Serna v. Colorado Springs

25CA1597 Serna v Colorado Springs 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1597 El Paso County District Court No. 17CV31927 Honorable Eric Bentley, Judge City of Colorado Springs, Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Francisco Serna, Defendant-Appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division IV Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Harris and Gomez, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Marc Smith, Acting City Attorney, Anne H. Turner, Assistant City Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Francisco Serna, Pro Se ¶1 Francisco Serna appeals the district court’s order determining that (1) the City of Colorado Springs (the City) satisfied its obligation to pay him just compensation, including accrued interest, for his property (the property) that it acquired through eminent domain; and (2) the amounts the City deposited into the court registry did not accrue interest between the date the court entered its final judgment and the date the court dispersed the funds in the registry to Serna. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 In August 2017, the City filed a condemnation action to acquire the property. On October 23, 2017, the district court granted the City immediate possession of the property. ¶3 On October 25, the City deposited into the court registry $64,100 (the initial deposit), the amount at which an independent appraiser valued the property. Serna, appearing pro se, filed a motion to withdraw and disperse the initial deposit, which the court granted. ¶4 Following the disbursement of the initial deposit to Serna, the only remaining issue in the condemnation action was the full amount of just compensation to which Serna was entitled from the 1  City. The City filed a summary judgment motion asserting that the amount of the initial deposit represented just compensation for the property. The district court granted the motion. A division of this court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the City and remanded the case to the district court. City of Colorado Springs v. Serna, (Colo. App. No. 19CA0856, Aug. 20, 2020) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Serna I). On December 23, 2021, Serna removed the case to federal court, but on June 13, 2022, the federal court remanded the case to the state court. Following the remand from the federal court, the state court set a valuation trial before a three-person commission, as section 38-1-105(1), C.R.S. 2026, requires. The commission valued the property at $103,203.75. Thus, after accounting for the initial deposit, the City owed Serna $39,103.75 (the valuation balance). On April 27, 2023, the City deposited the valuation balance into the court registry (the second deposit). ¶5 The City then submitted a proposed rule and order — and, later, an amended proposed rule and order — in accordance with section 38-1-105(3) and (4). The amended proposed rule and order provided that Serna was entitled to prejudgment interest under 2  section 38-1-116, C.R.S. 2026, and to postjudgment interest between the date the City paid the second deposit into the court registry and the date the City paid into the court registry the remaining balance due under section 5-12-106, C.R.S. 2026. The City stated in its amended proposed rule and order that Serna was not entitled to prejudgment interest under section 38-1-116 “for the period wherein the trial of the case [was] delayed or continued by or at” Serna’s request from December 23, 2021, through June 13, 2022, when the case was pending in federal court. ¶6 The City provided the district court with its calculations of pre- and post-judgment interest to support its amended proposed rule and order. The City calculated the interest it owed Serna on the valuation balance from the date the City made the initial deposit until Serna removed the case to federal court. It did not include interest for the period the case was pending in federal court. The City then calculated interest from the date of the remand from federal court until it made the second deposit. According to the City, the balance due, consisting of the valuation balance and accrued interest, was $57,591.51 before the City made the second deposit. After the City made the second deposit, the balance due 3  was $18,738.44, which represented accrued pre- and post-judgment interest on the valuation balance through June 30, 2023. The City deposited that amount into the court registry on June 20, 2023 (the interest deposit). ¶7 Finally, the City included a provision in its proposed amended rule and order stating that, upon payment of the interest deposit, it “satisfi[ed] in full” its “obligation to pay just compensation” for the property (the satisfaction provision). ¶8 The City certified that it had conferred with Serna. It reported that Serna opposed the amended proposed rule and order and “ask[ed] that the court clerk retain the City’s deposits.” (The record does not indicate why Serna requested that the court clerk retain the deposits.) ¶9 Serna did not object to the City’s calculations or the satisfaction provision. ¶ 10 On August 17, 2023, the district court adopted the City’s amended proposed rule and order, which it said was “an order of final judgment in this case” (the final judgment). ¶ 11 The final judgment included the satisfaction provision, as well as the City’s language indicating that Serna was not entitled to 4  interest under section 38-1-116 for the time when the case was pending in federal court. Adopting the City’s language in its proposed rule and order, the court ordered the court clerk to hold the second deposit plus the interest deposit (the registry balance) in an “interest-bearing account until further [o]rder of the [c]ourt.” ¶ 12 Serna filed numerous post-trial motions challenging the final judgment, all of which the district court denied. ¶ 13 On October 4, 2023, Serna appealed the final judgment. Another division of this court affirmed. City of Colorado Springs v. Serna, (Colo. App. No. 23CA1710, Sep. 5, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Serna II). ¶ 14 In January 2025, after the mandate issued in Serna II, Serna asked the district court to disburse the registry balance to him, and on February 5, 2025, the court granted his request. Twenty days later, Serna filed a “Demand for Immediate Release of Accrued Interest Under [Section] 38-1-112[, C.R.S. 2026]” (the interest demand), arguing that “the calculation of interest must reflect” the entire period from August 23, 2023, to February 5, 2025. (We assume that Serna meant to say that interest accrued between August 17, 2023, when the court entered the final judgment, and 5  February 5, 2025. In any event, we use the date Serna included in the interest demand.) ¶ 15 The district court responded to the interest demand in an order saying, The [c]ourt has conferred with the Finance Department and has been informed that funds deposited into the court registry do not accrue interest, and the entirety of the funds held in the court registry have been released to [Serna]. .... C.R.S. 38-1-112, upon which [Serna] relies, does not require that payments in eminent domain cases be held in an interest-bearing account. However, pursuant to the Rule and Order issued August 17, 2023, as well as C.R.S. 5-12-106, [Serna is] entitled to post[]judgment interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Judgment in this case entered on August 17, 2023. In this regard, the [c]ourt notes that it erroneously granted the City’s request that “the Clerk of the Court shall hold the Petitioner’s deposits . . . in an interest-bearing account until further Order of the Court,” thereby giving [Serna] an expectation that the [registry balance] would bear interest. As noted above, the [c]ourt’s registry accounts do not bear interest except in circumstances not applicable here. .... 6  [T]he parties shall raise any disagreements they may have with the above conclusions. The City shall also calculate the amount of interest, if any, it believes to be due. ¶ 16 In its own response to the interest demand filed three weeks later, the City said it took “no position” on the interest demand because the “dispute” was “between [Serna] and the district court.” ¶ 17 In Serna’s reply in support of the interest demand, he conceded that he had received the disbursement from the court registry and that “statutory mandates” govern how just compensation is determined. But he asserted that the City had caused an “unjustified delay” in disbursing the registry balance to him and, therefore, that the court should impose “maximum interest . . . including equitable interest.” He requested that the court void the final judgment for this reason. ¶ 18 The court issued an order reiterating that part of the final judgment “was in error” because “funds deposited into the court registry do not normally accrue interest, and the amount deposited did not meet the minimum requirement for an interest-bearing account.” The court concluded that the error did not “create an entitlement to interest where none otherwise exist[ed].” 7 ¶ 19 The district court said that “the City’s deposits satisfied in full its obligation to pay the judgment as well as pre[]judgment and post[]judgment interest.” The court added that, by submitting the interest deposit and the proposed amended rule and order, the City “satisfied . . . [its] obligations in this case.” ¶ 20 The district court concluded that Serna “could have petitioned the court for release of [the registry balance]” any time after June 20, 2023, but “[i]nstead exercised [his] right to file various post-trial motions and an appeal.” The court determined that the “most relevant authority” was section 38-1-116: “[W]hile interest accrues on the commissioners’ award of just compensation up to the date the award is filed with the court, no interest is allowed ‘for the period wherein the trial of the case is delayed or continued by or at the request of the respondent.’” (Quoting § 38-1-116.) Further, the court said that, although Serna had the right to appeal the final judgment, “the statute expressly provides that interest [did] not accrue” while he pursued his appeal. ¶ 21 Serna appeals the district court’s order finding that the City satisfied its obligation under the final judgment and denying Serna 8  interest between the date of the final judgment and the date the court disbursed the registry balance to him. II. Analysis ¶ 22 We understand Serna to be contending that (1) he is entitled to postjudgment interest under section 5-12-102(4), C.R.S. 2026, because the final judgment was not satisfied while Serna II was pending, given that Serna was not legally allowed to obtain the funds held in the court registry during that time; and (2) the district court misapplied section 38-1-116 when it determined that Serna’s appeal in Serna II “delayed” the trial such that the statute “expressly” prohibited interest to accrue during the pendency of that appeal. We affirm. A. Serna Did Not Preserve His Contention that the Final Judgment Was Not Satisfied ¶ 23 Section 5-12-102(4), which governs statutory interest, provides that interest accrues on any judgment until the judgment is satisfied. Serna argues that the final judgment was never satisfied because he was legally barred from obtaining the registry balance during the pendency of Serna II and that postjudgment interest continued to accrue during that time. In support of this 9  contention, Serna argues that section 38-1-111, C.R.S. 2026, which governs eminent domain proceedings, requires that money deposited into the court registry must “remain on deposit” until an appellate court disposes of the case. Under Serna’s reasoning, he was entitled to postjudgment interest during the pendency of Serna II because the judgment was not satisfied at that time. ¶ 24 To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must bring the issue to the attention of the district court, and the court must have had an opportunity to rule on it. Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010). “It is axiomatic that in civil cases, issues not raised in or decided by the [district] court generally will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.” Madalena v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2023 COA 32, ¶ 50, 532 P.3d 776, 788 (quoting Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co of Wis., 2019 COA 11, ¶ 21, 436 P.3d 597, 600). ¶ 25 Significantly, Serna did not object to the City’s interest calculations or the satisfaction provision in the City’s amended proposed rule and order. In neither the interest demand nor his reply in support of the interest demand did Serna argue that the final judgment had not been satisfied or that interest should have 10  continued to accrue during the pendency of Serna II. Similarly, in Serna II, Serna did not argue that the final judgment was unsatisfied. Serna filed the interest demand only after the court had entered the final judgment. And even in that interest demand, Serna did not cite section 38-1-111 or make the argument he now makes on appeal. Thus, at no point did Serna provide the district court with an opportunity to rule on his argument that the final judgment was never fully satisfied. Cf. People v. Quillen, 2023 COA 22M, ¶ 14, 530 P.3d 1253, 1258 (holding that an issue is unpreserved when the grounds raised on appeal are different from those raised below). For this reason, we decline to address Serna’s new contention on appeal. See Gallegos Fam. Props., LLC v. Colo. Groundwater Comm’n, 2017 CO 73, ¶ 36, 398 P.3d 599, 610. B. Serna Was Not Entitled to Accrued Interest During the Pendency of Serna II Because the City Satisfied the Final Judgment Before Serna Filed His Appeal ¶ 26 Serna’s second contention is similar to his first argument to the extent he argues that he did not receive all the interest to which he was entitled. Rather than focusing on whether the final judgment was satisfied, however, Serna contends in his second 11  argument that his appeal in Serna II did not toll the accrual of interest. Unlike his first contention, Serna arguably preserved his second contention by asserting in the interest demand that the court had failed to distribute interest “as required.” See People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 697 (Colo. 2010) (explaining that courts liberally construe pro se litigants’ filings). (The City does not dispute that Serna preserved his interest argument.) ¶ 27 Serna specifically contends that the district court misapplied section 38-1-116 when it concluded in its July 8, 2025, order that he “delayed or continued” the case by filing his appeal in Serna II. § 38-1-116. Serna argues that section 38-1-116 “governs delay of the trial, not post[]judgment proceedings,” and thus his appeal in Serna II was outside of the scope of the statute. Additionally, he argues that the court should not have relied on section 38-1-116 to determine that interest tolled during the pendency of Serna II because the eminent domain statutes do not address postjudgment interest. We disagree. ¶ 28 “We review a district court’s statutory interpretation de novo.” Dreifus v. Diamond Cabaret, 2026 COA 59, ¶ 18, ___ P.3d ___, ___. 12 ¶ 29 Under section 38-1-116, interest accrued on the final judgment “on and after the date of . . . possession until the date [the] award of the commissioners . . . [was] filed with the clerk of the court.” But “[n]o interest shall be allowed” on any deposit satisfying any portion of the final judgment “which the owner and others interested received or could have received as a partial payment by withdrawal from” the court registry. Id. And interest does not accrue “for the period wherein the trial of the case is delayed or continued by or at the request of the respondent.” Id. ¶ 30 We agree with Serna that neither section 38-1-116 nor any of the other eminent domain statutes address postjudgment interest. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. 455 Co., 997 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Colo. App. 1999). Thus, the court should have applied section 5-12-106(1)(a) when calculating postjudgment interest. Although we agree that the court applied the wrong statute to calculate postjudgment interest, the court’s error did not prejudice Serna. ¶ 31 When a court enters a final judgment, “the result is the same as any other judgment, and the general interest statutes apply.” E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 997 P.2d at 1277. Under the general interest statute, if a party appeals a judgment, the judgment 13  accrues interest “from the date of entry” in the district court “until satisfaction of the judgment.” § 5-12-106(1)(a). When a public entity pays a final judgment into the court registry, the judgment is satisfied, and interest stops accruing on it. See E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 997 P.2d at 1277 (“[A] payment into the court registry constitutes a partial satisfaction of the judgment for the amount tendered and terminates the accrual of interest on that amount.”). ¶ 32 For this reason, Serna was entitled to accrued interest from October 23, 2017 — when the court granted the City immediate possession of the property — until December 22, 2021 — when Serna removed the case to federal court — and from June 13, 2022 — when the federal court remanded the case to the state court — until June 20, 2023, when the City paid the interest deposit into the court registry. See § 5-12-106(1)(a); E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 997 P.2d at 1277. When the City paid the interest deposit, it satisfied the final judgment in full, and interest stopped accruing, regardless of Serna’s appeal in Serna II and whether that appeal constituted a delay of the “trial.” See E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 997 P.2d at 1277; § 38-1-116. In other words, even if Serna 14  is correct that interest should otherwise have accrued while Serna II was pending, the City had already satisfied the final judgment by that time. See § 5-12-106(1)(a). Thus, when Serna filed his notice of appeal in Serna II, there was no balance due on the final judgment upon which interest could accrue. ¶ 33 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying Serna interest during the pendency of Serna II, albeit on different grounds. III. Disposition ¶ 34 The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE GOMEZ concur. 15