Savannah Dickson and Frank Bloom v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 563
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-26-411
Opinion Delivered November 18, 2026
SAVANNAH DICKSON AND FRANK
BLOOM APPEAL FROM THE RANDOLPH
APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 61JV-24-82]
V. HONORABLE ADAM G. WEEKS,
JUDGE
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILDREN AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
APPELLEES REMANDED IN PART
WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge
Appellants Savannah Dickson (Savannah) and Frank Bloom (Frank) separately appeal
after the Randolph County Circuit Court issued an order terminating their parental rights
to Minor Child 3 (MC3) (DOB 05-14-21) and Minor Child 4 (MC4) (DOB 09-05-22). On
appeal, Savannah argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination was
in the children’s best interest. Frank argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that
statutory grounds existed to support the termination. We affirm the termination of
Savannah’s parental rights, and we reverse and remand the termination of Frank’s parental
rights.
I. Relevant Facts
On November 1, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
petition for dependency-neglect and emergency custody of MC3 and MC4 as well as
Savannah’s two older children, Minor Child 1 (MC1) (DOB 02-13-16) and Minor Child 2
(MC2) (DOB 02-23-19).1 In the affidavit attached to the petition, a family service worker
(FSW) stated that, on October 29, 2024, DHS was notified that Savannah had been arrested
for child endangerment, assault on a family member, and driving while intoxicated with
MC2, MC3, and MC4 in the car.2 DHS received a report that Savannah was seen pulling
the children by their hair at a local grocery store and driving with the children unrestrained
in the vehicle. Frank, who was in jail at the time, was identified as a putative parent of MC3
and MC4. DHS exercised a seventy-two-hour hold because of concerns that the caregiver did
not meet the children’s immediate needs for supervision, food, and clothing and that
substance abuse seriously impaired the caregiver’s ability to supervise, protect, or care for the
children. An ex parte order placing the children in DHS’s legal custody was filed on
November 4.
1
Frank is not the father of MC1 or MC2. MC1 and MC2 were ultimately dismissed
from the case after MC1’s paternal grandparents were granted guardianship of MC1, and
MC2’s father was awarded permanent custody of MC2. Only the parental rights relating to
MC3 and MC4 are at issue in this appeal.
2
Law enforcement officers were performing a welfare check at Savannah’s home
where they found MC1 alone. Officers were still there when Savannah returned home with
her other three children in the vehicle with her. She appeared to be intoxicated and was
arrested in the driveway.
2
A probable-cause hearing was held on November 5, and an order was filed on
November 13. The court found there was probable cause that the emergency conditions that
necessitated removal from Savannah’s custody continued and that it was contrary to the
welfare of the children to be returned home and in their best interest to remain in DHS
custody.
An adjudication hearing was held on December 10, and an order was filed on January
13, 2025. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the children were
dependent-neglected on the bases of parental unfitness and inadequate supervision due to
Savannah’s driving a motor vehicle while consuming alcohol with the children in the car.
The court found that Frank did not contribute to the dependency-neglect of the children
because he was incarcerated but that he was not “a fit parent” for custody purposes because
he was presently in jail and had testified that he would be sent to the Arkansas Division of
Correction within the next few weeks. The court found that it was in the best interest of the
children to remain in DHS custody and set the goal of the case as reunification with a fit
parent with a concurrent goal of guardianship or permanent custody with a fit relative.
A review hearing was held on April 22, and an order was filed on July 14. The court
ordered that MC3 and MC4 “shall remain in the custody of [DHS] because the parents are
unfit and the juveniles’ health and safety cannot be protected by the parents if returned to
the parents.” The court found that DHS had complied with the orders of the court and had
made reasonable efforts to provide family services and finalize a permanency plan for the
children. The court found that Savannah was in partial compliance with the case plan and
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had demonstrated some progress, but she had not provided DHS with proof of employment,
she had been late for at least four visits with the children and a “no show” for three visits
since January, and she still needed to obtain appropriate housing and resolve her pending
legal issues. The court found that Frank was incarcerated at the Tucker Unit of the Arkansas
Division of Correction, was noncompliant with the case plan, and had not demonstrated
progress. The goal remained reunification with a concurrent goal of guardianship or
permanent custody.
A second review hearing was held on July 8, and an order was filed on July 18. The
court found that DHS had complied with the case plan and the orders of the court and had
made reasonable efforts to provide family services and finalize a permanency plan for the
children. The court found that Savannah was in partial compliance with the case plan and
had demonstrated some progress. Her home had been cleaner, but she still had not provided
DHS with proof of employment and did not have appropriate beds for MC3 and MC4.
Additionally, she had a positive alcohol screen and had been arrested for failure to appear.
The court found that Frank was noncompliant with the case plan and had demonstrated no
progress. The court found that continuation of custody with DHS was in the best interest of
MC3 and MC4 and was the least-restrictive alternative. The goal remained reunification with
a concurrent goal of guardianship.
A permanency-planning hearing was held on October 14, and an order was filed on
November 5. The court found that DHS had complied with the case plan and the orders of
the court and had made reasonable efforts to provide family services and finalize a
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permanency plan for MC3 and MC4. The court found, during this review period, that
Savannah had not demonstrated progress towards the goal of the case, had not benefited
from the services offered by DHS, and had not remedied the issues that prevented safe return
of the children. She did not have appropriate housing; the home was cluttered and infested
with roaches; and there was no room or beds set up for children. Additionally, she had
provided paystubs purportedly from her employer that were forged, she tested positive for
drugs on multiple occasions, she missed a permanency-planning meeting and several family-
time visits, and there had been multiple failed home visits. The court found that Frank also
had not demonstrated progress toward the goals of the case, had not benefited from the
services offered, and was not diligently working toward reunification or placement in the
home. He was not employed, had not provided DHS with an accurate address, had tested
positive for THC and methamphetamine, and had inappropriate conversations with the
children during visitation. Finally, the court found:
After reviewing the facts of the case and the evidence presented today, in accordance
with the best interest, health, and safety of the juveniles, considering the permanency
goals in order of preference, the court determines that adoption following
termination of parental rights shall be the goal of the case pursuant to A.C.A. § 9-35-
324 and it is the least restrictive permanency plan. The concurrent goal shall be
guardianship with a relative or adoption by a relative.
The court granted Frank’s request for appointment of counsel and scheduled a termination-
of-parental-rights hearing.
DHS filed a petition to terminate Savannah’s and Franks’ parental rights on
November 7, alleging the following:
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a. Savannah Dickson is a parent of [MC3 and MC4] for the purposes of the juvenile
code because she is the biological mother.
b. The Court previously found that Frank Bloom has established significant contacts
and his rights as a putative father have attached as to [MC3 and MC4].
As to Savannah, the petition alleged the following grounds for termination: (1) twelve
months failure to remedy, Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(1) (Supp.
2025); (2) twelve months failure to maintain meaningful contact, section 9-35-
325(b)(3)(B)(ii); (3) other subsequent factors, section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(vii); and (4)
aggravated circumstances; specifically, little likelihood that continued services would result
in reunification, section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(A)(B)(i). The petition pled the same grounds
for termination with respect to Frank, except that it alleged the twelve-months-failure-to-
remedy ground that is applicable to a noncustodial parent, section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(i)(a)(2).
The petition also alleged that termination of parental rights was in MC3’s and MC4’s
best interest. DHS asserted that it had an appropriate placement plan, that it was seeking to
clear the children for adoption, and that there were no known issues that would prevent or
prolong the adoption process. DHS alleged that potential harm would be caused by returning
the children to the custody of the parents, citing “the parents’ inconsistent progress with the
case plan, unemployment, lack of transportation, inconsistent visitation, continued
substance abuse, and unstable housing.”
A termination hearing was held on March 3, 2026. Savannah testified that she was
currently incarcerated in the Randolph County Detention Center, after she was arrested in
December and again in January, and that she had no source of income. She said that she was
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detained on a $25,000 bond and was not sure when she would be released and that her next
court date was in May. She testified that she had been evicted from her home but that she
has friends and family she could stay with once she is released from jail. She admitted using
methamphetamine during the pendency of the case. She also admitted that she had not
visited MC3 and MC4 since the first week of October 2025. She acknowledged that the
children could not come home with her that day, but she believed that termination was not
in their best interest and wanted them to be placed with her aunt in Florida, Natalie Nichols.
She claimed that DHS should have known about Nichols from a prior case and therefore
should have contacted her at the beginning of the instant case.
Frank testified that he was currently incarcerated and acknowledged that MC3 and
MC4 could not be placed with him. He said that he understood they were probably going to
be placed with Savannah’s aunt in Florida and was “absolutely okay” with that. He thought
it would be in their best interest to be placed immediately with family and believed it had
taken DHS too long to start the process of vetting Nichols for placement. He asked that his
parental rights not be terminated and for additional time to get himself together.
Dusty Brown, the FSW assigned to the case, testified that the children had been
removed from the parents’ custody for about eighteen months, and the progress made by the
parents had been minimal. According to Brown, things started to regress in the summer of
2025 and “just continued to go in the wrong direction until now.” She said that both parents
were incarcerated at the beginning of the case and both were incarcerated at the time of the
termination hearing. She testified that Savannah’s drug screens were negative at the
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beginning of the case, but as the case progressed, Savannah started testing positive for
methamphetamine and had positive drug screens in September, October, and November
2025 and January 2026, and that Savannah had admitted using drugs. She said that Frank
also tested positive for drugs throughout the case and was positive for methamphetamine
and THC in September, October, November, and December 2025, and he admitted that he
was using before he was arrested in January 2026. She said that random home visits at the
address provided by Frank were unsuccessful, neither parent was employed, and neither
parent had reliable transportation.
Additionally, she testified that MC3 and MC4, who were three and four years old at
the time, are very adoptable; both are “super sweet” with no behavior or health issues. She
said that DHS had completed an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC)
home study with Savannah’s aunt, Nichols, and had not identified another adoptive
placement outside of that. She agreed that Nichols could have been contacted sooner. She
acknowledged a note in the case file dated July 16, 2025, indicating that “the county will
seek out additional relative replacement and that Natalie Nichols is a possible hand [sic] in
Florida [and] will require an ICPC.” She said that Nichols first contacted DHS in September
2025 and that DHS had completed her ICPC home study by October 2025. She said that it
was her understanding that “we are just right close at approval for the kids to go there.”
Suzanne Hendricks, the secondary FSW assigned to the case, testified that Savannah
had attended only five out of twenty-nine visits with the children (17 percent) and that Frank
had attended only seven out of twenty-nine visits (24 percent). She said that she picked up
8
the children and drove them nearly two hours for visits, and on multiple occasions, neither
parent showed up.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Savannah moved to dismiss the petition, arguing
that DHS presented insufficient evidence. She argued, in relevant part, that DHS was not
diligent in contacting her aunt about the potential placement of MC3 and MC4 and that a
least-restrictive alternative would be to continue the case for three months and see if the
placement with Nichols occurs. The circuit court denied Savannah’s motion to dismiss and
ruled from the bench as follows:
So while it is true that [DHS] has been less than optimum in their working of this
case, there is a limit to how much weight I’m going to give that argument. I would
have given the most weight back in the summer of ’25. I would have given a great deal
of weight at the [permanency-planning hearing]. However, here at termination, the
weight I give it is not enough to overcome the weight I give to the best interest of the
children and their need for permanency. The concurrent goal at [the permanency-
planning hearing] was guardianship with a fit and willing relative or adoption with a
fit and willing relative. That was the last time this court visited and reviewed the goal.
[DHS] has made reasonable efforts from and after PPH to pursue that goal.
The court entered an order terminating Savannah’s and Frank’s parental rights as to
MC3 and MC4 on March 23. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that DHS
proved each of the grounds alleged in the petition. The court also found by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of MC3 and
MC4. The court found that the children are adoptable and that they would be subjected to
potential harm because the parents had not consistently had stable or appropriate housing,
transportation, and employment; were currently incarcerated; and had not consistently
participated in the case plan. The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to
9
finalize the permanency plan and made reasonable and meaningful efforts to provide
appropriate family services to the parents; yet, “[d]espite these services, the juveniles cannot
and should not be returned to the parents.”
Savannah filed a timely notice of appeal from the termination order on April 6. Frank
filed a timely notice of appeal from the termination order on April 7 and an amended notice
on April 13.
II. Standard of Review
A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved
by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3). A circuit court must
find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child,
taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted if the termination
petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health
and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(A). The order terminating parental rights must also be based on a
showing of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination
listed in section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B). Jurls v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 443, at
10, 676 S.W.3d 316, 324.
Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural
rights of parents, but parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of
the health and well-being of the child. Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 193,
at 7, 625 S.W.3d 374, 379. In deciding whether to terminate the parental rights of a parent,
10
the circuit court has a duty to evaluate all the circumstances surrounding the parent’s ability
to discharge his or her duties as a parent. Id., 625 S.W.3d at 379. The intent behind the
termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency in a child’s life when it is not
possible to return the child to the family home because it is contrary to the child’s health,
safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable
period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(a)(3). Even
full compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether the parent has
become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Jurls, 2023 Ark. App. 443, at
10, 676 S.W.3d at 324.
This court’s review of termination proceedings is de novo, and we will not reverse the
circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. at 9, 676 S.W.3d at 324. A
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous,
we give due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of
witnesses. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324.
III. Savannah’s Appeal
Savannah concedes that there is sufficient evidence to support a statutory ground
supporting termination of her parental rights, and she does not challenge the circuit court’s
findings that MC3 and MC4 are adoptable or that they would face potential harm if returned
to her care. Instead, she argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination
11
was in the best interest of MC3 and MC4 because, citing sections 9-28-1003, -105, and -108,
“our legislature has codified statutes that promote the well-being of children and declared
that placement with relatives is the preferred goal when accomplishing permanency for
children.” Savannah argues that a less restrictive means of permanency could have been
achieved with guardianship or permanent custody with Nichols, her aunt in Florida. We
disagree.
The relative preference outlined by the legislature must be balanced with the
individual facts of each case. Littlejohn v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 411, at 10,
675 S.W.3d 893, 899. This court has held that a circuit court is permitted to set termination
as a goal even when a relative is available and requests custody. Thompson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 80, at 19, 707 S.W.3d 483, 495. We have also rejected least-restrictive-
placement arguments when, like here, reunification with the parent is futile. Id., 707 S.W.3d
at 495. When the parent demonstrates stability and a reasonable hope for reunification, then
there is no harm in waiting a little longer before terminating parental rights; but when that
stability and a reasonable hope for reunification are not present, there is no reason to further
delay achieving permanency through termination and adoption. Littlejohn, 2023 Ark. App.
411, at 10, 675 S.W.3d at 899; see also Gamble v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App.
404, at 14, 636 S.W.3d 368, 376 (holding that “there was no compelling reason for the court
to choose permanent custody rather than adoption and TPR because there was no reasonable
prospect that appellant would eventually reunify with her children as demonstrated by her
failure to challenge the statutory grounds at the termination hearing or on appeal”). Here,
12
by the time of the termination hearing, Savannah was incarcerated, unemployed, and had
unresolved problems with substance abuse. See Thompson, 2025 Ark. App. 80, at 20, 707
S.W.3d at 495–96 (stability and reasonable hope for reunification were lacking when the
parent failed to comply with the case plan throughout the case, had not had stable
employment, and did not have stable housing by the time of the termination hearing); see
also Otis v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 28, at 8, 538 S.W.3d 870, 875 (affirming
best-interest finding when the parent had not addressed issues with drug use and mental
illness despite referrals for these services by DHS).
Further, MC3 and MC4 were never in a relative’s custody, and there was no
demonstration of any bond with Nichols. See Blankenship v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023
Ark. App. 63, at 18–19, 661 S.W.3d 227, 238 (rejecting least-restrictive-placement argument
when relatives had met child on only one occasion). While the FSW testified that she
believed Nichols’s ICPC home study would likely be finalized and approved, Nichols did not
appear at the termination hearing or at any other hearing, and it is not certain whether she
ultimately would be approved for placement of MC3 and MC4. See Alexander v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 536, at 11, 679 S.W.3d 450, 457 (“[T]o make a least-restrictive-
placement argument on appeal, at a minimum, there must be an appropriate and approved
relative in the picture.”). DHS’s failure to investigate Nichols as a potential placement for
MC3 and MC4, moreover, does not render the circuit court’s best-interest finding clearly
erroneous. See Otis, 2018 Ark. App. 28, at 9, 538 S.W.3d at 876 (holding “that the lack of
13
exploration of placing [a child] with a relative before termination does not render the [circuit]
court’s overall best-interest finding clearly erroneous”).
After our de novo review, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the
circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination of Savannah’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Savannah’s parental
rights to MC3 and MC4.
IV. Frank’s Appeal
Frank argues that the circuit court erred in finding that statutory grounds existed to
support the termination of his parental rights. He contends that the only statutory grounds
alleged by DHS, and found by the circuit court, pertained to a “parent” and that the record
does not support the circuit court’s finding that he is a “parent” of MC3 and MC4 for
purposes of termination. He argues that because the “parent” element of the statutory
grounds was not met, the termination of his parental rights should be reversed. We agree.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325 provides a remedy when, as in this case,
DHS “is attempting to clear a juvenile for permanent placement by terminating parental
rights of a parent and putative parent based on the definition of ‘parent’ and ‘putative father’
under § 9-35-102.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(a)(2)(A). Pursuant to section 9-35-102(49)
(Supp. 2025), “putative father” means “any man not deemed or adjudicated under the laws
of the jurisdiction of the United States to be the biological father of a juvenile who claims
to be or is alleged to be the biological father of the juvenile.” Pursuant to section 9-35-
102(42), “parent” means:
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(A) A biological mother;
(B) An adoptive parent; or
(C) A man:
(i) To whom the biological mother was married at the time of conception or birth;
(ii) Who has signed an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to § 9-10-120;
(iii) Who has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the biological
father of the juvenile or to have otherwise established paternity; or
(iv) Who is listed as the parent on the birth certificate of the child.
Frank argues that because he was at all times treated as only a putative parent and the circuit
court never found him to be a “parent” as that term is defined in the Juvenile Code, the
termination order must be reversed.
Here, the dependency-neglect petition listed Frank as MC3 and MC4’s putative
parent, as did the emergency-custody order, the probable-cause order, the adjudication order,
and both review orders. In the probable-cause order, the circuit court specifically found that
Frank was “a putative father of [MC3 and MC4]” and ordered that “[a]ny putative fathers
shall establish paternity and submit to genetic testing.” But the court never made any finding
that Frank had established paternity, and nothing in the record indicates that genetic testing
was ever done.
The court found in the adjudication order that Frank had presented evidence proving
he had established significant contacts with the children and that “putative parent rights”
had attached. While the permanency-planning order listed Frank as a “parent” of MC3 and
15
MC4, it did not find that he had established paternity and did not otherwise legally establish
him as a “parent”; it stated that his rights as a “putative father” had attached:
As to the putative parent in this case: The Court finds there is a single putative father
identified. The putative father, Frank Bloom, has presented evidence proving that he
has established significant contacts with the juveniles. As a result, the Court finds
that his rights have attached, and he shall be named a party to the case.
Compare Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-314(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2025) (if “the circuit court finds that
the putative parent has established paternity, the court shall . . . [e]nter an order establishing
the putative parent as a parent for the purposes of this subchapter”) with Ark. Code Ann. §
9-35-314(c)(2)(B)(i) (if “the circuit court finds that the putative parent has established
significant contacts with the juvenile, the court shall . . . [e]nter an order stating that the
rights of the putative parent have attached”). The termination order states that Frank “is a
parent of the juveniles because this Court previously found that he has established significant
contacts and his rights as a putative father have attached” but does not establish his legal
status as a “parent” for termination purposes, and his legal status was not discussed at the
termination hearing.
Similarly, while the petition for termination of parental rights listed Frank as a
“parent” of MC3 and MC4, DHS asserted in the body of the petition that Savannah is a
“parent” for purposes of the Juvenile Code “because she is the biological mother” of the
children and that the circuit court previously found Frank had “established significant
contacts” and “his rights as a putative father have attached” to MC3 and MC4. (Emphasis
added.) Despite its own assertion that Frank is a putative father whose rights have attached,
16
and no finding by the circuit court establishing him as a “parent,” DHS pled grounds that
pertain only to a “parent” and did not allege the statutory ground applicable to a putative
parent.3 See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(x) (providing ground for termination of
putative parent’s rights if the putative parent fails to establish or maintain meaningful
contact with the juvenile and the court has found that the rights of the putative parent with
regard to the juvenile have attached).
The grounds alleged by DHS and found by the circuit court required proof that Frank
is a “parent” as a prerequisite to terminating his parental rights. See Blankenship, 2023 Ark.
App. 63, at 14–15, 661 S.W.3d at 235–36 (reversing termination based on subsequent-
factors and twelve-months-failure-to-remedy grounds when circuit court had never made a
specific finding that putative father was a “parent”). Because Frank was treated as a putative
parent throughout the case, and the circuit court never entered an order expressly finding
him to be a “parent,” his rights were not legally established to then be terminated. See Campos
v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 221, at 11–13, 644 S.W.3d 465, 471–72
(reversing termination where the circuit court consistently referred to Campos as a putative
parent and never entered an order expressly finding him to be a “parent” for purposes of
termination). Moreover, we can determine no basis in the record that would support a
3
DHS did not file a brief on appeal contesting Frank’s challenge to termination on
grounds that pertain only to a “parent.” Therefore, we are left with no explanation for DHS’s
inconsistent positions vis-à-vis Frank’s parental status.
17
finding that Frank fell within section 9-35-102(42)’s definition of a “parent.” See Tovias v.
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 228, at 6–7, 575 S.W.3d 621, 624–25 (reversing
termination where the circuit court found that Tovias was the “legal father” with no basis in
the record to support a finding that he fell within any of the designated categories in the
Juvenile Code’s definition of “parent”). Frank obviously is not MC3’s and MC4’s biological
mother. There is no evidence that he is an adoptive parent, that he was married to Savannah
when MC3 and MC4 were conceived or born, that any court has previously determined him
to be the biological father of MC3 and MC4, that he signed an acknowledgment of paternity
pursuant to section 9-10-120, or that he is listed as a parent on as MC3’s and MC4’s birth
certificates because the birth certificates are not in the record. See Barnoski v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 324, at 6–7, 690 S.W.3d 128, 132 (holding that without a
finding that Barnoski’s parental rights attached to the child, the statutory requirements to
terminate rights on the ground applicable to a “putative parent” were not met, and the record
was insufficient to establish that he was a “parent” to child).
DHS had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Frank is a parent.
See Terry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 591, at 9–10, 591 S.W.3d 824, 830.
DHS, however, did not produce anything to establish Frank’s parental status under law.
Accordingly, the circuit court lacked sufficient evidence on which to conclude that Frank is
a “parent” whose rights could be terminated. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred
in terminating Frank’s parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.
Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant
Savannah Dickson.
Bell Law Co., by: Evan C. Bell, for separate appellant Frank Bloom.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children.
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