Full Opinion

Filed 10/29/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE HANNA CARROLL RESTAURANT GROUP LLC, G065313 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022- v. 01283759) JOHN S. HAGESTAD, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Nick A. Dourbetas, Judge. Affirmed. Price Caspino, Michael W. Caspino and Michael J. Weiler for Plaintiff and Appellant. Scheppach Bauer and Brian R. Bauer; Shantar Law, and Nicholas S. Shantar for Defendant and Appellant. * * * Plaintiff Hanna Carroll Restaurant Group LLC (the Hanna Group) provided several days of catering services for defendant John Hagestad’s family at the Masters golf tournament in Georgia (the Masters). Before the Masters, the parties agreed on a menu for seven days of meals but never signed a contract or discussed pricing. After the Masters, the Hanna Group sent Hagestad an invoice for $74,960. Hagestad believed he had been overcharged and refused to pay. The Hanna Group then sued him for breach of contract. During discovery, Hagestad denied a request for admission that “YOU contracted with Plaintiff for food and catering services for the entire seven days of [the Masters], in April of 2022” (the request). The Hanna Group later prevailed on its breach of contract claim at trial. After trial, the Hanna Group moved for $81,875 in cost-of-proof fees (the fee motion) under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, subdivision (a).1 Generally, this statute “allows a party to request fees where it serves requests for admission and the responding party unreasonably fails to admit a request that the serving party later proves true.” (Gamo v. Merrell (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 656, 660.) The Hanna Group also sought costs under section 1033.5, subdivision (a), including $25,741.20 in court reporting costs. Hagestad opposed the fee motion and also filed a motion to strike or tax the Hanna Group’s claimed court reporter costs (the motion to tax costs). The trial court partially granted the fee motion, awarding the Hanna Group only $1,950 in cost-of-proof fees. The court also granted the motion to tax costs, striking the Hanna Group’s $25,741.20 request for court reporter costs. Both parties appeal the court’s order granting the fee motion (the fee order), and the Hanna Group also appeals the order granting the motion to tax costs (the costs order). 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 As to the fee order, Hagestad contends the trial court erred by awarding the Hanna Group any fees. He claims that the request sought admission of multiple facts, not all of which were proved true at trial. Even if this were true, though, the Hanna Group was still entitled to cost-of-proof fees. We publish this case to remind litigants of their duties in responding to requests for admission. Here, Hagestad had a duty to admit the parts of the request that were true. (§ 2033.220, subd. (b)(1).) He did not fulfill this duty. He denied the entire request, and the Hanna Group later proved at least part of the request true: Hagestad contracted with the Hanna Group for food and services at the Masters. Thus, the Hanna Group was entitled to the fees it incurred in proving this fact. Hagestad has also failed to persuade us that any exception to section 2033.420, subdivision (a), applies here. The Hanna Group argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding only $1,950 in cost-of-proof fees without explaining the substantial reduction. We disagree. The court explained this amount was warranted because the Hanna Group had not identified the specific fees it incurred proving contract formation. Further, because the focus of the trial was on the value of the Hanna Group’s services, the court concluded that the Hanna Group had incurred few fees proving contract formation. The Hanna Group has not shown that either the court’s explanation or the amount the court awarded was unreasonable. We also publish this case to encourage precision when moving for cost-of-proof fees. A moving party must identify the fees it incurred proving the specific issues that the responding party denied. It cannot outsource this duty to the court. As to the costs order, the Hanna Group has failed to show that the trial court erred by striking its request for $25,741.20 in court reporter costs. 3 The fee order and the costs order are affirmed. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. THE PARTIES’ DISPUTE The Hanna Group operates a high-end restaurant in Orange County. Hagestad and his wife (collectively, the Hagestads) were apparently so impressed with their dining experience there in March 2022, that they contacted the Hanna Group’s chief operating officer, Dave Hanna, after their meal. They told Dave Hanna that their son would be competing at the Masters the next month in Augusta, Georgia. They asked the Hanna Group to provide meals for their family and friends for the entire week of the Masters. The Hagestads and Dave Hanna corresponded as the Masters approached. The Hagestads expected between 20 to 30 people for each meal. Dave Hanna sent them a proposed menu that included breakfast and dinner for seven days, which the Hagestads approved. The parties did not sign a written contract. Nor did they ever discuss the price of the requested food and services. At the Masters, the Hanna Group provided the Hagestads with breakfast, dinner, and a full bar for five days, serving an average of 25 guests per meal.2 The Hagestads praised the Hanna Group’s food and service. They sent Dave Hanna a text message after the Masters saying, “We just want to thank you for everything this week. The staff, the food, everything was perfect.” Then the bill came. 2 While the proposed menu included meals for seven days, the record indicates that the Hagestads unexpectedly left the Masters two days early. 4 The Hanna Group sent Hagestad an invoice for $74,960, which included a $5,000 discount. Hagestad balked at the amount. He sent Dave Hanna a letter disputing the bill. His letter closed by stating, “[h]ad I known that this was the costs [sic] and/or the arrangement that we would wind up with, I would have gone in a totally different direction . . . . If you want to sit down and talk about my issues, I’m willing to try to resolve our differences.” Dave Hanna responded by rescinding the $5,000 discount and adding another $5,000 for “the time, burden, and delay in seeking payment[,]” bringing the total bill to $84,960. Hagestad did not pay the invoice. II. THE LAWSUIT A. The Complaint, Discovery, and Trial The Hanna Group filed this lawsuit against Hagestad for breach of contract.3 It then served Hagestad with several requests for admission. Request Number 10 asked Hagestad to “Admit, that YOU contracted with Plaintiff for food and catering services for the entire seven days of the Master’s [sic] Golf Tournament, in April of 2022” (defined above as the request). “YOU” was a defined term, which we will discuss later. 3 The Hanna Group’s complaint also alleged a claim for common counts, which sought “[t]he reasonable value of the goods and services” provided. It dismissed this claim prior to trial. 5 Hagestad objected to the request on grounds it was vague, ambiguous, and compound. But subject to those objections, Hagestad denied the entire request.4 The case proceeded to a jury trial. At the outset of trial, Hagestad acknowledged that the Hanna Group provided food and services at the Masters, but he claimed their reasonable value was less than the $79,960 he was initially billed. Thus, trial primarily focused on the value of the catering services the Hanna Group provided. The jury found in favor of the Hanna Group but only awarded it $60,391. B. Postjudgment Requests 1. Memorandum of costs After the verdict, the Hanna Group filed a memorandum of costs seeking $40,351.04 in total costs, including $25,741.20 in court reporter costs. Hagestad filed the motion to tax costs, seeking to strike or reduce the claimed court reporter costs. He argued that the Hanna Group’s evidence showed that it sought recovery of costs specifically disallowed under section 1033.5, subdivision (b), such as trial transcripts that had not been ordered by the court. Further, because the Hanna Group failed to produce the court reporter’s invoices, Hagestad asserted that the amount of allowable court 4 Hagestad’s full response to the request was as follows: “[Hagestad] incorporates by reference his Preliminary Statement and each of his General Objections, above, as though set forth in full in this response. [Hagestad] further objects that the Request (1) is vague and ambiguous; and (2) is compound. [¶] Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant responds as follows: Deny.” 6 reporter costs could not be determined and the entire amount should be stricken. 2. Cost-of-proof fees The Hanna Group also filed the fee motion, which requested $81,875 in cost-of-proof fees under section 2033.420, subdivision (a). The fee motion was based entirely on Hagestad’s denial of the request. Hagestad argued that cost-of-proof fees were not warranted because the Hanna Group “never proved the [truth of the] multiple matters asserted in Request for Admission No. 10.” He also maintained that various exceptions to section 2033.420, subdivision (a), applied. C. The Fee and Costs Orders The fee order awarded the Hanna Group $1,950 of the $81,875 in cost-of-proof fees it had requested. The court found that the Hanna Group had proved the truth of the request and that Hagestad had not established any applicable exception. But it explained that the Hanna Group had “failed to identify the specific costs and/or fees incurred in proving the truth of [the request] at trial.” Instead, it sought to recover all the fees it had incurred from the date that Hagestad denied the request through trial. The court also observed that the primary issue at trial was the value of the Hanna Group’s catering services. “Whether a contract had been formed . . . did not involve expenditure of as much time and resources as [the Hanna Group] suggest[ed] in [its] motion.” The costs order granted Hagestad’s motion to tax costs and struck the entire $25,741.20 claimed for court reporter costs. The court explained that the Hanna Group “failed to demonstrate that the claimed costs of the trial transcripts were for transcripts ordered by the court and . . . 7 failed to demonstrate that these costs are otherwise ‘expressly authorized by law.’” Both parties appeal the fee order. Hagestad argues the trial court erred by granting the Hanna Group any cost-of-proof fees, while the Hanna Group contends the court abused its discretion by awarding it only $1,950. The Hanna Group also appeals the costs order, arguing the court abused its discretion by striking its request for $25,741.20 in court reporter costs. DISCUSSION The most fundamental principle of appellate review is that the lower court’s order is presumed correct. We make all presumptions in favor of the order, and the appellant has the burden of showing error. (Universal Home Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 125–126.) I. AWARD OF COST-OF-PROOF FEES We begin with Hagestad’s argument that the trial court erred by awarding the Hanna Group any cost-of-proof fees. A. Applicable Law “If a party fails to admit . . . the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves . . . the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” (§ 2033.420, subd. (a).) “The court shall make this order unless it finds” that an exception applies. (§ 2033.420, subd. (b).) We will discuss the relevant exceptions later. Cost-of-proof fees are intended to encourage the parties to admit facts during discovery to streamline trial. “‘The primary purpose of requests 8 for admissions is to set at rest triable issues so that they will not have to be tried; they are aimed at expediting trial. [Citation.] The basis for imposing [cost-of-proof fees] is directly related to that purpose. Unlike other discovery sanctions, an award of expenses pursuant to [the statute] is not a penalty. Instead, it is designed to reimburse reasonable expenses incurred by a party in proving the truth of a requested admission where the admission sought was “of substantial importance” [citations] such that trial would have been expedited or shortened if the request had been admitted.’” (Orange County Water Dist. v. The Arnold Engineering Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 96, 115.) We review an award of cost-of-proof fees for abuse of discretion. (Spahn v. Richards (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 208, 217.) “An abuse of discretion is only demonstrated when no reasonable judge could have made the challenged order.” (In re Marriage of Barth (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 363, 374.) B. Matters Proved at Trial Hagestad claims that no cost-of-proof fees should have been awarded because the Hanna Group did not actually prove the entirety of the request. We find no error. The request asked Hagestad to “Admit, that YOU contracted with Plaintiff for food and catering services for the entire seven days of the Master’s [sic] Golf Tournament, in April of 2022.” (Italics added.) “YOU” included “JOHN S. HAGESTAD and his agents, attorneys, employees, representatives, accountants, and all other natural persons or entities representing and/or acting on his behalf, or purporting to represent and/or act on his behalf.” Hagestad asserts that the request sought admission of five facts: (1) Hagestad and all his representatives included in the definition of “YOU,” (2) contracted with the Hanna Group for food and services, (3) for seven days, 9 (4) for the entirety of each day, i.e., breakfast, lunch, and dinner, and (5) that this contract was entered into in April 2022. Hagestad claims that the Hanna Group did not prove all of these facts at trial. At most, it showed the parties formed a contract for food and services for some portion of the Masters. We agree that the request was unfocused. While it primarily sought an admission from Hagestad that the parties formed a contract for catering services at the Masters, it sought admission of multiple ancillary facts. Nor does it appear that the Hanna Group proved all of these ancillary facts at trial. As to the contract formation issue, the jury only had to find that (1) “the contract terms were clear enough that the parties could understand what each was required to do;” (2) “the parties agreed to give each other something of value;” and (3) “the parties agreed to the terms of the contract.” The jury was not asked in either the jury instructions or the verdict form to decide whether the contract covered seven days of meals, what meals it included, or whether persons other than Hagestad were parties to the contract.5 However, even if the Hanna Group failed to prove every ancillary fact set forth in the request, Hagestad had a duty to provide “a response . . . as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to” him permitted. (§ 2033.220, subd. (a).) Each response to a request for admission must “[a]dmit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party.” (§ 2033.220, subd. (b)(1).) The response must also “[d]eny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue.” 5 In the verdict form, the jury found “in favor of [the Hanna Group] and against [Hagestad] and award[ed] damages to [the Hanna Group] in the amount of $60,391.” 10 (§ 2033.220, subd. (b)(2).) Thus, “[i]f any portion of the [request for admission] is true, the party to whom it is directed must admit that portion.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶ 8:1322.) Though the request contained multiple parts, Hagestad had a duty to admit the portions of the request that were true. (§ 2033.220, subd. (b)(1).) For example, he could have admitted that he alone contracted with the Hanna Group to provide some food and services during the Masters and then denied the facts he disputed or provided some other qualification as to the ancillary matters. He did not. He denied the entire request. Due to this blanket denial, the Hanna Group had to prove at trial that the parties formed a contract for catering services at the Masters, which it did. Thus, it was entitled to the fees it incurred in proving this fact. (§ 2033.420, subd. (a).) C. Statutory Exceptions When the requirements of section 2033.420, subdivision (a), have been met, a trial court is required to award cost-of-proof fees unless “it finds any of the following: [¶] (1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290. [¶] (2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance. [¶] (3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter. [¶] (4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit.” (§ 2033.420, subds. (b)(1)–(4).) Hagestad argues that the first, third, and fourth exceptions apply here. Again, we find no error. 1. Sustained objection Hagestad contends the first exception applies because he objected that the request was vague, ambiguous, and compound, making it “unclear what [the request] even asked [him] to admit.” 11 We agree with the trial court that this exception is inapplicable because none of Hagestad’s objections to the request were sustained. Though Hagestad objected, he unequivocally denied the entire request. In doing so, he left “no aspect of [the request] unresolved and nothing to be addressed by the trial court in a motion to compel further responses.” (American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 268.) The Hanna Group properly construed his response as an “unequivocal denial[] and expended time and effort proving the truth of the matters to the trial court.”6 (Ibid.) In response, Hagestad argues that the trial court failed to consider whether any of his objections should have been sustained when ruling on the fee motion. Specifically, he asserts that the exception in section 2033.420, subdivision (b)(1), “is broad enough to allow a trial court to decide whether an objection is (or was) valid in the first instance when evaluating a Section 2033.420 fee request.” Hagestad cites no authority to support his argument. Nor does he analyze the relevant statute to support his interpretation. As such, we will not address this argument. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 [courts may “‘disregard conclusory arguments’”].) 2. Reasonable grounds or good reason for denial Hagestad also contends that he had a reasonable ground to believe he would prevail on the issues set forth in the request and that he had good reason to deny it. He argues both exceptions apply because the 6 We note that if Hagestad found the request so vague or ambiguous that he could not understand it, or believed it was improperly compound, he could have met and conferred with the Hanna Group. If the parties could not resolve these issues, he could have stood on his objections rather than provide an unequivocal denial. 12 Hanna Group failed to prove the five facts set forth in the request. As set forth above, though, Hagestad had a duty to admit the portions of the request that were true and deny any portions that were untrue. (§ 2033.220, subd. (b)(1).) He did not fulfill this duty. Hagestad also argues that “even if Request No. 10 were somehow rewritten to simply seek an admission that Hagestad and [the Hanna Group] had entered into some kind of (unspecified) contract, that contract was so amorphous and vague that Hagestad still had reasonable grounds to deny the request at the time he answered it.” This argument is unpersuasive. The record contains e-mails showing the parties agreed that the Hanna Group would provide food and services at the Masters. These e-mails include a menu that the Hagestads approved, which contained specific meal plans for seven days (Monday through Sunday). Thus, the parties knew the Hanna Group would be providing meals and services to the Hagestads for seven days of the Masters, including the specific food it was bringing. These terms were sufficiently definite to create an enforceable contract. (See Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199, 209 [“‘a contract will be enforced if it is sufficiently definite’”].) While the parties did not agree upon a price, “it is well settled that a contract need not specify price if it can be objectively determined.” (Cal. Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 474, 482.) Due to the substantial evidence that the parties contracted for the provision of food and services at the Masters, it was not reasonable for Hagestad to deny the existence of a contract in the request. (See, e.g., Grace v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 530 [unreasonable for defendant to deny that he ran a red light given the substantial evidence that he did].) 13 II. AMOUNT OF FEES The Hanna Group asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide an adequate explanation for only awarding $1,950 of the $81,875 in cost-of-proof fees it requested. It has not shown any error. Section 2033.420, subdivision (a), only allows recovery of expenses incurred in “proving the matters denied by the opposing party.” (Garcia v. Hyster Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 724, 736–737.) The moving party must show that the claimed fees were incurred to prove issues the responding party denied. (Grace v. Mansourian, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) “The requested amounts must be segregated from costs and fees expended to prove other issues.” (Ibid.) “It is the obligation of the party (and attorney) seeking the fee award ‘to prune the fee request to comply with the law,’ and the party (and attorney) cannot ‘transfer that responsibility onto the trial court.’” (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 280.) The Hanna Group did not meet its burden. As the trial court noted, it “failed to identify the specific costs and/or fees incurred in proving the truth of [the request] at trial.” Rather, the Hanna Group sought to recover all the attorney fees it incurred from the date of Hagestad’s denial of the request through trial. But not all of these fees were related to the issues set forth in the request. While the request focused entirely on contract formation, the trial’s primary focus was the value of the Hanna Group’s food and services. Thus, the court could reasonably find that not all of the Hanna Group’s fees incurred from the denial of the request through trial were recoverable under section 2033.420, subdivision (a). 14 The Hanna Group also claims that the trial court “did not explain what work was excessive, duplicative or unnecessary and what work was compensable” to justify “a 97 percent cut” of its requested fees. This argument ignores that it was the Hanna Group’s burden to segregate the fees it incurred proving contract formation. (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 280; Grace v. Mansourian, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) It made no attempt to meet this burden. It simply submitted a request for all the fees it incurred after the relevant denial without attempting to identify which fees were related to proving contract formation. It was not the trial court’s initial duty to comb through these invoices and identify the recoverable fees for the Hanna Group. Because the Hanna Group failed to segregate the fees it incurred proving contract formation, the trial court could have denied the fee motion. (See Grace v. Mansourian, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) It did not. Rather, it awarded the Hanna Group $1,950 in cost-of-proof fees. Given the court’s assessment that contract formation was a necessary but minor issue in this case, this result was not unreasonable. We also reject Hagestad’s argument that the Hanna Group’s failure to segregate fees should have led to a denial of the fee motion. The trial court recognized that the Hanna Group incurred some fees proving contract formation after Hagestad’s denial of the request. It was not unreasonable to award the Hanna Group a portion of its requested fees for proving this element of its breach of contract claim at trial. 15 III. THE COSTS ORDER The Hanna Group contends the trial court abused its discretion by striking the $25,741.20 it requested in court reporting costs. We find no error. Allowable costs generally include “[c]ourt reporter fees as established by statute.” (§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(11).) But “[t]ranscripts of court proceedings not ordered by the court” are not recoverable except when authorized by law. (§ 1033.5, subd. (b)(5).) The trial court struck the Hanna Group’s entire claim for court reporter costs because it “failed to demonstrate that the claimed costs of the trial transcripts were for transcripts ordered by the court and has failed to demonstrate that these costs are otherwise ‘expressly authorized by law.’” The Hanna Group’s argument appears to arise from a purported concession by Hagestad. Hagestad’s reply brief in support of the motion to tax costs concluded by arguing “that at a minimum, the [trial court] should tax the costs allegedly incurred for court reporter costs in the amount of at least $2,931.00, for a total [costs] award of, at most, $37,420.04.” The Hanna Group seizes on this statement and contends that despite Hagestad’s “concessions and proposed reduction, [the trial court] without any explanation struck all of [the Hanna Group’s] court reporting fees in the amount of $25,741.20.” (Fn. omitted.) Hagestad never conceded that the lower court could only strike $2,931 in court reporter costs. He argued that the court should strike that amount “at a minimum.” Indeed, the motion to tax costs expressly argued that “because Hanna failed to produce the underlying invoices for the court reporter, the costs claimed for court reporter fees cannot be segregated, and 16 the whole item should be stricken.” (Italics added.) The notice for the motion to tax costs likewise specified that Hagestad sought to strike the entire amount of claimed court reporter costs: “Hagestad seeks to strike or tax the following costs claim by Hanna: [¶] 1. $25,741.20 in ‘Court reporter fees as established by statute.’” Further, the trial court explained that it was striking the entire claim for court reporter costs because the Hanna Group failed to show that they were for court-ordered transcripts or were otherwise authorized by law. The Hanna Group has not demonstrated on appeal that it provided the lower court with evidence showing the total amount of allowable court reporter costs it incurred under section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(11). Thus, it has not shown that it met its burden of proof, and the court could reasonably strike its entire claim for $25,741.20 in court reporting costs. (See Wagner Farms, Inc. v. Modesto Irrigation Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 765, 773–774 [following a proper objection, party claiming costs has burden of proving them].) 17 DISPOSITION The fee order and the costs order are both affirmed. Each party shall bear its own costs incurred in this appeal. MOORE, J. WE CONCUR: MOTOIKE, P. J. GOODING, J. 18