In Re: A.M.J., a Minor
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket971 MDA 2026
JudgeMurray
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-S41016-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: A.M.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.J., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 971 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2025-00088
IN RE: E.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.J., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 972 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2025-00089
IN RE: L.R.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.J., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 973 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2025-00090
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.
J-S41016-26
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 16, 2026
J.J. (Father) appeals from the orders granting the petitions filed by the
Lackawanna County Office of Youth and Family Services (the Agency), and
terminating his parental rights to his biological daughters, A.J. and L.J. (born
in August 2021 and February 2024, respectively), and his biological son E.J.
(born in June 2022) (collectively, Children).1, 2 After careful review, we affirm.
In its opinion, the orphans’ court described the Agency’s initial
involvement with the family, and the ensuing procedural history:
The family had an open and ongoing case for services with the
[Agency] since August 29, 2023. Additionally, the Agency had
prior involvement with the family dating back to 2021. A referral
was made on October 22, 2024, regarding substance abuse by
[Mother and Father (Parents)]. [See N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 6
(Service, Access, and Management (SAM) caseworker Kristie
Valera (Ms. Valera) testifying that the referral alleged Mother was
abusing methamphetamine, and Father was housing illicit drug
users in the basement of the family residence).] In response to
the referral, caseworkers were able to enter the home on October
23, 2024. Mother was present and tested positive for
methamphetamine. Father was at work. The Agency also had
concerns about the conditions of the home. An Emergency
Protective Order was granted on the same day[,] and a Shelter
Care hearing was held on October 24, 2024. [C]hildren were
adjudicated dependent on November 12, 2024[, and were
ultimately placed with Father’s mother (paternal grandmother)]….
….
____________________________________________
1 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of Children’s biological
mother, N.H. (Mother). Mother’s consolidated appeals are listed before this
panel at 1030-1032 MDA 2026.
2 On July 16, 2026, we sua sponte consolidated Father’s appeals.
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Three separate Family Service Plans (hereinafter “FSP”)
were created in this case[, dated November 19, 2024; and May
12 and November 12, 2025]. All three plans had nearly identical
goals and objectives for Mother and Father to complete. … [T]he
goals and objectives for Mother were to (1) maintain a sober
lifestyle, which include[d] the requirement that Mother submit to
drugs screens twice [] a week and attend drug and alcohol
counseling; (2) maintain safe and stable housing[,] which
include[d] a requirement to maintain employment; (3) maintain
safe and healthy relationships with [C]hildren, which include[d] a
requirement to complete [the] Safe Care[ Program3]; (4)
understand how her actions affect the family; (5) address …
mental health[ concerns]; and (6) maintain a clean and safe
home.
The goals and objectives for Father include[d] all six of the
above goals[,] but also include[d] an additional goal requiring
successful completion of the Domestic Violence Intervention
Program[ (DVIP)].
… The initial [permanency review hearing (PR)] was held on
January 16, 2025. No ratings were offered[,] as the first FSP was
adopted at that hearing. The next PR was scheduled for July 10,
2025[,] but was continued at Mother’s request because she was
in [a drug] rehab[ilitation program]. The [PR] was ultimately held
on August 26, 2025. At that hearing, both Mother and Father
received a compliance rating of moderate and a progress rating of
none. The next PR took place on March 11, 2026. Mother received
a compliance and progress rating of none and none. Father
received a compliance and progress rating of minimal and
minimal.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 1-3 (record citations omitted; footnote
moved to body).
____________________________________________
3 The orphans’ court explained that the “Safe Care [Program] is an evidence[-
]based, parent-training curriculum[,] specifically designed to assist parents
with [] baseline parenting skills and to enhance the well[-]being of children
[from newborn] to five[ years old].” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 11
n.5.
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On November 25, 2025, the Agency filed separate, substantially
identical termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions (one for each child),
each requesting termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The matter proceeded to a
hearing, which occurred on April 27-28 and May 5, 2026. Father appeared
and was represented by counsel. Children, who did not appear, were
collectively represented by their guardian ad litem, George Mehalchick,
Esquire (GAL).4 The Agency presented the testimony of several witnesses.
Father presented no witnesses and did not testify.
Gene Hockenbury (Mr. Hockenbury), an employee of drug-testing
agency Northern Tier Research, testified as an expert toxicology witness.
N.T., 4/27/26, at 16-17. Mr. Hockenbury testified that Father submitted to
____________________________________________
4 While the certified record does not contain an order defining the scope of the
GAL’s appointment (or any appointment order), our review of the notes of
testimony discloses that the GAL represented both the best interests and legal
interests of Children. See In re P.G.F., 247 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. 2021) (“[T]he
Adoption Act requires that all children receive counsel in contested involuntary
parental termination proceedings.” (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a))). At the
TPR hearing, the orphans’ court inquired of Parents’ counsel and Children’s
GAL whether they believed a conflict of interest exists between Children’s best
and legal interests. N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 49; see also In re Adoption
of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1224 (Pa. 2020) (“Given the essential nature of
the GAL/[legal c]ounsel’s ability to represent a child without conflict and this
Court’s mandate that the orphans’ court make that determination prior to
appointment, we conclude that appellate courts should verify that the orphans’
court indicated that the attorney could represent the child’s best interests and
legal interests without conflict.”). Children’s GAL represented that no conflict
exists. N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 49-50. The orphans’ court thereafter
accepted the GAL’s representation. See id. at 50 (the orphans’ court
entertaining the parties’ arguments).
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25 drug screens, 22 of which “were positive for cannabinoids, which he
declared[,] and were consistent with[,] medical marijuana.” Id. at 19; see
also Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 22 (the orphans’ court noting that,
throughout Children’s dependency case, “Father has not produced a medical
marijuana card.”); N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 38 (Ms. Valera testifying that
Father failed to appear for 136 drug screens). Mr. Hockenbury indicated that,
on five occasions, Father additionally tested positive for methamphetamine
and amphetamine. N.T., 4/27/26, at 23-24; see also id. at 39 (Mr.
Hockenbury testifying that methamphetamine “can be out of the system
within 24 hours”).
Kaleen Pastrana (Ms. Pastrana), supervisor of DVIP, testified concerning
the extent of Father’s involvement with the program. Id. at 61-70. Ms.
Pastrana explained that Father failed to appear at three initial intake sessions
and did not respond to her numerous attempts to contact him. Id. at 62-63.
Ms. Pastrana testified that on July 17, 2025, she spoke with Father, and he
told her “that he didn’t need to do group[ sessions] or an assessment.” Id.
at 63. According to Ms. Pastrana, when she explained to Father that she had
received several Agency referrals for Father to complete DVIP, Father “started
raising his voice and cursing. He cut me off[; the] call was ended and no
assessment was scheduled ….” Id. at 63-64.
Ms. Pastrana testified that Father finally appeared for his intake
assessment toward the end of August 2025. Id. at 64. Father thereafter
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attended just two group sessions, one each in September and October 2025.
Id. at 66; see also id. at 72 (Ms. Pastrana testifying that DVIP is a 26-week
program). Ms. Pastrana explained that at Father’s last session in October
2025, Father made a “vulgar,” derogatory comment about the sexual
orientation of one of his daughters, which caused Ms. Pastrana to attempt to
“redirect” him. Id. at 67-68. Ms. Pastrana testified that Father responded,
“this [is] bullshit”; left the session; failed to appear at any further
appointments; and ceased communicating with Ms. Pastrana. Id. at 68-69.
Ms. Pastrana testified that Father was thereafter unsuccessfully discharged
from DVIP. Id.
Kristen Bear (Ms. Bear) testified as the domestic violence education
facilitator at LOTUS Therapeutic and Empowerment Services (LOTUS). Id. at
80. Ms. Bear testified that after several missed appointments, Father
appeared for an intake assessment in November 2025. Id. at 84-85.
According to Ms. Bear, Father was candid with her about the extent of the
physical and verbal “abuse that he had been inflicting” on Mother. Id. at 85.
Ms. Bear testified that Father advised her that he and Mother have “a long
history of mutual drug use and infidelity[, a]nd [Father] felt that was partially
what was fuel[]ing the abuse in the relationship.” Id. at 86. Ms. Bear
assessed Father as needing a “high level” of domestic violence counseling.
Id.; see also id. at 86-87, 107 (Ms. Bear testifying that, “[f]or the safety of
[Mother] and the safety of the family, it was imperative that [Father] should
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be in the program”; and that “domestic violence in any relationship can affect
[] children if they’re in the home”). Ms. Bear testified that Father’s treatment
was expected to last 52 weeks. Id. at 102.
Ms. Bear testified that at Father’s first group session, “he was bragging
about beating” Mother, which was met with disapproval by the other
individuals in the session. Id. at 87-88. Following Father’s first group session,
Ms. Bear determined that individual sessions were more appropriate for Father
at that time. Id. at 88. Ms. Bear testified that Father’s subsequent individual
sessions were productive, but Father stopped attending in January 2026, after
Father and Mother’s relationship ended. Id. at 90-92. Ms. Bear testified that,
approximately two weeks prior to the TPR hearing, Father contacted her about
continuing with virtual sessions, and she indicated she would be willing to
work with him on arranging those sessions. Id. at 93.
Kristy Vassell (Ms. Vassell) testified concerning her involvement with the
family in her capacity as the supervised visitation lead at Outreach Center for
Community Resources Family Reunification Program (Outreach). N.T. (Vol.
I), 4/28/26, at 12. Ms. Vassell testified that Parents had supervised visits with
Children at the Outreach facility every other week, between November 2024
and November 2025, for a total of 28 visits. Id. at 18, 32; see also id. at 22
(Ms. Vassell testifying that “a police officer was present each time [M]other
and [F]ather had visits with [C]hildren,” due to Father’s aggressive behavior
toward Outreach staff and Mother). According to Ms. Vassell, Parents’ last
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supervised visit with Children was in November 2025. Id. at 33. Ms. Vassell
stated that “after several attempts of scheduling [additional visits between
Parents and Children, Parents advised Outreach] that they didn’t want the
visitation because they were seeing” Children independent of Outreach’s
supervised visitation. Id.
Ms. Vassell testified that Outreach staff had concerns about Father’s
“violent behavior and tendencies,” and explained that Father was resistant to
redirection during visits. Id. at 26-27; see also id. at 26, 46 (Ms. Vassell
describing an incident where Father was “aggressive[ly] throwing” then-nine-
month-old L.J. in the air, and ignored Outreach staff’s request that he stop).
According to Ms. Vassell, she was aware of at least one visit where Father
smelled of marijuana, and Mother remarked that Father’s “pupil looked like it
was going to pop.” Id. at 30. Notwithstanding staff concerns about Father’s
behavior and appearance, Ms. Vassell acknowledged that Children and Father
appeared to share a bond and “strong relationship.” Id. at 53-54.
Outreach supervised visitation specialist Olivia Fryer (Ms. Fryer) testified
that Parents’ “nodding off and falling asleep” was a “recurring issue” during
their supervised visits with Children. Id. at 65. Ms. Fryer opined that Parents’
[c]onsistent dozing off …, laying on the floor and falling asleep[
during visits], [] is consistent with my concerns [regarding
Parents’] sobriety during visitations. I know [Parents’ youngest
child, L.J.,] at one point had crawled on [Father,] trying to pat him
awake, and [Father] said that he was sleeping. [S]o those were
my main concerns with the lack of engagement in the visits[,] due
to the consistent nodding off.
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Id. at 68.
Kathryn Schnurr (Ms. Schnurr) testified that during her time working
with Parents, she facilitated the Safe Care Program. Id. at 81. Ms. Schnurr
explained that both Mother and Father successfully completed the Safe Care
Program. Id. at 83. The orphans’ court summarized Ms. Schnurr’s pertinent
testimony as follows:
Ms. Schnurr testified she observed some of the visits at Outreach
and she noted some language in the visits was concerning. [N.T.
(Vol. I), 4/28/26,] at 89. On one occasion, Father asked Ms.
Schnurr if he smelled like “pot[,]” and she replied in the
affirmative. Id. Father replied[,] “I just sprayed myself. I
shouldn’t smell like weed.” Id. Ms. Schnurr observed Father
nodding off. Id.
Ms. Schnurr [] talk[ed] to Parents about available
[parenting, mental health, and drug and alcohol] resources, as
well as made referrals[ for various programs]. Id. at 91. Ms.
Schnurr reviewed the FSP with [] Parents. Id. at 93. [Ms.
Schnurr] testified she would remind [Parents] to [submit to drug]
screen[s,] because [they] were required under the FSP. Id. …
[Ms. Schnurr] also referred [Parents] to Parents as Teachers, a
parenting program at Outreach. Id. at 96. [] Parents did not
follow through. Id.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 11 (capitalization modified; paragraph
break added).
Ms. Valera testified that she has acted as the family’s primary Agency
caseworker, through SAM, since Children were adjudicated dependent in
November 2024. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 3. Concerning Father’s FSP goals,
Ms. Valera testified consistently with the orphans’ court’s above factual
recitation. See id. at 26-27. Ms. Valera testified that, following their
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dependency adjudications, Children were placed into kinship care with
paternal grandmother. Id. at 5; see also id. (Ms. Valera stating that A.J.
and E.J. were placed with paternal grandmother on July 22, 2025, and that
L.J. was placed with paternal grandmother on November 13, 2025).5
The orphans’ court summarized Ms. Valera’s testimony concerning
Father’s engagement with drug and alcohol services, and Father’s failure to
satisfy his housing FSP goal:
[Ms.] Valera testified she referred both Mother and Father to Drug
and Alcohol Treatment services (hereinafter “DATS”). [N.T. (Vol.
II), 4/28/26,] at 8. … Ms. Valera testified Father had a “check-in”
scheduled for December 22, 2025[, which he rescheduled]. Id.
at 40. [Father’s] attendance was spotty for the next three
months. Id. Father only attended three (3) sessions at DATS
before the [TPR] petitions were filed. Id. at 41. Father attended
four more sessions between the date the petition[s were] filed and
the date of the [TPR] hearing. Id.
….
Ms. Valera referred Mother and Father to housing case
management to assist with housing. Id. at 12. Neither Mother
nor Father provided pay stubs as requested. Id. Ms. Valera
testified the Agency made rental payments for the family on June
3, 2024[, but made no further payments because Parents failed
to provide proof of income]. [N.T. (Vol. I), 5/5/26, at 39.] ….
On September 25, 2025, [the family residence] was
condemned according to records from the Scranton Police
Department. [N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26,] at 12-14[; see also id. at
14 (Ms. Valera stating that Scranton Police observed that the
family residence “was full of trash, roaches, garbage, maggots,
____________________________________________
5 At the time of the TPR hearing, Children and paternal grandmother were
residing in Middletown, New York. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 5. It is unclear
from the record whether paternal grandmother is a pre-adoptive resource for
Children.
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old food,” and housed dogs that “were starved and full of
bedbugs”)].
….
Ms. Valera testified she currently does not know where
Father is living. [Id. at 18. Ms. Valera] testified Father gave her
an address in Matamoras, Pennsylvania[, but when she] went to
the address[,] unannounced[,] to assess it[, t]he woman who
answered the door told her Father does not live there. Id. Ms.
Valera testified Father gave her a second address in Middletown,
New York[, but when she] looked into that address[, she]
discovered it doesn’t actually exist. Id.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 13-16 (some paragraph breaks omitted).
Concerning his mental health FSP goal, Ms. Valera testified that Father
was referred to Omni Health Services (Omni), a mental health services
provider, in November 2024, and that Father completed an intake in April
2025. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 38. According to Ms. Valera, Father’s
attendance was inconsistent, and Omni discharged Father from the program.
Id. at 38.6 Ms. Valera subsequently referred Father to both Jewish Family
Services and Friendship House for mental health treatment, but Father did not
avail himself of their services. Id. at 38-39.
Ms. Valera testified that Children share a bond with Parents, but opined
that Children could not be safely returned to Parents “due to the ongoing
concerns throughout the dependency … case.” N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 57;
____________________________________________
6 On cross-examination, Ms. Valera agreed that, at some point, Omni ceased
its operations. N.T. (Vol. I), 5/5/26, at 35. The notes of testimony do not
clearly establish whether Father was discharged from Omni due to his
repeated absences, or whether his participation ended because Omni closed.
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see also id. at 59-60 (Ms. Valera opining that termination of Parents’ parental
rights would not harm Children). Ms. Valera highlighted that Children each
have special needs to which paternal grandmother attends:
[E.J.] has cerebral palsy with hypoxia. [E.J.] is receiving services
in Middletown, New York[, where Children reside with paternal
grandmother]. [Paternal grandmother] has been getting [E.J.] all
the appropriate services that are needed. [E.J.] does outpatient
therapy, [physical therapy], and speech[ therapy]. [A.J.] was
diagnosed with autism. [A.J.] gets occupational therapy and
speech [therapy] in the day care. And [L.J.] is [going to] have
a[n] early intervention appointment to see if she is up to speed
on her milestones.
Id. at 57 (paragraph breaks omitted); see also id. at 58 (Ms. Valera testifying
that paternal grandmother “is a director of a school, so she is up to speed on
all the services and needs of [C]hildren”). According to Ms. Valera, she
observed paternal grandmother interact with Children, and opined that
Children are “extremely bonded to” paternal grandmother. Id. at 59.7
At the conclusion of the TPR hearing, the orphans’ court terminated
Father’s parental rights to Children.8 Father timely filed notices of appeal and
____________________________________________
7 At the conclusion of testimony, Children’s GAL advised the orphans’ court
that he “feel[s] the best place for [C]hildren is to be with paternal
grandmother. And in that regard, I would support the [A]gency’s petitions.”
N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 50.
8 On May 6, 2026, the orphans’ court issued orders (docketed May 13, 2026)
formally terminating Father’s parental rights. While the orders do not
reference any subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, it is apparent from the
orphans’ court’s on-the-record remarks, at the conclusion of the TPR hearing,
and its subsequent Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, that the orphans’ court
terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statements. On June 26,
2026, the orphans’ court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Father raises the following issues:
A. Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law
and/or manifestly abused its discretion in finding that the
[Agency] had proven by clear and convincing evidence the
grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)[,] when Father
addressed and/or was continuing to address the circumstances
that originally necessitated placement, and those conditions no
longer existed?
B. Whether the [orphans’] court erred as a matter of law
and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining the
[Agency] sustained its additional burden of proving the
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of
[Children] when there was consistent testimony and evidence of
the bond between Father and [Children]?
Father’s Brief at 5 (capitalization modified).
We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an
abuse of discretion. In re M.L.R., 351 A.3d 731, 736 (Pa. 2026).
[A]ppellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
____________________________________________
(8), and (b). See N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 55-61; Orphans’ Court Opinion,
6/25/26, at 20-25.
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may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
hearings.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the
orphans’ court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or
her child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Interest of N.A.S., 338 A.3d 191, 196-97 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation
omitted); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2021)
(instructing that in reviewing an order terminating parental rights, “the
appellate court should not search the record for contrary conclusions or
substitute its judgment for that of the [orphans’] court.”). “[Our Supreme]
Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases involving close calls,
deference to the [orphans’] court’s determination is particularly crucial.” In
re Adoption of G.W., 342 A.3d 68, 84 (Pa. Super. 2025) (en banc) (citation
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis: “Courts must begin by first
considering whether a parent’s conduct warrants termination under [S]ection
2511(a) prior to shifting its focus to whether termination best serves the
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child’s needs and welfare.” Interest of M.K.L., 354 A.3d 42, 60 (Pa. Super.
2026) (citation omitted). If the court finds grounds exist to warrant
termination under Section 2511(a), it must then assess the evidence relative
to the child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), “giv[ing] primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
Notably, this Court need only agree with the orphans’ court as to “any
one subsection of [Section] 2511(a), in addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order
to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830
(Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).
Instantly, because the orphans’ court addressed only Section
2511(a)(8) in its opinion,9 we confine our analysis to that subsection, which
provides as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
____________________________________________
9 In its opinion, the orphans’ court stated its intention to “focus its analysis
on” Section 2511(a)(8), because a petitioner “need only prove by clear and
convincing evidence all of the elements of any one of the [] subsections it has
chosen to proceed under.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 23. Although
the orphans’ court accurately described a petitioner’s burden, an orphans’
court should address each subsection of Section 2511(a) upon which
the court bases its termination decision. Here, had we disagreed with
the orphans’ court’s Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, our ability to review the
sufficiency of the evidence as to the remaining subsections would have been
materially impeded by the absence of the court’s alternative reasoning.
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).
To satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that
(1) the child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least
12 months; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or
placement still exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child. Section 2511(a)(8)
does not necessitate an evaluation of a parent’s willingness or
ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the
child. Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-issue
conditions have been remedied such that reunification of parent
and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.
In re E.J.C., 335 A.3d 1222, 1230-31 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations and
quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
In considering Section 2511(a)(8), we have observed that “a parent’s
progress toward remedying the conditions [necessitating his child’s
placement] is insufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant a finding in favor of
the parent under the second prong of [Section 2511](a)(8).” In re Adoption
of G.W., 342 A.3d at 87 (citing In re R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 512 (Pa. Super.
2006), wherein we emphasized that termination under Section 2511(a)(8)
“does not require an evaluation of [the parent’s] willingness or ability to
remedy the conditions that led to placement of [his] children.” (emphasis in
original; citation omitted)). Moreover, Section 2511(a)(8) does not “require
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an evaluation of the availability or efficacy of [a county agency’s] services.”
Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
Here, in his first issue,10 Father claims the evidence established that the
conditions which led to Children’s removal were no longer present. Father’s
Brief at 12. Father points out that he “was engaged with [DATS] even after
the Agency filed” its TPR petitions, and that “of [Father’s] 25 [drug] screens,
only five (5) were positive for a non-declared medication.” Id. at 12-13.
Father further contends that he “maintained safe and stable housing
through[out] the life of this case.” Id. at 13; see also id. (Father claiming
that the residence Ms. Valera visited, and where the occupant advised her
Father did not live, “is safe and suitable for reunification with [] Children.”).
Father additionally argues that he engaged in mental health services, and
those services stopped, through no fault of his own, when Omni closed. Id.
____________________________________________
10 In his brief, Father states that he, like the orphans’ court, “focus[es] his
analysis on subsection (a)(8).” Father’s Brief at 11. We could deem Father’s
first issue waived for failing to offer any argument concerning subsections
2511(a)(1), (2), and (5). See In re L.J.W., 264 A.3d 345 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(unpublished memorandum at 9-10) (where the orphans’ court determined
termination was warranted pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8),
this Court concluded that the parent’s “failure to contest subsection (a)(8)
concedes that subsection and [] compels us to conclude that the [orphans’]
court properly terminated her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a).”
(citing In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004), wherein we
reiterated that “we need only agree with [the orphans’ court’s] decision as to
any one subsection [of Section 2511(a)] in order to affirm the termination of
parental rights.”)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential
memorandum decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for
their persuasive value). We decline to do so, particularly in light of the
orphans’ court’s exclusive focus on Section 2511(a)(8).
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at 13-14. Finally, concerning his domestic violence FSP goal, Father highlights
Ms. Bear’s testimony that he had made improvements. Id. at 14; see also
id. (Father stating that “none of the concerns regarding domestic violence
involved” Children).
Instantly, the orphans’ court set forth its rationale for terminating
Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8) as follows:
[C]hildren have been in placement since October 23, 2024. At the
time of the [TPR] hearing …, [C]hildren had been in [placement]
for 18 months.11 … Th[e orphans’] court is satisfied the Agency
has established by clear and convincing evidence that the
conditions that led to [C]hildren’s placement continue to exist
today. ….
….
[Pursuant to the FSPs, P]arents were required to address
their drug and alcohol issues, their mental health issues, and
maintain safe and stable housing. … Throughout the history of
the case, neither parent received a compliance rating higher than
moderate. In addition, neither parent received a progress rating
higher than none or minimal. At the last PR held on March 11,
2026, … Father received a compliance and progress rating of
minimal and minimal. The testimony [at the TPR hearing]
established that at the time of the hearing …, [P]arents were still
only allowed to have supervised visits with [C]hildren. Currently,
[] paternal grandmother supervises visits between [P]arents and
[C]hildren at her home in Middletown, New York. [P]arents were
offered additional visits at Outreach[,] but they declined.
The testimony established that neither [Mother nor Father]
has adequately addressed their drug and alcohol issues. … Father
is not engaged in drug and alcohol treatment. [Father’s drug]
____________________________________________
11 We note that the 12-month period described in the first element of Section
2511(a)(8) must be measured from the date the child is removed from the
parent’s care until the date the termination petition is filed. In re S.D.T., Jr.,
934 A.2d 703, 706-07 (Pa. Super. 2007).
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screens have also been concerning. [Father] last tested positive
for methamphetamine on July 16, 2025. All of his screens in 2026
have been for [purported] medical marijuana. Father has not
produced a medical marijuana card, but on his screens[,] the
results are identified as “positive for his declared medication.”
Neither [Mother nor Father] adequately addressed their
mental health [issues,] despite multiple referrals. ….
Neither [Mother nor Father] has established that they have
safe and stable housing. As of the [TPR] hearing date, the Agency
did not have an address for Father. … Father has also not
adequately addressed the domestic violence [FSP goal,] despite
ample evidence in the record that it is an ongoing issue.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 20-23 (some paragraph breaks omitted;
emphasis and footnote added).
The orphans’ court additionally emphasized that a court’s inquiry, in
considering the sufficiency of termination under Section 2511(a)(8), “is
focused upon whether the at-issue conditions [necessitating placement] have
been remedied such that reunification of parent and child is imminent at the
time of the [TPR] hearing.” Id. at 23 (quoting In re E.J.C., 335 A.3d at 1231
(emphasis in original)); see also N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 61 (the orphans’
court finding that, “because of all the issues in the case, [P]arents are nowhere
near making any progress that would allow or justify” Children’s return to
Parents’ care).
The orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and
its conclusion is free of legal error. Interest of N.A.S., 338 A.3d at 196-97;
see also In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012) (in termination
of parental rights cases, “we must defer to the trial judges so long as the
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factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions
are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” (citation
omitted)).
Regarding the first element of Section 2511(a)(8), the record confirms
that Children were removed from Father’s care on October 23, 2024, and the
Agency filed its TPR petitions on November 25, 2025, approximately 13
months later. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8); In re S.D.T., Jr., 934 A.2d at
706-07. As the orphans’ court observed, at the time of the TPR hearing,
Children had been separated from Father for approximately 18 months.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 20.
Father’s Section 2511(a)(8) challenge primarily concerns its second
element, i.e., whether the conditions that led to Children’s removal continue
to exist. Upon review, we agree with the orphans’ court that those conditions,
in fact, continue to exist.
Beginning with Father’s drug and alcohol FSP goal, while Father
emphasizes that only five of his 25 submitted drugs screens returned positive
results for a non-declared substance, Father failed to appear for 136 drug
screens over the course of Children’s dependency case. N.T. (Vol. II),
4/