In the Int. of: N.G., a Minor

J-S28032-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: N.G., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: L.G., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 599 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered March 19, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-21-DP-0000015-2025 IN RE: ADOPTION OF: N.G., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: L.G., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 605 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Decree Entered March 19, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Orphans' Court at No(s): 078-ADOPT-2025 BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2026 L.G. (“Mother”) appeals from the March 19, 2026 decree involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her son, N.G. (“Child”), born in January ____________________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S28032-26 2025, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 Mother also appeals from the March 19, 2026 order changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. Mother’s court-appointed counsel, Robert H. Hawn, Jr., Esq, has filed a petition to withdraw from these appeals and an accompanying brief, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).2 After review, we grant Attorney Hawn’s petition to withdraw, affirm the termination decree, and dismiss Mother’s appeal from the goal change order as moot. The orphans’ court set forth the facts giving rise to Child’s placement on January 23, 2025, shortly after his birth, as follows: [The relevant] involvement with Cumberland County Children and Youth Services [(“CCCYS” or “the Agency”)] began on January 13, 2025, when CCCYS received a referral regarding [Child] . . . and his Cord stat had tested positive for amphetamines, cannabinoids, and methamphetamines.[3] CCCYS contacted Mother . . . to schedule a home visit and when the allegations were discussed, Mother indicated she was unaware that she was pregnant with [Child] but notably did not deny using illicit substances. Due to Mother’s lack of cooperation, CCCYS was unable to ____________________________________________ 1 By decree of April 21, 2026, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, L.C. (“Father”). Father did not appeal or participate in the instant appeals. 2 This Court extended the Anders procedure to appeals from decrees terminating parental rights in In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa.Super. 1992). 3 We glean from the certified record that this is testing related to the Child’s umbilical cord. Mother also tested positive for these substances at this time. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 47. -2- J-S28032-26 conduct a valid home visit and assure the safety of [Child] despite multiple attempts between January 13-23, 2025[. O]n January 23, 2025, court intervention was sought and a shelter care hearing was held[,] at which time [Child] was placed into the legal and physical custody of CCCYS. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/6/26, at 1-2 (unpaginated).4 Accordingly, the Agency placed Child in foster care. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 48. Following a hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated Child dependent on March 27, 2025, and established a permanency goal of reunification along with a concurrent goal of adoption. In furtherance of reunification, the Agency instituted objectives for Mother to complete that focused on, inter alia, substance abuse, mental health, parenting skills, and contact with Child. See id. at 49-55; see also Agency Exhibit 2.5 These objectives remained consistent throughout the course of Child’s dependency. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 49. Thereafter, the court conducted several permanency review hearings from June 2025 through January 2026. While the court initially found Mother to be in moderate compliance with the permanency plan and to be making moderate progress toward alleviating the circumstances causing Child to be ____________________________________________ 4 The Agency had prior involvement with Mother related to her older children on several occasions from 2017 through 2024, with respect to her substance abuse. These older children are not subjects of the instant appeals. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 47-48. 5 All citations to exhibits herein reference those admitted with respect to the orphans’ court docket. -3- J-S28032-26 placed, by January 2026, the court found that she was not in compliance and had made no progress. See Permanency Review Orders, 6/30/25 & 1/22/26. During this period of time, Mother completed a dual diagnosis program. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 53, 77. Nevertheless, as discussed infra, she largely failed to engage in drug screening, and when last tested in January 2026, in conjunction with a court appearance, she tested positive for illegal substances. See id. at 53-54. The Agency also received a referral in January 2026, claiming, in part, that Mother drove with her older children while under the influence. See id. at 48. This report was validated and closed in February 2026. See id. Mother likewise failed to obtain the recommended mental health evaluations upon discharge from dual diagnosis treatment. See id. at 51-52. Additionally, Mother participated in a parenting program but was unsuccessfully discharged by the provider in August 2025, due to poor attendance. See id. at 29. Moreover, Mother commenced supervised visitation with Child in April 2025. See id. at 14. However, as addressed within, due to her limited participation, the provider placed Mother’s visitation “on hold” in December 2025, and ultimately discharged her in February 2026. Id. at 17-18. From December 2025 through the subject hearing, the Agency instead offered Mother weekly supervised visitation, which Mother all but disregarded. See id. at 50-51. Mother last visited Child on January 9, 2026. See id. at 51. -4- J-S28032-26 On November 26, 2025, the Agency filed a petition to change Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.6 Then, on February 10, 2026, the Agency filed a petition seeking to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The court held a combined evidentiary hearing on March 17, 2026, at which time Child was fourteen months old and represented by a separate guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and legal interests counsel.7 The Agency presented the testimony of Alternate Behavior Consultants (“ABC”) employees, Jared Riester and Michelle Brode, as to supervised visitation and parenting education, respectively; current Agency caseworker, Pamela Gross; and D.Y., Child’s foster mother (“Foster Mother”). The Agency further offered numerous exhibits, which the court admitted. Mother was present, represented by Attorney Hawn, and testified on her own behalf. By decree entered on March 19, 2026, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), ____________________________________________ 6 The Agency filed an amended goal change petition on December 24, 2025, as best we can discern, correcting a reference to an unknown father in the original petition. 7 The court appointed Tammi Blackburn, Esquire, Child’s GAL from the dependency proceedings, as GAL and Cindy Martin, Esquire, as legal counsel in the termination proceedings. See Order, 12/2/25. As such, the court complied with the mandate of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a), as interpreted by our High Court. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 639 Pa. 428, 442, 161 A.3d 172, 180 (2017) (footnote omitted). -5- J-S28032-26 (2), (5), (8), and (b). Thereafter, on March 17, 2026, the court entered an order changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. On April 15, 2026, Mother, through Attorney Hawn, filed timely notices of appeal, which this Court later consolidated sua sponte. Accompanying the notices of appeal were statements filed by Attorney Hawn of his intent to seek to withdraw pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) in lieu of a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b). See re J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa.Super. 2009) (holding that the decision of counsel to follow Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) procedure in a termination of parental rights case was proper). On May 6, 2026, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a). On June 8, 2026, Attorney Hawn filed in this Court a petition for leave to withdraw as Mother’s attorney pursuant to Anders, along with a brief expressing his belief that Mother’s potential appellate claims are frivolous. When counsel seeks to withdraw pursuant to Anders and its progeny, this Court may not review the merits of the appeal without first addressing counsel’s request to withdraw. See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 240 A.3d 658, 661 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”). In order to successfully withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must: (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw and aver that, after making a -6- J-S28032-26 conscientious examination of the record, he has determined that an appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy of the Anders brief to the appellant; and (3) advise the appellant that they have the right to retain private counsel or bring additional arguments to the court’s attention. See B.G.S., 240 A.3d at 661 (citation omitted). To confirm client notification has occurred, counsel must provide a copy of the letter advising the appellant of their rights in conformity with Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa.Super. 2005). See B.G.S., 240 A.3d at 661 (citing Millisock, 873 A.2d at 752). Additionally, our Supreme Court has set forth the following substantive requirements for Anders briefs: [W]e hold that in the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Instantly, Attorney Hawn filed a petition to withdraw certifying his conscientious review of the case and determination that Mother’s appeal was frivolous. He also filed an Anders brief that includes a summary of the history and facts of the case; the facts that arguably support the appeal; and his assessment that the appeal is frivolous, which includes his reasoning -7- J-S28032-26 supported by citations to relevant legal authority. Appended to Attorney Hawn’s petition is a copy of the letter he sent to Mother that complies with Millisock, supra. This letter confirms that Attorney Hawn provided Mother with copies of the petition to withdraw and Anders brief. As such, we conclude that Attorney Hawn has satisfied the requirements of Anders and Santiago.8 Having concluded that Attorney Hawn has complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago, we must next “conduct a review of the record to ascertain if on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc). Attorney Hawn’s Anders brief raises the following issues for our review: 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of law when it found sufficient grounds for termination of [Mother’s] parental rights in [Child] under [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b)]? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of law when it found that [C]hild’s permanent placement goal of reunification was neither appropriate, nor feasible and ordered a goal change to adoption, thus contravening [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)]? Anders Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted). ____________________________________________ 8 To date, Mother has not responded to Attorney Hawn’s petition to withdraw and Anders brief. -8- J-S28032-26 Our standard of review regarding the involuntary termination of parental rights is well-established: In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings. In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-830 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). -9- J-S28032-26 The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant termination. Id. at 830; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for termination under one of these subsections by “clear and convincing evidence,” the court then assesses the petition pursuant to Section 2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This Court need only agree with the orphans’ court’s determination as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b), in order to affirm termination. See In re K.R., 200 A.3d 969, 979 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we analyze the decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b),9 which provide as follows: (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: ... ____________________________________________ 9 Given our disposition relative to Section 2511(a)(2), we need not review and make no conclusions as to the orphans’ court’s findings with respect to Section 2511(a)(1), (5), and (8). See K.R., 200 A.3d at 979 (observing this Court may review one subsection of Section 2511(a) “[w]ithout considering the orphans’ court’s determinations” under any other subsection). - 10 - J-S28032-26 (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well- being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. ... (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). To prove the applicability of Section 2511(a)(2), the party petitioning for termination must establish: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), however, “are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern parental - 11 - J-S28032-26 incapacity that cannot be remedied.” Id. (citation omitted). We have long recognized that “[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” Id. (citation omitted). As it relates to Section 2511(a), the orphans’ court found as follows: Mother has failed to maintain sobriety, demonstrate to the [c]ourt and CCCYS that she has achieved sobriety and her lack of follow through on her reunification goals prevents a finding that she is capable of providing [Child] with safe and stable care that he requires at his vulnerable age. Mother was not addressing her drug and alcohol issues including failing to test and failing to demonstrate sobriety. She has failed to have consistent contact with [Child] through visitation, the only method to establish a meaningful relationship with [Child] given his age. She had too many missed visits through ABC’s visitation program causing her to be discharged from the program and requiring her visits to be moved to CCCYS for weekly visits. She still could not visit on a regular basis. In the three months preceding the termination of parental rights hearing, she could have had approximately 12 visits with [Child], however she only attended 2 and had not seen him for 67 days. Her lack of sobriety for a significant period of time and lack of consistent visitation has prevented her from receiving necessary and recommended parenting skills through ABC. She was required to address her mental health which included undergoing a [psychiatric] or a neuropsychological evaluation as recommended, but she failed to do so. [Child] has been in care . . . the majority of his life. Mother cannot demonstrate that she is in a position to offer [Child] a safe and stable home life where his needs would be met such that reunification is not able to be achieved now or in the foreseeable future. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/6/26 at 10-11 (unpaginated). The orphans’ court’s findings are supported by the certified record. - 12 - J-S28032-26 With respect to her substance abuse, Mother completed a dual diagnosis treatment program at Gaudenzia West Shore (“Gaudenzia”) in 2025, but she failed to participate in drug screening. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 53, 56, 60, 62; see also Agency Exhibits 12 & 15. Agency caseworker, Pamela Gross, reported that, of 74 requested screenings from February 13, 2025 through March 6, 2026, Mother was a “no show” 71 times. notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 53-54. Further, Ms. Gross testified that Mother last tested on January 21, 2026, when present for a court hearing, and tested positive for illegal substances, including methamphetamines and amphetamines. See id.; see also Agency Exhibit 13. Thus, Ms. Gross expressed “ongoing substance use concerns” for which Mother had not reengaged in treatment. Notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 55, 61. She characterized Mother’s progress in dealing with her substance abuse issues as “minimal.” Id. at 55. As to her mental health, as noted, Mother participated in a dual diagnosis program though Gaudenzia from which she was discharged successfully. See id. at 51; see also id. at 77. However, upon discharge, she was recommended to obtain a psychiatric and/or a neuropsychological evaluation. See id. at 51-52. Ms. Gross reported that Mother did not obtain such evaluation. See id. at 52. With respect to her parenting skills, Mother participated in ABC’s parenting program. See id. at 28-29. Michelle Brode, Mother’s parent - 13 - J-S28032-26 educator, confirmed that Mother’s substance abuse was identified as a “major concern.” Id. at 28. Indeed, she stated that Mother was not recommended to transition to the next phase of the parenting program or to have unsupervised visits with Child until she demonstrated sobriety. See id. Ms. Brode testified that Mother completed six of ten sessions from July 16 to August 27, 2025, when she was discharged after failing to appear three times. See id. at 29, 31, 37; see also Agency Exhibit 8, at 4. Ms. Brode further described challenges working with Mother, such as her lack of preparedness for sessions and inability to stay on topic. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 31-33; see also Agency Exhibit 8, at 1-2. In order to reenroll in the parenting program, Mother was required to: engage in regular drug screening; participate in a recovery support group or work with a sponsor; and sustain consistent visitation for 60 days. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 52-53; see also id. at 36, 40; see also Agency Exhibit 8, at 4. Mother failed to satisfy these conditions. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 36-37, 41, 53. Although Mother testified to participation in another online parenting program, she acknowledged that this program was not approved by the Agency. See id. at 76-77. Hence, Ms. Gross testified that Mother made no progress related to her parenting skills. See id. at 53. With respect to supervised visitation, Mother commenced supervised visitation with Child through ABC’s visitation service in April 2025. See id. at 14. Jared Riester, ABC visitation supervisor, testified, “Attendance was the - 14 - J-S28032-26 main concern. [Mother’s] attendance really was below 50 percent throughout the entirety of the course of visits.” Id. at 15; see also CYS Exhibit 10. Specifically, Mr. Riester recounted that Mother attended 11 of 38 visits offered through ABC from April through December 2025. See notes of testimony, 3/17/26 at 14, 17. As a result, Mr. Riester testified that ABC suspended Mother’s visitation through their service in December 2025, and ultimately discharged Mother in February 2026. See id. at 17-18; see also id. at 49. Despite the provision of weekly visitation at the Agency thereafter, Ms. Gross testified that Mother only visited Child twice, on January 2 and 9, 2026. See id. at 50. She had not had contact with Child since. See id. at 50-51. Based upon the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The record amply supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity and refusal, namely her ongoing substance abuse and failure to comply with her mental health, parenting, and supervised visitation goals, has caused Child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical and mental well-being. See A.H., 247 A.3d at 443. Moreover, the record confirms that the causes of Mother’s incapacity and refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See id. We reiterate that a parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. See id. Thus, - 15 - J-S28032-26 we agree with Attorney Hawn that Mother’s potential claims with respect to Section 2511(a)(2) are frivolous. Since the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that adequate grounds for termination existed pursuant to at least one subsection of Section 2511(a), we now turn to a review of the court’s findings pursuant to Section 2511(b), which gives “primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Our Supreme Court has generally outlined this inquiry, as follows: [C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent. Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved. Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs. Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always consider. The courts must consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent, the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not always an easy task. - 16 - J-S28032-26 Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105-1106 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted). However, our Supreme Court has concluded that “only a necessary and beneficial” parental bond should be maintained. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109. A bond is considered to be “necessary and beneficial” if its severance would cause “extreme emotional consequences” or significant, irreparable harm. Id. at 1109-1110. Furthermore, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of ‘primary’ importance in the Section 2511(b) analysis.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109. Therefore, it is “within the discretion of the orphans’ court to prioritize the safety and security” of children “over their bonds with their parents.” M.E., 283 A.3d at 839 (cleaned up). In terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b), the orphans’ court found as follows: The [orphans’] court has thoroughly examined the impact termination of parental rights will have on [Child’s] developmental, physical and emotional needs as well as his overall welfare. The record demonstrates that termination of Mother’s parental - 17 - J-S28032-26 rights will not result in [Child] suffering extreme emotional consequences or irreparable harm. [Child] knows his current foster parents as his only caretakers and Mother’s failure to maintain consistent contact with him since his birth has resulted in a lack of caretaker/child bond between them. [Child] is being provided with safety, stability and consistent care in the home of his foster parents, which cannot be provided by Mother. His foster parents are able to provide him with permanency through adoption. Termination of parental rights will serve his developmental, physical and emotional needs and is in his best interest. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/6/26 at 11 (unpaginated). Upon review of the certified record, we discern no abuse of discretion. Significantly, there is no evidence of the existence of a parent-child bond between Mother and Child. Thus, the court properly inferred none existed. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762-763. Conversely, the record reveals that a bond exists between Child and his foster parents. Ms. Gross described Child as “really happy” and “very comfortable” in the pre-adoptive foster home, where he had been placed since he was six weeks old. Id. at 48, 58-59. Ms. Gross recounted positive interaction and affection between Child and Foster Mother. See id. at 59. She further reported that Child was “doing really well” and found to be developmentally “on target.” Id. at 58. Likewise, Foster Mother testified that Child is “doing great.” Id. at 65. She indicated that she and her husband share a “great” relationship with Child, and her two children “love” him. Id. at 66. - 18 - J-S28032-26 As such, Ms. Gross opined that Child would not experience any negative impact if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. See id. at 60. Ms. Gross explained: He doesn’t know [his foster parents] as anybody but his parents. They are the ones meeting his daily needs, his emotional needs, his physical needs, his basic needs. He’s had such infrequent visit[s] with his mother. … I don’t know that it would harm him in any way not to see her. She hasn’t seen him since January, and there is has been no report of negative side effects, behaviors from him as a result of that. Id. Thus, we likewise agree with Attorney Hawn that any potential claims that Mother has with respect to Section 2511(b) are frivolous. Further, our review of the record does not reveal any overlooked non-frivolous issues with respect to Section 2511(a) and (b). Given our disposition concerning termination, Mother’s appeal from the goal change order is moot. See A.H., 247 A.3d at 446 (citation omitted) (“[T]he effect of our decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s termination decree necessarily renders moot the dependency court’s decision to change [the c]hild’s goal to adoption[.]”). For the foregoing reasons, we grant Attorney Hawn’s petition to withdraw. We affirm the termination decree and dismiss the goal change issue as moot. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed. - 19 - J-S28032-26 Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/20/2026 - 20 -