Shin v. Orange County Housing Authority CA4/3

Filed 11/10/26 Shin v. Orange County Housing Authority CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE DONG SHIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, G065930 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2025- 01476475) ORANGE COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, OPINION Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Scott A. Steiner, Judge. Affirmed. Motion to augment record denied. Dong Shin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and Daniel L. Richards, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.  Dong Shin appeals from the judgment denying his petition for writ of mandamus. He brought the petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1094.5,1 to overturn a decision by the Orange County Housing Authority (OCHA) deeming him ineligible for housing assistance under Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, 42 United States Code section 1437f, (Section 8). Shin raises several issues on appeal with respect to the judgment. We affirm the judgment on four grounds. First, Shin failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) and therefore his fact-based arguments are forfeited. Second, the trial court found Shin’s writ petition was not timely filed and Shin does not challenge that finding in his opening brief. Third, OCHA’s decision was not arbitrary and OCHA complied with the law in making its ineligibility determination. Finally, we conclude Shin did not suffer a due process violation. FACTS In June 2023, Shin submitted an application to OCHA for Section 8 housing assistance. On May 13, 2024, OCHA informed Shin via letter, his application had been made ineligible on the ground he had misrepresented his residency. In the same letter, OCHA informed Shin that if he did not agree with the ineligibility decision, he had a “right to file a written complaint and request an informal review within fifteen (15) calendar days” from the date of notification. In a subsequent mailing, dated May 14, 2024, OCHA informed Shin it had conducted an informal review of the ineligibility decision at his request, but indicated its decision would not be reversed. In this correspondence, OCHA explained the Orange County District Attorney’s 1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated. 2 Office had conducted an investigation which confirmed Shin had misrepresented his residency. OCHA’s occupancy section chief later reviewed Shin’s application in response to a discrimination complaint made by Shin. As a result, the section chief sent Shin a letter in August 2024 indicating he had reviewed Shin’s application and OCHA’s processes and found no “facts supporting the allegations of ‘discrimination.’” The section chief concluded OCHA’s ineligibility decision was within program guidelines and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development guidelines. The section chief informed Shin his application remained ineligible. Shin then met with OCHA’s housing manager to discuss his concerns and the district attorney’s investigation. The housing manager requested additional information and documentation in order to re-evaluate his application. Shin supplied additional information and some photographs, but on October 8, 2024, OCHA notified him via letter, the information and photographs were insufficient to establish the residency requirement. Shin sent OCHA an e-mail attempting to explain discrepancies in the information he had provided. On October 21, 2024, OCHA’s housing manager responded by letter to Shin’s e-mail. The letter informed Shin the information he had provided did not change OCHA’s ineligibility decision and indicated “the ineligible decision is final.” Shin responded via e-mail, claiming OCHA had “intentionally sought reasons to disqualify [him]” and he “sensed a bias in the way [his] case was treated.” OCHA’s housing manager then sent a reply e- mail informing Shin his allegations of bias were “unsupported” and the OCHA’s ineligible decision “stands as final.” 3  PROCEDURAL HISTORY Shin filed a verified petition for writ of mandamus and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on April 18, 2025. OCHA filed opposition, which included numerous exhibits. The trial court conducted a hearing in August 2025, after which the court issued a minute order denying Shin’s petition for writ of mandamus. The court concluded the petition was filed more than 90 days after OCHA made its final decision and therefore was untimely under section 1094.6, subdivision (a). The court also found the writ of mandate “should be considered pursuant to [section] 1094.5” and under that section Shin failed to meet his burden of showing a prejudicial abuse of discretion on the part of OCHA. Shin appealed from the resulting judgment in favor of OCHA.2 DISCUSSION I. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Mandamus “‘Statutes provide for two types of mandate review: ordinary mandate and administrative mandate.’ [Citation.] ‘The nature of the administrative action or decision at issue determines which type of review applies.’” (Napa Valley Unified School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 609, 624 (Napa Valley).) “‘Ordinary mandate under . . . section 1085 is used to review ministerial acts, quasi-legislative acts, and quasi-judicial decisions which do not meet the requirements for review under . . . section 1094.5. [Citations.] In 2 Shin filed a motion to augment the record which is denied because the motion asks to add documents that are already a part of our record. 4 such cases, the appropriate standard is whether the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or failed to follow the procedure required by law.’” (Napa Valley, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 624.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the trial court’s factual findings. (James v. State of California (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 130, 136.) Under this standard, “any conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the prevailing party.” (Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Bellflower Unified School District (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 927, 939.) “‘[A]dministrative mandate under . . . section 1094.5 is used to review the validity of quasi-judicial decisions resulting from a proceeding in which (1) a hearing was required to be given, (2) evidence was required to be taken, and (3) discretion in the determination of facts was vested in the agency.” (Napa Valley, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 624.) Under section 1094.5, an agency decision may be set aside only if the challenger shows a “prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) “‘[A]buse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.’” (Napa Valley, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 624.) Public assistance benefits are a fundamental right. (Johnson v. Housing Authority of City of Oakland (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 603, 612 (Johnson).) “In reviewing an agency’s factual findings in cases . . . involving a fundamental right, a trial court ‘“exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence.”‘“ (Crooks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 893, 900 (Crooks).) 5 B. Section 8 Housing Assistance Section 8 authorizes housing assistance payments “[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing.” (42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a).) The rental voucher program established by Section 8 is funded by the federal government but administered by local public housing agencies (PHA’s). (See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) & (o); see also Crooks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 903.) OCHA is the local PHA responsible for administering the voucher program in Orange County. OCHA has authority to establish local preferences to give priority to applicants for housing vouchers who live and work in Orange County. (See 24 C.F.R. § 982.207(a)(1) [“The PHA may establish a system of local preferences for selection of families admitted to the program. PHA selection preferences must be described in the PHA Administrative Plan”].) “A residency preference is a preference for admission of persons who reside in a specified geographic area (‘residency preference area’). A county or municipality may be used as a residency preference area.” (24 C.F.R. § 982.207(b)(1)(ii).) II. SHIN HAS FORFEITED FACT-BASED ARGUMENTS Shin argues OCHA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, a prejudicial abuse of discretion, and unsupported by substantial evidence. He also argues OCHA did not proceed in the manner required by law and violated his due process rights. Those arguments are forfeited to the extent they are factual in nature because Shin has not supported them with citations to the appellate record. 6  Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court (rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)) requires any “reference to a matter in the record” to be supported by “a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”. “It is an elementary principle of appellate practice that this requirement applies to every factual reference in a brief. “‘“Any statement in a brief concerning matters in the appellate record—whether factual or procedural and no matter where in the brief the reference to the record occurs—must be supported by a citation to the record.”‘“ (Wentworth v. Regents of University of California (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 580, 595.) We may disregard factual assertions that do not comply with this rule and “conclude that parties forfeit arguments by failing to support statements in the argument section of a brief with record citations.” (Wentworth v. Regents of University of California, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 596; see WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [“Rather than scour the record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record”]; City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 [Court of Appeal declines to consider challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because appellants did not provide citations to the record].) Shin’s opening brief has but a handful of citations to the appellate record. Of those few citations, one is to the trial court’s minute order and another is to the judgment, which are not evidence. Shin provides no record citations to support his statement of the case and statement of facts. Shin’s arguments are for the most part intensely factual. He argues OCHA’s decision was arbitrary because it was based on inconsistent explanations but provides no record citations to identify the explanations or 7 the inconsistencies. Shin argues the record does not support OCHA’s decision but provides no citations to that very record. We therefore deem the arguments made at subsections I.C., II.B (in part), II.C., and III.B. of his opening brief’s argument section to be forfeited. We are mindful Shin represents himself in this appeal. However, self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543; Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 [“requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation”].) III. SHIN’S WRIT PETITION WAS UNTIMELY Shin sought relief under section 1085 for ordinary mandamus and under section 1094.5 for administrative mandamus. Section 1094.6 imposes time deadlines for filing a writ petition under section 1094.5. Under section 1094.6, “Judicial review of any decision of a local agency . . . may be had pursuant to Section 1094.5 of this code only if the petition for writ of mandate pursuant to such section is filed within the time limits specified in this section.” (§ 1094.6(a).)3 Subdivision (b) specifies “[a]ny such petition shall be filed not later than the 90th day following the date on which the decision becomes final.” (§ 1094.6(b).) The trial court noted that “[a]lthough the parties’ briefing is mainly directed at obtaining and opposing a writ petition pursuant to section 1085, a writ of mandate as to [r]espondent’s determination that [Shin] is 3 Government Code section 54951 defines “local agency” to mean “a county, city, whether general law or chartered, city and county, town, school district, municipal corporation, district, political subdivision, or any board, commission or agency thereof, or other local public agency.” 8 ineligible for the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program should be considered pursuant to [section] 1094.5.” Indeed, Shin challenges the determination of a local agency (OCHA) following an administrative hearing at which evidence was taken and discretion given to the agency in determining facts. (Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 612.) He does not identify any statute, regulation or other source of law imposing a ministerial duty enforceable by traditional mandamus under section 1085. Thus, his challenge to OCHA’s determination that his application for section 8 housing assistance was ineligible constitutes a claim only for administrative mandamus under section 1094.5. Consequently, pursuant to section 1094.6, Shin’s writ petition was untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after OCHA notified Shin of its final decision on October 21, 2024. Although Shin addresses the untimeliness issue in his reply brief, he has forfeited any challenge to that issue by not addressing it in his opening brief. (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066; Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. AMZ Ins. Services, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 401, 427–428 [arguments raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief are forfeited].) Shin also included in his writ petition, a cause of action for declaratory relief. “An action for declaratory relief may not be used to attack an administrative order.” (Scott v. City of Indian Wells (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541, 546.) Shin also included a claim for injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, not a cause of action. (Fuance v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 173.) Because the writ petition is time-barred, or Shin’s arguments forfeited, there are no allegations that would entitle Shin to injunctive relief. 9  IV. OCHA’S DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND COMPLIED WITH GOVERNING LAW Even if we were to find the petition was not time barred and that Shin did not forfeit his arguments, OCHA’s decision was not arbitrary and complied with governing law. Shin argues OCHA failed to comply with governing law and its decision was arbitrary because it was based “on shifting rationales unsupported by regulation” and “relied on a [d]istrict [a]ttorney investigative report that was internally inconsistent and factually inaccurate.” In its May 2024 notice of ineligibility, OCHA informed Shin his application for Section 8 rental assistance had been made ineligible due to “Misrepresentation in Residency.” (Boldface omitted.) Making a misrepresentation is a valid ground for denying an application for section 8 housing assistance. (See 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)(4) [“[a]ny information by the family must be true and complete”], 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i) & (iv); see also Crooks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 903–904 [misrepresentation on application is valid ground for denying Section 8 housing assistance].) In response to the notice of ineligibility, Shin submitted additional information and documentation in an attempt to show he met the residence requirement. In its October 21, 2024 letter, OCHA acknowledged receiving that information but concluded Shin “failed to provide sufficient unambiguous information to overturn the previous decision.” OCHA’s determination was not a “shifting rationale,” but a response to the information and documentation supplied by Shin. 10  Shin asserts OCHA relied on a district attorney’s “investigative report that was internally inconsistent and factually inaccurate.” OCHA cited the district attorney’s report in a May 14, 2024 letter regarding the informal review of Shin’s ineligible status. OCHA described the report as verifying that the owner of the property at the address given by Shin as his residence had no record that Shin lived or was authorized to live there and the son of the tenant at the same address had confirmed Shin did not reside there. OCHA and the trial court were within their respective prerogatives by accepting the report as accurate. (See Swan v. Hatchett (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1215 [“we generally do not second-guess the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses or documentary evidence”].) Shin makes a related argument that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review by not independently reviewing OCHA’s compliance with the law and by adopting OCHA’s conclusions “wholesale.” Even though the court upheld OCHA’s decision that does not mean it failed to conduct an independent review of the evidence before it. (See Deck v. Developers Investment Co., Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 808, 831 [“The court’s approval of a referee’s report and recommendation does not establish the trial court failed to comply with its obligation to independently review the report and consider the referee’s findings”].) Further, the trial court’s obligation to conduct an independent review extends to factual findings, and to such findings we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (Crooks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 901.) We find nothing in the record to support Shin’s argument that there was a failure by the trial court to conduct an independent review of the evidence and substantial evidence supports the court’s finding. 11  V. SHIN WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS Shin argues OCHA violated his due process rights by (1) failing to provide him adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond and (2) relying on a “non-adversarial investigative report” without affording him an opportunity to “challenge its conclusions, confront witnesses, or correct factual inaccuracies.” He contends the trial court did not address those asserted due process violations in its order denying his writ petition. Although Shin forfeited his due process claim by not providing record citations to support its factual bases, we address the claim nonetheless because it is of constitutional dimension. Although the trial court made no express findings or conclusions on Shin’s due process claim, we presume the court made implied findings. A party may request a statement of decision on a petition for writ of mandamus. (Ochoa v. Anaheim City School Dist. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 209, 224.) Because Shin did not request a statement of decision, we may infer the trial court impliedly made factual findings favorable to OCHA on all issues necessary to support the judgment. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 60.) Those conclusions include findings rejecting Shin’s due process claims. We review those implied findings under the substantial evidence standard. (Id. at p. 60.) Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied findings. “Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (People v. Hamilton (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 423, 439; see U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7(a).) Shin was given an abundance of notice and opportunities to submit evidence and respond to OCHA. Shin was given notice OCHA had denied his application due to misrepresenting his 12 residency. He then had the opportunity to, and did, respond to that decision. When Shin made discrimination claims, OCHA’s occupancy section chief reviewed Shin’s application and the processes conducted by OCHA. Shin requested, and was granted, a meeting with OCHA’s housing manager, who gave Shin the opportunity to submit additional information and documentation to support his claims. OCHA’s housing manager and Shin communicated by e-mail several times. OCHA’s October 8, 2024 letter to Shin provided a detailed history of the notices and opportunities to be heard afforded to him. As to the “non-adversarial investigative report,” Shin does not identify the investigative report he is referring to, although presumably it was the report prepared by the district attorney’s office. Nothing in the record suggests that Shin was denied the opportunity to speak to the investigator or to the persons who were interviewed as part of the investigation. Shin had the opportunity to submit evidence in response to the investigative report. We find no due process violation. In his reply brief, Shin argues for the first time the trial court violated his due process rights by not resolving conflicts in the evidence in his favor. Arguments made for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited. (People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 848, fn. 46.) 13  DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal. MOTOIKE, P. J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, J. GOODING, J. 14