Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two October 20, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II TERESA GOMEZ, No. 60302-1-II Appellant, v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION CITY OF VANCOUVER, TETRAGON LLC, Respondent. CHE, J. — Gomez appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Vancouver (City) and an award of costs to the City in her lawsuit to quiet title and for trespass. The City moved for summary judgment, claiming it had an implied easement or, in the alternative, a prescriptive easement over a water line the City had installed in 1954 under a private street Gomez’s predecessors in interest owned at the time. In response, Gomez argued that the City could not show that the prior owners knew about or consented to the water line. The City also argued that Gomez could not show the required elements for her trespass claim regarding an unrelated sidewalk project that allegedly caused Gomez to rebuild her fence years later. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on both claims and awarded the City costs as the prevailing party. We hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment based on this record. Additionally, we decline to consider the merits of Gomez’s trespass or cost arguments. No. 60302-1-II Accordingly, we affirm. FACTS A. Background Facts1 Gomez owned a property in the city of Vancouver which included the private road known as NE 4th Street. The property was located at the intersection of NE 4th Street and “County Road #104,” also known as NE 112th Avenue. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 69. Gomez’s property, as well as neighboring lots, were previously owned by Carl and Ellen Roesen. Over time, the Roesens sold off the land now owned by Gomez’s neighbors, including the land comprising of three lots abutting NE 4th Street. The Roesens retained the property Gomez now owns, including NE 4th Street, until 1968 when the property and private street were deeded to Gomez’s predecessor in interest. More than ten years prior to the Roesens deeding the property and private road to Gomez’s predecessor in interest, in 1954, the City installed a water line underneath NE 4th Street running nearly the full length of the private road. The water line installation included 460 feet of pipe and a “blowoff” for the water line. CP at 117. The blowoff was described as “a small pipe that protrudes out of the water main that enables the line to be flushed.” CP at 117. 1 Because this appeal arises following a summary judgment dismissal, we derive the below background facts mostly from Gomez’s complaint and her response to the City’s motion for summary judgment. See Zonnebloem, LLC v. Blue Bay Holdings, LLC, 200 Wn. App. 178, 182, 401 P.3d 468 (2017) (“We review summary judgment orders de novo” and “construe all evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”). 2 No. 60302-1-II Gomez’s Property and the Water Line CP at 69. When Gomez acquired the property in 2018, she was unaware of the water line but later became aware of it when a neighbor submitted development plans mentioning the water line. Gomez’s property did not get its water from the water line; instead, water for her property came from a private well. According to Gomez, one of her three neighbors along NE 4th Street also had a water well which Gomez contended was built in 1955 after the water main was installed. Unrelated to the water line, in 2022, the City hired an independent contractor to install a sidewalk on NE 112th Avenue running alongside Gomez’s property as part of a sidewalk project. After the City installed the sidewalk, Gomez’s fence, part of which was built on a public right of way, fell. 3 No. 60302-1-II B. Procedural Facts Gomez sued the City2 for quiet title over the NE 4th Street water line and for an injunction enjoining the City and its contractors from trespassing over NE 4th Street. The City countersued Gomez to quiet title for a maintenance easement for the water line. Gomez amended her complaint against the City to include a trespass claim related to Gomez’s fence. The City moved for summary judgment. Regarding the water line, the City first argued that it had an “implied maintenance easement” for the water line, asserting that the line “was undisputedly installed . . . per the consent of the original property owner, the Roesens.” CP at 217. Attached to the City’s motion was evidence that, in 1954, the Roesens and other property owners, requested that the City “furnish city water” to “the area bounded by Patterson Road, Mill Plain Road and County Road 104.” CP at 201-203. The City also relied on a 1954 work order submitted to the City’s Department of Public Works “[a]s per property owners request.” CP at 194. The work order described the work to be done as “[l]ay water mains in Patterson Road, Mill Plain Road [a]nd County Road #104 as per attached sketch.” CP at 194. The sketch depicted a water line down NE 4th Street but showed that the private road intersected with County Road 104 and was not within the area of land bounded by Patterson Road, Mill Plain Road, and County Road 104. According to a declaration 2 Gomez also named a limited liability company as a codefendant in the case. She later named an additional limited liability company—one she alleged was a subsidiary of the first company— in her amended complaint. While Gomez’s appeal initially included the company, she later amended her appeal to remove review of any decision as it concerns this codefendant. See CP at 353-54 (Am. Notice of Appeal). 4 No. 60302-1-II by a city civil engineer, the NE 4th Street water line was installed and had been in operation continuously since 1954. In response, Gomez raised an issue of her predecessor’s intent: There is no evidence that the Roesens ever knew about the water main under NE 4th St[reet]. . . . .... Perhaps the Roesens were simply never asked or made aware of the [water line] extension under NE 4th St[reet]. Perhaps they had just drilled and connected houses to private well water at their own expense and wished to benefit from this. Perhaps the Roesens were reluctant to create any permanent encumbrances over their land. CP at 230-32. The City, maintaining it had an implied easement as a matter of law, replied that, even if Gomez’s “hypothesis” about the Roesens’ intent were true, the City would then have a prescriptive easement as a matter of law. CP at 239. Thus, the City’s primary theory was the Roesens requested that the City install the water line, which created an implied easement, but the City contended that, even if Gomez’s assertion was correct, the City would then have a prescriptive easement. It argued, “Either way, the result is the same.” CP at 241. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City had a prescriptive easement right and dismissing with prejudice all of Gomez’s claims. Specifically, the court found for the City that “a prescriptive easement exists for the maintenance of the water line running under NE 4th Street” as a matter of law. CP at 327. The granted easement encompassed “reconstructing, repairing, operating, [and] maintaining the existing water line . . . and providing service to users of such service as authorized and permitted by the City” but did not include an easement for enlarging or extending the water line. CP at 327. 5 No. 60302-1-II After the trial court’s summary judgment ruling, the City requested an award of costs pursuant to RCW 4.84.030 and .060.3 Finding that the City was the prevailing party in the case, the court granted the City’s request. The court then entered a judgment against Gomez for $369.95. Gomez appeals.4 ANALYSIS I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT Gomez argues that the trial court erred in granting the City’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Gomez argues that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the City had a prescriptive easement for maintaining the water line and its dismissal of Gomez’s trespass claim. A. Summary Judgment Standard We review summary judgment rulings de novo. Zonnebloem, LLC v. Blue Bay Holdings, LLC, 200 Wn. App. 178, 182, 401 P.3d 468 (2017). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows “‘no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and ‘the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting CR 56(c)). 3 RCW 4.84.030 provides, “In any action in the superior court of Washington the prevailing party shall be entitled to his or her costs and disbursements.” RCW 4.84.060 provides, “In all cases where costs and disbursements are not allowed to the plaintiff, the defendant shall be entitled to have judgment in his or her favor for the same.” 4 Prior to appealing, Gomez moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the City’s favor. The trial court denied her motion. Gomez does not appeal this decision. 6 No. 60302-1-II The moving party has the initial burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 183. Once the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present “specific facts that rebut the moving party’s contentions and show a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. When determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, we construe all evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 182. There exists a genuine issue of material fact if the evidence would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 182-83. “‘If reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion on an issue of fact, that issue may be determined on summary judgment.’” Id. at 183 (quoting Sutton v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 180 Wn. App. 859, 865, 324 P.3d 763 (2014)). B. Prescriptive Easement Gomez argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the City had a prescriptive maintenance easement over the water line. Besides an express grant, an easement right in another’s property can arise in several contexts, including through prescription or implication. Boyd v. Sunflower Props., LLC, 197 Wn. App. 137, 143, 389 P.3d 626 (2016). Easements by implication involve easements whose existence is implied based on certain facts. See id. at 144 (“The principle underlying implied easements is that a grant of land is impliedly accompanied by all things necessary to its reasonable use and enjoyment.”). Differently, a prescriptive easement involves use of another’s property in a way that is “adverse” to the rights of the property owner. Id. at 143 (prescriptive easements require use that is adverse to the owner of the property). 7 No. 60302-1-II “‘Prescriptive rights . . . are not favored in the law, since they necessarily work corresponding losses or forfeitures of the rights of other persons.’” Gamboa v. Clark, 183 Wn.2d 38, 43, 348 P.3d 1214 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Nw. Cities Gas Co. v. W. Fuel Co., 13 Wn.2d 75, 83, 123 P.2d 771 (1942)). Establishing a prescriptive easement requires showing that one has used another’s land for a period of 10 years and that the use was (1) “in an ‘open’ and ‘notorious’ manner,” (2) “‘continuous’ or ‘uninterrupted,’” (3) “occurred over ‘a uniform route,’” (4) “‘adverse’ to the landowner,” and (5) “occurred ‘with the knowledge of such owner at a time when [the owner] was able in law to assert and enforce [their] rights.’” Id. (quoting Nw. Cities, 13 Wn.2d at 83, 85). Whether the City’s use of NE 4th Street for the water line was adverse is the sole issue Gomez appears to contest in this appeal. Adverse use generally means that the land was used without the landowner’s permission. Gamboa, 183 Wn.2d at 44. Generally, there is a presumption that a person uses another’s property with their permission. Id. However, this presumption can be defeated “‘when the facts and circumstances are such as to show that the user was adverse and hostile to the rights of the owner, or that the owner has indicated by some act his admission that the claimant has a right of easement.’” Id. at 44-45 (quoting Nw. Cities, 13 Wn.2d at 87); see also Crescent Harbor Water Co., Inc. v. Lyseng, 51 Wn. App. 337, 342, 753 P.2d 555 (1988) (“When the owner of a servient estate confers upon another the right to use that property as if it had been legally conveyed, the resultant use is made under a claim of right, rather than by permission.”). Gomez argues the City failed to overcome a presumption of permissive use because it argued repeatedly that the Roesens knew about and consented to the water line and also it 8 No. 60302-1-II produced work order documents supporting its argument that the Roesens consented to the use. We disagree. As the party moving for summary judgment, the City had the burden to show no genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zonnebloem, 200 Wn. App. at 182-83. Although the City initially argued they had permission from the Roesen’s to install the water line in the private road, the City accepted Gomez’s argument that the Roesens did not permit the installation on the private road and, alternatively, argued that the City had a prescriptive easement based on an agreed-upon fact. With that agreed-upon fact, the undisputed facts showed that the City’s installation of a water line underneath a private road and including a blowout pipe were “facts and circumstances . . . show[ing] that the user was adverse and hostile to the rights of the [Roesens].” Gamboa, 183 Wn.2d at 44-45. This established a prescriptive easement’s adversity easement based on undisputed facts. The remaining elements of a prescriptive easement were neither disputed below nor are at issue in this appeal. See Cave Props. v. City of Bainbridge Island, 199 Wn. App. 651, 663, 401 P.3d 327 (2017) (We do not make arguments for the parties on appeal); RAP 9.12 (“On review of an order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment the appellate court will consider only evidence and issues called to the attention of the trial court.”). Because Gomez only disputes a prescriptive easement’s adversity element in this appeal and given the agreed upon fact in the proceedings below that the Roesens did not permit a water main installation on their private road, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and the City showed it had a prescriptive easement as a matter of law. Based on this record, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. 9 No. 60302-1-II C. Trespass Claim Gomez argues, summarily, that summary judgment against her trespass claim was inappropriate. She notes that the City raised multiple arguments supporting its motion and argues, “[t]hese [arguments] cannot be fully and fairly decided in summary judgment.” Corr. Br. of Appellant at 15. Gomez provides no further argument in her opening brief nor cites to any authority supporting her claim. While Gomez elaborates on the City’s arguments in her reply brief, Gomez only argues that the City’s arguments “deserve[d] to be heard and weighed by the finder of fact, a jury.” Reply Br. at 10. Gomez does not explain why the City’s arguments render summary judgment inappropriate. With such passing treatment of her claim and Gomez’s failure to cite any authorities supporting her position, we decline to consider the merits of her argument. Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290 (1998) (“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.”); DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (“Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”); see also RAP 10.3(a)(6). II. AWARD OF COSTS Gomez claims that the trial court erred in awarding the City costs because she alleges that the City engaged in bad faith conduct prior to trial. She also asserts that the City did not sufficiently prevail in the action so as to justify an award of costs. However, as with Gomez’s argument related to the trespass claim’s dismissal, Gomez fails to cite any authorities supporting 10 No. 60302-1-II her position and, thus, we decline to consider the merits of her argument. See DeHeer, 60 Wn.2d at 126; RAP 10.3(a)(6). CONCLUSION We affirm. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Che, J. We concur: Price, A.C.J. Lee, J. 11