Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals James Loper and Lauren Loper, Respondents, v. John Dolan, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2025-000622 Appeal From Greenville County Perry H. Gravely, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-481 Submitted October 2, 2026 – Filed November 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Kenneth G. Southerlin, Jr., of Travelers Rest, for Appellant. M. Stokely Holder and Ra'na Heidari, both of Holder, Padgett, Littlejohn & Prickett, LLC, of Greenville, for Respondents. PER CURIAM: John Dolan appeals an award of damages to James Loper and Lauren Loper (collectively, Respondents) following an entry of default, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) finding service of process was valid and the court had personal jurisdiction over him; (2) requiring him to prove fraud; (3) relying on an unauthenticated document; (4) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to vacate a default judgment; (5) applying an erroneous analysis to his motion to vacate a default judgment; and (6) denying his motion to dismiss without a hearing. We affirm. 1. We hold the circuit court did not err in determining service of process was valid and the court had personal jurisdiction over Dolan. "We have never required exacting compliance with the rules to effect service of process. Rather, we inquire whether the plaintiff has sufficiently complied with the rules such that the court has personal jurisdiction of the defendant and the defendant has notice of the proceedings." Roche v. Young Bros. of Florence, 318 S.C. 207, 209–10, 456 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1995) (internal citations omitted). "There is a presumption of proper service when the civil rules on service are followed." Fassett v. Evans, 364 S.C. 42, 47, 610 S.E.2d 841, 843 (Ct. App. 2005). Although "[a]n affidavit of service is [p]rima facie evidence of service[, it] may be impeached by extrinsic evidence." Richardson Constr. Co. v. Meek Eng'g & Constr., Inc., 274 S.C. 307, 311, 262 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1980). Here, Respondents received the presumption of proper service by relying on the private process server's affidavit of service. The circuit court recognized there were "some questions about the service" and allowed extrinsic evidence; however, the court ultimately concluded Dolan failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was not served. We determine the circuit court did not err in reaching this conclusion.1 2. We conclude the circuit court did not erroneously require Dolan to prove fraud despite its comment that "[t]o accept [Dolan's] position, the [c]ourt would have to find that someone was impersonating [Dolan] or perpetrating a fraud on him." The court considered the conflicting affidavits regarding whether Dolan was present at the house at the time of service, the evidence that Dolan acknowledged service via a letter to Respondents' counsel, and the evidence that he "still had contact with" the house's address in finding Dolan was served. We determine any error in the court's comment regarding fraud was harmless. See Regions Bank v. Owens, 402 S.C. 642, 647, 741 S.E.2d 51, 54 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The decision whether to set 1 Dolan also argues the court erred in denying his motion to set aside the first default judgment. However, by order filed July 22, 2024, the court set aside the first default judgment and ordered a new damages hearing. Thus, no issue remains for this court to decide as to the first default judgment. See In re Blue Granite Water Co., 434 S.C. 180, 204, 862 S.E.2d 887, 899 (2021) (finding when the appellant received the relief it requested, nothing further remained for the appellate court to decide). aside an entry of default or a default judgment lies solely within the sound discretion of the circuit court."); State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the circumstances of the particular case. . . . [T]he materiality and prejudicial character of the error must be determined from its relationship to the entire case."). 3. We hold the circuit court did not err in considering the letter received by Respondents' counsel. Respondents' counsel's paralegal swore by affidavit that on or about May 11, 2022, she received "a written note from John Dolan via US Mail stating that he received the complaint and was seeking legal counsel." The letter was addressed to Respondents' counsel's law firm and merely stated, "I have received the complaint . . . . I am seeking legal council [sic]." The letter concludes with "John Dolan" as a typed signature. During the hearing, Dolan noted the letter was not signed or dated, and he argues on appeal the circuit court erred in relying on it without authentication. "A party offering evidence must meet '[t]he requirement of authentication . . . as a condition precedent to admissibility.'" Deep Keel, LLC v. Atl. Private Equity Grp., LLC, 413 S.C. 58, 64, 773 S.E.2d 607, 610 (Ct. App. 2015) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Rule 901(a), SCRE). Rule 901(a) provides "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Rule 901(a). "'[T]he burden to authenticate . . . is not high' and requires only that the proponent 'offer[ ] a satisfactory foundation from which the [fact finder] could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic.'" Deep Keel, 413 S.C. at 64, 773 S.E.2d at 610 (omission and first and second alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)). Authentication requires "the proponent [to] only make 'a prima facie showing that the "true author" is who the proponent claims it to be.'" State v. Green, 427 S.C. 223, 230, 830 S.E.2d 711, 714 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting United States v. Davis, 918 F.3d 397, 402 (4th Cir. 2019)), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 432 S.C. 97, 851 S.E.2d 440 (2020). We conclude the paralegal's affidavit and the contents of the letter provided a prima facie showing of authenticity and the circuit court did not err in considering the letter. 4. We determine the circuit court did not err in failing to hold evidentiary hearings on Dolan's motion to set aside default and motion to dismiss. 2 The circuit court's February 14, 2025 order explained that it considered Dolan's motion for an 2 We combine Dolan's fourth and sixth arguments and a portion of his first argument, all of which relate to the circuit court's failure to hold hearings. evidentiary hearing and found that "Dolan was not entitled to a further hearing on the issues of personal service since those issues had been specifically addressed at the hearing on July 17, 2024 . . . ." We conclude the circuit court did not err. See Graham L. Firm, P.A. v. Makawi, 396 S.C. 290, 299, 721 S.E.2d 430, 435 (2012) (recognizing discovery is not always necessary to protect due process concerns in relation to issues of personal jurisdiction). Here, we agree with Respondents that Dolan had ample opportunity at the hearing on July 17, 2024, to raise his objections to service and he did so by presenting affidavits in support of his position. As noted by the circuit court, Dolan was not entitled to a second hearing on the same issue. As to his motion to dismiss, it raised the same issue—lack of service. Further, we determine Dolan's argument that equates personal jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction has no merit. See Williams v. Jeffcoat, 444 S.C. 224, 239, 906 S.E.2d 588, 596 (2024) ("In South Carolina, 'subject matter jurisdiction' refers to the court's 'power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.'" (quoting Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 237–38, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994))). We likewise determine there is no merit to Dolan's argument that because the order denying his motion to set aside entry of default was interlocutory, he should be permitted to relitigate the finding of service of the summons and complaint. The rules governing appealability concern the timing of appellate review of the order denying the motion to set aside the entry of default. See Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 194, 607 S.E.2d 707, 708 (2005) ("An appeal ordinarily may be pursued only after a party has obtained a final judgment."); Palmetto Constr. Grp., LLC v. Restoration Specialists, LLC, 428 S.C. 261, 266, 834 S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2019) ("[T]he denial of a motion to set aside an entry of default is not appealable until after final judgment."), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 432 S.C. 633, 856 S.E.2d 150 (2021). 5. Lastly, Dolan argues the circuit court erred "in applying a Rule 60(b), SCRCP (other than Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP) analysis to Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP." This argument relates to the service of the summons and complaint, which we have addressed, concluding the circuit court did not err in finding service of process was valid and the court had personal jurisdiction over Dolan. Any argument regarding the different standards for vacating an entry of default compared to a default judgment are without merit given this finding of proper service of the summons and complaint. See Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607, 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009) ("We take this opportunity to reassert the basic legal premise that the standard for granting relief under Rule 60(b) is more rigorous than under Rule 55(c)[, SCRCP] . . . ."); id. at 608, 681 S.E.2d at 888 ("Rule 60(b) requires a more particularized showing of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, surprise, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, or 'other misconduct of an adverse party.'" (quoting Rule 60(b), SCRCP)). As to the argument that Dolan did not request a second damages hearing, he should have raised it in his motion for reconsideration of the order filed July 22, 2024. Instead, he waited until after the order following the second damages hearing before raising this issue. We find it is not preserved for appellate review. See State v. Sullivan, 310 S.C. 311, 314, 426 S.E.2d 766, 768 (1993) ("To preserve an issue for appellate review, an appellant must object at his first opportunity."). AFFIRMED.3 THOMAS, KONDUROS, and CURTIS, JJ., concur. 3 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.