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IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Barry Dircks, Jun 30 2026, 9:07 am CLERK Appellant-Plaintiff Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. Joseph Delamater and Razumich & Delamater, P.C., Appellees-Defendants June 30, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CT-932 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Timothy W. Oakes, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D02-2204-CT-11758 Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judge Bailey concurs. Judge Kenworthy dissents with separate opinion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 1 of 34 Tavitas, Chief Judge. Case Summary [1] Attorney Joseph Delamater, then of the law firm Razumich & Delamater, P.C. (“the Firm”), voluntarily intervened on behalf of Barry Dircks when Dircks was involved in an approximately ten-hour standoff with law enforcement. With Delamater’s help, the standoff was resolved peacefully. Delamater did not appear on Dircks’ behalf at a subsequent child in need of services (“CHINS”) detention hearing, and Dircks’ children were temporarily removed from his custody. Dircks later brought a legal malpractice claim against Delamater and the Firm (collectively, “Defendants”). After each party moved for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Dircks appeals and argues that genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judgment. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm. Issue [2] Dircks presents one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Facts [3] On the morning of March 4, 2019, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report of potential neglect involving Dircks’ two children, then four years old and one year old. The source informed DCS of the following allegations: a family member brought Dircks’ wife and the children’s mother, Kathryn, to the hospital around 3:00 a.m. Kathryn “had not eaten, drank [sic], Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 2 of 34 or slept for three days,” and she was “paranoid” and “aggressive.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 35. Someone from the hospital contacted Dircks around 6:00 a.m. He stated he was at the family’s home in Lebanon with the children. The source had no knowledge of imminent danger, injury, or threats to the children, but reported that Dircks was “very protective” of them. Id. Dircks was described as “very paranoid” and “delusional” and stated his in-laws sent the military and government after his family; there was “small artillery” in the home; the family did not sleep unless two people were guarding the home with rifles; he barricaded the doors whenever anyone knocked; and he believed that Kathryn was “possessed.” Id. [4] Based on this report, DCS sent caseworkers to Dircks’ home to check on the children’s welfare, accompanied by deputies from the Boone County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”). After the deputies approached and knocked on the door, Dircks denied them entry to the home due to the lack of a warrant. [5] The situation escalated from there. BCSO set up a command center near the property line and activated the Special Response Team and Crisis Negotiation Team. BCSO attempted to contact Dircks and other family members by phone. In addition to Dircks and the children, Dircks’ adult brother and sister were inside the house. Dircks’ mother, Shirley, was also en route to Indiana from Utah. [6] Around 1:45 p.m. that afternoon, DCS filed a motion in the Boone Circuit Court to compel the Dirckses to allow DCS to interview the children and observe the home environment. Shortly thereafter, that court ordered the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 3 of 34 Dirckses “to allow the [BCSO] and [DCS] Family Case Managers to enter the home and the property . . . to determine the welfare and safety of all individuals, including all children in the home,” and “to produce [the children] for interview.” Id. at 106. [7] Meanwhile, Dircks attempted to reach an attorney to assist him. He called an attorney with whom Kathryn had worked and left a voicemail with the office. That attorney contacted Delamater, who agreed to call Dircks. Delamater and Dircks spoke on the phone around 4:20 p.m. What occurred during this call is disputed, but Delamater called dispatch and told them he was an attorney trying to get information about his client. Delamater explained he was not sure if his client had “a mental break” or if a SWAT team was at the client’s house. Appellant’s Supp. App., Ex. 35 at 1:48. Dispatch confirmed that multiple officers were near Dircks’ property and took Delamater’s phone number to pass on to BCSO. [8] Boone County Sheriff Michael Nielsen called Delamater. Delamater explained that he was trying to figure out “what’s actually happening.” Id., Ex. 3 at 0:48. Delamater stated that he did not believe DCS would “find anything amiss with the home” but he was concerned for his “client’s state of mind.” Id. at 5:10- 5:22. Sheriff Nielsen wanted to “work out a surrender plan” for everyone to come out of the house so DCS could complete the welfare check. Id. at 8:05. Delamater said he would speak to Dircks. [9] In a call about forty minutes later, Sheriff Nielsen explained to Delamater BCSO’s plan to have Dircks’ sister bring the children out of the home to an Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 4 of 34 armored personnel carrier and for DCS to take custody of them. Delamater stated that Dircks was agreeable to BCSO and DCS coming onto the property to do a welfare check. Sheriff Nielsen responded that DCS had decided to detain the children “because of the seriousness of the situation for now.” Id. at 3:38:26. DCS confirmed that it planned to open a CHINS case and indicated that the children would not be permitted to stay in the home that night. [10] Thereafter, BCSO and DCS developed a plan for Dircks to surrender the children and for DCS to place them overnight in the home of Benjamin and Allison Crockett, who knew the Dirckses through church. The Crocketts agreed that the children’s grandmother, Shirley, who had since landed in Indianapolis and been picked up at the airport by BCSO, could stay at their home with the children. Delamater agreed to present the plan to Dircks and try to persuade Dircks to follow it. [11] At approximately 7:00 p.m., Dircks sent the children out of the home without incident, and DCS detained the children on an emergency basis. Neither BCSO nor DCS went into the home that evening; according to DCS, Dircks directed all further communications to his attorney. [12] The day after the standoff, DCS requested authorization to file petitions alleging that the children were CHINS. That day, Delamater left Dircks a voicemail stating that DCS told Delamater there was a court hearing scheduled for the next morning, March 6, but Delamater would not be able to attend due to a prior commitment. Delamater advised Dircks to attend, tell the court he was hiring counsel, and request another hearing date “so that I can appear with Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 5 of 34 you,” and “just kinda go from there.” Id., Ex. 12 at 0:23. Delamater also advised Dircks that, when he called the Firm back, Dircks should speak to his assistant to set up an appointment with Delamater to go over paperwork. At some point that day, the assistant left a voicemail for Dircks to set up a phone appointment with Delamater. [13] The trial court held the initial and detention hearings on the morning of March 6, 2019. Dircks and Shirley attended; Delamater, as he had informed Dircks, did not. At the outset, Dircks informed the court that he had an attorney who could not attend due to a prior commitment. The trial court asked, “Who is your attorney sir?” and Dircks responded, “Uh, Joe Delm – Delamante – Delamonte [phonic].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 164 (brackets in original). The trial court noted that any attorney would need to file an appearance, but it would set a status review hearing for the next week so that an attorney could attend. [14] The trial court advised Dircks of his rights and entered a preliminary denial of the CHINS petitions. In the detention phase, the trial court authorized the detention based on the testimony of a DCS supervisor. After a discussion with Dircks and Shirley, the trial court ordered the children placed with Shirley at the Crocketts’ house, subject to Shirley’s completion of a background check and drug test. As to visitation, the trial court explained: The Court: Now, visitation with father. [] DCS is asking for that to be supervised . . . by [a] provider[.] [W]e may get to that point where we have to do it but . . . you wouldn’t even be able to get that done this week. If you sir [] and the Crockets [sic] are Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 6 of 34 agreeable, if you want to go over there and see your kids a couple of times and including – Mr. Dircks: Thank you. The Court: today. Mr. Dircks: Thank you. I can go over after this? The Court: Yes. Id. at 191. The trial court later stated: The Court: . . . I’m not going to enter any orders ordering you to [get a mental health evaluation] right now. The only order is that you – you can have visitation with the kids this week with grandmother there at the Crockets [sic] home. . . . Id. at 193 (emphasis added). The trial court then set a review hearing for March 14, 2019. [15] After the hearing, Shirley went with DCS officials to complete a background check and drug test. Dircks went to the Crocketts’ home to visit the children even though Shirley was not present. The DCS local office supervisor advised the court via email that Dircks was at the Crocketts’ home without Shirley being present. That afternoon, the court held an emergency hearing. Because Dircks violated the order by visiting the children outside of Shirley’s presence, the court ordered the children to be placed in foster care and Dircks’ visitation to be fully supervised. [16] According to Dircks, he called Delamater after the hearing and fired him. Dircks hired another firm to represent him, and that firm entered an appearance Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 7 of 34 in the CHINS case on March 7, 2019. Dircks underwent a psychological evaluation on March 11, and the psychologist concluded that Dircks “does not present as a threat to himself or others and is fully capable of raising his children without outside intervention.” Id. at 82. DCS completed a home inspection on March 12, 2019. The children remained in foster care until the March 14 hearing, after which they returned to the Dirckses’ home. About a month later, the court dismissed the CHINS petitions on DCS’s motion. [17] In October 2019, Dircks requested his client file from Delamater. Delamater responded that there was no file because they spoke only on the phone on an “emergency basis” and “[t]hat night we determined I couldn’t help you past that evening due to your desire to sue the county.” Id. at 84. In December 2019, the Dirckses filed a twenty-eight-count complaint in federal court against 107 defendants—nearly every party involved in the March 4 standoff. The complaint included a legal malpractice claim against Delamater. The federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim and dismissed it without prejudice in 2022. [18] On April 11, 2022, Dircks, pro se, filed a single-count legal malpractice claim against Defendants, alleging: 18. As [Dircks’] attorneys, the Defendants failed to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge required of an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Indiana. 19. The Defendants’ failure to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge of an attorney includes but is not limited to: failure to conduct a careful and timely investigation into the facts and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 8 of 34 circumstances of the JM and CHINS cases, failure to procure witnesses to testify in the CHINS initial/detention hearing, failure to attend the CHINS initial/detention hearing, failure to diligently and promptly advocate on [Dircks’] behalf, and failure to inform [Dircks] of his rights. 20. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of the aforesaid acts, [Dircks] has suffered and continues to suffer damages. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 25. [19] On January 20, 2024, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that no attorney-client relationship had been formed between the parties, and even if it had, there was “no evidence to establish the duty, breach, and causation elements required for a viable legal malpractice claim[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. IV p. 73. Defendants designated fifteen exhibits, including Delamater’s affidavit stating he did not believe that he was in an attorney-client relationship with Dircks. Defendants also designated the expert opinion of attorney Shelley Haymaker that no attorney-client relationship existed between Delamater and Dircks, but even if it did, Delamater neither breached his duty nor was any alleged breach the proximate cause of Dircks’ damages. [20] In November 2024, Dircks filed his response in opposition to Defendants’ motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment. In support, he designated evidence, including his own affidavit averring that: Delamater agreed to be his attorney on March 4; he told Delamater that law enforcement and DCS could come into his home; and he relied on Delamater’s advice when he agreed to send the children out. Dircks also designated the expert opinion of attorney Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 9 of 34 Dorothy Ferguson that an implied attorney-client relationship arose from the circumstances and that Delamater breached his duty by failing to adhere to the standards of practice for attorneys representing parents in abuse and neglect cases. Ferguson later supplemented her opinion, stating that Delamater was the proximate cause of the children’s removal. [21] On February 3, 2025, the trial court denied Dircks’ motion for summary judgment and granted Defendants’ motion. Dircks then filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. Dircks now appeals. Discussion and Decision I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review [22] Dircks appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.1 “We review summary judgment decisions de novo, and Trial Rule 56(C) supplies the framework.” Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 684 (Ind. 2024). “The moving party is entitled to summary judgment only if the evidence it designates in support of its motion ‘shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 684-85 (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). The purpose of summary judgment is to withdraw issues from the jury only when there are no genuine material factual issues for the jury to 1 Technically, Dircks appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct error, in which he alleged that the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In this procedural posture, we apply the standard of review appropriate for reviewing a trial court’s summary judgment decision. See, e.g., Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d 1236, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 10 of 34 decide. Id. at 685. “Summary judgment is available when the nonmovant cannot prove its claim based on the undisputed evidence[.]” Id. [23] The summary judgment movant has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must then show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. “We limit our review to the materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018). II. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. [24] Dircks’ sole claim against Defendants is for legal malpractice. The elements of an action for legal malpractice include: (1) employment of an attorney, which creates a duty to the client; (2) failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge, which constitutes a breach of the duty; and (3) such negligence was the proximate cause of (4) damage to the plaintiff. Reiswerg v. Statom, 926 N.E.2d 26, 30 (Ind. 2010). “A defendant is entitled to summary judgment when the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff’s malpractice claim.” Shorewood Forest Utils., Inc. v. Welsh, 237 N.E.3d 1142, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 11 of 34 A. The designated evidence shows that there was no continuing attorney-client relationship. [25] Dircks claims that an attorney-client relationship began on March 4, when Delamater first called him during the standoff, and continued through at least March 6, the date of the detention hearing. Delamater claims that, if any attorney-client relationship existed at all, it existed only during the March 4 standoff. We agree with Delamater. [26] It is undisputed that the parties never executed a written contract for services, and no fee was charged or paid. But this is not dispositive as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed because the creation of such a relationship does not depend upon the formal signing of an engagement agreement or upon the payment of attorney fees. In re Anonymous, 655 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind. 1995). An attorney-client relationship need not be express and may be implied by the conduct of the parties. In re Kinney, 670 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1996). “The relationship is consensual, existing only after both attorney and client have consented to its formation.” Id. (emphasis added). The relationship’s “existence is dependent only on the nature of the interaction between the parties and their consent, express or implied, to such a relationship.” Anonymous, 655 N.E.2d at 71. [27] “Attorney-client relationships have been implied where a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, where the advice sought pertains to matters within the attorney’s professional competence, and where the attorney gives the desired advice or assistance.” Id. at 70. An important factor is the potential Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 12 of 34 client’s “subjective belief that he is consulting a lawyer in his professional capacity and his intent to seek professional advice.” Id. But a potential client’s unilateral belief cannot create an attorney-client relationship. Douglas v. Monroe, 743 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 1. The March 4 engagement was limited in scope and duration. [28] What occurred between Delamater and Dircks on March 4, 2019, was an emergency intervention that was limited in scope and temporary in duration. No written contract was signed; no fee was charged or paid; no engagement letter was executed; and the parties never even met in person. Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c) expressly authorizes attorneys to limit the scope of their representation, providing: “A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.” When an attorney steps into an emergency such as here, where Delamater was called by a third-party attorney to de- escalate an armed standoff, with no retainer, no fee, and an explicit statement the following day that he could not attend the impending hearing, that intervention is limited in scope and duration. 2 See Flatow v. Ingalls, 932 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Rule 1.2(c) limits an attorney’s duty 2 Comment 3 to Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 provides that an attorney may give limited advice in an emergency. That comment addresses attorney competence, whereas Rule 1.2(c) addresses the scope of representation. But both provisions indicate that emergency assistance is meant to be limited. Therefore, interpreting such intervention as giving rise to ongoing representation would contradict both the letter and purpose of these rules. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 13 of 34 to the agreed-upon scope of engagement, and that no duty arises for tasks outside that scope). 3 2. The March 5 voicemail confirms that there was no continuing attorney-client relationship. [29] Delamater’s March 5 voicemail does not show that a relationship continued beyond March 4; in fact, it shows the opposite. Delamater told Dircks to attend the March 6 hearing without him, to tell the trial court that Dircks planned to hire counsel, and to call back to schedule an appointment “to go over paperwork.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 46. Telling Dircks to complete paperwork shows that formal steps to establish representation had not been taken. [30] Delamater’s reference to appearing at a future hearing was not evidence of a continuing engagement. Such a prospective statement about what Delamater might do if Dircks retained him does not establish that an ongoing relationship already existed. The voicemail’s instructions to attend the March 6 hearing without Delamater and to tell the trial court that Dircks was planning to hire 3 Dircks contends that Delamater’s affidavit, in which he denied the existence of an attorney-client relationship, conflicts with Delamater’s earlier deposition testimony, in which he stated he had an “ethical duty” to help Dircks. It is well settled that statements in a subsequent affidavit cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting earlier deposition testimony. Shorewood Forest, 237 N.E.3d at 1148. “‘Where deposition and affidavit are in conflict, the affidavit is to be disregarded unless it is demonstrable that the statement in the deposition was mistaken, perhaps because the question was phrased in a confusing manner or because a lapse of memory is in the circumstances a plausible explanation for the discrepancy.’” Id. (quoting Crawfordsville Square, LLC v. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co., 906 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). Here, Delamater’s affidavit does not directly conflict with his prior deposition testimony. Delamater’s deposition testimony regarding an ethical duty was limited to the context of de-escalating the March 4 emergency, which is the same limited duty described in his affidavit. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 14 of 34 counsel simply described the steps necessary to form such a relationship. Indeed, Dircks never went to Delamater’s office and never formally retained Delamater. Thus, to the extent that Dircks was Delamater’s client, he was a client only for the emergency situation on March 4. 3. Statements to third parties did not create an attorney-client relationship. [31] We acknowledge that Delamater referred to Dircks as his “client” when speaking with the dispatcher and the Sheriff. But the relevant inquiry is whether Delamater’s conduct, directed at Dircks, created a reasonable basis for Dircks to believe that an ongoing attorney-client relationship had been formed. See Anonymous, 655 N.E.2d at 71 (holding that the existence of an attorney- client relationship “is dependent only on the nature of the interaction between the parties and their consent, express or implied, to such a relationship.”) (emphasis added). Statements made to third parties cannot supply the consent necessary to form such a relationship. At most, Delamater was acting as Dircks’ attorney only during the emergency. [32] Dircks’ own declaration to the trial court at the March 6 hearing that Delamater 4 was his attorney is precisely the kind of unilateral belief that cannot establish the consent of the other party. See Douglas, 743 N.E.2d at 1186 (noting that a potential client’s unilateral belief cannot create an attorney-client 4 In fact, Dircks could not even remember Delamater’s name at that hearing and referred to him as “Delamante” or “Delamonte.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 164. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 15 of 34 relationship). Moreover, Dircks’ own expert conceded that Delamater clearly communicated to Dircks that he would not attend the March 6 hearing. If Dircks’ own expert agrees that Delamater affirmatively told Dircks he would not appear at the very hearing at which Dircks claims he was damaged by the absence of counsel, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Delamater owed Dircks a duty of representation at that hearing. 5 Because the designated evidence negates the duty element of Dircks’ claim, Defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. B. Delamater did not cause Dircks’ damages. [33] Assuming arguendo that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the existence of an attorney-client relationship and any resulting breach, the designated evidence reveals no genuine factual dispute regarding proximate causation. To establish causation and the extent of harm in a legal malpractice case, the client must show that the outcome of the underlying litigation would have been more favorable but for the attorney’s negligence. In other words, the client must prove the lawyer’s negligence proximately caused its injury. This proof generally requires a trial within a trial. Proximate cause is primarily a question of fact for the jury, but it can be decided as a matter of law if the relevant facts are undisputed and lead to only a single inference or conclusion. 5 We question whether expert testimony was relevant here. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for a jury or an expert witness. Vaughn v. Daniels Co., 841 N.E.2d 1133, 1145 (Ind. 2006); see also In re Estate of Lee, 954 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that experts may not testify as to conclusions of law). Expert opinion is more properly directed to breach of duty and causation. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 16 of 34 Shorewood Forest, 237 N.E.3d at 1147 (citation modified). Here, the undisputed facts establish that any damages 6 resulted from an independent chain of events already in motion before Delamater became involved and, more importantly, from Dircks’ own conduct afterward. 1. DCS’s intervention preceded Delamater’s involvement. [34] The procedures that led to the detention of Dircks’ children were already in motion well before Delamater made his first phone call. DCS filed a motion for an order to compel entry into Dircks’ home at approximately 1:45 p.m. on March 4. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered an order authorizing entry “by any and all means necessary and appropriate.” Appellant’s App. Vol. IV p. 60. Delamater did not speak with Dircks until approximately 4:20 p.m., over two hours after the court order was issued. Thus, DCS had already determined that a judicially authorized forced entry into Dircks’ home was necessary. [35] Further, DCS confirmed that it planned to open a CHINS case and that the children would not be permitted to remain in the home that night, well before Delamater and law enforcement had agreed on any plan for Dircks to surrender the children. As Defendants’ expert, Attorney Haymaker, correctly noted, Delamater “had no authority to prevent DCS from making a unilateral decision to detain the children.” Id. at 67. This is not a contested factual dispute; 6 Dircks’ complaint and appellate briefs are not entirely clear as to what specific claim of damages Dircks is asserting, but the only damages he refers to are the temporary removal of his children. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 17 of 34 Haymaker’s statement is a correct legal observation about the limits of what any attorney could have done under those circumstances. 2. Delamater’s involvement helped, not harmed, Dircks. [36] On March 4, the Sheriff’s Office had an active court order, a Special Response Team had been deployed, and sniper positions had been scouted. Delamater, nonetheless, negotiated a peaceful resolution to that tense situation, and the children were initially placed with family rather than strangers in foster care. Without Delamater’s intervention, the situation would almost certainly have ended worse for Dircks. 3. Dircks’ own conduct was the proximate cause of his damages. [37] Setting aside the March 4 events, the undisputed facts concerning the March 6 hearing clearly establish that Dircks, not Delamater, caused any resulting damages. At the close of that hearing, the trial court granted Dircks informal visitation at the Crocketts’ home, conditioned on the children’s paternal grandmother, Shirley, being present. The trial court’s order explicitly informed Dircks that he could visit the children that afternoon so long as Shirley was present. Nevertheless, Dircks went to the Crocketts’ home while Shirley was completing her DCS background check and visited the children without her, which was a direct violation of the trial court’s order. The trial court held an emergency hearing that same afternoon, revoked the informal visitation arrangement, and ordered the children to be placed in foster care with Dircks’ visitation fully supervised. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 18 of 34 [38] Dircks’ violation of the trial court’s unambiguous order was an intervening cause of Dircks’ alleged damages. Ferguson’s opinion that the presence of counsel could have “thwarted” this violation through the advice of counsel is mere speculation. Appellant’s App. Vol. VIII p. 116. The trial court’s order was unambiguous; Ferguson herself agreed at deposition that the trial court’s instructions were not confusing, and she agreed that the reason the children were placed in foster care was that Dircks violated the order. Nothing in the record suggests that Delamater would have somehow convinced Dircks to wait for Shirley to complete her background check before visiting the children. Dircks’ own choice, and not anything Delamater did or failed to do, caused the trial court to place the children in foster care. 4. Ferguson’s supplemental opinion does not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. [39] Causation in a legal malpractice case generally requires a “trial within a trial.” Shorewood Forest, 237 N.E.3d at 1147. Ferguson’s supplemental opinion that “it is more probable than not that if Mr. Delamater had utilized varying legal strategies that are typically utilized in that situation, the outcome would have been different,” Appellant’s App. Vol. VIII p. 113, was a generic assertion that different lawyering might have produced a different result. It is not a reconstruction of what would have happened at the March 6 detention hearing Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 19 of 34 had Delamater appeared. Nor does it adequately account for the constraints of an emergency CHINS detention proceeding. 7 [40] The designated evidence gives rise to a single inference: Delamater’s actions helped Dircks and Delamater’s non-appearance at the March 6 hearing was not the proximate cause of Dircks’ claimed injuries. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Conclusion [41] The designated evidence shows that there was no continuing attorney-client relationship between Dircks and Delamater beyond the March 4 incident. Even if there were, the designated evidence clearly shows that Delamater did not cause Dircks’ alleged damages. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. [42] Affirmed. Bailey, J., concurs. Kenworthy, J., dissents with separate opinion. 7 Ferguson’s opinion that Delamater worsened the situation by disclosing his concerns about Dircks’ mental state to law enforcement is a breach argument, not a causation argument. Moreover, the original DCS hotline report, which was made well before Delamater was contacted, already documented that Dircks was “very paranoid” and “delusional,” that there was “small artillery” in the home, and that the family slept in armed shifts. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 35. DCS did not need Delamater’s opinions to come to its own conclusions about Dircks’ mental state. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 20 of 34 APPELLANT PRO SE Barry Dircks Lebanon, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES Vincent P. Antaki Reminger Co., LPA Indianapolis, Indiana Kenworthy, Judge, dissenting. [43] Under our well-settled summary judgment standard of review, “Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014). Because I believe the designated evidence shows genuine issues of material fact exist on each element of Dircks’ legal malpractice claim, I would hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants and would remand for further proceedings. I therefore respectfully dissent. 1. Existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty [44] “The existence of a duty is generally a question of law for the court to decide.” In re Estate of Lee, 954 N.E.2d 1042, 1046–47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. But whether an implied attorney-client relationship has formed may also be a factual question which turns on the facts and circumstances of the parties’ dealings. See, e.g., Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1288 (Ind. 1996) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-932 | June 30, 2026 Page 21 of 34 (considering whether evidence of an attorney’s dealings with a putative client created a genuine issue of material fact). [45] The majority concludes that if any attorney-client relationship existed, it was of limited scope and duration, forming when Delamater intervened during the events of March 4 and ceasing when the emergency ended. I agree a genuine factual dispute exists as to whether an implied attorney-client relationship formed on March 4. Overall, the designate