrong place at the wrong
7
time with the wrong people. She said that she was placed on probation for a period of ten
years. Lindsey was asked whether there were two other charges when she went to jail, but she
said that she did not remember. She eventually admitted that she was also found guilty of or
pled no contest to theft of property and financial identity fraud.
Lindsey said that while she was in jail, she completed an anger-management class that
was not required, that she participated in a faith-based substance-abuse program, and that
she attended AA meetings. When she was asked about the failed drug test in January 2026,
Lindsey said that she was not proud of it. Lindsey provided prescriptions for amphetamine
salts (Adderall) and alprazolam. She maintained that amphetamine salts caused her to test
positive for methamphetamine, insisting that “[she doesn’t] do meth.” When asked whether
she would take a hair-follicle test, she said, “I’m not okay with that.”
Lindsey admitted that MC1 and MC2 had already been traumatized, and the trial
court said that Lindsey was already on the record stating that she wanted them to stay in the
courtroom and hear the testimony. Lindsey was asked how many children she has, and she
pointed to MC1 and MC2. She was asked about MC3 and MC4, but she did not want to
discuss them. Lindsey insisted that she did not “lose” MC3 and MC4 and that she did not
“give [them] up,” either.
Lindsey identified photos she had sent to her lawyer the day before the hearing of the
apartment that she and Matthew had moved into in February. Lindsey had also taken photos
of her and Matthew with MC1 and MC2. She said, “That was pictures I just wanted the
Court to see that, I mean, this is real. This is—the bond is real. It is there. It’s not fake.” The
8
AAL made a relevance objection to the photos, and the trial court said that photos would
not show a bond.
MC1 testified, “I don’t really want to be with [Matthew and Lindsey], no.” MC1 said
that he had concerns about his parents’ financial issues and their instability. He stated that
he wanted to be adopted. MC1 said on cross-examination, however, that the visits with
Matthew and Lindsey had gone well and that he would like to continue a relationship with
them but that he did not know what that relationship would look like. MC2 testified that,
if it was possible, he would like to be adopted by his current foster mother and that this was
probably in his best interest.
Tinisa Lipsie testified that she had supervised visits between Matthew and Lindsey
and the children for a year. She said that the visits had gone well but that MC1 and MC2
were upset when the parents missed their visits. Lipsie agreed that the family is bonded. She
said that she did not see any parenting issues during the visits but that they last only one
hour. Lipsie concluded by saying that she did not see anything that concerned her.
III. Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court found that the evidence supported terminating Matthew’s and
Lindsey’s parental rights on the following grounds listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-
325(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2025): (i)(a)(1) & (2) (failure to remedy); (vii)(a) (subsequent factors or
issues); and (ix)(a)(3)(A) & (B)(i) (aggravated circumstances—little likelihood). The trial court
found that Matthew and Lindsey’s home was no more stable now than it was when the
children came into care and that the parents had not remedied the conditions that caused
9
the removal of MC1 and MC2. The trial court pointed out that Matthew and Lindsey had
been provided more than eighteen months of services but that things had gotten worse, not
better. The trial court also expressed doubt whether the photos depicted the parents’ current
home and concluded that the parents had not maintained stable housing during the case.
The trial court further found that Matthew’s and Lindsey’s drug use was a subsequent
factor or issue and that the parents continued to test positive for drugs, refused drug screens,
and failed to attend AA/NA meetings. The trial court noted that Lindsey, who had tested
positive for methamphetamine in January, had not completed drug treatment. The trial
court found that it would be detrimental to the children’s health and safety to be returned
to the parents given their drug use and inappropriate lifestyle, especially with MC1’s medical
condition. Moreover, the trial court found that the parents’ failure to comply with court
orders was a subsequent factor or issue: they had not fully complied with drug treatment,
attended AA/NA meetings, participated in individual and family counseling, obtained stable
housing, and followed the recommendations of their psychological evaluations. Also, the
trial court noted that Lindsey had obtained criminal charges during the case and that she
had gone to jail for several months. The trial court further found that the parents had missed
a lot of visits with MC1 and MC2 and that it had not been possible to increase their
visitation.
In addition, the trial court found that DHS had done all it could to help Matthew
and Lindsey but that they had chosen not to comply with services that could have helped,
such as counseling. The trial court noted that, while Matthew had completed more services,
10
he had not learned anything from them. The trial court concluded that there were no
additional services that could have been provided and that there was little likelihood
continued services would result in successful reunification.
Finally, the trial court found that termination of Matthew’s and Lindsey’s parental
rights was in the best interest of MC1 and MC2 because they need permanency and stability.
The trial court noted that the children were thriving in their current foster home and that
Matthew and Lindsey were not able to give them stability and permanency in a time frame
appropriate for the children given their developmental needs. The trial court noted that
there was a risk of harm given the parents’ housing instability and continued drug use. The
trial court also found that the children are highly adoptable with no barriers to their
adoption. The trial court noted that, while the current foster mother was considering
adopting both boys, there were also twenty-five possible adoptive matches for the children.
IV. Standard of Review
This court’s review of cases involving the termination of parental rights is de novo.
Brown v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 370, 584 S.W.3d 276. Grounds for
termination must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is a degree of proof
that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be
established. Id. Our inquiry is whether the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was
proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. Credibility determinations
are left to the fact-finder. Id.
11
Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a determination that
the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-35-325(b)(3). The first step requires proof of one or more statutory grounds for
termination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B). The second step, the best-interest analysis,
includes consideration of the likelihood the juvenile will be adopted and of the potential
harm caused by returning custody of the child to the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-
325(b)(3)(A).
V. Discussion
A. Matthew’s Parental Rights
1. Family photos
The trial court ruled that photos depicting Matthew and Lindsey with MC1 and MC2
in which they are smiling with arms around each other were irrelevant to show a bond.
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. Ark. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is not
admissible. Ark. R. Evid. 402. A trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence will not
be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Hopkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 79
Ark. App. 1, 83 S.W.3d 418 (2002).
Matthew argues that the trial court erred in not admitting family photos for the
purpose of showing the bond that he and Lindsey shared with MC1 and MC2 because their
bond is highly relevant to one of the best-interest factors: potential harm. He asserts that the
12
photos were also relevant to the aggravated-circumstances ground—specifically, the question
of the likelihood of successful reunification. According to Matthew, the photos show that
the children are interested in reuniting and do not fear him or Lindsey. Matthew argues that
the prejudice is clear because the trial court did not see that MC1 and MC2 obviously love
their parents and that he and Lindsey love them.
Matthew’s argument is not preserved. Matthew, who was represented by separate
counsel below, was not the proponent of the photos and made no argument for their
admission into evidence when the AAL objected to them as irrelevant. Cf. Rockett v. State,
319 Ark. 335, 891 S.W.2d 366 (1995) (holding that a codefendant must make his own timely
and complete objections and cannot benefit from objections made by another defendant).
Matthew’s counsel sat by silently during the exchange about the photos and made no attempt
to join Lindsey’s counsel in arguing for their admission or with proffering them. Even
assuming that Matthew’s argument was sufficiently preserved through Lindsey’s counsel, we
have said that the existence of a bond may not be sufficient to prevent termination of
parental rights when weighed against other facts in the case. Rice v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
2024 Ark. App. 278, 688 S.W.3d 491. In other words, even if the photos were admissible to
prove the existence of a bond, it may not have been enough to prevent termination of
Matthew’s parental rights in light of, for example, Matthew’s instability in terms of housing
and his continued use of THC. In any event, there was no prejudice by excluding the photos
13
given that there was testimony regarding that bond by Lindsey and Lipsie.2 While the trial
court may have found Lindsey generally not credible, it could have believed her when it came
to the existence of a bond that both parents share with MC1 and MC2. The trier of fact may
believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony. Gibby v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2022
Ark. App. 145, 643 S.W.3d 479. To the extent Matthew contends that a bond impacts the
sufficiency of the evidence, that will be discussed below.
2. Golden rule
A “golden rule” argument suggests to jurors that they place themselves in the position
of a party or victim. Puckett v. State, 324 Ark. 81, 88, 918 S.W.2d 707, 711 (1996) (citing
King v. State, 317 Ark. 293, 293, 877 S.W.2d 583, 586 (1994)). Such an argument is
impermissible because it tends to subvert the objectivity of the jury. Id. It is seen as an attempt
to dissuade the jurors from their duty to weigh the evidence and instead to view the case
from the standpoint of a litigant or party. Id. The golden rule is applied to criminal cases as
well as civil cases. Id.
Matthew argues that the trial court, as the fact-finder, placed itself in the position of
the parents in stating from the bench the following:
There’s just no way in the world that if I have one hour a week to be with my kids
twice a week or whatever it is, that I would miss any time. I don’t even miss with my
grandchildren. And I have to work too. So there’s no way that that would happen.
2
Handie’s testimony was somewhat confusing on this topic, but even she admitted
that there was a bond between the parents and children. Handie seemingly stated that she
did not see a bond between Matthew and Lindsey because “they’re usually just talking to the
children.”
14
Speaking specifically to Matthew, the trial court also said, “There’s no way that I—that
anybody would ever test me and I would have drugs in my system.” Matthew argues that a
circuit court judge and a blue-collar worker employed washing diesel trucks are not—and
never will be—in the same shoes. Matthew asserts that he does not have the luxury of setting
his own schedule, as most circuit court judges do.
Even assuming arguendo that the golden rule applies to bench trials, Matthew’s
argument is not preserved. To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must object at the
first opportunity. Waller v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 113, 686 S.W.3d 15. Matthew claims in his
reply brief that he had no opportunity to object, but the trial court made the objectionable
statements from the bench with counsel present. Moreover, this is not an argument going to
the sufficiency of the evidence, which can be raised for the first time on appeal following a
bench trial. See Terry v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 591, 591 S.W.3d 824.
3. Prejudgment about best interest
Matthew argues that, when MC2 testified that it was in his best interest to be adopted,
the trial court said, “I agree. There we go.” Matthew contends that DHS and the AAL had
not rested their case at that point, yet the trial court had already determined best interest.
He argues that courts warn jurors all the time about not making up their minds before all of
the evidence is introduced. Matthew argues that he suffered prejudice because when fact-
finders make up their minds prematurely, the party against whom they have decided has
been deprived of a fair trial.
15
We first note that Matthew raised no objection to the trial court’s comment during
MC2’s testimony. Despite the trial court’s remark, its written order demonstrates that the
trial court’s conclusion that termination of Matthew’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interest was based on all of the evidence in the record rather than on MC2’s statement
that adoption was in his best interest. To the extent that the trial court left the impression
that it had prejudged the best-interest finding, thus creating a conflict or discrepancy with its
subsequent written order, the written order generally controls over oral pronouncements.
Martin v. Higgins, 2024 Ark. App. 1, at 4 n.3, 682 S.W.3d 357, 359 n.3.
4. Sufficiency of evidence as to grounds
Matthew discussed each of the three grounds found by the trial court to support its
decision, but we will address only the failure-to-remedy ground, Ark. Code Ann. 9-35-
325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(1), given that only one ground is needed to support the termination of his
parental rights. Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918. Section
9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) provides that a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be
dependent-neglected and has continued to be out of the custody of the parent for twelve
months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and
correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the
parent.
Matthew argues that he remedied the conditions that caused removal: his refusal to
pick up his children and his homelessness. He argues that he was no longer abandoning his
children and that he has a home—whether it was with his mother, in a hotel, or in an
16
apartment. Although the argument was made with respect to the subsequent-factors-or-issues
ground, Matthew contends that just because someone moves does not mean his housing is
unstable. He relies on Strickland v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 103 Ark. App. 193,
287 S.W.3d 633 (2008), in which the mother’s rights were terminated due, in part, to her
unstable housing given that she had moved eight times in twenty-one months. We said that
the trial court erred in finding that the mother’s housing was unstable because she always
maintained housing; the residences were not shown to be inappropriate; and she had
reasonable excuses for many of the moves. Matthew was homeless in the beginning of the
case; he then lived in various hotels; he moved in with his mother; and he stayed in an
apartment but was evicted after a month. At a minimum, a hotel room is inappropriate
housing for two children. A child suffers harm from the lack of stability in a permanent
home. Brumley v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. 356. While Matthew claimed to have
found an apartment in early February, he did not share the address with DHS until four days
before the termination hearing. Handie testified that she had not been shown a copy of the
lease or seen the home for herself. Handie noted that the apartment had very little furniture,
and Matthew admitted that, although he had beds for MC1 and MC2, he had not yet set
them up because he did not want to see the beds set up and then be disappointed if the boys
were not returned to his custody. Because Matthew’s housing was unstable and sometimes
inappropriate, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the failure-to-
remedy ground supports the termination of Matthew’s parental rights.
17
5. Best interest
Matthew raises four points in challenging the trial court’s best-interest finding. First,
he argues that the trial court made no findings “specifically addressing the effect on the
children’s health and safety” that would result from returning the children to his custody. In
Crawford v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2019 Ark. App. 474, 588 S.W.3d 383, the
mother failed to preserve an argument that the trial court was required to make specific
findings of fact in its written order in support of its best-interest finding given that the
mother did not request specific findings, and she failed to cite any authority for the
proposition that the trial court is otherwise obligated to expressly make specific factual
findings to support its best-interest finding absent a request to do so. Matthew did not
request specific findings and thus failed to preserve this argument.
Second, Matthew argues that the family bond—as shown by the excluded photos—is
relevant to best interest, citing Richie v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2023 Ark.
App. 219. In Richie, we reversed the termination of a father’s parental rights because, due to
his compliance, progress, and bond with his children, we could not say that the father’s past
relationship with the children’s mother necessarily justified severing his parental rights.
Here, Matthew did not comply with or make substantial progress with the case plan, and his
relationship with Lindsey had no bearing on the termination of his rights. Despite the
existence of a bond, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that
termination was in MC1’s and MC2’s best interest given the other facts in this case.
18
Matthew’s third and fourth points address severed relationships caused by
termination of his parental rights. He argues that MC1 testified that he wants a continued
relationship with him and Lindsey but that termination will end their relationship. He also
argues that the court-appointed special advocate (CASA) recommended that the children
stay in touch with their grandparents but that termination severs that relationship, too,
because an adopted individual becomes a stranger to his blood relations, except for sibling
visitation. Clark v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 223, 575 S.W.3d 578.
Parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and
well-being of the child and must give way to the best interest of the child when the natural
parents fail to provide reasonable care for their minor children. Spencer v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 96, 426 S.W.3d 494. Here, Matthew failed to provide the most basic
of needs: stable housing. MC1 and MC2 both testified about the instability and uncertainty
they felt with their parents, and they wanted permanency through adoption. We cannot say
that the trial court clearly erred with its best-interest finding.
B. Lindsey’s Parental Rights
Lindsey does not challenge the adoptability prong of the best-interest analysis; rather,
she argues that the trial court erred in finding that MC1 and MC2 would be at risk of
potential harm if returned to her custody. In assessing the potential-harm factor, the court
is not required to find that actual harm would ensue if the child were returned to the parent
nor to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Rice v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2024 Ark.
App. 278, 688 S.W.3d 491. The potential-harm analysis is to be conducted in broad terms.
19
Id. Past actions of a parent over a meaningful period of time are good indicators of what the
future may hold. Id.
Lindsey contends that, by the time of the termination hearing, she had made
significant progress and was ready for the children to be placed in her custody. Lindsey argues
that she and Matthew had a home and income. She points to the fact that the visitations
went well and that there was obviously a strong family bond. Lindsey asserts that, while MC1
and MC2 expressed an interest in adoption, they also said that they wanted to continue to
have a relationship with her and Matthew. She argues that she completed her psychological
evaluation, the drug-and-alcohol assessment, and parenting classes. She says that she also
completed a faith-based substance-abuse program and anger-management classes and
attended AA/NA meetings while incarcerated. Lindsey asserts that, while she missed some
therapy sessions, her absence was due to illness. As for her positive drug screen, Lindsey
denies use of methamphetamine and reiterates her argument that her prescription for
amphetamine salts caused the positive test result. Lindsey points out that flawless compliance
is not required to avoid termination of parental rights. Citing Mason v. Arkansas Department
of Human Services, 2022 Ark. App. 124, 642 S.W.3d 260, she argues that she does not have
to prove she is the perfect parent but points out that she was hospitalized when the children
were removed from her custody. She says that her past behavior should not necessarily dictate
her future. Lindsey believes that she achieved the intended result of being a better parent
and that she benefited from the services.
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Lindsey’s parental rights were terminated on three separate grounds that she does not
challenge on appeal. Factual findings that support the statutory grounds may also provide
evidence pertaining to the potential-harm prong of the best-interest determination. Minchew
v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 95, 660 S.W.3d 909. Lindsey’s housing
situation remained unstable throughout the case: she was homeless; she stayed at various
hotels; she resided in jail for a few months; and she lived in an apartment from which she
was evicted after only one month for failing to pay rent. Although Lindsey claimed she had
a home at the time of the termination hearing, she had provided DHS with the address only
four days earlier, and Handie testified that she had not gained access to see the apartment
for herself. Although Lindsey asserts that she benefited from the services, the trial court
clearly disagreed. In Mason, we reversed the termination of a father’s parental rights because,
among other things, his daughter was not at any real risk of potential harm through the
father’s “slight lapses in judgment.” Mason, 2022 Ark. App. 124, at 18, 642 S.W.3d at 270.
Lindsey has had more than slight lapses in judgment with her continued drug use, and she
has not shown that she can provide a permanent home for her children. We have held that
both of these circumstances represent a risk of potential harm. See Furnish v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 511, 529 S.W.3d 684; Carpenter v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
2020 Ark. App. 21, 592 S.W.3d 718. We are simply not left with a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court made a mistake in finding that terminating Lindsey’s parental
rights was in MC1’s and MC2’s best interest.
Affirmed.
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BARRETT and WOOD, JJ., agree.
Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, for separate appellant
Matthew Ross.
Jennifer Oyler Olson, Ark. Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant
Lindsey Ross.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children.
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