Sweet, M. v. Kaufman, M.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket434 EDA 2026
JudgeMcLaughlin
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
MAGDALENA SWEET : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL F. FOX, PETRELLI : No. 434 EDA 2026
PREVITERA, LLC, MADELEINE R. :
KAUFMAN, AND LAW OFFICES OF :
MADELEINE R. KAUFMAN :
Appeal from the Order Entered December 18, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
No(s): 2023-18608
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2026
Magdalena Sweet appeals pro se from the order granting summary
judgement in favor of Madeleine R. Kaufman and Law Offices of Madeleine R.
Kaufman (collectively, “Defendants”). Sweet argues the court erred in finding
her professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims failed as a
matter of law because she did not offer expert evidence and failed to plead
causation. We affirm the order entering summary judgment.
The trial court summarized the facts as follows.
[Sweet and her ex-husband were divorced in February
2020]. In April of 2020, [Sweet] retained Madeleine Kaufman,
Esquire to represent her in her equitable distribution dispute.
From May 2020 to June 2021 [Sweet] regularly emailed
[Attorney] Kaufman with purported evidence of fraud committed
by [Sweet]’s ex-husband as well as claims of evidence of the
parties’ assets, debts, and credits. On June 30, 2021, [Attorney]
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Kaufman submitted a prehearing statement prior to an equitable
distribution conference before a master. The purported fraudulent
activity and debts of [Sweet]’s ex-husband were not included in
the pre-hearing statement submitted by [Attorney] Kaufman. The
master’s conference took place on July 7, 2021. In August of
2021, [Sweet] fired [Attorney] Kaufman and filed for a de novo
equitable distribution hearing before a common pleas judge.
[Sweet] chose to represent herself after terminating
[Attorney] Kaufman’s representation. On October 25, 2021, Ms.
Sweet, representing herself, filed a supplemental pre-hearing
statement prior to the de novo hearing before . . . [the Honorable
Charissa J.] Liller. [Sweet]’s supplemental pre-hearing statement
included the allegations of fraud and purported additional debts
accrued by her ex-husband during the marriage.
Prior to the equitable distribution hearing before Judge
Liller, Ms. Sweet and her husband reached an agreement on the
value of all of the disputed assets and liabilities except the marital
home. [Sweet] never raised the issue of the purported fraud and
additional debts of her ex-husband at the de novo hearing on
October 28, 2021. Judge Liller issued her Decision on November
23, 2021. [Sweet] did not appeal the Decision.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/24/26, at 3-6 (citations and footnote omitted).
On August 16, 2023, Sweet instituted this action against Defendants. 1
Sweet’s complaint asserted claims for professional negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty.2 The complaint alleged,
19. In or around April 2021, [Sweet] hired [Attorney] Kaufman.
20. [Attorney] Kaufman failed to timely and properly value
[Sweet]’s assets prior to trial.
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1 The court granted summary judgment in favor of the additional defendants
that Sweet initially named in the suit.
2 A third count, for breach of contract, was dismissed during preliminary
objections.
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21. Additionally, [Attorney] Kaufman failed to submit some of
[Sweet]’s debts and assets prior to trial.
22. Moreover, [Kaufman] neglected to hire the appropriate
economic expert to value [Sweet]’s assets. Specifically, upon
information and belief, [Sweet]’s ex-husband had:
a. Submitted spreadsheets with false banking information.
b. Hid and updated several retirement plans.
c. Submitted irrelevant account information.
23. [Attorney] Kaufman never engaged the proper expert to look
into and evaluate the aforementioned fraud.
24. Furthermore, [Attorney] Kaufman failed to:
a. Investigate a potential business that [Sweet]’s ex-
husband was running from his home.
b. Refused to subpoena Ardent Credit Union, where
[Sweet]’s ex-husband was believed to have opened secret
accounts.
c. Neglected to research the three home equity loans taken
by [Sweet]’s ex-husband.
d. Neglected to research the home loan [Sweet]’s ex-
husband allegedly took out for his mother.
25. Upon information and belief, the aforementioned caused
[Sweet] to lose several million dollars in assets.
26. In or around August 2021, [Sweet] realized Kaufman’s errors.
27. In or around August 2021, [Sweet] terminated Kaufman’s
services. [Sweet] was forced to work on her case pro se, without
the assistance of counsel.
28. [Attorney] Kaufman breached her fiduciary duty to [Sweet] by
her failure to value [Sweet]’s assets and investigate the alleged
fraud of [Sweet]’s ex-husband.
29. The aforementioned acts caused [Sweet] to suffer severe
emotional and financial distress.
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30. As a result of [Kaufman]’s negligence, [Sweet] has suffered
and continues to suffer significant financial damages and
emotional distress.
31. But for [Kaufman]’s negligence, [Sweet] has suffered and
continues to suffer significant financial strain and emotional
distress.
Trial Ct. Op. at 1-2 (quoting Complaint at ¶¶ 19-31).
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In relevant part,
Defendants argued Sweet’s legal malpractice claim failed as a matter of law
“because she had failed to serve an expert report for purposes of
demonstrating that Attorney Kaufman breached the standard of care[.]”
Motion for Summary Judgment, Oct. 16, 2025, at ¶ 27; see also id. at 30.
They also asserted Sweet failed to establish that Attorney Kaufman’s alleged
negligence negatively affected the outcome of Sweet’s equitable distribution
case. Defendants asserted that expert testimony is required to establish the
standard of professional care in a legal malpractice case and whether the
defendant attorney’s deviation from that standard of care caused the plaintiff
damages. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 29.
Defendants also argued Sweet’s breach of fiduciary duty claim failed as
a matter of law because Sweet did not allege that Attorney Kaufman “was
disloyal to her, or put the interests of herself or another before the interests
of Sweet.” Id. at ¶ 39. Defendants further argued that Sweet was also
required to offer expert testimony to support that Attorney Kaufman breached
a fiduciary duty and that the breach was the cause of Sweet’s damages. Id.
at ¶¶ 40-43.
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Following argument, the trial court granted the motion. It found Sweet’s
legal malpractice claim failed as a matter of law because she “failed to obtain
an expert to support her claim that [Attorney] Kaufman’s conduct fell below
the standard of care.” Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (footnote omitted). The court observed
that “[t]he standard of care in a legal malpractice action must be established
by expert testimony,” and that “an attorney’s conduct in discovering,
analyzing, and applying equitable distribution factors to assets, credits, debts,
and liabilities is not within the knowledge of the average layperson.” Id. at 5-
6. The court also found that expert testimony would be required to prove
damages, because “[e]valuating, weighing, and applying the [23 Pa.C.S.A. §
3502] factors to [Sweet]’s equitable distribution claim is well beyond the scope
of a layperson’s knowledge.” Id. at 9. The court noted Sweet even
acknowledged, in filing her certificate of merit, that expert testimony would
be required to prove her claims. Id. at 6 (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1042.3(a)(1)). 3
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3 This provision states,
(a) In any action based upon an allegation that a licensed
professional deviated from an acceptable professional standard,
the attorney for the plaintiff, or the plaintiff if not represented,
shall file with the complaint or within sixty days after the filing of
the complaint, a certificate of merit signed by the attorney or party
that . . .
(1) an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a
written statement that there exists a reasonable probability
that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in
the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the
complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The court also found that Sweet’s allegations failed to establish that
Attorney Kaufman’s alleged breaches – in failing to properly prepare and
present Sweet’s equitable distribution case – proximately caused Sweet’s
damages. The court noted that after the alleged breaches, Sweet represented
herself at the de novo hearing before Judge Liller and thus had had another
opportunity to present and dispute the assets and liabilities of the parties. Id.
at 6. The court found, “[Sweet’s] causation claim fails where the record
demonstrates she had the opportunity to present the very same evidence she
claims Kaufman failed to present.” Id. at 7.4
The court likewise found Sweet could not prove her breach of fiduciary
duty claim without expert testimony, because she could not establish Attorney
Kaufman breached a fiduciary duty or that any such breach caused Sweet’s
damages. Id. at 10.
The court issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendants. Sweet appealed. She complied with the trial court’s order
____________________________________________
and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the
harm[.]
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.3(a)(1).
4 The court also found Defendants were not the proximate cause of the alleged
damages because “the equitable distribution hearing before Judge Liller
unequivocally demonstrates that [Sweet] and her ex-husband agreed to the
resolution of all disputed assets and liabilities before the de novo hearing
before Judge Liller.” Trial Ct. Op. at 7. Sweet argues whether she agreed to
the stipulations is a disputed issue of material fact, and that the transcript
proves she did not agree to the stipulations. Because we find Sweet’s claims
fail as a matter of law for other reasons, we will not reach this specific finding
by the court, or address Sweet’s arguments relating to it.
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directing her to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and filed one listing the
following issues:
1. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment
where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding
Defendant’s alleged omissions and failures during her
representation of Plaintiff.
2. The trial court erred by resolving disputed issues of
material fact and credibility in favor of Defendant, the
moving party, in violation of the summary judgment
standard.
3. The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law,
that Defendant’s alleged conduct could not be the proximate
cause of Plaintiffs damages.
4. The trial court erred by relying on Plaintiffs later pro se
participation in a De Novo equitable distribution hearing to
negate causation, where Defendant’s alleged malpractice
occurred prior to Plaintiffs termination of Defendant and
materially affected the proceedings.
5. The trial court erred in holding that expert testimony was
required to establish breach and causation where the
alleged malpractice involved documentary omissions and
failures within the understanding of a layperson.
6. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim for the same reasons
it erred on the legal malpractice claim.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 2/10/26, at 1.
However, Sweet’s brief contains what she terms a “Statement of the
Issue” listing a single issue: “Whether the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment where expert testimony was not required because the
alleged misconduct falls within the understanding of a layperson.” Sweet’s Br.
at 2 (unpaginated). Sweet’s brief lacks many other obligatory elements,
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including a Statement of Jurisdiction and a Statement of the Case. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2111 (listing matters required in an appellant’s brief). Other
required elements are in effect present but misnamed and not fully in
compliance with the appellate rules. Compare Sweet’s Br. at 2 (unpaginated)
(containing “Introduction” that gives Sweet’s characterization of the order at
issue) with Pa.R.A.P. 2115(a) (requiring the text of the order from which the
appeal was taken to be “set forth verbatim”). Furthermore, Sweet’s brief is
disorganized and difficult to follow. She has not divided her argument into
sections that meaningfully correspond to the issues listed in her Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement.
The failure to include all issues in her Rule 1925(b) statement in her
Statement of the Issue” constitutes waiver of the omitted issues. See
Commonwealth v. Fremd, 860 A.2d 515, 523-24 (Pa.Super. 2004). “No
question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions
involved or is fairly suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). To the extent that
the substantial defects in Sweet’s brief have prevented us from understanding
her arguments, they are waived. See Gould v. Wagner, 316 A.3d 634, 639
(Pa.Super. 2024) (“If a deficient brief hinders this Court’s ability to address
any issue on review, the issue will be regarded as waived”). We will confine
our review to Sweet’s arguments addressing whether the court erred in
entering summary judgment.
Sweet first argues the allegations in this case are understandable to a
lay jury and do not require the testimony of an expert. Sweet’s Br. at 2-3
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(unpaginated). She asserts, “This case does not involve complex financial
valuation or technical accounting principles. Rather, it concerns clear instances
of concealment, omission, and misrepresentation, which a jury can readily
understand without expert assistance.” Id. at 3 (unpaginated). Sweet also
argues that expert testimony is unnecessary because her own “summaries
and supporting documentation” presented in the exhibits to her pretrial
statement “exceed[] the level of factual development that would typically be
provided through expert testimony” by a forensic accountant. Id.
Sweet next claims the court erred in finding she did not plead all the
elements of her claims, when the transcript of the de novo hearing shows
Attorney Kaufman breached her “continuing duties to [Sweet] as a former
client[.]” Id. at 15 (unpaginated). She alleges Attorney Kaufman did so by
“her unauthorized presence at the De Novo hearing alongside [Sweet]’s
adversary, which contributed to confusion and disruption of [Sweet]’s ability
to participate meaningfully in the proceeding.” Id.
Sweet ultimately contends summary judgment was inappropriate
because she raised a material issue of fact. She maintains that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether she “was [c]apable of
meaningfully presenting her case after unexpectedly encountering her former
attorney [i]mmediately before the hearing while simultaneously experiencing
the confusion, emotional distress, and inability to effectively advocate for
herself reflected through the transcript.” Sweet’s Amended Reply Br. at 3
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(unpaginated).5 Sweet argues, “Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to [the a]ppellant, as Pennsylvania law requires, a reasonable jury
could conclude that Attorney Kaufman’s conduct before and during the De
Novo Proceedings materially impaired [Sweet]’s ability to present her divorce
case and contributed to the adverse financial outcome.” Id. at 6
(unpaginated).
We employ the following standard of review.
Our review on an appeal from the grant of a motion for
summary judgment is well-settled. A reviewing court may disturb
the order of the trial court only where it is established that the
court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. As with
all questions of law, our review is plenary.
In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary
judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment
may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears the
burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his
pleadings or answers in order to survive summary
judgment. Failure of a non-moving party to adduce
sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on
which it bears the burden of proof . . . establishes the
entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of
law. Lastly, we will view the record in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the
moving party.
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5 Sweet filed a “Motion to Amend Appellant Responds [sic] to Appellee’s Brief.”
We hereby grant the motion, and consider Sweet’s reply brief, as amended.
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Commc'ns Network Int’l, Ltd. v. Mullineaux, 187 A.3d 951, 960
(Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted) (emphasis in Commc'ns Network Int’l,
Ltd.).
Sweet’s failure to produce expert testimony entitled Defendants to
judgment as a matter of law. “A claim of legal malpractice requires that the
plaintiff plead the following three elements: employment of the attorney or
other basis for a duty; the failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and
knowledge; and that the attorney’s negligence was the proximate cause of
damage to the plaintiff.” 412 N. Front St. Assocs., LP v. Spector Gadon &
Rosen, P.C., 151 A.3d 646, 657 (Pa.Super. 2016). A plaintiff asserting a
breach of fiduciary duty must show: “the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between [the p]laintiff and [the defendant], that [the defendant] negligently
or intentionally failed to act in good faith and solely for [the plaintiff’s] benefit,
and that [the plaintiff] suffered an injury caused by [the defendant’s] breach
of [its] fiduciary duty.” Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., 288 A.3d 76, 88 (Pa.
2023) (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
As in any other professional liability case, expert testimony is necessary
to establish legal malpractice claims “when the subject matter of the inquiry
is one involving special skills and training not common to the ordinary lay
person.” Storm v. Golden, 538 A.2d 61, 64 (Pa.Super. 1988); accord 412
N. Front St. Assocs., LP, 151 A.3d at 661 (“the standard of care applicable
to a given profession must be determined from the testimony of experts,
unless the conduct involved is within the common knowledge of the ordinary
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layperson”). The question is whether the alleged deviation from the standard
of care “is sufficiently clear so as to be determinable by laypersons or
concluded as a matter of law, or whether the alleged breach of duty involves
too complex a legal issue so as to warrant explication by expert evidence.”
Id. at 65.
Prior decisions demonstrate the distinction. For example, expert
testimony was required to prove a claim of legal malpractice based on
allegations that the defendant pursued a declaratory judgment action on
plaintiff’s behalf, rather than a civil action, in a dispute over a purchase option
within a commercial lease agreement. See True R.R. Realty, Inc. v. McNees
Wallace & Nurick, LLC., 275 A.3d 490, 492, 498 (Pa.Super. 2022). Expert
testimony was also required to prove legal malpractice when the allegations
regarded the handling of a real estate transaction. See Storm, 538 A.2d at
65 (“Whether an attorney failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care and
skill related to common professional practice in handling a real estate
transaction is a question of fact outside the normal range of the ordinary
experience of laypersons”). In contrast, lay testimony was sufficient to prove
legal malpractice based on allegations that the defendant failed to investigate
and communicate a settlement offer to the plaintiff in a medical malpractice
suit, and breached his duty as a fiduciary by engaging in financial transactions
with the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 67 (Pa. 1989).
We agree with the trial court that whether Attorney Kaufman breached
a duty of care while representing Sweet in the underlying equitable distribution
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action is not within the common knowledge of the ordinary layperson.
Contrary to Sweet’s contentions, such matters as whether a home equity loan
constituted marital property subject to equitable distribution are not the sorts
of things a non-expert knows.6 Thus, Sweet was required to present expert
testimony to support her professional negligence claim. Her failure to adduce
expert evidence in this regard entitled Defendants to judgment as a matter of
law. See True R.R. Realty, Inc., 275 A.3d at 498; Storm, 538 A.2d at 65.
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6 For example, Sweet claims the jury would not need expert testimony to
understand the following:
A $922,468 undisclosed home equity loan constitutes
marital property subject to equitable distribution. . . .
Public records, including Bucks County deed records,
contain no record of the alleged PennyMac loan, raising clear
issues of nondisclosure.
Forged loan applications and the use of an employer’s office
to transmit fraudulent documents constitute evidence of
fraud.
Undisclosed bank accounts are marital assets that must be
identified and divided.
Retirement accounts must be disclosed and valued as of the
date of separation (June 21, 2019), which [Attorney
Kaufman] acknowledged was not done.
False or misleading financial spreadsheets do not constitute
competent evidence, particularly where [Sweet] incurred
significant expense to obtain accurate records from the SB1
Fraud Department.
Marital debt in the amount of $16,400 was omitted from
[Sweet’s] pretrial statement.
Sweet’s Br. at 3 (unpaginated).
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We also agree with the trial court that, even if Sweet could establish
Attorney Kaufman deviated from the applicable standard of care when
representing Sweet, Sweet’s allegations fail to establish causation. See 412
N. Front St. Assocs., LP, 151 A.3d at 657. Sweet was self-represented at
the de novo hearing that gave rise to the equitable distribution order.
We also find the court properly granted summary judgment on Sweet’s
breach of fiduciary duty claim. In alleging Attorney Kaufman failed to properly
present her equitable distribution case, Sweet failed to allege Attorney
Kaufman breached any fiduciary duty. See Marion, 288 A.3d at 88.
Finally, while Sweet argues Attorney Kaufman breached a duty through
her “unauthorized appearance” at the de novo hearing, causing Sweet such
emotional distress as to prevent her from presenting her case, Sweet’s
complaint did not allege Attorney Kaufman’s unexpected appearance at the
hearing constituted professional negligence or a breach of a fiduciary duty.
This argument is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (arguments cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal).
Application to Amend granted. Order affirmed.
Judge Bowes joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
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Date: 11/16/2026
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