Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 563 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-26-411 Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026 SAVANNAH DICKSON AND FRANK BLOOM APPEAL FROM THE RANDOLPH APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 61JV-24-82] V. HONORABLE ADAM G. WEEKS, JUDGE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILDREN AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND APPELLEES REMANDED IN PART WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge Appellants Savannah Dickson (Savannah) and Frank Bloom (Frank) separately appeal after the Randolph County Circuit Court issued an order terminating their parental rights to Minor Child 3 (MC3) (DOB 05-14-21) and Minor Child 4 (MC4) (DOB 09-05-22). On appeal, Savannah argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. Frank argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that statutory grounds existed to support the termination. We affirm the termination of Savannah’s parental rights, and we reverse and remand the termination of Frank’s parental rights. I. Relevant Facts On November 1, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for dependency-neglect and emergency custody of MC3 and MC4 as well as Savannah’s two older children, Minor Child 1 (MC1) (DOB 02-13-16) and Minor Child 2 (MC2) (DOB 02-23-19).1 In the affidavit attached to the petition, a family service worker (FSW) stated that, on October 29, 2024, DHS was notified that Savannah had been arrested for child endangerment, assault on a family member, and driving while intoxicated with MC2, MC3, and MC4 in the car.2 DHS received a report that Savannah was seen pulling the children by their hair at a local grocery store and driving with the children unrestrained in the vehicle. Frank, who was in jail at the time, was identified as a putative parent of MC3 and MC4. DHS exercised a seventy-two-hour hold because of concerns that the caregiver did not meet the children’s immediate needs for supervision, food, and clothing and that substance abuse seriously impaired the caregiver’s ability to supervise, protect, or care for the children. An ex parte order placing the children in DHS’s legal custody was filed on November 4. 1 Frank is not the father of MC1 or MC2. MC1 and MC2 were ultimately dismissed from the case after MC1’s paternal grandparents were granted guardianship of MC1, and MC2’s father was awarded permanent custody of MC2. Only the parental rights relating to MC3 and MC4 are at issue in this appeal. 2 Law enforcement officers were performing a welfare check at Savannah’s home where they found MC1 alone. Officers were still there when Savannah returned home with her other three children in the vehicle with her. She appeared to be intoxicated and was arrested in the driveway. 2 A probable-cause hearing was held on November 5, and an order was filed on November 13. The court found there was probable cause that the emergency conditions that necessitated removal from Savannah’s custody continued and that it was contrary to the welfare of the children to be returned home and in their best interest to remain in DHS custody. An adjudication hearing was held on December 10, and an order was filed on January 13, 2025. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the children were dependent-neglected on the bases of parental unfitness and inadequate supervision due to Savannah’s driving a motor vehicle while consuming alcohol with the children in the car. The court found that Frank did not contribute to the dependency-neglect of the children because he was incarcerated but that he was not “a fit parent” for custody purposes because he was presently in jail and had testified that he would be sent to the Arkansas Division of Correction within the next few weeks. The court found that it was in the best interest of the children to remain in DHS custody and set the goal of the case as reunification with a fit parent with a concurrent goal of guardianship or permanent custody with a fit relative. A review hearing was held on April 22, and an order was filed on July 14. The court ordered that MC3 and MC4 “shall remain in the custody of [DHS] because the parents are unfit and the juveniles’ health and safety cannot be protected by the parents if returned to the parents.” The court found that DHS had complied with the orders of the court and had made reasonable efforts to provide family services and finalize a permanency plan for the children. The court found that Savannah was in partial compliance with the case plan and 3 had demonstrated some progress, but she had not provided DHS with proof of employment, she had been late for at least four visits with the children and a “no show” for three visits since January, and she still needed to obtain appropriate housing and resolve her pending legal issues. The court found that Frank was incarcerated at the Tucker Unit of the Arkansas Division of Correction, was noncompliant with the case plan, and had not demonstrated progress. The goal remained reunification with a concurrent goal of guardianship or permanent custody. A second review hearing was held on July 8, and an order was filed on July 18. The court found that DHS had complied with the case plan and the orders of the court and had made reasonable efforts to provide family services and finalize a permanency plan for the children. The court found that Savannah was in partial compliance with the case plan and had demonstrated some progress. Her home had been cleaner, but she still had not provided DHS with proof of employment and did not have appropriate beds for MC3 and MC4. Additionally, she had a positive alcohol screen and had been arrested for failure to appear. The court found that Frank was noncompliant with the case plan and had demonstrated no progress. The court found that continuation of custody with DHS was in the best interest of MC3 and MC4 and was the least-restrictive alternative. The goal remained reunification with a concurrent goal of guardianship. A permanency-planning hearing was held on October 14, and an order was filed on November 5. The court found that DHS had complied with the case plan and the orders of the court and had made reasonable efforts to provide family services and finalize a 4 permanency plan for MC3 and MC4. The court found, during this review period, that Savannah had not demonstrated progress towards the goal of the case, had not benefited from the services offered by DHS, and had not remedied the issues that prevented safe return of the children. She did not have appropriate housing; the home was cluttered and infested with roaches; and there was no room or beds set up for children. Additionally, she had provided paystubs purportedly from her employer that were forged, she tested positive for drugs on multiple occasions, she missed a permanency-planning meeting and several family- time visits, and there had been multiple failed home visits. The court found that Frank also had not demonstrated progress toward the goals of the case, had not benefited from the services offered, and was not diligently working toward reunification or placement in the home. He was not employed, had not provided DHS with an accurate address, had tested positive for THC and methamphetamine, and had inappropriate conversations with the children during visitation. Finally, the court found: After reviewing the facts of the case and the evidence presented today, in accordance with the best interest, health, and safety of the juveniles, considering the permanency goals in order of preference, the court determines that adoption following termination of parental rights shall be the goal of the case pursuant to A.C.A. § 9-35- 324 and it is the least restrictive permanency plan. The concurrent goal shall be guardianship with a relative or adoption by a relative. The court granted Frank’s request for appointment of counsel and scheduled a termination- of-parental-rights hearing. DHS filed a petition to terminate Savannah’s and Franks’ parental rights on November 7, alleging the following: 5 a. Savannah Dickson is a parent of [MC3 and MC4] for the purposes of the juvenile code because she is the biological mother. b. The Court previously found that Frank Bloom has established significant contacts and his rights as a putative father have attached as to [MC3 and MC4]. As to Savannah, the petition alleged the following grounds for termination: (1) twelve months failure to remedy, Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(1) (Supp. 2025); (2) twelve months failure to maintain meaningful contact, section 9-35- 325(b)(3)(B)(ii); (3) other subsequent factors, section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(vii); and (4) aggravated circumstances; specifically, little likelihood that continued services would result in reunification, section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(A)(B)(i). The petition pled the same grounds for termination with respect to Frank, except that it alleged the twelve-months-failure-to- remedy ground that is applicable to a noncustodial parent, section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(2). The petition also alleged that termination of parental rights was in MC3’s and MC4’s best interest. DHS asserted that it had an appropriate placement plan, that it was seeking to clear the children for adoption, and that there were no known issues that would prevent or prolong the adoption process. DHS alleged that potential harm would be caused by returning the children to the custody of the parents, citing “the parents’ inconsistent progress with the case plan, unemployment, lack of transportation, inconsistent visitation, continued substance abuse, and unstable housing.” A termination hearing was held on March 3, 2026. Savannah testified that she was currently incarcerated in the Randolph County Detention Center, after she was arrested in December and again in January, and that she had no source of income. She said that she was 6 detained on a $25,000 bond and was not sure when she would be released and that her next court date was in May. She testified that she had been evicted from her home but that she has friends and family she could stay with once she is released from jail. She admitted using methamphetamine during the pendency of the case. She also admitted that she had not visited MC3 and MC4 since the first week of October 2025. She acknowledged that the children could not come home with her that day, but she believed that termination was not in their best interest and wanted them to be placed with her aunt in Florida, Natalie Nichols. She claimed that DHS should have known about Nichols from a prior case and therefore should have contacted her at the beginning of the instant case. Frank testified that he was currently incarcerated and acknowledged that MC3 and MC4 could not be placed with him. He said that he understood they were probably going to be placed with Savannah’s aunt in Florida and was “absolutely okay” with that. He thought it would be in their best interest to be placed immediately with family and believed it had taken DHS too long to start the process of vetting Nichols for placement. He asked that his parental rights not be terminated and for additional time to get himself together. Dusty Brown, the FSW assigned to the case, testified that the children had been removed from the parents’ custody for about eighteen months, and the progress made by the parents had been minimal. According to Brown, things started to regress in the summer of 2025 and “just continued to go in the wrong direction until now.” She said that both parents were incarcerated at the beginning of the case and both were incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing. She testified that Savannah’s drug screens were negative at the 7 beginning of the case, but as the case progressed, Savannah started testing positive for methamphetamine and had positive drug screens in September, October, and November 2025 and January 2026, and that Savannah had admitted using drugs. She said that Frank also tested positive for drugs throughout the case and was positive for methamphetamine and THC in September, October, November, and December 2025, and he admitted that he was using before he was arrested in January 2026. She said that random home visits at the address provided by Frank were unsuccessful, neither parent was employed, and neither parent had reliable transportation. Additionally, she testified that MC3 and MC4, who were three and four years old at the time, are very adoptable; both are “super sweet” with no behavior or health issues. She said that DHS had completed an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) home study with Savannah’s aunt, Nichols, and had not identified another adoptive placement outside of that. She agreed that Nichols could have been contacted sooner. She acknowledged a note in the case file dated July 16, 2025, indicating that “the county will seek out additional relative replacement and that Natalie Nichols is a possible hand [sic] in Florida [and] will require an ICPC.” She said that Nichols first contacted DHS in September 2025 and that DHS had completed her ICPC home study by October 2025. She said that it was her understanding that “we are just right close at approval for the kids to go there.” Suzanne Hendricks, the secondary FSW assigned to the case, testified that Savannah had attended only five out of twenty-nine visits with the children (17 percent) and that Frank had attended only seven out of twenty-nine visits (24 percent). She said that she picked up 8 the children and drove them nearly two hours for visits, and on multiple occasions, neither parent showed up. At the conclusion of the hearing, Savannah moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that DHS presented insufficient evidence. She argued, in relevant part, that DHS was not diligent in contacting her aunt about the potential placement of MC3 and MC4 and that a least-restrictive alternative would be to continue the case for three months and see if the placement with Nichols occurs. The circuit court denied Savannah’s motion to dismiss and ruled from the bench as follows: So while it is true that [DHS] has been less than optimum in their working of this case, there is a limit to how much weight I’m going to give that argument. I would have given the most weight back in the summer of ’25. I would have given a great deal of weight at the [permanency-planning hearing]. However, here at termination, the weight I give it is not enough to overcome the weight I give to the best interest of the children and their need for permanency. The concurrent goal at [the permanency- planning hearing] was guardianship with a fit and willing relative or adoption with a fit and willing relative. That was the last time this court visited and reviewed the goal. [DHS] has made reasonable efforts from and after PPH to pursue that goal. The court entered an order terminating Savannah’s and Frank’s parental rights as to MC3 and MC4 on March 23. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that DHS proved each of the grounds alleged in the petition. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of MC3 and MC4. The court found that the children are adoptable and that they would be subjected to potential harm because the parents had not consistently had stable or appropriate housing, transportation, and employment; were currently incarcerated; and had not consistently participated in the case plan. The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to 9 finalize the permanency plan and made reasonable and meaningful efforts to provide appropriate family services to the parents; yet, “[d]espite these services, the juveniles cannot and should not be returned to the parents.” Savannah filed a timely notice of appeal from the termination order on April 6. Frank filed a timely notice of appeal from the termination order on April 7 and an amended notice on April 13. II. Standard of Review A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3). A circuit court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child, taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(A). The order terminating parental rights must also be based on a showing of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B). Jurls v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 443, at 10, 676 S.W.3d 316, 324. Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of parents, but parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 193, at 7, 625 S.W.3d 374, 379. In deciding whether to terminate the parental rights of a parent, 10 the circuit court has a duty to evaluate all the circumstances surrounding the parent’s ability to discharge his or her duties as a parent. Id., 625 S.W.3d at 379. The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(a)(3). Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Jurls, 2023 Ark. App. 443, at 10, 676 S.W.3d at 324. This court’s review of termination proceedings is de novo, and we will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. at 9, 676 S.W.3d at 324. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, we give due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324. III. Savannah’s Appeal Savannah concedes that there is sufficient evidence to support a statutory ground supporting termination of her parental rights, and she does not challenge the circuit court’s findings that MC3 and MC4 are adoptable or that they would face potential harm if returned to her care. Instead, she argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination 11 was in the best interest of MC3 and MC4 because, citing sections 9-28-1003, -105, and -108, “our legislature has codified statutes that promote the well-being of children and declared that placement with relatives is the preferred goal when accomplishing permanency for children.” Savannah argues that a less restrictive means of permanency could have been achieved with guardianship or permanent custody with Nichols, her aunt in Florida. We disagree. The relative preference outlined by the legislature must be balanced with the individual facts of each case. Littlejohn v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 411, at 10, 675 S.W.3d 893, 899. This court has held that a circuit court is permitted to set termination as a goal even when a relative is available and requests custody. Thompson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 80, at 19, 707 S.W.3d 483, 495. We have also rejected least-restrictive- placement arguments when, like here, reunification with the parent is futile. Id., 707 S.W.3d at 495. When the parent demonstrates stability and a reasonable hope for reunification, then there is no harm in waiting a little longer before terminating parental rights; but when that stability and a reasonable hope for reunification are not present, there is no reason to further delay achieving permanency through termination and adoption. Littlejohn, 2023 Ark. App. 411, at 10, 675 S.W.3d at 899; see also Gamble v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 404, at 14, 636 S.W.3d 368, 376 (holding that “there was no compelling reason for the court to choose permanent custody rather than adoption and TPR because there was no reasonable prospect that appellant would eventually reunify with her children as demonstrated by her failure to challenge the statutory grounds at the termination hearing or on appeal”). Here, 12 by the time of the termination hearing, Savannah was incarcerated, unemployed, and had unresolved problems with substance abuse. See Thompson, 2025 Ark. App. 80, at 20, 707 S.W.3d at 495–96 (stability and reasonable hope for reunification were lacking when the parent failed to comply with the case plan throughout the case, had not had stable employment, and did not have stable housing by the time of the termination hearing); see also Otis v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 28, at 8, 538 S.W.3d 870, 875 (affirming best-interest finding when the parent had not addressed issues with drug use and mental illness despite referrals for these services by DHS). Further, MC3 and MC4 were never in a relative’s custody, and there was no demonstration of any bond with Nichols. See Blankenship v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 63, at 18–19, 661 S.W.3d 227, 238 (rejecting least-restrictive-placement argument when relatives had met child on only one occasion). While the FSW testified that she believed Nichols’s ICPC home study would likely be finalized and approved, Nichols did not appear at the termination hearing or at any other hearing, and it is not certain whether she ultimately would be approved for placement of MC3 and MC4. See Alexander v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 536, at 11, 679 S.W.3d 450, 457 (“[T]o make a least-restrictive- placement argument on appeal, at a minimum, there must be an appropriate and approved relative in the picture.”). DHS’s failure to investigate Nichols as a potential placement for MC3 and MC4, moreover, does not render the circuit court’s best-interest finding clearly erroneous. See Otis, 2018 Ark. App. 28, at 9, 538 S.W.3d at 876 (holding “that the lack of 13 exploration of placing [a child] with a relative before termination does not render the [circuit] court’s overall best-interest finding clearly erroneous”). After our de novo review, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination of Savannah’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Savannah’s parental rights to MC3 and MC4. IV. Frank’s Appeal Frank argues that the circuit court erred in finding that statutory grounds existed to support the termination of his parental rights. He contends that the only statutory grounds alleged by DHS, and found by the circuit court, pertained to a “parent” and that the record does not support the circuit court’s finding that he is a “parent” of MC3 and MC4 for purposes of termination. He argues that because the “parent” element of the statutory grounds was not met, the termination of his parental rights should be reversed. We agree. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325 provides a remedy when, as in this case, DHS “is attempting to clear a juvenile for permanent placement by terminating parental rights of a parent and putative parent based on the definition of ‘parent’ and ‘putative father’ under § 9-35-102.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(a)(2)(A). Pursuant to section 9-35-102(49) (Supp. 2025), “putative father” means “any man not deemed or adjudicated under the laws of the jurisdiction of the United States to be the biological father of a juvenile who claims to be or is alleged to be the biological father of the juvenile.” Pursuant to section 9-35- 102(42), “parent” means: 14 (A) A biological mother; (B) An adoptive parent; or (C) A man: (i) To whom the biological mother was married at the time of conception or birth; (ii) Who has signed an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to § 9-10-120; (iii) Who has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the biological father of the juvenile or to have otherwise established paternity; or (iv) Who is listed as the parent on the birth certificate of the child. Frank argues that because he was at all times treated as only a putative parent and the circuit court never found him to be a “parent” as that term is defined in the Juvenile Code, the termination order must be reversed. Here, the dependency-neglect petition listed Frank as MC3 and MC4’s putative parent, as did the emergency-custody order, the probable-cause order, the adjudication order, and both review orders. In the probable-cause order, the circuit court specifically found that Frank was “a putative father of [MC3 and MC4]” and ordered that “[a]ny putative fathers shall establish paternity and submit to genetic testing.” But the court never made any finding that Frank had established paternity, and nothing in the record indicates that genetic testing was ever done. The court found in the adjudication order that Frank had presented evidence proving he had established significant contacts with the children and that “putative parent rights” had attached. While the permanency-planning order listed Frank as a “parent” of MC3 and 15 MC4, it did not find that he had established paternity and did not otherwise legally establish him as a “parent”; it stated that his rights as a “putative father” had attached: As to the putative parent in this case: The Court finds there is a single putative father identified. The putative father, Frank Bloom, has presented evidence proving that he has established significant contacts with the juveniles. As a result, the Court finds that his rights have attached, and he shall be named a party to the case. Compare Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-314(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2025) (if “the circuit court finds that the putative parent has established paternity, the court shall . . . [e]nter an order establishing the putative parent as a parent for the purposes of this subchapter”) with Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-314(c)(2)(B)(i) (if “the circuit court finds that the putative parent has established significant contacts with the juvenile, the court shall . . . [e]nter an order stating that the rights of the putative parent have attached”). The termination order states that Frank “is a parent of the juveniles because this Court previously found that he has established significant contacts and his rights as a putative father have attached” but does not establish his legal status as a “parent” for termination purposes, and his legal status was not discussed at the termination hearing. Similarly, while the petition for termination of parental rights listed Frank as a “parent” of MC3 and MC4, DHS asserted in the body of the petition that Savannah is a “parent” for purposes of the Juvenile Code “because she is the biological mother” of the children and that the circuit court previously found Frank had “established significant contacts” and “his rights as a putative father have attached” to MC3 and MC4. (Emphasis added.) Despite its own assertion that Frank is a putative father whose rights have attached, 16 and no finding by the circuit court establishing him as a “parent,” DHS pled grounds that pertain only to a “parent” and did not allege the statutory ground applicable to a putative parent.3 See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(x) (providing ground for termination of putative parent’s rights if the putative parent fails to establish or maintain meaningful contact with the juvenile and the court has found that the rights of the putative parent with regard to the juvenile have attached). The grounds alleged by DHS and found by the circuit court required proof that Frank is a “parent” as a prerequisite to terminating his parental rights. See Blankenship, 2023 Ark. App. 63, at 14–15, 661 S.W.3d at 235–36 (reversing termination based on subsequent- factors and twelve-months-failure-to-remedy grounds when circuit court had never made a specific finding that putative father was a “parent”). Because Frank was treated as a putative parent throughout the case, and the circuit court never entered an order expressly finding him to be a “parent,” his rights were not legally established to then be terminated. See Campos v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 221, at 11–13, 644 S.W.3d 465, 471–72 (reversing termination where the circuit court consistently referred to Campos as a putative parent and never entered an order expressly finding him to be a “parent” for purposes of termination). Moreover, we can determine no basis in the record that would support a 3 DHS did not file a brief on appeal contesting Frank’s challenge to termination on grounds that pertain only to a “parent.” Therefore, we are left with no explanation for DHS’s inconsistent positions vis-à-vis Frank’s parental status. 17 finding that Frank fell within section 9-35-102(42)’s definition of a “parent.” See Tovias v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 228, at 6–7, 575 S.W.3d 621, 624–25 (reversing termination where the circuit court found that Tovias was the “legal father” with no basis in the record to support a finding that he fell within any of the designated categories in the Juvenile Code’s definition of “parent”). Frank obviously is not MC3’s and MC4’s biological mother. There is no evidence that he is an adoptive parent, that he was married to Savannah when MC3 and MC4 were conceived or born, that any court has previously determined him to be the biological father of MC3 and MC4, that he signed an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to section 9-10-120, or that he is listed as a parent on as MC3’s and MC4’s birth certificates because the birth certificates are not in the record. See Barnoski v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 324, at 6–7, 690 S.W.3d 128, 132 (holding that without a finding that Barnoski’s parental rights attached to the child, the statutory requirements to terminate rights on the ground applicable to a “putative parent” were not met, and the record was insufficient to establish that he was a “parent” to child). DHS had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Frank is a parent. See Terry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 591, at 9–10, 591 S.W.3d 824, 830. DHS, however, did not produce anything to establish Frank’s parental status under law. Accordingly, the circuit court lacked sufficient evidence on which to conclude that Frank is a “parent” whose rights could be terminated. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in terminating Frank’s parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 18 Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree. Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant Savannah Dickson. Bell Law Co., by: Evan C. Bell, for separate appellant Frank Bloom. Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee. Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children. 19