Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Nov 17 2026, 9:04 am Mark Traino, et al, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals Appellant-Plaintiff and Tax Court v. Kyle Knutson, individually and/or d/b/a Valparaiso First Insurance, Inc., et al, Appellee-Defendant November 17, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CT-450 Appeal from the Porter Superior Court The Honorable Michael A. Fish, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 64D02-2301-CT-1004 Opinion by Judge Pyle Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 1 of 14 Judges May and Scheele concur. Pyle, Judge. Statement of the Case [1] Mark Traino (“Traino”) and his wife, Rochelle, (collectively “the Trainos”), appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kyle Knutson (“Knutson”) individually and/or d/b/a Valparaiso First Insurance, Inc. The Trainos argue that the trial court erred in granting Knutson’s summary judgment motion. Concluding that the trial court did not err in granting Knutson’s summary judgment motion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. [2] We affirm. Issue Whether the trial court erred in granting Knutson’s summary judgment motion. Facts [3] In 2019, Traino owned Xtreme Clean, Inc., (“Xtreme”), which provided snow removal, power washing, and lawn services. In June 2019, Traino met with Knutson and completed an application to obtain commercial auto insurance coverage for Xtreme with Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Traino signed the Auto-Owners application, which listed the vehicles to be included in the policy (“the Auto-Owners application”). The application did Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 2 of 14 not include a 2019 Volkswagen Atlas (“the Atlas”). At the same time, Traino completed an application for personal auto insurance coverage with Safeco Insurance (“Safeco”). Traino signed the application, which included the autos to be included in the policy (“the Safeco application”). The Safeco application included the Atlas. [4] Auto-Owners issued the commercial auto insurance policy (“the Auto-Owners policy”) to the Trainos with a term from June 17, 2019 to June 17, 2020. Auto- Owners sent the Trainos the policy, which specifically highlighted and numbered each of the vehicles that were covered by the policy. Specifically, the policy highlighted the following covered vehicles: (1) a 2019 Ford F250 Super Duty (“the Ford F250”); (2) a 2019 Cargo Mate (“the Cargo Mate”);1 (3) a 2019 Cargo Express (“the Cargo Express”);2 and (4) a 2018 Polaris Ranger (“the Polaris”).3 Further, according to the terms of the policy, Auto-Owners’ liability coverage was limited to $1,000,000 for each accident, and the policy’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage was limited to $1,000,000 for each person and $1,000,000 for each accident. [5] Safeco issued the personal auto policy (“the Safeco policy”) to the Trainos with a term from July 1, 2019 to July 1, 2020. In addition, Safeco sent the Trainos the policy, which provided that it covered the following three vehicles: (1) the 1 The Auto-Owners policy identified the Cargo Mate as a service/utility trailer. 2 The Auto-Owners policy also identified the Cargo Express as a service/utility trailer. 3 The Auto-Owners policy identified the Polaris as an ATV/recreational vehicle. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 3 of 14 Atlas; (2) a 2017 Chevrolet Cruze (“the 2017 Cruze”); and (3) a 2013 Volkswagen Beetle (“the Beetle”). The Safeco policy’s liability coverage was limited to $100,000 for each person and $300,000 for each occurrence, and the policy’s uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage was limited to $100,000 for each person and $300,000 for each accident. [6] In June 2020, the Trainos renewed the Auto-Owners policy for a term from June 17, 2020 to June 17, 2021. On January 25, 2021, Auto-Owners sent the Trainos an updated policy (“the updated Auto-Owners policy”), which deleted from coverage the Ford F250. The updated Auto-Owners policy highlighted and numbered each of the vehicles covered in the policy. Specifically, the policy highlighted the following covered vehicles: (1) the Cargo Mate; and (2) a 2020 Jeep Gladiator Crew Sport (“the Jeep”).4 The Atlas was not included in the highlighted and numbered covered vehicles in the updated Auto-Owners policy. [7] In July 2020, the Trainos also renewed the Safeco policy for a term from July 1, 2020 to July 1, 2021. In January 2021, Safeco sent the Trainos an updated policy (“the updated Safeco policy”) that added coverage for a 2006 Honda CR- V (“the Honda CR-V”). The Atlas remained listed as one of the covered vehicles in the updated Safeco policy. In addition, the updated Safeco policy 4 The designated materials reveal that the Jeep was apparently added to the Auto-Owners policy in September 2019. Further, the designated materials reveal that the Polaris was stolen at some point and that Auto-Owners covered the loss. However, the date of that loss is not clear. In addition, it is not clear from the designated materials why the Cargo Express was no longer included in the Auto-Owners policy. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 4 of 14 included coverage for a 2011 Chevrolet Cruze (“the 2011 Cruze”) but no longer included the 2017 Cruze or the Beetle.5 [8] On February 1, 2021, Traino, who was driving the Atlas, was involved in an automobile accident with a driver who was either underinsured or uninsured (“the February 2021 accident”). Traino submitted a claim to Auto-Owners, which denied it. [9] Nearly two years later, on January 31, 2023, the Trainos filed a multi-count complaint against Knutson and Auto-Owners. This appeal concerns Count 3 of that complaint, wherein the Trainos alleged that Knutson had negligently failed to procure the insurance that they had requested. [10] In October 2024, Knutson filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law in support of his motion. In his motion, Knutson specifically argued that the Trainos’ negligent failure to procure insurance claim was barred by the statute of limitations because the Trainos had failed to file their complaint within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. In addition, Knutson designated, among other things, the 2019 Auto-Owners and Safeco applications, the 2019 Auto-Owners and Safeco policies, and the January 2021 updated Auto-Owners and Safeco policies. 5 The designated materials are also not clear as to why the 2017 Cruze and the Beetle were not included in the updated Safeco policy. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 5 of 14 [11] In January 2025, the Trainos filed a response in opposition to Knutson’s summary judgment motion and a memorandum of law in support of their opposition. In their motion, the Trainos argued that their claim “ultimately [was] a negligence claim for failing to procure [the] insurance coverage” that they had requested. (App. Vol. 2 at 55). They further contended the statute of limitations had been tolled because they had not “discover[ed], nor could they have reasonably discovered, the alleged deficiencies until after” the February 2021 accident had revealed a denial of coverage. (App. Vol. 2 at 60). [12] In support of their response, the Trainos cited Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied, for the proposition that “a tort claim accrues when a plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as the result of a tortious act.” (App. Vol. 2 at 60-61). The Trainos specifically argued that Traino had told Knutson to include the Atlas on the Auto-Owners commercial insurance policy and had “had no reason to suspect negligence or deficiencies in coverage[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 61). Therefore, according to the Trainos, Knutson’s alleged negligence in failing to procure commercial insurance coverage for the Atlas had not been discoverable at the time of the policy issuance. Rather, the Trainos argued that they had not discovered Knutson’s negligence “until they [had been] informed that there was no business policy coverage on the Atlas, which was well after the date of the motor vehicle incident.” (App. Vol. 2 at 61). In support of their response, the Trainos designated excerpts from Traino’s deposition, wherein he stated that he had asked Knutson to include the Atlas on Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 6 of 14 his Auto-Owners commercial insurance policy before the February 2021 accident. [13] Also, in January 2025, Knutson filed a reply to the Trainos’ response to his summary judgment motion. In this reply, Knutson, cited the Filip case and argued that “[t]he undisputed material facts demonstrate[d] that any alleged error on [his] part . . . took place more than 2 years before [the Trainos] filed suit, and therefore, [the Trainos] [we]re time-barred from bringing their claims herein against [him].” (App. Vol. 2 at 46-47). [14] In December 2025, the trial court issued an order granting Knutson’s summary judgment motion. One month later, in January 2026, the Trainos filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. [15] The Trainos now appeal. Decision [16] The Trainos appeal following the denial of their motion to correct error, which challenged the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Knutson. “Where a motion to correct error is grounded upon a claim that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment, we review on appeal the grant of summary judgment.” Hamilton v. Prewett, 860 N.E.2d 1234, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [17] When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, our well-settled standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court. Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 7 of 14 Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). In other words, “[w]e stand in the shoes of the trial court and apply a de novo standard of review.” Webb v. City of Carmel, 101 N.E.3d 850, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “Our review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court.” Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(H)). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 386. Once the moving party has met these two requirements, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact by setting forth specifically designated facts. Id. We view the pleadings and the designated materials in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Webb, 101 N.E.3d at 860. In addition, we construe all facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Further, a trial court’s specific findings and conclusions are not binding on this Court, and we will affirm upon any theory or basis supported by the designated materials. Id. at 861. [18] The Trainos characterize their case as a negligence action. Specifically, they contend that “Count III of [their] [c]omplaint is grounded in negligent procurement - the failure to exercise reasonable care in obtaining the requested coverage.” (The Trainos’ Br. 12). [19] Such tort actions are governed by INDIANA CODE § 34-11-2-4(a), which requires that they be commenced within two years “after the cause of action accrues.” In general, and in the context of claims of negligent procurement of insurance, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 8 of 14 “the cause of action of a tort claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another.” Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1082 (cleaned up). [20] In the Filip case, the Filips purchased a six-unit apartment building in late 1998. They moved into one of the apartment’s units and rented out the other five. In early 1999, they met with an insurance agent who had procured insurance coverage for the complex’s prior owner and told the agent that they wanted the same coverage as the prior owner. The agent arranged for a commercial insurance policy that was substantially similar to the prior owner’s policy. Although the agent was aware that the Filips lived in one of the units, the insurance policy did not cover nonbusiness personal property. Between 1999 and 2003, the Filips made several changes to their policy, including increasing property damage limits, adding the prior owner as an additional insured, and changing the spelling of their names. [21] In April 2003, a fire substantially destroyed the building. Because of the coverage limitations in the Filips’ insurance policy, a substantial portion of the Filips’ loss was not covered. The Filips filed a negligence action against the insurance agent and agency from whom they had obtained their insurance policy. Specifically, the Filips claimed that because their agent had told them that their property would be covered, they should have received replacement cost rather than actual value coverage, that the policy limit was less than the replacement cost, that the policy failed to cover nonbusiness personal property, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 9 of 14 and that the policy failed to include business interruption coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurance agent and agency because the two-year statute for negligence claims had expired. Our Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and set forth a detailed analysis that is both relevant and helpful to our consideration of the case before us. [22] Specifically, the supreme court began its analysis in Filip by noting “that a claim against an agent for negligent procurement of the wrong coverage begins at the start of the coverage if the breach was discoverable at the time through ordinary diligence.” Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1082. The supreme court further explained that although the physical loss in the case did not occur until the fire, a policyholder receives protection from risk of loss when the policy is issued. Id. at 1083. Thus, any claim based on inadequacy of coverage generally occurs when the policy is issued. Id. Our Indiana Supreme Court also explained that because the Filips could have ascertained “that their policy lacked coverage of nonbusiness personal property and business interruption, and that the building and business personal property coverage had inadequate limits[,]” the limitations period began to run as to such claims “on or shortly after the activation of the policy[.]” Id. at 1084. [23] In addition, the supreme court explained that an exception to this general rule exists when a policyholder reasonably relies upon an agent’s representations. Id. In general, this exception applies if an agent insists that a particular hazard will be covered. Id. In other words, “[i]f the agent insists to the prospective purchaser that the policy will insure against a hazard . . . that the prospect is Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 10 of 14 particularly concerned about, and the hazard materializes, the company may be estopped to plead the terms of the policy because the strength of the agent’s oral assurances lulled the prospect into not reading, or reading inattentively, dense and rebarbative policy language.” Id. (cleaned up). [24] In the Filip case, our Indiana Supreme Court phrased the question as “whether there [wa]s any evidence that [the agent] [had] made representations to the Filips, which, if true, would have covered their loss and also tolled the running of the limitations period.” Id. The supreme court reviewed the designated evidence and determined that it revealed that the Filips had told the agent that they wanted the same insurance as the previous owner and that they had then received a substantially similar policy. Id. The designated evidence further revealed that the Filips had telephoned the agent multiple times between 1999 and 2003 to make changes in the coverage. Id. Specifically, these changes included increasing the coverage on the building, adding the previous owner as an additional insured, and changing the spelling of the Filips name on the policy. Id. [25] Our Indiana Supreme Court noted that the Filips had known the policy well enough to make changes but claimed to not understand the commercial nature of the policy, the type of value coverage included, or the lack of business interruption coverage. Id. Further, according to the supreme court, there was nothing in the Filips’ designated evidence that raised an issue of material fact as to whether the agent had made representations regarding the inadequacy of the amount of business personal property coverage, whether the building coverage Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 11 of 14 was replacement value or material value, or the lack of business interruption coverage. Id. The supreme court explained that “[t]hese shortcomings in their policy, which the Filips s[ought] to attribute to [the agent]’s negligence, were readily ascertainable from the policy itself.” Id. According to the supreme court, “as to these three alleged omissions, the statute of limitations began to run two years after the start of coverage, in 1999, and bar[red] those three parts of the Filip’s complaint, which was filed in 2003.” Id. at 1084-85. [26] Here, the Trainos argue that the exception to the general rule exists in this case because Traino “was lulled into believing the commercial policy provided coverage for vehicles utilized in business operations and that a reasonable lay insured, exercising ordinary diligence, would not necessarily discover a lack of coverage defect at the time the policy was issued when an agent also handles the personal coverage.” (The Trainos’ Br. 10). [27] However, our review of the designated evidence reveals that, in 2019, Traino signed a commercial Auto-Owners application that did not include the Atlas and a personal Safeco Application that did. Shortly thereafter, Auto-Owners sent the Trainos the Auto-Owners policy, which specifically highlighted and numbered each of the vehicles included in the policy, including the Ford F250, the Cargo Mate, the Cargo Express, and the Polaris. The Atlas was not included in this policy. In addition, Safeco sent the Trainos the Safeco policy, which provided that it covered the Atlas, the 2017 Cruze, and the Beetle. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 12 of 14 [28] Between 2019, when the Trainos obtained the Auto-Owners and Safeco policies, and 2021, the Trainos made multiple changes to both policies. Specifically, in 2021, Auto-Owners sent the Trainos an updated Auto-Owners policy that deleted the Ford F250 from coverage and included coverage for the Jeep. The updated policy did not include the Cargo Express or the Polaris, which had been stolen at some point. In addition, Auto-Owners had covered the loss of the Polaris. Also, in 2021, the Trainos made changes to the Safeco policy, including adding the Honda CR-V. Also, at some point, the Trainos had added the 2011 Cruze to the Safeco policy and removed the 2017 Cruze and the Beetle. [29] Here, as in Filip, the Trainos knew the Auto-Owners and Safeco Policies well enough to make changes and claims but contend that they did not know that the Atlas was not included in the Auto-Owners policy. Further, as in Filip, there is nothing in the Trainos’ designated evidence that raises an issue of fact regarding whether Knutson made representations regarding the Atlas being included in the commercial Auto-Owners policy. Also, as in Filip, the Atlas not being covered by the Auto-Owners policy, which the Trainos seek to attribute to Knutson’s negligence, was readily ascertainable from the policy itself. Accordingly, as to this alleged omission, the statute of limitations began to run two years after the 2019 start of coverage and barred Count 3 of the Trainos Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 13 of 14 complaint, which was filed in 2023. See Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1084-85. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting Knutson’s summary judgment motion. 6 [30] Affirmed. May, J., and Scheele, J., concur. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Jason R. Moseley Miguel F. Martinez James A. Hoffman Law Office of Moseley & Martinez, LLC Merrillville, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Richard A. Rocap Rocap Law Firm LLC Indianapolis, Indiana 6 Because we have determined that Knutson was entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, we need not further examine the merits of the Trainos negligent procurement of insurance claim. We further note that “[a]ll insurance agents who undertake to procure coverage owe their clients a general duty of reasonable care and skill in obtaining insurance and following their clients’ instructions.” Indiana Restorative Dentistry, P.C. v. Laven Insurance Agency, Inc., 27 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind. 2015). “However, an agent’s duty to procure is distinct from the duty to advise their clients about the adequacy of the coverage or any alternative coverage.” Id. “Agents have no duty to advise unless the agent and the insured have a ‘special relationship’ of trust and intimacy.” Id. Here, where the Trainos have specifically stated that their claim was “grounded in negligent procurement - the failure to exercise reasonable care in obtaining the requested coverage[,]” (The Trainos’ Br. 12), we agree with Knutson that “an examination of the ‘special relationship’ doctrine is unnecessary.” (Knutson’s Br. 7). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CT-450 | November 17, 2026 Page 14 of 14