Austin Bischoff v. SCDOE
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket2026-UP-483
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Austin Bischoff, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Education, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2025-000839
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Robert L. Reibold, Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-483
Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026
AFFIRMED
Austin Bischoff, of Grovetown, Georgia, pro se.
Makenzie Polston Segars, of the S.C. Department of
Education, of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Austin Bischoff appeals an order of the Administrative Law
Court (ALC) affirming the final decision of the State Board of Education to
suspend Bischoff's educator certificate for two years. On appeal, Bischoff argues
that (1) the ALC's "misapplication of Jones v. Flowers 1 fail[ed] to identify that the
1
547 U.S. 220 (2006).
notice of disciplinary action and right to due process [was] tainted by the
misdelivery of certified and regular mail," (2) "the court's ruling d[id] not
accurately refute [Bischoff's] arguments regarding" section 59-25-260 of the South
Carolina Code (2020) and due process, and (3) the South Carolina Department of
Education's (the Department's) "failure to comply with procedural and due process
requirements was overlooked by the [ALC]." We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.
We hold substantial evidence supports the ALC's finding that Bischoff's due
process rights were not violated because the November 29, 2023 notice sent by
regular mail satisfied due process. See Major v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole &
Pardon Servs., 384 S.C. 457, 464, 682 S.E.2d 795, 799 (2009) ("The decision of
the ALC should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence
or controlled by some error of law."); id. ("The ALC's order should be affirmed if
supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Tennant v. Beaufort Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 381 S.C. 617, 620, 674 S.E.2d 488, 490 (2009) ("Substantial evidence is not
a mere scintilla of evidence, but evidence which, considering the record as a
whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency
reached."). Regarding Bischoff's argument that the ALC misapplied the court's
reasoning in Jones, we find this argument is without merit. Jones may be
distinguished from this case because Bischoff did not provide any evidence the
Department was on notice that the letter sent by regular mail likely failed, and
there was no evidence that the letters sent by certified and regular mail were
returned to the Department. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 225 (holding that the plaintiff's
due process rights had been violated because, after the notice the State sent via
certified mail was returned as "unclaimed," the State failed to take other measures
reasonably available to determine the plaintiff's address); id. ("[W]hen mailed
notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable
steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property,
if it is practicable to do so." (emphasis added)). Although the Department
conceded the November 23, 2023 letter sent by certified mail was delivered to his
former address, there was no evidence of any error in service associated with the
same letter sent by regular mail; moreover, the Department sent Bischoff a
follow-up notice via regular mail to his current address on July 31, 2024.
Therefore, we find the Department's sending of the November 23, 2023 letter by
regular mail satisfied due process. See Tulsa Pro. Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope,
485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988) ("[Appellate courts] have repeatedly recognized that mail
service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to
provide actual notice.").
Next, we hold that because the Department did not violate Bischoff's due process
rights, and the due process issue is dispositive, this court need not consider
Bischoff's second and third issues on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior
issue is dispositive).
AFFIRMED.2
GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.