Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-1430 Document: 34 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 5, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court In re: LINN W. JENSEN, Debtor. ------------------------------ LINN W. JENSEN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 25-1430 (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-00837-RM) THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, (D. Colo.) f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of CWMBS, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2005-1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-1; NEWREZ LLC, d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined * unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1430 Document: 34 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 2 Linn Jensen, proceeding pro se 1, appeals a district court order that affirmed an order by a bankruptcy court permitting a proof of claim to real property she owned (the “Property”) filed by Bank of New York Mellon (the “Bank”) and overruling her statute-of-limitations-based objections thereto. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. BACKGROUND In 2004, the Property was owned by Mark and Sonya Ashmore, who mortgaged it. The Bank came to hold the note secured by a deed of trust on the Property. The note required monthly payments through 2035. By June 2010, the Ashmores were in default on the note. The Bank sent Mr. Ashmore a notice of intent to accelerate and, a year later, filed a “Notice of Election and Demand for Sale” (“NED”) with the Boulder County Public Trustee. But, ultimately, the Bank withdrew the NED and did not proceed with the sale. The Bank restarted foreclosure proceedings in January 2013 with a second NED. The Property was auctioned to Resurgent Capital Services, LP, which paid Mr. Ashmore $2,000 to get him to move out but then set aside the sale and reinstated the note and deed of trust. The Bank then withdrew its second NED. In 2015, the Bank filed and then withdrew a third NED. 1 Because Ms. Jensen proceeds pro se, we construe her arguments liberally, but we “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [her] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). 2 Appellate Case: 25-1430 Document: 34 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 3 In 2017, the Ashmores quitclaimed their interests in the Property to Ms. Jensen. In 2019, the Bank filed a fourth NED and obtained from the Boulder County District Court an order authorizing a foreclosure sale. But before it could complete the sale, Ms. Jensen filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy court, the Bank filed a proof of claim related to the Property, and Ms. Jensen initiated an adversary proceeding objecting on statute-of-limitations grounds. She argued the statute of limitations ran six years after the Bank filed the first NED. The bankruptcy court rejected Ms. Jensen’s argument, finding after a trial that the Bank abandoned acceleration of the note when it withdrew the 2011, 2013, and 2015 NEDs, which reinstated the original maturity date of the note for statute-of- limitations-accrual purposes. Ms. Jensen appealed to the district court, which affirmed, and thereafter to this court. DISCUSSION “In an appeal in a bankruptcy case, we independently review the bankruptcy court’s decision, applying the same standard as the . . . district court.” Miller v. Bill and Carolyn Limited P’ship (In re Baldwin), 593 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010). “In doing so, we treat the . . . district court as a subordinate appellate tribunal whose rulings are not entitled to any deference . . . .” Aviva Life & Annuity Co. v. White (In re Millennium Multiple Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan), 772 F.3d 634, 638 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). So, like the district court, “[w]e review findings of fact pursuant to a clearly erroneous standard and conclusions of 3 Appellate Case: 25-1430 Document: 34 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 4 law de novo.” Stillwater Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. v. CIT Grp./Equip. Fin., Inc., 383 F.3d 1148, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004). Because the Property was located in Colorado, we apply Colorado law to this dispute. See Lindsay v. Beneficial Reins. Co. (In re Lindsay), 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Texas law controls in this case, because the real estate foreclosed on is in Texas. . . . The security of land title in Texas should not be compromised by applying the law of a different state to Texas foreclosure sales.”); see also id. at 948– 49 (“The deed of trust said that any foreclosure sale should follow Texas law. No serious argument can be made for applying the law of any state but Texas to the Texas real estate foreclosure.”); R. vol. 1 at 211 (deed of trust, stating “[t]his Security Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located.” (emphasis added)). When applying Colorado law, “[i]f the Colorado Supreme Court has not decided an issue, our task is to predict how it would rule.” Evanston Ins. Co. v. Law Off. of Michael P. Medved, P.C., 890 F.3d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 2018). And in so doing, “we follow the opinions of an intermediate state appellate court unless convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” Id. at 1200 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Colorado law, the statute of limitations to foreclose is six years. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-39-207 (“The lien created by any instrument shall be extinguished, regardless of any other provision in this article to the contrary, at the same time that the right to commence a suit to enforce payment of the indebtedness 4 Appellate Case: 25-1430 Document: 34 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 5 or performance of the obligation secured by the lien is barred by any statute of limitation of this state.”); id. § 13-80-103.5(1)(a) (setting six-year statute of limitations for “all actions for the enforcement of rights set forth in any instrument securing the payment of or evidencing any debt”). When a lender exercises its right under a note repayable in installments to accelerate amounts due because of a debtor’s default, “the entire remaining balance of the loan becomes due immediately and the statute of limitations is triggered for all installments that had not previously become due.” Hassler v. Acct. Brokers of Larimer Cnty., Inc., 274 P.3d 547, 553 (Colo. 2012). Colorado’s intermediate appellate courts, following the “great weight of authority,” have held that “in Colorado, a lender may abandon the acceleration of a note.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Peterson, 442 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Colo. App. 2018), modified on reh’g (Jan. 10, 2019); see also Igou v. Bank of Am., N.A., 459 P.3d 776, 780 (Colo. App. 2020) (“[A] creditor may abandon . . . acceleration. To do so, the creditor must manifest its intent to abandon acceleration by a clear affirmative act. Abandoning the acceleration restores the [note’s] original maturity date for purposes of accrual of the statute of limitations.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). This holding follows the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding “that the doctrine of waiver applies to acceleration.” See Peterson, 442 P.3d at 1011 (citing Goodwin v. Dist. Ct., 779 P.2d 837, 843-44 (Colo. 1989)). Ms. Jensen argues this court should apply New York law to determine when the statute of limitations began to run, see Aplt. Opening Br. at 3–4, but she provides 5 Appellate Case: 25-1430 Document: 34 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 6 no reason New York law would control here, nor does she provide any basis to conclude the Colorado Supreme Court would be more likely to apply New York common law than to apply the rule set forth in Peterson and Igou. The Bank manifested its intent to abandon acceleration of its security interest in the Property when it withdrew the NEDs in 2011, 2013, and 2015. That abandonment restored the note’s original maturity date for purposes of when the statute of limitations accrued. So the statute of limitations had not run when it foreclosed on Ms. Jensen. The bankruptcy court did not err in so ruling. 2 CONCLUSION We affirm the judgment of the district court. Entered for the Court Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge 2 Ms. Jensen also asserts, in passing, that proceedings in the bankruptcy court were “hobbled by . . . a Covid Era Zoom Trial which posed many challenges for a fair and manageable trial” Aplt. Opening Br. at 2. But she does not develop this argument any further, including an explanation of whether the court reached any adverse findings due to its being so “hobbled” or an explanation as to why the trial was unfair or mismanaged Because the statement is conclusory and undeveloped, we conclude she has waived any argument on these points, and consider them no further. See United States v. Woodmore, 135 F.4th 861, 877 (10th Cir. 2025) (“Under the doctrine of appellate-briefing waiver, a litigant may waive appellate review of an issue by not arguing it—or arguing it in an inadequate manner—in one’s opening brief. This rule applies to arguments that are advanced in an opening brief only in a perfunctory manner.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 6