Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Nov 12 2026, 9:07 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.G. (Minor Child); J.M. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner November 12, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-JT-1249 Appeal from the La Porte Circuit Court The Honorable Julianne K. Havens, Judge The Honorable Erika C. Stallworth, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 46C01-2508-JT-45 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 1 of 27 Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judge May concurs. Judge Vaidik dissents with separate opinion. Tavitas, Chief Judge. Case Summary [1] J.M. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, J.G. (“Child”). We affirm. Issue [2] Father presents two issues, which we revise and restate as: whether the trial court clearly erred by terminating Father’s parental rights to Child. Facts [3] Father and K.G. (“Mother”) 1 (collectively, “Parents”) have one child together, Child, born in February 2024. In August 2024, when Child was five months old, Parents were arrested on charges of dealing methamphetamine in his presence. Mother and Father were both charged with dealing in methamphetamine in the presence of a minor, a Level 3 felony, and Father was also charged with dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 4 felony. At that time, DCS removed Child from Parents’ care and placed him in foster care. 1 Mother eventually consented to the adoption of Child and does not participate in this appeal. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 2 of 27 [4] Two days after Child’s removal, DCS filed a petition alleging that he was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). The following month, upon admissions by Parents, the trial court found Child to be a CHINS. In its dispositional order, the trial court required Parents to, among other things, participate in casework services, undergo substance-use assessments and follow any resulting recommendations, and submit to random drug screens. The trial court also ordered Father, who was still in jail for the pending drug charges, to participate in supervised visitation upon his release, and complete inpatient rehabilitation. [5] In his criminal case, Father pleaded guilty to dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 4 felony, and the State dismissed the Level 3 felony charge. In January 2025, Father was sentenced to nine years, with six years executed—three in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) and three on community corrections— followed by three years suspended to probation. The sentencing court found as aggravating factors that: (1) Father had an extensive criminal history; (2) he was on bond when the offense occurred; (3) he was at high risk to reoffend; and (4) he had been unsuccessful in community-based sentences. The sentencing court found the following mitigating factors: Father had earned several certificates in jail; had attended AA and NA; and had stayed sober while incarcerated. [6] Meanwhile, Mother was initially compliant with services, and DCS placed Child with her for a trial home visit in May 2025. But approximately two months later, Mother relapsed, and Child tested positive for methamphetamine. DCS removed Child from Mother and returned him to his previous foster Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 3 of 27 placement, where he has since remained. On August 26, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. [7] Father initially participated in casework services while incarcerated. He also cooperated with paternity testing. Father was described by a former family case manager as cooperative. But the trial court’s periodic case review orders later noted that Father could not receive ordered services, including casework services, a clinical assessment, a substance-use assessment, and supervised visitation, because of his incarceration. Father did participate in other programming while incarcerated: he attended AA and NA, earned four certificates through Ivy Tech, and completed the Hoosier Initiative for Re-Entry (“HIRE”) program and Recovery While Incarcerated (“RWI”), a ninety-day outpatient program. Father also testified that he completed more than sixteen online certificates, none of which he could name. Father gave DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Charles Anderson the results of one clean drug screen from February 2026. [8] The trial court held termination hearings in December 2025 and March 2026. DCS presented evidence of Father’s criminal history, which included convictions for dealing in narcotics; stalking, a Level 6 felony; misdemeanor battery, operating while intoxicated, and invasion of privacy. Father’s projected release date was in December 2026, to be followed by a period on community corrections that he estimated to be four months. Father testified that he intended to seek a modification of his placement to work release. He also stated that, upon release, he would live with his own father, where Child Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 4 of 27 could stay, and then get his own apartment. Father claimed that he had employment opportunities ready when he was released. Father planned to enter a residential treatment program and a community recovery program upon release and claimed that he had not used drugs since his August 2024 arrest. [9] FCM Anderson testified that Father’s treatment program in the DOC did not meet DCS’s requirements, that the February 2026 screen was the only one Father had provided, and that Father would need to be out of the DOC for at least six months and participate in services before DCS could consider reunification. FCM Anderson acknowledged on cross-examination that the six- month estimate is not a DCS policy and that reunification could occur sooner, although he thought Father would be “cutting it very close.” Tr. Vol. II p. 140. FCM Anderson also admitted that Parents might be able to remedy the reasons for DCS’s involvement at some point but that the timeline was so far out as to be unfair to Child. FCM Anderson and Child’s court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) both supported termination. [10] On April 13, 2026, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon terminating Father’s parental rights. The trial court found that: (1) Father had remained incarcerated throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings; (2) Father admitted at the dispositional hearing that he “is unable to care for the child while incarcerated”; (3) Father could not care for Child in either a DOC facility or a work-release program; (4) Father’s circumstances “have not changed appreciably since the day of removal”; (5) the services Father participated in while incarcerated did “not meet the requirements of this Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 5 of 27 Court”; (6) even if Father were released in December 2026, reunification would take at least six more months; and (7) Father had not visited Child in over eighteen months. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 92, 94. [11] The trial court concluded that: (1) there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child’s removal, or his continued placement outside Father’s home, would not be remedied; and (2) continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being, safety, physical health, or life because it “means having [Child] remain in the care and custody of [DCS] for an uncertain but lengthy period of time,” and Child “has already been in the care of the Department, under this case, for more than eighteen months of his two-year life.” Id. at 96. The trial court further concluded that termination was in Child’s best interests, noting that Child has no bond with Father and is bonded to his foster family, who wish to adopt him. Father now appeals. Discussion and Decision I. Standard of review and governing law. [12] Father contends that DCS failed to meet the statutory requirements to terminate his parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent’s interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). We Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 6 of 27 recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46. [13] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall write a formal order with: (1) findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights. Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS’s petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. We will affirm the trial court’s termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court’s judgment. Id. [14] DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent- Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 7 of 27 child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31- 35-2-8. [15] Here, DCS filed its petition under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4. 2 Under subsection (c) of this statute, DCS had to allege and prove (1) one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d); (2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and (3) that termination is in the child’s best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. The trial court found two of the circumstances listed in subsection (d): (1) there was a reasonable probability that “the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied;” and (2) continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the child’s well-being, safety, physical health, or life. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (4). Father challenges both of these conclusions. 2 This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again effective July 1, 2025. DCS filed its petition in August 2025, under the version in effect as of July 1, 2025. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 8 of 27 II. The trial court did not clearly err by terminating Father’s parental rights. A. The findings Father challenges are not clearly erroneous. [16] Father initially claims that the trial court’s Findings 19 and 20 3 are clearly erroneous.4 Finding 19 provides: “The circumstances of Father have not changed appreciably since the day of removal. He was incarcerated at the time of detention and has remained incarcerated since. He is unable to care for [Child].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 94. This finding is amply supported by the evidence presented at the termination hearings and is, therefore, not clearly erroneous. [17] Finding 20 provides: Since removal, Father has not participated in services toward reunification. He testified to participating in some services for substance use during his incarceration but those do not meet the requirements of this Court. Additionally, he is just as unable to have the child in his care as he was on the day his child was removed. Testimony indicated that even if his release were to occur in December 2026, the shortest timeline for reunification would be another 6 months from that date. The child will have 3 Father lists Finding 22 as among the findings he challenges, but he makes no argument regarding this finding in his Appellant’s Brief. The only argument regarding this finding is made for the first time in Father’s Reply Brief and is, therefore, waived. See In re Paternity of P.B., 932 N.E.2d 712, 725 n.12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Moreover, this finding merely notes that Child deserves permanency and that termination of Father’s rights will allow Child to remain in a loving, stable home with his foster parents. This finding is not clearly erroneous. 4 DCS argues that Father has waived any challenge to the findings by failing to present a cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Father’s arguments as to Findings 19 and 20 are intertwined with his argument that the trial court clearly erred regarding the non-remedy of the conditions that led to Child’s removal, and Father cites to the record and legal authority in making this argument. Thus, we decline to find waiver as to Father’s challenges to these findings. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 9 of 27 been in foster care for more than thirty-four (34) months were that to occur. Father stated that his child would be “alright” waiting that period of time for him to be in a position to care for his child and have permanency. Id. [18] Father claims that the statement in Finding 20 that he “has not participated in services toward reunification” is clearly erroneous because he did cooperate with paternity testing and casework services. Id. Although the challenged portion of Finding 20 may overstate the situation slightly, it is not clearly erroneous when read in context with the rest of Finding 20. The CHINS dispositional order required Father to complete a substance-use assessment, a clinical assessment with inpatient rehabilitation, and to participate in supervised visitation upon release. It is undisputed that Father completed none of these reunification services due to his incarceration. Finding 20 then separately addresses the programming Father did pursue on his own, such as the substance-abuse services he testified to participating in, but it finds that those services “do not meet the requirements of this Court.” Id. Finding 20, thus distinguishes the court-ordered reunification services Father did not complete from the services he completed while incarcerated. Finding 20 is not clearly erroneous. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 10 of 27 B. The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child’s removal, or his continued placement outside the Parents’ home, will not be remedied. [19] Father also claims that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal, or Child’s continued placement outside the Parents’ home, will not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). To determine whether there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in a child’s removal, or continued placement outside the parents’ home, will not be remedied, we apply a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). First, we identify the conditions that led to removal and the reasons for the child’s continued placement outside the home. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. [20] At the second step, the trial court must judge the parent’s fitness “as of the time of the termination proceeding,” balancing recent improvements against “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court “has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination” and may find that “past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 11 of 27 [21] Father correctly notes that incarceration alone is an insufficient basis for terminating parental rights. See K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 648 (Ind. 2015). A parent’s release date is “only one consideration of many” and “alone is not determinative.” Id. We consider “whether other evidence, coupled with this consideration, demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that [the parent] would be unable to remedy the conditions for removal.” Id. Thus, the relevant question is whether the record contains other evidence that, coupled with Father’s incarceration and release date, supports the trial court’s conclusion. [22] Here, the conditions that led to Child’s removal and continued placement outside of Father’s home are Father’s substance abuse, his criminal behavior, and his resulting incarceration. Father claims that the trial court emphasized his incarceration and criminal history but did not separately label substance abuse as a condition that led to removal. But the findings recount that Child was removed when Parents were arrested for dealing methamphetamine in his presence; that the CHINS court ordered Father to undergo substance-use and clinical assessments, submit to random drug screens, and complete inpatient rehabilitation; and that Father has a long history of criminal conduct. Father himself agreed that the reasons for removal involved “substance abuse,” and FCM Anderson identified “drug usage and housing instability” as reasons for Child’s removal. Tr. Vol. II pp. 175, 145. In fact, Child was removed at five months old after Parents were arrested for dealing methamphetamine in his presence. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 12 of 27 [23] Father has also been incarcerated throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings, and he admitted that he could not care for Child while incarcerated. Father also testified that Child could not be placed with him while he is in community corrections. Father has a long history of criminal conduct, which the trial court found put him at strong risk for recidivism. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred by finding that the circumstances that led to Child’s removal and continued placement outside Father’s care “have not changed appreciably since the day of removal.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 94. [24] Here, there is evidence in addition to Father’s incarceration that supports the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights, including: (1) Child was removed at five months old after Parents were arrested for dealing methamphetamine in his presence, and Father’s sentencing court found that Father was on bond at the time, was at high risk to reoffend, and had been unsuccessful in community-based sentences; (2) Father has a criminal history that includes convictions for stalking, battery, and invasion of privacy; (3) Father did not seek community substance-use treatment before his arrest; (4) Father’s only demonstrated sobriety has been in custody, where he produced a single clean screen; (5) the RWI program Father completed was a ninety-day outpatient program rather than the inpatient treatment the CHINS court ordered; and (6) Father’s release date, December 2026, was about nine months Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 13 of 27 away at the time of the final hearing and would be followed by a period on community corrections 5 during which Child could not be placed with him. [25] Father claims that his release was only months away and that, by the time we decide this appeal, he will likely have been released. But the trial court judges a parent’s fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. FCM Anderson testified that, after release, DCS would need at least six months of services and supervised visitation before reunification could be considered. Although FCM Anderson conceded that this estimate was not DCS policy and could ultimately be shorter or longer, the trial court could reasonably credit FCM Anderson’s time estimate. Even on the shortest timeline, Child, who was just over two years old at the time of the final termination hearing, would have been in foster care for over thirty-four months. [26] Father contends that the trial court wholly disregarded the programs he completed while incarcerated—AA, NA, the Ivy Tech certificates, HIRE, and RWI. But the termination order did not ignore Father’s efforts. Indeed, Finding 20 expressly acknowledged that Father “testified to participating in some services for substance use during his incarceration.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 94. And the trial court then weighed that testimony against the fact that “those do not meet the requirements of this Court” and that Father “is just as unable to have the child in his care as he was on the day his child was 5 Father’s sentence included three years on community corrections, but he testified that he expected to spend about four months there following his release from the DOC. Tr. Vol. II p. 178. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 14 of 27 removed.” Id. The trial court also noted that Father’s “long pattern of criminal activity indicates that he is at strong risk for recidivism.” Id. at 95. The trial court “has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. [27] The evidence also shows that Father’s sobriety has been demonstrated only within a controlled setting. Father testified that he last used drugs on the day of his arrest and that he did not seek treatment beforehand. Despite testifying that he had been drug screened an “[u]ncountable” number of times in a facility he described as “infested with drugs,” Father produced documentation of only a single clean screen from February 2026. Tr. Vol. II pp. 173, 41. And the RWI program Father completed was a ninety-day outpatient program, not the inpatient treatment the CHINS court ordered. The trial court weighed these facts against Father’s recent participation in programs while incarcerated and reasonably concluded that his participation did not establish that the conditions leading to removal would be remedied. See In re W.B., 772 N.E.2d 522, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming termination of parental rights where the trial court acknowledged parents’ year of stable housing but found that short-term improvement did not outweigh their longer pattern of unstable and unsuitable living conditions). And even if the trial court credited Father’s testimony that he would have employment and housing on his release, this does not address the substance abuse and criminal conduct that led to Child’s removal. The trial court could reasonably conclude that Father’s ability to remain sober and law- Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 15 of 27 abiding outside a controlled setting remained untested and that his criminal history made the risk of recidivism high. [28] In support of his argument, Father relies on E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636. In that case, this Court reversed the termination of an incarcerated father’s rights on grounds that the trial court had emphasized the father’s past conduct and minimized his recent progress, including parenting and anger-management classes he completed in prison. 4 N.E.3d at 641. Our Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed, concluding that this Court’s focus on the father’s recent efforts, though “understandable,” “amounted to reweighing the evidence in violation of the standard of review.” Id. at 647. The Court also emphasized that the father made no effort to maintain a relationship with his children while in prison, and it observed that he could have sent cards or letters or telephoned. Id. at 647, 649. Here, too, the trial court acknowledged Father’s participation in programming while incarcerated and weighed it against his history and the other evidence of record. For us to give Father’s participation in services more weight than the trial court did would require us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. [29] Father’s reliance on K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, is similarly misplaced. The father in that case had been incarcerated since before the child’s birth and was serving a ten-year sentence. Id. at 644. At the time of the termination hearing, the father’s possible release was still more than two years away, although by the time of the Court’s decision it was less than a year away. Id. at 648. The Court held that the release date was not determinative and looked to the other Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 16 of 27 evidence, including that the father had completed twelve programs addressing parenting skills and substance abuse; his plan to live and work with his own father upon release was unrebutted; he visited the child every other week for two to three hours, in visits arranged by the child’s paternal aunt; and he called every night to say goodnight. Id. at 647-49. The child in that case also recognized his father. Id. at 649. The Court emphasized that the father’s “recent improvements . . . were not balanced against his habitual patterns of conduct” and concluded that the father had “pursued every avenue possible” to prepare for parenthood, had bonded with the child, and would remain part of the child’s life, regardless of termination, “as long as he remains sober and otherwise law-abiding.” Id. at 649, 651. [30] Here, in contrast, Child was five months old when he was removed, and Father has not seen or visited Child since. And, although the lack of visitation may have been out of Father’s control, there is no indication that Father called, wrote, or otherwise contacted Child to create or maintain a parental bond. The trial court found that Child has no bond with Father and that Child has instead spent most of his life in foster care and is bonded to his foster parents, who wish to adopt him. The regular visits, nightly calls, and established bond that were present in K.E. are simply not present here. And unlike in K.E., the trial court here weighed Father’s efforts against his history of criminal activity, his recent sobriety that has never been tested outside a controlled setting, and a pattern of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 17 of 27 substance abuse that persisted for years before this case, and found his efforts insufficient. 6 [31] We have previously distinguished K.E. in another case where an incarcerated father had no relationship with his child. In In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, the father was incarcerated months before the child’s birth and had “never seen, never held, nor [] touched his child[.]” Id. at 479. We affirmed the termination and observed that the facts of K.E. were “easily distinguishable” because the father and child had never met. A.G., 45 N.E.3d at 479 n.3. Here, Father and Child were briefly together before removal. But, as in A.G. and unlike in K.E., Father has had no contact with Child since removal, and there was no bond between them. [32] Lastly, Father’s citation to In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), is also unavailing. There, we reversed the trial court’s termination of an incarcerated mother’s parental rights because DCS and the trial court “categorically disregarded” the mother’s participation in programming while in prison and never weighed her progress against her habitual patterns. 7 Id. at 491. Specifically, the mother had obtained her GED, taken parenting classes, 6 Our Supreme Court’s decision in G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, on which K.E. relied, is distinguishable for similar reasons. The mother in G.Y. had been her child’s sole caretaker for the first twenty months of his life, she maintained a consistent relationship through monthly visits and letters, and her release was “imminent.” Id. at 1265. Here, however, Father has no similar history of caring for Child, and he has not maintained a consistent relationship with Child. And, although his release was relatively imminent, he would still have to participate in community corrections, further delaying any reunification. 7 We affirmed the trial court’s decision to terminate the incarcerated father’s rights and held that his partial compliance with services did not preclude termination because he “failed to make appreciable improvement in his habitual conduct.” A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 494. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 18 of 27 attended six peer-counseling groups a week, and participated in RWI. Id. Notably, we observed that “[t]here was no evidence presented regarding Mother’s response to the programming she received while incarcerated or that despite the benefits of the programming, Mother’s habitual patterns remained unchanged,” and that the trial court made no attempt to weigh the two. Id. [33] Here, however, the trial court did not “categorically disregard” Father’s efforts. Instead, it acknowledged them and found that they did not outweigh Father’s long pattern of criminal activity and substance abuse, the absence of any completed reunification services, and the uncertainty surrounding when Father would actually be able to safely care for Child. C. The trial court did not clearly err in determining that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child’s wellbeing. [34] Father also claims that the trial court clearly erred in determining that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child’s wellbeing, safety, physical health, or life. See I.C. § 31-35-2- 4(d)(4). Termination of parental rights is proper where a child’s emotional or physical development is threatened, and a trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that his or her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 649. [35] Father has an extensive criminal history and a history of substance abuse. And Father has never demonstrated that he has acted as a father to Child or that the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 19 of 27 two share any parental bond. Child was five months old when he was removed, and Father has not seen or visited him since—a period of more than eighteen months. We recognize that the lack of visitation may have been a function of Father’s incarceration, but his incarceration was a result of Father’s voluntary criminal activities. See In A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 490 (“[I]ndividuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children.”) (quoting In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)). And nothing in the record indicates that Father wrote, called, or otherwise reached out to Child to create or maintain a paternal relationship. Child has no bond with Father and has instead spent nearly his entire life in foster care and is bonded to his foster family, who wish to adopt him. [36] Considering only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we cannot say that it clearly erred in concluding that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s wellbeing. See C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (affirming conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship with incarcerated father posed a threat to the children’s wellbeing where children had bonded with their foster parents, and therapist opined they would be “retraumatized” if reunified). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 20 of 27 Conclusion [37] The trial court did not clearly err in determining that there is a reasonable probability that (1) the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal, or the reasons for his continued placement outside of Father’s care, will not be remedied, and (2) that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s wellbeing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights. [38] Affirmed. May, J., concurs. Vaidik, J., dissents with separate opinion. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jessica R. Merino Wyatt, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Lela Rae Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-JT-1249 | November 12, 2026 Page 21 of 27 Vaidik, Judge, dissenting. [39] Termination of parental rights is irreversible. When contemplating this extreme measure, courts must give parents who are making substantial strides toward reunification a chance. Father was incarcerated throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings, so he couldn’t participate in court-ordered reunification services. Even so, he completed a number of programs and certifications while incarcerated, and his projected release date is in December. Our Supreme Court has reversed terminations on similar facts, and the majority’s efforts to distinguish those cases don’t hold up. Father should be given the opportunity to finish what he started. Thus, I would reverse the termination of his parental rights. [40] Two Supreme Court decisions show why reversal is warranted. In In re G.Y., 904 N.E.