Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON LYNNWOOD COUNTRY CLUB APARTMENTS, LLC, No. 88607-0-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION CATHERINE GASSMAN, Defendant, and AUSTIN HSU, Appellant. COBURN, J. — Lynnwood Country Club Apartments LLC (LCCA) moved for attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party in an ejectment action against Catherine Gassman. LCCA also requested CR 11 sanctions against Gassman’s former attorney Austin Hsu and Hsu’s then-employer Snohomish County Legal Services (SCLS). The trial court entered an order sanctioning Hsu in the amount of $1,000 and requiring Hsu to pay half of LCCA’s attorney fees and costs. Hsu appealed the order. This court remanded for the trial court’s entry of necessary findings to support its award of $1,000 and attorney fees against Hsu. In this second appeal, Hsu argues that the trial court’s supplemental findings entered on remand do not provide a proper basis for CR 11 sanctions or attorney fees against him. We affirm the award of CR 11 sanctions in the 88607-0-I/2 amount of $1,000 but reverse and remand for the trial court to enter additional findings to adequately explain its attorney fee award against Hsu. Additionally, we deny LCCA’s request for fees on appeal. FACTS 1 In September 2023 LCCA brought a cause of action to eject Catherine Gassman for unpaid rent and utilities under chapter 7.28 RCW. See Lynnwood Country Club Apartments, LLC v. Gassman, No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. June 30, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/867849.pdf. LCCA moved for summary judgment in November. See id. On December 7 Hsu filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Gassman. See id. At the time, Hsu was employed by SCLS. Id. Hsu requested a continuance of the summary judgment hearing on the basis that he needed more time to prepare an opposition to LCCA’s summary judgment motion under CR 56(f). See id. The trial court held a hearing on Hsu’s continuance motion in December 2023 during which Hsu verbally alleged 2 that LCCA acted in bad faith and that one of LCCA’s named attorneys, Evan Loeffler, had multiple bar complaints pending against him. See id. The court granted Hsu’s continuance request. See id. On January 5, 2024, Hsu, without requesting leave from court, filed an amended answer and affirmative defenses on Gassman’s behalf. 3 See id. In the amended answer, Hsu 1 Many of the underlying facts are derived from this court’s prior unpublished decision in Lynnwood Country Club Apartments, LLC v. Gassman, No. 86784-9-I (Wash. Ct. App. June 30, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/867849.pdf. We reference the prior opinion to the extent that it is necessary for a reasoned opinion. See GR 14.1(c). 2 Hsu does not assign error to the trial court’s supplemental findings regarding his statements at the December 8 hearing. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. Mid Mountain Contractors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 136 Wn. App. 1, 4, 146 P.3d 1212 (2006) (citing Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 808, 828 P.2d 549 (1992)). 3 Hsu did not designate the initial answer but does not dispute the trial court’s finding that the January 5, 2024, filing was an amended answer filed without permission from the court. 2 88607-0-I/3 alleged 4 that LCCA acted in bad faith by bringing an ejectment action under chapter 7.28 RCW rather than an unlawful detainer action governed by chapters 59.12 and 59.18 RCW “to circumvent the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act” (RLTA) under chapter 59.18 RCW. See id. On this premise, Hsu claimed that LCCA’s named law firm and Loeffler “purposely” omitted information from the summons and complaint that is required under the RLTA to interfere with Gassman’s ability to respond. See id. at 2-3. Referring to the law firm representing LCCA, Hsu wrote: Here, [LCCA], represented by the law firm, Williams, Kastner, and Gibbs PLLC … purposely did not follow the [sic] RCW 59.18.365 [of the RLTA] in their filed Summons filed on September 12, 2023 … to make it harder for this low-income Defendant [Gassman] to seek help and respond to the Summons. In [LCCA’s] Summons, on page 2, [LCCA] only gives out their mailing address and emails to respond to the Summons without any information on how to seek legal services. Hsu claimed that the firm’s purported filing of unlawful detainer actions under the RLTA and compliance with RCW 59.18.365 in other cases demonstrated that the firm filed the ejectment action against Gassman in bad faith. Hsu attached to the amended answer an eviction summons Loeffler filed with the court in an unlawful detainer matter that included the information allegedly deliberately omitted from the summons in the instant case. Hsu claimed that Loeffler “knowingly, purposefully, and intentionally provided [a] different Summons form” to Gassman that did not include certain contact and legal assistance information required under RCW 59.18.365 of the RLTA. 5 See Gassman, 4 Hsu does not dispute that he wrote the amended answer, which is also signed by him. See Gassman, No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 2. 5 We observe that LCCA brought an ejectment action under chapter 7.28 RCW and not an unlawful detainer action under chapter 59.12 RCW. The amended answer filed by Hsu asserted that LCCA’s named law firm “purposely did not follow the RCW 59.18.365.” (Emphasis added.) Until this court’s recent opinion in Riviera Northgate Apartments, LLC v. Caine, published July 29, 2026, courts have recognized two methods of evicting a tenant: ‘an action in ejectment under RCW 7.28; or an action for unlawful detainer under RCW 59.12.’” See Riviera 3 88607-0-I/4 No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). That same day, January 5, 2024, Hsu sent an email to Loeffler stating that he would correct the record on his past statement at the continuance hearing to explain that there were not any current bar complaints against Loeffler. 6 Hsu did not correct the record and did not file an opposition to LCCA’s summary judgment motion. The trial court held a hearing on LCCA’s motion for summary judgment on January 17, 2024. 7 Id. at 3. The court clerk’s hearing minutes indicate that the trial court judge 8 described Hsu’s accusations that Loeffler acted in bad faith as “baseless and regrettable.” 9 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court granted summary judgment to LCCA. See id. On February 20, 2024, LCCA filed a motion for $15,368.25 in attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party on summary judgment. See id. LCCA requested fees and costs for commencing the ejectment action, including “the filing and maintaining of a motion for summary judgment that necessitated two (2) separate hearings, along with the preparation of multiple, related response pleadings and supplemental declarations.” Northgate Apartments, LLC v. Caine, 37 Wn. App. 2d 370, 373, 594 P.3d 1132 (2026) (quoting Hous. Auth. of City of Everett v. Terry, 114 Wn.2d 558, 566, 789 P.2d 745 (1990)). This court held in Caine that because the ejectment statute is a general statute and the RLTA is a statute specific to residential relationships, the latter statute controls evictions involving residential tenants. Id. at 376. 6 Gassman, No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 3, mistakenly stated the year the email was sent was 2023. 7 As referenced in our prior opinion, there is no report of proceedings for the January 17, 2024, summary judgment hearing consistent with Snohomish County’s standard practice. See Gassman, No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 3 n.2. 8 The trial court judge who presided over the summary judgment hearing was a different judicial officer than the trial court judge who ruled on LCCA’s subsequent motion for attorney fees and sanctions under CR 11. See Gassman, No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 5 n.4. 9 Because the minute entry does not necessarily represent a verbatim record of the hearing, we do not treat the document as a transcript in lieu of a designated report of proceedings. See Gassman, No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 3 n.2. 4 88607-0-I/5 (Footnote omitted.) LCCA asserted that it “incurred legal costs for having to maintain its motion for summary judgment for two separate hearings as a result of [Gassman’s] counsel’s request for a continuance … for the reason of ‘unpreparedness.’” LCCA calculated its fees and costs based on the entirety of the action; from before its filing of the September 2024 complaint and summons through the summary judgment hearing on January 17, 2024. In the same February 20 motion, LCCA also requested that the trial court, in addition to awarding attorney fees against Gassman, impose CR 11 sanctions “against defense counsel [Hsu] and his firm [SCLS] in an amount equal to the attorney’s fees awarded.” LCCA requested that the court award $15,368.26 10 in attorney fees as CR 11 sanctions for Hsu’s false accusations of bad faith against Loeffler and Hsu’s false statement that Loeffler had pending bar complaints against him. See Gassman, No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 3. LCCA asserted that Hsu unnecessarily delayed the case and increased litigation costs when he, instead of retracting his false statement about bar complaints against Loeffler, filed additional paperwork after the continuance hearing that accused Loeffler of acting in bad faith in bringing the action against Gassman. On March 5 Gassman responded to LCCA’s motion for fees and sanctions. At this point, Gassman was represented by another attorney employed by SCLS. See id. at 4. Gassman asserted that Hsu was no longer employed by SCLS as of February 15 and requested that any award of CR 11 sanctions be imposed against Hsu personally because, in part, Hsu acted in violation of SCLS policy. See id. Hsu filed an opposition 10 LCCA’s request for $15,368.26 in attorney fees and costs as CR 11 sanctions against Hsu and SCLS was one cent more than LCCA substantively sought in attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party against Gassman. See Gassman, No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 3 & n.3. 5 88607-0-I/6 to LCCA’s motion and Gassman’s response. See id. In a March 7 order, the trial court awarded fees and costs and CR 11 sanctions to LCCA. See id. The court sanctioned Hsu and SCLS “jointly and severally” in the amount of $1,000 for Hsu’s conduct “for falsely stating that plaintiff’s counsel acted in bad faith in bringing Plaintiff’s underlying action, for falsely stating there were numerous bar complaints pending against plaintiff’s counsel, and for refusing to correct the record after acknowledging the falsity of these statements.” Id. at 4, 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). As to fees and costs, the court ordered Gassman and Hsu to each pay half of the total awarded amount of $15,368.30 in reasonable attorney fees and court costs. Id. The court clerk’s minutes for the March 7 hearing states that LCCA’s motion for attorney fees was “GRANTED IN PART” and that the court ordered half of the fees to be paid by Gassman and the other half to be paid by Hsu “FOR VIOLATION OF CR11.” The trial court denied Hsu’s motion for reconsideration. 11 Id. at 4. Hsu appealed the trial court’s order granting CR 11 sanctions against him. See id. at 5, 8. In part, Hsu argued that the court failed to make adequate factual findings that his arguments were devoid of legal or factual support. Id. at 8. We held that the trial court’s order was insufficient for appellate review. Id. at 11. Specifically, the trial court’s order did not identify a pleading that served as the basis for the CR 11 sanctions and “the trial court awarded the amount of fees and costs LCCA sought and apportioned them equally to Gassman and Hsu without a finding as to the authority under which the 11 We noted in our prior opinion, “In its response to the motion for reconsideration, SCLS memorialized its verbal agreement with LCCA that SCLS should be jointly and severally liable with Hsu for a $1,000 sanction based on his conduct, but that any sanction beyond that amount should be apportioned to Hsu personally for the reasons set out in Gassman’s response to LCCA’s fee request.” Gassman, No. 86784-9-I, slip op. at 5 n.4. 6 88607-0-I/7 fees were awarded.” Id. We reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter necessary findings consistent with case law. Id. On remand, the trial court entered “SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS Re: SANCTIONS.” The court found in part that CR 11 sanctions were warranted based on Hsu’s amended answer filed on January 5, 2024, wherein Hsu accused Loeffler of bad faith. The court found that the amended answer, in which Hsu “knowingly made unsubstantiated claims,” was baseless and not grounded in fact and was the result of Hsu’s failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of his claims. The court found: There was no evidence to support that the Plaintiff law firm engaged in any bad faith activities whatsoever. Throughout this case, Plaintiff’s attorney followed proper procedures. There is no evidence to indicate Plaintiff’s attorney acted in bad faith, violated any civil procedure rules, statutes, or laws, or acted in any way in which to abuse or harass the Respondent or Respondent’s attorney. Attorney Hsu’s affirmative pleading had no basis in fact, was not warranted, and was simply vindictive. Hsu had several opportunities to correct these claims and failed to do so. The court ordered, “Hsu and SCLS are jointly and severally sanctioned in the amount of $1,000.00 for falsely stating Plaintiff acted in bad faith.” The court awarded attorney fees and costs to LCCA against both Hsu in the amount of $7,684.13 and Gassman in the amount of $7,684.13. 12 As to the award of fees against Hsu, the court found that “attorney fees are appropriate because of Defendant’s abuse of litigation.” The court cited Hsu’s filing of the amended answer, 12 There is an apparent scrivener’s error in the trial court’s supplemental findings, which states that the “judgment” for “costs incurred and reasonable attorney fees” against Gassman and Hsu totals $15,368.25, which is one cent less than the combined amounts of $7,684.13 that the trial court separately awarded against Gassman and Hsu. Because the amount awarded against Hsu is the only fee award at issue in the instant appeal, we refer to the $7,684.13 amount. 7 88607-0-I/8 finding: Attorney Hsu’s lackadaisical representation of his client included a last- minute notice of appearance and request for continuance of the summary judgment hearing. This request for a continuance was based on CR 56(f), which allows for a continuance for the opposing party to provide evidence in opposition of the summary judgment motion. For no apparent reason, Attorney Hsu, having been granted the continuance, failed to submit affidavits or memoranda opposing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Instead, Attorney Hsu filed an amended answer, without having sought the leave to amend under CR 15(a). He filed no opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff, nor did he file any affidavits, memoranda, or exhibits that put in dispute any material fact. These actions caused the Plaintiff to spend unnecessary attorney fees. Essentially, Attorney Hsu wasted the Court’s time. This type of conduct requires an additional award of attorney fees. Hsu appeals the court’s supplemental findings. DISCUSSION CR 11 Hsu contends that the trial court erred in finding that he violated CR 11. He avers that the court did not specify which of Hsu’s arguments lack factual or legal support to warrant CR 11 sanctions and, by extension, failed to determine whether he engaged in a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual basis of his arguments. Under CR 11(a): The signature of a party or of an attorney constitutes a certificate by the party or attorney that the party or attorney has read the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, and that to the best of the party’s or attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is well grounded in fact; (2) it is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence 8 88607-0-I/9 or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. ... If a pleading, motion, or legal memorandum is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, including a reasonable attorney fee. The rule is intended to curb “abuses of the judicial system” by preventing attorneys from submitting “baseless” filings. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 219-20, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992). “CR 11 requires attorneys to ‘stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers.’” Id. at 219 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 192 (1983)). A filing is baseless if it is either not “well grounded in fact” or unwarranted by existing law or a good faith argument for a modification of the law. See CR 11(a)(1); Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wn. App. 250, 261, 277 P.3d 9 (2012). A trial court may impose CR 11 sanctions based on a pleading that is in any part not well grounded in fact or law. See Bryant, 119 Wn.2d at 220; Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 200-01, 876 P.2d 448 (1994). To impose sanctions for a baseless filing under CR 11, the trial court must find both that (1) the claim was without a factual or legal basis and (2) the attorney who signed the filing did not conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis of the claim. West v. Wash. Ass’n of County Officials, 162 Wn. App. 120, 135, 252 P.3d 406 (2011) (citing Bryant, 119 Wn.2d at 220). A trial court may consider various factors in determining whether the filing attorney objectively conducted a reasonable inquiry, including the time that the signing attorney had available, the complexity of the issues, and the need for discovery to develop facts for a claim. Bryant, 119 Wn.2d at 220-21. We review the trial court’s imposition of CR 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion. 9 88607-0-I/10 Biggs, 124 Wn.2d at 197. A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons. Gordon v. Robinhood Fin., LLC, 31 Wn. App. 2d 185, 207, 547 P.3d 945 (2024). We may affirm CR 11 sanctions on any ground supported in the record. Id. Here, the trial court found that Hsu violated CR 11 based in part on his January 5, 2024, amended answer that he filed after the court delayed the summary judgment hearing to allow time for Hsu to file an opposition to LCCA’s summary judgment motion. The court found that Hsu’s accusations of bad faith in the amended answer against Loeffler and Williams, Kastner, and Gibbs PLLC, were not grounded in fact. Specifically, the court found that [t]here was no evidence to support that the Plaintiff[’s] law firm engaged in any bad faith activities whatsoever. Throughout this case, Plaintiff’s attorney followed proper procedures. There is no evidence to indicate Plaintiff’s attorney acted in bad faith, violated any civil procedure rules, statutes, or laws, or acted in any way in which to abuse or harass the Respondent or Respondent’s attorney. Attorney Hsu’s affirmative pleading had no basis in fact, was not warranted, and was simply vindictive. Hsu had several opportunities to correct these claims and failed to do so. Hsu does not assign error to this finding. It is apparent from the court’s supplemental findings that the court found that the filed amended answer was a product of Hsu’s failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of his bad faith claims. Hsu provides no argument on appeal to show that his written bad faith accusations in the amended answer filing were factually supported. Instead, Hsu points to the legal basis for his claims, asserting that his argument that Loeffler “should” have filed a claim under the RLTA “in lieu of an ejectment action” was “carefully analyzed” under the law. This is not responsive to whether Hsu provided a factual basis for his allegations that Loeffler and the law firm representing LCCA intentionally omitted information from the summons 10 88607-0-I/11 and complaint to prevent Gassman from obtaining legal assistance and/or to thwart her ability to respond to the lawsuit. Hsu makes no showing that he conducted a reasonable inquiry to verify any instance of alleged improper motive on the part of Loeffler or Williams, Kastner, and Gibbs PLLC. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s findings support its imposition of CR 11 sanctions against Hsu for his amended answer filing and affirm the $1,000 award against Hsu on this basis. 13 Trial Court’s Attorney Fee Award Against Hsu Hsu contends that the trial court failed to provide findings to support its award of attorney fees against him, including findings to explain how the fee amount related to his conduct in the case. “A trial court may award reasonable attorney fees only if it has a statutory, contractual, or recognized equitable basis.” Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics & Accountability Now (C.L.E.A.N.), 119 Wn. App. 665, 687-88, 82 P.3d 1199 (2004). An attorney fees award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Greenbank Beach & Boat Club, Inc. v. Bunney, 168 Wn. App. 517, 524, 280 P.3d 1133 (2012). In context, though it is not altogether clear, it appears that the trial court’s imposition of attorney fees against Hsu stemmed from Hsu’s CR 11 violation by way of his baseless amended answer filing on January 5, 2024. LCCA solely requested attorney fees against Hsu and SCLS as sanctions under CR 11. In the trial court’s supplemental findings, which are titled, “SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS Re: SANCTIONS,” the court found that Hsu’s amended answer pleading resulted in 13 Because we may affirm the trial court’s sanctions award under CR 11 on any basis that the record supports, we need not address Hsu’s argument regarding the trial court’s findings about Hsu’s response to LCCA’s motion for attorney fees and sanctions. 11 88607-0-I/12 unnecessary litigation and attorney fees. CR 11 authorizes a trial court to order a party who violates CR 11 to compensate the opposing party for reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred because of the filing. CR 11(a). However, “[i]f a trial court grants fees under CR 11, it ‘must limit those fees to the amounts reasonably expended in responding to the sanctionable filings.’” Just Dirt, Inc. v. Knight Excavating, Inc., 138 Wn. App. 409, 418, 157 P.3d 431 (2007) (citing Biggs, 124 Wn.2d at 201). Remand for recalculation is appropriate where a trial court does not segregate fees to “limit an attorney fee award to amounts reasonably expended in responding to specified sanctionable conduct.” See id. (citing Biggs, 124 Wn.2d at 201-02; MacDonald v. Korum Ford, 80 Wn. App. 877, 892-93, 912 P.2d 1052 (1996)). For any attorney fees award, the trial court must provide findings of fact and conclusions of law that articulate the grounds for the award. See Copper Creek (Marysville) Homeowners Ass’n v. Kurtz, 1 Wn.3d 711, 724, 532 P.3d 601 (2023); White v. Clark County, 188 Wn. App. 622, 639, 354 P.3d 38 (2015) (citing Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398, 435, 957 P.2d 632 (1998)). The trial court’s clear explanation of the basis of the award is necessary to facilitate meaningful appellate review. See Copper Creek, 1 Wn.3d at 724; White, 188 Wn. App. at 639. Additionally, when calculating a fee award, a trial court must show how it arrived at the amount awarded in consideration of the relevant factors. Absher Const. Co. v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 79 Wn. App. 841, 848, 917 P.2d 1086 (1995). “‘[T]he absence of an adequate record upon which to review a fee award will result in a remand of the award to the trial court to develop such a record.’” Peiffer v. Pro-Cut Concrete Cutting & Breaking Inc., 6 Wn. App. 2d 803, 833, 12 88607-0-I/13 431 P.3d 1018 (2018) (quoting Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at 435). Here, the trial court’s supplemental findings only show that it awarded half of the total attorney fees that LCCA requested as CR 11 sanctions against Hsu. The trial court’s findings do not explain how the final determined amount of $7,684.13 in fees against Hsu were incurred due to Hsu’s specific sanctionable conduct. In its motion, LCCA appeared to base its requested fee amount of $15,368.26 under CR 11 on work that occurred throughout the life of the case, including litigation that precipitated Hsu’s involvement in the case and, thus, his filing of the amended answer pleading. The trial court’s failure to segregate fees and to provide findings connecting such segregated fees to Hsu’s specific sanctionable filing or filings compels remand for recalculation. Because the trial court’s supplemental findings are insufficient, we reverse the court’s imposition of $7,684.13 in fees against Hsu and remand for the court’s entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law to clarify the basis for the fee award against Hsu and to show that the amount of the award is limited to fees reasonably incurred by LCCA in responding to Hsu’s specific sanctionable conduct. 14 14 We note that the trial court found that Hsu “acted in bad faith” for violating Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.3 and that such a violation is “an independent basis to impose sanctions against Attorney Hsu.” We have previously held that “[t]he RPCs cannot be proper grounds for the trial court to base a fee award because a ‘breach of an ethics rule provides only a public, e.g., disciplinary, remedy and not a private remedy.’” Just Dirt, 138 Wn. App. at 417 (quoting Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wn.2d 251, 259, 830 P.2d 646 (1992)). On remand, LCCA is not entitled to attorney fees against Hsu on this ground. See id. The trial court also stated that Hsu acted in bad faith “by making false statements about opposing counsel” and “refusing to correct those statements when given the chance to do so.” The court does not connect such conduct to its award of fees against Hsu in its findings. A trial court has the inherent authority to sanction an attorney for bad faith litigation conduct. State v. Merrill, 183 Wn. App. 749, 755, 335 P.3d 444 (2014). However, a court may only award attorney fees as a sanction for bad faith litigation conduct in compliance “with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1991). This includes the requirement that a party requesting fees provides the opposing party with a meaningful opportunity to respond to the request and/or to make an informed decision to undergo the risks of litigation. See Dalton M, LLC v. N. 13 88607-0-I/14 Attorney Fees on Appeal LCCA requests appellate attorney fees under RAP 18.9(a). RAP 18.9(a) authorizes an appellate court to award attorney fees to a party as sanctions, terms, or compensatory damages when the opposing party files a frivolous appellate action. Advocs. for Responsible Dev. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 170 Wn.2d 577, 580, 245 P.3d 764 (2010). “‘An appeal is frivolous if, considering the entire record, the court is convinced that the appeal presents no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ and that it is so devoid of merit that there is no possibility of reversal.’” Kinney v. Cook, 150 Wn. App. 187, 195, 208 P.3d 1 (2009) (quoting Lutz Tile, Inc. v. Krech, 136 Wn. App. 899, 906, 151 P.3d 219 (2007)). Hsu’s partially successful appeal is by definition not frivolous. See In re Marriage of Scanlon, 110 Wn. App. 682, 688, 42 P.3d 447 (2002). Thus, we decline to award LCCA fees on appeal. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s award of CR 11 sanctions in the amount of $1,000 against Hsu. We reverse and remand the trial court’s attorney fee award in the amount of $7,684.13 against Hsu for the court to enter adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial court must, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, clearly articulate the basis for the attorney fee award against Hsu and limit the fee award to LCCA’s costs reasonably attributable to Cascade Tr. Servs., Inc., 2 Wn.3d 36, 49-50, 55, 534 P.3d 339 (2023). Here, LCCA only requested fees as sanctions for Hsu’s conduct under CR 11. Hsu thus did not have a meaningful opportunity to respond to any claim from LCCA for fees against him as a sanction on the equitable basis of bad faith litigation conduct. See State v. Gassman, 175 Wn.2d 208, 211, 283 P.3d 1113 (2012). 14 88607-0-I/15 Hsu’s specific sanctionable conduct. 15 This holding does not limit the trial court’s ability to hold further proceedings on the issue of its award of attorney fees against Hsu if warranted. WE CONCUR: 15 As we note above, the only attorney fee award on appeal in the case at the bar is the trial court’s award of attorney fees against Hsu in the amount of $7,684.13. Therefore, our instructions on remand are limited to the trial court’s supplemental findings regarding the fee award against Hsu. Neither party challenged the court’s fee award against Gassman in the amount of $7,684.13; that award is not at issue on remand. 15