In Interest of RZ

25CA1343 In Interest of RZ 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1343 Eagle County District Court No. 23JV30010 Honorable Jonathan Shamis, Judge In the Interest of R.Z., a Child, and Concerning M.Z., Appellant, and R.E.H., Appellee. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE TOW Taubman* and Ashby*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 The Harris Law Firm PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Emily L. Olson, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Caplan and Earnest, LLC, Rohn K. Robbins, Christopher D. Tomchuck, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 M.Z. (mother) appeals the judgment determining that R.E.H. was not the legal father of R.Z. (the child) under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), §§ 19-4-101 to -130, C.R.S. 2026. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 Mother and R.H. began a romantic relationship in August 2020. The parties dispute the length of their intimate relationship. R.H. asserts the romantic relationship ended in December 2021, though the parties continued to have occasional intimate relations. Mother asserts the romantic relationship ended in January 2023. ¶3 In June 2021, the parties began exploring having a child. Approximately two decades earlier, R.H. had frozen some of his sperm, so the parties began investigating in vitro fertilization (IVF) to allow mother to conceive. Around March 2022, mother presented R.H. with a proposed coparenting agreement, which R.H. never signed. In May 2022, R.H. presented mother with a sperm donor agreement, which mother never signed. ¶4 Mother underwent two egg retrievals in May and July 2022. In December 2022, mother was implanted with R.H.’s sperm, which successfully resulted in the child’s conception. Mother learned she was pregnant in January 2023. 1 ¶5 The child was born in September 2023. Shortly thereafter, mother initiated this parentage proceeding and filed a petition to determine parentage, naming R.H. as the child’s biological father and requesting he be determined the child’s legal father. R.H. filed an admission of parentage, agreeing that he was the child’s “biological sperm donor,” but asserted the parties had agreed that he would not have any legal responsibilities for the child. ¶6 The trial court set the matter for a hearing. After a contested hearing, the court determined that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the parties had agreed that R.H. would be the child’s legal father. II. Mother’s Contentions ¶7 Mother contends that the court’s factual findings are unsupported by the record and its legal conclusions are unsound. She asserts that the court erred when it (1) determined R.H.’s completion of the IVF documents was insufficient to establish his written consent to being the child’s legal parent; (2) concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence of an oral agreement between the parties for R.H. to be the child’s legal parent; and (3) found R.H. was a “sperm donor with benefits” because it 2  inappropriately created a new legal category unsupported by statute. A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review ¶8 The UPA governs the determination of parentage disputes. See People in Interest of J.G.C., 2013 COA 171, ¶ 11. Section 19-4- 106(1), C.R.S. 2026, provides, in pertinent part, If, with the consent of another intended parent, an intended parent consents to become pregnant through an assisted reproductive procedure, the intended parent who does not give birth is treated in law as the natural parent of the child conceived. The consent of both the intended parent who will give birth and the other intended parent must be in writing and signed by each such party, except as provided in subsection (5) of this section. Subsection (5), in turn, provides, Failure of the intended parent to sign a consent required by subsection (1) of this section before or after the birth of the child does not preclude a finding that the intended parent is the parent if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, prior to the conception of the child, the parent who gave birth and the intended parent had an oral agreement that both would be parents of the child and that the child was conceived through an assisted reproductive procedure. 3  § 19-4-106(5). And section 19-4-106(2) provides, “A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of an assisted reproductive procedure.” ¶9 Mother’s contention turns in part on statutory interpretation of the UPA, which is a question of law we review de novo. See People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 42. When interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine and effectuate the General Assembly’s intent. People in Interest of C.L.S., 313 P.3d 662, 666 (Colo. App. 2011). “[W]e first look at the statute’s language and give effect to the words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meanings. In doing so, we employ rules of grammar and common usage.” Id. (citation omitted). “We ‘must read and consider the statutory scheme as a whole to give consistent, harmonious[,] and sensible effect to all its parts.” In re Marriage of Rooks, 2018 CO 85, ¶ 52 (quoting People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, ¶ 32). ¶ 10 If the statute’s language is unambiguous, we do not resort to interpretive canons. Id. And a statutory term is not necessarily ambiguous merely because it is not defined in the statute, 4  particularly when the term has a commonly understood meaning. Stoesz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 COA 86, ¶ 13. ¶ 11 Contrary to mother’s contention, however, we must also review the trial court’s factual determinations, which we review for clear error — meaning we will reverse only if the findings have no record support. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 11. Intent is a factual question. Bolinger v. Neal, 259 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Colo. App. 2010). So is the existence of an oral contract. Tuscany Custom Homes, LLC v. Westover, 2020 COA 178, ¶ 52. In addressing such factual issues, we defer to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting testimony and assessment of witness credibility. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (observing that it is for the district court to determine witness credibility and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, including the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom). B. Analysis ¶ 12 Mother asserts that the trial court erred when it determined R.H. did not intend to be the child’s parent because, she argues, R.H. “manifested his intent to be legally bound as a parent” when 5  he signed “multiple contracts and agreements with the artificial insemination agency.” In other words, mother contends that R.H.’s signature on the IVF forms giving his consent to mother being inseminated with his sperm means, ipso facto, that he intended to be the child’s parent. But mother puts the cart before the horse. Before the trial could determine whether the consent forms R.H. signed were sufficient to create the statutory presumption of paternity under section 19-4-106(1), it had to determine whether R.H. was an “intended parent” or simply a donor. To assess whether the trial court erred, then, we must determine what the General Assembly meant by the phrase “intended parent,” which it elected not to define in the UPA. ¶ 13 The Colorado Children’s Code defines “parent” for purposes of any action under title 19, though we acknowledge that the definition is circular: “‘Parent’ means either a natural parent of a child, as may be established pursuant to [the UPA], or a parent by adoption.” § 19-1-103(105)(a), C.R.S. 2026. ¶ 14 In the absence of any statutory definition of “intended” in this context, we look to the dictionary. See DISH Network Corp. v. Altomari, 224 P.3d 362, 366 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[A]ppellate courts 6  may determine the meaning of undefined statutory words by referring to the dictionary.”). “[I]ntend” is defined as “to have in mind as a purpose or goal.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/4J6B-7RJM. Taken together, the phrase intended parent requires the person to have a clear aim to assume the legal obligations of parentage.1 ¶ 15 Having determined the definition of intended parent, we turn to whether the court erred when it determined that R.H.’s signature on the IVF forms did not manifest his intent to be legally bound as the child’s parent. Given the record support for the court’s findings, we conclude it did not. ¶ 16 As two witnesses who worked at the IVF facilities described, the documents refer to only the IVF process itself. They do not describe anything related to any intention to become a legal parent 1 We note that the General Assembly defined “intended parent” in another portion of the Children’s Code, the Colorado Surrogacy Agreement Act, § 19-4.5-101 to -114, C.R.S. 2026 (the Surrogacy Act): “‘Intended parent’ means an individual, married or unmarried, who manifests an intent to be legally bound as a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction.” § 19-4.5-103(10), C.R.S. 2026. Although that definition is limited to “[a]s used in” the Surrogacy Act, we note that it is consistent with our reading of the phrase in the context of the UPA. § 19-4.5-103. 7  or to the custody or control of any child that may result from the procedures. And mother does not argue, nor does our review of the documents indicate, that the terms in the IVF documents are ambiguous. See Bennett v. Price, 692 P.2d 1138, 1139 (Colo. App. 1984) (“[B]y well-established rule, when the language used is plain, its meaning clear, and no absurdity is involved, an agreement must be enforced as written.”). Moreover, if consent to participating in the insemination procedure alone were deemed sufficient to establish the intent to be the parent of the resulting child, then section 19-4-106(2) — which distinguishes a donor from an intended parent — would be made a nullity, because all donors would necessarily be intended parents. Thus, we disagree with mother that R.H.’s consent to having his sperm used in the insemination process conclusively establishes his intent to be the child’s parent. ¶ 17 Mother points to other evidence as well to support her contention that R.H. intended to be the child’s parent. But “[w]hen the evidence is conflicting, a reviewing court may not substitute its conclusions for those of the trial court merely because there may be credible evidence supporting a different result.” Lawry v. Palm, 192 8  P.3d 550, 558 (Colo. App. 2008). And there is ample evidence in the record that R.H. did not intend to be the child’s parent, including • R.H.’s testimony that he never agreed to be the child’s parent; • his description of his involvement in the insemination process; • the sperm donor agreement he proffered to mother (which mother never signed, despite R.H.’s testimony that she orally agreed to); • his refusal of mother’s request to sign a parenting agreement; and • the child’s birth certificate not identifying him as the father. ¶ 18 In sum, there is record support for the trial court’s finding that R.H. was merely a donor and, accordingly, for the trial court’s implied finding that R.H. did not intend to be the child’s father. See § 19-1-103(61) (defining donor as not including an intended parent pursuant to section 19-4-106(1)). And because R.H. was a donor and, thus, not an intended parent, the trial court’s legal conclusion 9  that R.H. was not the child’s father under section 19-4-106(1) was not error. ¶ 19 We are not persuaded to the contrary by mother’s reliance on In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989). There, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that the juvenile court erred when it extinguished the parental rights of a known donor to a child conceived by artificial insemination when that donor alleged that he and the mother had agreed that he would be the child’s natural father. Id. at 35. However, that court also determined that a factual dispute remained as to whether there was such an agreement, and if on remand, the juvenile court determined there was not, the father’s parental rights to the child would be extinguished. Id. To the contrary, in this case, the trial court determined there was no agreement between the parties that R.H. would be the child’s legal father and, thus, declined to impose on R.H. the legal status of parent.2 2 Notably, the Colorado Supreme Court did not have occasion in Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989), to interpret the term “intended parent,” because that term did not appear in the statute at that time. See § 19-4-106, C.R.S. 1988. 10 ¶ 20 As noted, even in the absence of sufficient signed consent to be a parent under section 19-4-106(1), if R.H. had orally agreed to be the child’s parent, the lack of written consent to do so would not be fatal to mother’s claim. But, for many of the same reasons that support the trial court’s determination that R.H. was a mere donor, the record supports the trial court’s finding that no such oral agreement existed.3 ¶ 21 Finally, we reject mother’s implication that the trial court erroneously created a new legal category by finding R.H. was a “sperm donor with benefits.” In context, the court was not articulating a new category; instead, it was — perhaps regrettably — playing off of R.H.’s counsel’s use of the colloquial phrase “friends with benefits” in closing argument, referring to the evidence that, in addition to R.H. being a sperm donor, R.H. and mother continued to have occasional intimate relations with each 3 To the extent mother contends that the trial court impermissibly placed on her the burden of establishing the existence of an oral agreement, we disagree. First, she does not identify where in the record the trial court imposed such a burden. Second, even if it did, she does not cite any authority holding that doing so would be improper. Indeed, it is well established that the party asserting the existence of an oral agreement has the burden of proving it. See Kiter v. Owen, 168 P.2d 254, 254-55 (Colo. 1946). 11  other. The crux of the court’s ruling was that R.H. was a “donor,” not an intended parent. And we discern nothing in the court’s findings and conclusions to suggest that R.H. was assigned any additional rights or responsibilities as a result of the court’s description. To the contrary, any “benefits” the court referenced were not those that are subject to legal purview. III. Mother’s Other Arguments ¶ 22 Mother contends that the trial court erred because it “did not reference any particular evidence” to support its findings. But this is belied by the record. While the court did not go through every scrap of admitted evidence in its findings, the court referenced photographs and conversations between the parties, R.H.’s presence during the IVF process, R.H.’s statements, and the lack of any signed agreement on either side. Based on these facts, the court ultimately determined there was not sufficient evidence that R.H. either intended or orally agreed to be the child’s legal parent. See Friends of Denv. Parks, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 2013 COA 177, ¶ 35 (oral findings and conclusions that are contained in a transcript are adequate if they are sufficiently comprehensive to provide a basis for review). 12 ¶ 23 Mother also argues that, because the court cited only section 19-4-106 in its findings, it is “not clear that the trial court understood the applicable law or that it applied it appropriately.” But mother points to only places in the record where the court did reference the correct legal authority. She does not identify any specific misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. Thus, she has not overcome the general presumption that the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts. See Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301, 313 (Colo. App. 2009), aff’d, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011). ¶ 24 Mother additionally asserts that the trial court’s ruling must be reversed as a matter of public policy because the ruling suggests that a brief, casual encounter between parties would result in financial responsibilities, while exempting those arising from an intentional, structured donor arrangement. But we have concluded that the trial court correctly applied the law. Any arguments that the law is bad public policy are more appropriately directed to the General Assembly, not the judiciary. See Ruybalid v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2017 COA 113, ¶ 18, aff’d on other grounds, 2019 CO 49. 13  IV. Attorney Fees ¶ 25 Mother requests her appellate attorney fees under C.A.R. 39.1 and section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2026, because of the disparity in the parties’ finances. R.H. asserts mother is precluded from requesting attorney fees pursuant to title 14 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, because the parties were never married and R.H. was determined not to be the child’s legal parent. We agree. ¶ 26 Section 14-10-119 applies to any proceeding brought under article 10 of title 14, including dissolutions and nonparent custody proceedings. In re Custody of C.J.S., 37 P.3d 479, 481 (Colo. App. 2001). Mother’s action was not brought under title 14 but, rather, under the UPA, which is found in title 19. See §§ 19-4-101 to -130. Consequently, mother is not entitled to attorney fees under title 14, and her request for appellate attorney fees is denied. V. Disposition ¶ 27 The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE ASHBY concur. 14