Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0466n.06 Nos. 25-4023/4026 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Nov 18, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) TENISHA R. WILSON; DENMAN GORDON, ) Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CITY OF SOUTH EUCLID, OHIO, ) OHIO Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. ) ) OPINION ) Before: GRIFFIN, READLER, and RITZ, Circuit Judges. GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Tenisha Wilson owns a home in the City of South Euclid. Along the south end of her home runs Laurens Avenue. But Laurens Avenue exists only in City records, on paper. In reality, Laurens Avenue is too narrow to be a public road. Today, Wilson uses a strip of Laurens Avenue as a driveway. She petitioned the City to vacate the strip, but the City refused. Wilson sued, seeking a judgment declaring that the City abandoned its rights to the strip when it accepted a 1927 development plan that blocked Laurens Avenue from ever becoming a public road. She also brought a class-of-one equal protection claim. The parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court agreed with Wilson that the City abandoned the strip of Laurens Avenue but found no basis for her equal protection claim. The parties cross-appeal. We affirm. I. Tenisha Wilson owns and resides in a home on Newberry Road in the City of South Euclid, Ohio. Laurens Avenue runs adjacent to Wilson’s home and is a “paper street.” A paper street is Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid a street that, although conveyed to the municipality and platted on its city record, has not been, and may never be, constructed. Wilson v. City of S. Euclid, 2016 WL 3091897, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 2, 2016). But the general rule that a municipality abandons property if it intends to abandon it and allows 21 years of nonuse still applies. Id. By tracing the development of South Euclid over the past one hundred years, Wilson argues this happened with Laurens Avenue. A. In 1916, S. H. Kleinman Realty Co. created the Rosemere Subdivision in Euclid Township (today, the City of South Euclid), Cuyahoga County. The Rosemere Subdivision included 165 lots, four 50-foot-wide streets (Chelston, Glenside, Clinton, and Newberry Avenues), and Laurens Avenue, which was only 25 feet wide. As part of the platting of the Rosemere Subdivision, S. H. Kleinman Realty Co. dedicated these five avenues “to the public for highways.” Although the dedication provided only 25 feet for Laurens Avenue, the Rosemere Subdivision plat indicated that Laurens Avenue was intended to be 50 feet wide. In July 1916, the Board of County Commissioners accepted the dedication “for Road purposes.” At that time, state law required all public roads to be thirty feet or greater, and counties could set wider rights-of-way minimums. Ohio Gen. Code § 6861 (1915). A few months after accepting the dedication, the Cuyahoga County Commissioners expanded the minimum width to 40 feet. And soon after Euclid Township incorporated as the Village of South Euclid in 1917, the Village set the same minimum. In 1926, the Village of South Euclid accepted a dedication of land to alter Green and Anderson Roads, which ran diagonally east of the Rosemere Subdivision. The following year, in 1927, the Village approved the Green-Anderson Plat (GA Plat), forming the Green-Anderson Subdivision directly south of the Rosemere Subdivision. Although the GA Plat identified Laurens -2- Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid Avenue, it did not dedicate any land to widen Laurens Avenue beyond 25 feet. Laurens Avenue was permanently set at 25 feet wide. When the Village incorporated as the City of South Euclid in 1941, Laurens Avenue remained unimproved and designated as “not open” in the City Records. A few years later, the City extended the minimum road width to 50 feet, which it remains today. The Rosemere subdivision began to see substantial development in the 1950s: Newberry Road was improved and developed into a paved road and, in 1958, a water main was installed under Laurens Avenue. Today, except for the water main, Laurens Avenue remains undeveloped. Some people use Laurens Avenue as a footpath, including children on their way to a nearby elementary school. Wilson uses the strip of Laurens Avenue next to her house as a driveway. B. Wilson purchased her property in 1996. Over the years, the City has demanded that she repair and maintain the strip of Laurens Avenue she uses, repeatedly citing or threatening to cite her. Eventually, in 2010, Wilson asked the City to vacate the strip of Laurens Avenue adjacent to her property. A nearby resident adamantly opposed Wilson’s efforts. And ultimately, the City declined to vacate Laurens Avenue, so Wilson filed an action in state court, further petitioning for vacation and raising an equal protection claim. See Wilson, 2016 WL 3091897, at *2, *7–8. The Ohio trial court prematurely ruled against her, and the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at *8. Wilson later voluntarily dismissed that action and sued in federal court. Her federal action seeks a judgment declaring that the City abandoned its interest in the strip of Laurens Avenue adjacent to her property. She also brings a “class of one” equal protection claim, alleging that the City discriminated against her by not vacating Laurens Avenue. As relevant here, Wilson moved for summary judgment on her declaratory judgment claim, and the -3- Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid City moved for summary judgment on both claims. The district court agreed that the City abandoned the strip of Laurens Avenue adjacent to Wilson’s property, but it found no merit to the equal protection claim. Both parties timely appealed. II. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. HRT Enters. v. City of Detroit, 163 F.4th 319, 331 (6th Cir. 2025). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A. In Ohio, when a municipality accepts a dedication of land, it holds the land in trust for the purposes “expressed, designated, or intended.” Callen v. Columbus Edison Elec. Light Co., 64 N.E. 141, 143 (Ohio 1902) (citation modified). Ordinarily, the dedication does “not [] vest in the municipality a fee simple absolute.” Id. Rather, the municipality receives a determinable fee. Id.; Anderson v. Village of Alger, 1999 WL 378377, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 14, 1999). Because a determinable fee reserves the right of reverter (or the possibility of reverter), the owners of abutting property retain reversionary rights to the land. Callen, 64 N.E. at 143; Babin v. City of Ashland, 116 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ohio 1953). If the municipality abandons dedicated land, its determinable fee terminates, and the land automatically reverts to the abutting properties. State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345, 354 (Ohio 2002); see also Koprivec v. Rails-to- Trails of Wayne Cnty., 102 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ohio 2018) (discussing determinable fees). Therefore, if the City abandoned the strip of Laurens Avenue, the property reverted to the abutting landowners. To prove abandonment, Ohio law requires evidence of the municipality’s intent to abandon the dedicated land and 21 years of nonuse. Shemo, 765 N.E.2d at 354–55. -4- Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid 1. To begin, Wilson contends that a significant period of nonuse may alone prove the municipality’s intent to abandon the property. But Ohio law does not support that conclusion. Instead, while nonuse “may give rise to an inference of intent to abandon,” Snyder v. Monroe Twp. Trs., 674 N.E.2d 741, 750–51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996), it is insufficient by itself. Kiser v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Logan Cnty., 97 N.E. 52, 52 (Ohio 1911) (“But mere nonuse[] is not ordinarily sufficient to establish the fact of abandonment.”); see Corban v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 76 N.E.3d 1089, 1094 (Ohio 2016). Thus, Wilson must point to more than the mere nonuse of Laurens Avenue to prove that the City intended to abandon it. Here, the City’s acceptance of the 1927 GA Plat meets that requirement. Recall that Laurens Avenue was initially accepted by the City “for Road purposes” upon the Rosemere Subdivision’s dedication.1 The Rosemere Subdivision’s dedication provided only 25 feet of roadway to Laurens Avenue, which was too narrow to be a road under Ohio law. The Rosemere Plat, however, indicated that Laurens Avenue was designed to be 50 feet wide, and property south of Laurens Avenue remained undeveloped but available to fulfill this intention. Yet when the City accepted the GA Plat a little more than a decade later, the GA Plat did not widen Laurens Avenue—rather, it locked in Laurens Avenue at 25 feet and prevented it from ever becoming a public road, the purpose for which it was dedicated. Thus, the City’s acceptance of the GA Plat evinced a clear intent to abandon Laurens Avenue as a road. See Shemo, 765 N.E.2d at 354–55 (concluding that a municipality’s acceptance of an adjacent subdivision that permanently prevented the development of a road established an intent to abandon its property rights). 1 At this point, we refer collectively to the Township, Village, and City simply as the City. -5- Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid The City argues otherwise but fails to persuade. First, the City asserts that although the GA Plat prevented use of Laurens Avenue as a road for motor vehicles, “Road purposes” is broad, encompassing uses like pedestrian footpaths and utility access, and those uses were never blocked. But the statutory authority that authorized the acceptance of land for road purposes also required any such dedicated roads to be at least 30 feet wide. See Ohio Gen. Code §§ 6861, 6886. And the City’s acceptance of the GA Plat permanently prevented Laurens Avenue from ever being that wide—so it could never be a public road under state law. At oral argument, the City suggested that this 30-foot requirement was a mere “guide.” But “[s]tatutory provisions prescribing a maximum or minimum width of highways are generally regarded as mandatory.” 54 Ohio Jur. 3d Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 83. And § 6861 of the Ohio General Code provided no relevant exception. See Ohio Gen. Code § 6861 (permitting 15- foot rights-of-way for roads on county lines); see also Ohio Rev. Code § 5553.03(B). Thus, this argument lacks merit. Next, attempting to rebuff the intent to abandon, the City points to the water main installation and Laurens Avenue’s current use as a footpath. But both are immaterial because they occurred in 1958 or later and, by then, the City had accepted the GA Plat—that is, it had already evinced an intent to abandon the strip of Laurens Avenue. 2. Next, Wilson must prove nonuse for 21 years. Nonuse requires “ceasing all acts of enjoyment on the property, [and] must occur for at least twenty-one years in order to constitute abandonment.” Shemo, 765 N.E.2d at 354. After the GA Plat was approved in 1927, Laurens Avenue could not be a public road. And by 1941, municipal records confirm that Laurens Avenue remained “not open” as a road. The City installed a water main in 1958—but that was well after -6- Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid the 21 years of nonuse ran in 1948. Therefore, the City abandoned the strip of Laurens Avenue, and this property reverted to the abutting properties, including Wilson’s. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wilson on this claim. III. Turning to Wilson’s equal protection claim, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Wilson brings a “class of one” claim under the Equal Protection Clause.2 To prevail, she must show that (1) the City intentionally treated her differently from others similarly situated and (2) “there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Wilson faces “a heavy burden” to demonstrate that she was “treated differently than those similarly situated in all material respects.” Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 462 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). Wilson offers several purported similarly situated persons. First, she points to Vera Dawson, who owned property across the street from Wilson and successfully had a portion of Laurens Avenue abutting her property vacated. Dawson’s and Wilson’s strips of Laurens Avenue are similar in size, affected a similar number of adjacent landowners, and evidenced similar use. But the differences are many. The City vacated Dawson’s strip in 1961; Wilson first requested her vacation in 2010. Dawson’s strip was a stub street; Wilson’s strip is a thoroughfare. No utilities ran under Dawson’s strip; a water main runs under Wilson’s strip. Thus, although Dawson’s and Wilson’s strips share some similarities, material differences distinguish them. See 2 We assume without deciding that a class of one claim is cognizable in this discretionary government action. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 604 (2008) (“It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized.”); Johnson v. Morales, 946 F.3d 911, 939 n.5 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). -7- Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 865–66 (6th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the mere passing of 18 months between zoning applications constitutes a material difference because “[g]aps in time and context may suggest a change in policy rather than differential treatment”). Next, Wilson points to a vacation that occurred in 1975 on the nearby Homestead Road. But the Homestead vacation is not a similarly situated comparator. Not only did that vacation concern a different road, but it also occurred decades before Wilson’s request. Wilson offers other comparators: (1) in 1986, the City vacated part of Lyndway Road; (2) in 1991, the City vacated a portion of Fenwick Road; (3) in 1992, the City vacated another portion of Lyndway Road; (4) in 2010, the City vacated a portion of Stanhope Road; and (5) in 2013, the City vacated a portion of Summit Drive. But they fare no better—each of these properties concerned roads materially distinguishable from Laurens Avenue or occurred decades apart from Wilson’s request. And although the latter two vacations occurred around the same time as Wilson’s request, the City vacated the portion of Stanhope Road to a food services company as part of the “Cedar Center North Redevelopment Project” and the portion of Summit Drive for construction of a new library. In both circumstances, the City vacated the land for broad public uses—redevelopment and a public library—that impacted more than a mere handful of adjacent individual property owners. They are therefore not similarly situated to Wilson. In sum, Wilson offers only materially distinguishable comparators that no reasonable jury could find similarly situated to her. And because Wilson offers no adequate comparator, we need not address whether Wilson can negate every conceivable basis or prove animus or ill will. Shavers v. Almont Township, 832 F. App’x 933, 937–39 (6th Cir. 2020). IV. We affirm. -8-