Tenisha Wilson v. City of S. Euclid, Ohio
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-4023
JudgeRichard Allen Griffin; Chad A. Readler; Kevin G. Ritz
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0466n.06
Nos. 25-4023/4026
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Nov 18, 2026
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
TENISHA R. WILSON; DENMAN GORDON,
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE
) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CITY OF SOUTH EUCLID, OHIO, ) OHIO
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. )
) OPINION
)
Before: GRIFFIN, READLER, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Tenisha Wilson owns a home in the City of South Euclid. Along the south end of
her home runs Laurens Avenue. But Laurens Avenue exists only in City records, on paper. In
reality, Laurens Avenue is too narrow to be a public road. Today, Wilson uses a strip of Laurens
Avenue as a driveway. She petitioned the City to vacate the strip, but the City refused. Wilson
sued, seeking a judgment declaring that the City abandoned its rights to the strip when it accepted
a 1927 development plan that blocked Laurens Avenue from ever becoming a public road. She
also brought a class-of-one equal protection claim. The parties moved for summary judgment, and
the district court agreed with Wilson that the City abandoned the strip of Laurens Avenue but
found no basis for her equal protection claim. The parties cross-appeal. We affirm.
I.
Tenisha Wilson owns and resides in a home on Newberry Road in the City of South Euclid,
Ohio. Laurens Avenue runs adjacent to Wilson’s home and is a “paper street.” A paper street is
Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid
a street that, although conveyed to the municipality and platted on its city record, has not been,
and may never be, constructed. Wilson v. City of S. Euclid, 2016 WL 3091897, at *5 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 2, 2016). But the general rule that a municipality abandons property if it intends to
abandon it and allows 21 years of nonuse still applies. Id. By tracing the development of South
Euclid over the past one hundred years, Wilson argues this happened with Laurens Avenue.
A.
In 1916, S. H. Kleinman Realty Co. created the Rosemere Subdivision in Euclid Township
(today, the City of South Euclid), Cuyahoga County. The Rosemere Subdivision included
165 lots, four 50-foot-wide streets (Chelston, Glenside, Clinton, and Newberry Avenues), and
Laurens Avenue, which was only 25 feet wide. As part of the platting of the Rosemere
Subdivision, S. H. Kleinman Realty Co. dedicated these five avenues “to the public for highways.”
Although the dedication provided only 25 feet for Laurens Avenue, the Rosemere Subdivision plat
indicated that Laurens Avenue was intended to be 50 feet wide. In July 1916, the Board of County
Commissioners accepted the dedication “for Road purposes.”
At that time, state law required all public roads to be thirty feet or greater, and counties
could set wider rights-of-way minimums. Ohio Gen. Code § 6861 (1915). A few months after
accepting the dedication, the Cuyahoga County Commissioners expanded the minimum width to
40 feet. And soon after Euclid Township incorporated as the Village of South Euclid in 1917, the
Village set the same minimum.
In 1926, the Village of South Euclid accepted a dedication of land to alter Green and
Anderson Roads, which ran diagonally east of the Rosemere Subdivision. The following year, in
1927, the Village approved the Green-Anderson Plat (GA Plat), forming the Green-Anderson
Subdivision directly south of the Rosemere Subdivision. Although the GA Plat identified Laurens
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Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid
Avenue, it did not dedicate any land to widen Laurens Avenue beyond 25 feet. Laurens Avenue
was permanently set at 25 feet wide.
When the Village incorporated as the City of South Euclid in 1941, Laurens Avenue
remained unimproved and designated as “not open” in the City Records. A few years later, the
City extended the minimum road width to 50 feet, which it remains today. The Rosemere
subdivision began to see substantial development in the 1950s: Newberry Road was improved
and developed into a paved road and, in 1958, a water main was installed under Laurens Avenue.
Today, except for the water main, Laurens Avenue remains undeveloped. Some people
use Laurens Avenue as a footpath, including children on their way to a nearby elementary school.
Wilson uses the strip of Laurens Avenue next to her house as a driveway.
B.
Wilson purchased her property in 1996. Over the years, the City has demanded that she
repair and maintain the strip of Laurens Avenue she uses, repeatedly citing or threatening to cite
her. Eventually, in 2010, Wilson asked the City to vacate the strip of Laurens Avenue adjacent to
her property. A nearby resident adamantly opposed Wilson’s efforts. And ultimately, the City
declined to vacate Laurens Avenue, so Wilson filed an action in state court, further petitioning for
vacation and raising an equal protection claim. See Wilson, 2016 WL 3091897, at *2, *7–8. The
Ohio trial court prematurely ruled against her, and the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at *8.
Wilson later voluntarily dismissed that action and sued in federal court.
Her federal action seeks a judgment declaring that the City abandoned its interest in the
strip of Laurens Avenue adjacent to her property. She also brings a “class of one” equal protection
claim, alleging that the City discriminated against her by not vacating Laurens Avenue. As
relevant here, Wilson moved for summary judgment on her declaratory judgment claim, and the
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Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid
City moved for summary judgment on both claims. The district court agreed that the City
abandoned the strip of Laurens Avenue adjacent to Wilson’s property, but it found no merit to the
equal protection claim. Both parties timely appealed.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. HRT Enters. v. City of
Detroit, 163 F.4th 319, 331 (6th Cir. 2025). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A.
In Ohio, when a municipality accepts a dedication of land, it holds the land in trust for the
purposes “expressed, designated, or intended.” Callen v. Columbus Edison Elec. Light Co.,
64 N.E. 141, 143 (Ohio 1902) (citation modified). Ordinarily, the dedication does “not [] vest in
the municipality a fee simple absolute.” Id. Rather, the municipality receives a determinable fee.
Id.; Anderson v. Village of Alger, 1999 WL 378377, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 14, 1999). Because
a determinable fee reserves the right of reverter (or the possibility of reverter), the owners of
abutting property retain reversionary rights to the land. Callen, 64 N.E. at 143; Babin v. City of
Ashland, 116 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ohio 1953). If the municipality abandons dedicated land, its
determinable fee terminates, and the land automatically reverts to the abutting properties. State ex
rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345, 354 (Ohio 2002); see also Koprivec v. Rails-to-
Trails of Wayne Cnty., 102 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ohio 2018) (discussing determinable fees).
Therefore, if the City abandoned the strip of Laurens Avenue, the property reverted to the abutting
landowners. To prove abandonment, Ohio law requires evidence of the municipality’s intent to
abandon the dedicated land and 21 years of nonuse. Shemo, 765 N.E.2d at 354–55.
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Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid
1.
To begin, Wilson contends that a significant period of nonuse may alone prove the
municipality’s intent to abandon the property. But Ohio law does not support that conclusion.
Instead, while nonuse “may give rise to an inference of intent to abandon,” Snyder v. Monroe Twp.
Trs., 674 N.E.2d 741, 750–51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996), it is insufficient by itself. Kiser v. Bd. of
Comm’rs of Logan Cnty., 97 N.E. 52, 52 (Ohio 1911) (“But mere nonuse[] is not ordinarily
sufficient to establish the fact of abandonment.”); see Corban v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C.,
76 N.E.3d 1089, 1094 (Ohio 2016). Thus, Wilson must point to more than the mere nonuse of
Laurens Avenue to prove that the City intended to abandon it. Here, the City’s acceptance of the
1927 GA Plat meets that requirement.
Recall that Laurens Avenue was initially accepted by the City “for Road purposes” upon
the Rosemere Subdivision’s dedication.1 The Rosemere Subdivision’s dedication provided only
25 feet of roadway to Laurens Avenue, which was too narrow to be a road under Ohio law. The
Rosemere Plat, however, indicated that Laurens Avenue was designed to be 50 feet wide, and
property south of Laurens Avenue remained undeveloped but available to fulfill this intention. Yet
when the City accepted the GA Plat a little more than a decade later, the GA Plat did not widen
Laurens Avenue—rather, it locked in Laurens Avenue at 25 feet and prevented it from ever
becoming a public road, the purpose for which it was dedicated. Thus, the City’s acceptance of
the GA Plat evinced a clear intent to abandon Laurens Avenue as a road. See Shemo, 765 N.E.2d
at 354–55 (concluding that a municipality’s acceptance of an adjacent subdivision that
permanently prevented the development of a road established an intent to abandon its property
rights).
1
At this point, we refer collectively to the Township, Village, and City simply as the City.
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Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid
The City argues otherwise but fails to persuade. First, the City asserts that although the
GA Plat prevented use of Laurens Avenue as a road for motor vehicles, “Road purposes” is broad,
encompassing uses like pedestrian footpaths and utility access, and those uses were never blocked.
But the statutory authority that authorized the acceptance of land for road purposes also required
any such dedicated roads to be at least 30 feet wide. See Ohio Gen. Code §§ 6861, 6886. And the
City’s acceptance of the GA Plat permanently prevented Laurens Avenue from ever being that
wide—so it could never be a public road under state law.
At oral argument, the City suggested that this 30-foot requirement was a mere “guide.”
But “[s]tatutory provisions prescribing a maximum or minimum width of highways are generally
regarded as mandatory.” 54 Ohio Jur. 3d Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 83. And § 6861 of the
Ohio General Code provided no relevant exception. See Ohio Gen. Code § 6861 (permitting 15-
foot rights-of-way for roads on county lines); see also Ohio Rev. Code § 5553.03(B). Thus, this
argument lacks merit.
Next, attempting to rebuff the intent to abandon, the City points to the water main
installation and Laurens Avenue’s current use as a footpath. But both are immaterial because they
occurred in 1958 or later and, by then, the City had accepted the GA Plat—that is, it had already
evinced an intent to abandon the strip of Laurens Avenue.
2.
Next, Wilson must prove nonuse for 21 years. Nonuse requires “ceasing all acts of
enjoyment on the property, [and] must occur for at least twenty-one years in order to constitute
abandonment.” Shemo, 765 N.E.2d at 354. After the GA Plat was approved in 1927, Laurens
Avenue could not be a public road. And by 1941, municipal records confirm that Laurens Avenue
remained “not open” as a road. The City installed a water main in 1958—but that was well after
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Nos. 25-4023/4026, Wilson v. City of S. Euclid
the 21 years of nonuse ran in 1948. Therefore, the City abandoned the strip of Laurens Avenue,
and this property reverted to the abutting properties, including Wilson’s. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wilson on this claim.
III.
Turning to Wilson’s equal protection claim, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Wilson brings a “class of one” claim under
the Equal Protection Clause.2 To prevail, she must show that (1) the City intentionally treated her
differently from others similarly situated and (2) “there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Wilson faces “a heavy
burden” to demonstrate that she was “treated differently than those similarly situated in all material
respects.” Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 462 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation modified).
Wilson offers several purported similarly situated persons. First, she points to Vera
Dawson, who owned property across the street from Wilson and successfully had a portion of
Laurens Avenue abutting her property vacated. Dawson’s and Wilson’s strips of Laurens Avenue
are similar in size, affected a similar number of adjacent landowners, and evidenced similar use.
But the differences are many. The City vacated Dawson’s strip in 1961; Wilson first requested
her vacation in 2010. Dawson’s strip was a stub street; Wilson’s strip is a thoroughfare. No
utilities ran under Dawson’s strip; a water main runs under Wilson’s strip. Thus, although
Dawson’s and Wilson’s strips share some similarities, material differences distinguish them. See
2
We assume without deciding that a class of one claim is cognizable in this discretionary
government action. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 604 (2008) (“It is no
proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective
and individualized.”); Johnson v. Morales, 946 F.3d 911, 939 n.5 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases).
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EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 865–66 (6th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the
mere passing of 18 months between zoning applications constitutes a material difference because
“[g]aps in time and context may suggest a change in policy rather than differential treatment”).
Next, Wilson points to a vacation that occurred in 1975 on the nearby Homestead Road.
But the Homestead vacation is not a similarly situated comparator. Not only did that vacation
concern a different road, but it also occurred decades before Wilson’s request.
Wilson offers other comparators: (1) in 1986, the City vacated part of Lyndway Road;
(2) in 1991, the City vacated a portion of Fenwick Road; (3) in 1992, the City vacated another
portion of Lyndway Road; (4) in 2010, the City vacated a portion of Stanhope Road; and (5) in
2013, the City vacated a portion of Summit Drive. But they fare no better—each of these
properties concerned roads materially distinguishable from Laurens Avenue or occurred decades
apart from Wilson’s request. And although the latter two vacations occurred around the same time
as Wilson’s request, the City vacated the portion of Stanhope Road to a food services company as
part of the “Cedar Center North Redevelopment Project” and the portion of Summit Drive for
construction of a new library. In both circumstances, the City vacated the land for broad public
uses—redevelopment and a public library—that impacted more than a mere handful of adjacent
individual property owners. They are therefore not similarly situated to Wilson.
In sum, Wilson offers only materially distinguishable comparators that no reasonable jury
could find similarly situated to her. And because Wilson offers no adequate comparator, we need
not address whether Wilson can negate every conceivable basis or prove animus or ill will.
Shavers v. Almont Township, 832 F. App’x 933, 937–39 (6th Cir. 2020).
IV.
We affirm.
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