ELHASSAN v. COVENTRY TEMPE
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket1 CA-CV 26-0083
JudgeMichael J. Brown
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
FAISAL ELHASSAN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
COVENTRY TEMPE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 26-0083
FILED 11-20-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-090807
The Honorable David E. McDowell, Judge
AFFIRMED
APPEARANCES
Faisal Elhassan, Tempe
Plaintiff/Appellant
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, Phoenix
By Jill J. Ormon, Solomon S. Krotzer
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
ELHASSAN v. COVENTRY TEMPE, et al.
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
B R O W N, Judge:
¶1 Faisal Elhassan appeals the superior court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor Coventry Tempe Community Association
(“Coventry”) on Elhassan’s claims for a wrongful lien, unjust enrichment,
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Elhassan owns a home located within Coventry and is
therefore subject to its rules and regulations. In 2021, Coventry sued
Elhassan, claiming he failed to pay assessments for a number of years. To
resolve the litigation, Elhassan signed a stipulation to judgment and
covenant not to execute, with the understanding that he would make
regular payments to satisfy the judgment. After Elhassan made his April
2022 payment and he failed to cure the default, Coventry obtained a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment. Elhassan eventually paid the
outstanding balance, and Coventry filed a satisfaction of judgment in
March 2023.
¶3 In 2024, Elhassan sued Coventry, alleging he was not given
proper credit for all the sums he had paid and thus the amount listed in the
2021 stipulated judgment and writ of execution was incorrect. After
discovery, Coventry moved for summary judgment, explaining in detail the
amounts credited to Elhassan under the payment plan and that such
amounts were properly reflected in the judgment and writ of execution. 1 In
1 Elhassan also sued the law firm representing Coventry, alleging the
writ of execution did not fully account for the payments he had made
toward the judgment up to the date of the writ. Elhassan v. Carpenter,
Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, 1 CA-CV 24-0816, 2025 WL 1743064, at *1,
¶¶ 1–2, 4 (Ariz. App. June 24, 2025) (mem. decision). After the superior
court granted the law firm’s motion to dismiss, this court affirmed the
dismissal. Id. at * 1, 3 ¶¶ 5–6, 22.
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ELHASSAN v. COVENTRY TEMPE, et al.
Decision of the Court
response, Elhassan argued a factual dispute existed regarding the amount
owed and Coventry’s own accounting misstated that amount.
¶4 The superior court granted the motion, explaining in part that
Elhassan did not produce any documents or other evidence disputing
Coventry’s ledger of charges and credits included with the factual
statements supporting the motion. The court therefore concluded that
Elhassan had not met his burden of showing a genuine issue of material
fact. The court also awarded Coventry attorneys’ fees and costs.
¶5 Elhassan timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶6 We review a summary judgment ruling de novo, viewing the
facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and construing all
reasonable inferences for that party. Tilley v. Delci, 220 Ariz. 233, 236, ¶ 7
(App. 2009). A party seeking summary judgment must show there is no
genuine dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
¶7 Elhassan argues that the law firm hired by Coventry to handle
the litigation “misstated the material fact of how much was still due on the
judgment.” The only document he relies on to support that argument is his
repeated reference to a portion of an email he attached to his opening brief
as Appendix A. Elhassan suggests that the email shows payments that
were made but not credited. But as noted by Coventry, the email is not part
of the superior court record and therefore cannot be considered on appeal.
See Schaefer v. Murphey, 131 Ariz. 295, 299 (1982) (“As an appellate court, we
are confined to reviewing only those matters contained in the record.”); see
also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)(B)(i) (requiring the party opposing a motion for
summary judgment to provide “the specific, admissible parts of the record
that establish” disputed facts). Because Elhassan has not established the
existence of any genuine dispute of material fact, the court did not err in
granting Coventry’s motion for summary judgment.
¶8 Coventry requests attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal under
A.R.S. § 12-341.01. In our discretion, we award reasonable attorneys’ fees
to Coventry, plus taxable costs, subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.
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ELHASSAN v. COVENTRY TEMPE, et al.
Decision of the Court
CONCLUSION
¶9 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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