Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE FAISAL ELHASSAN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. COVENTRY TEMPE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants/Appellees. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0083 FILED 11-20-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2024-090807 The Honorable David E. McDowell, Judge AFFIRMED APPEARANCES Faisal Elhassan, Tempe Plaintiff/Appellant Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, Phoenix By Jill J. Ormon, Solomon S. Krotzer Counsel for Defendants/Appellees ELHASSAN v. COVENTRY TEMPE, et al. Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined. B R O W N, Judge: ¶1 Faisal Elhassan appeals the superior court’s order granting summary judgment in favor Coventry Tempe Community Association (“Coventry”) on Elhassan’s claims for a wrongful lien, unjust enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. BACKGROUND ¶2 Elhassan owns a home located within Coventry and is therefore subject to its rules and regulations. In 2021, Coventry sued Elhassan, claiming he failed to pay assessments for a number of years. To resolve the litigation, Elhassan signed a stipulation to judgment and covenant not to execute, with the understanding that he would make regular payments to satisfy the judgment. After Elhassan made his April 2022 payment and he failed to cure the default, Coventry obtained a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. Elhassan eventually paid the outstanding balance, and Coventry filed a satisfaction of judgment in March 2023. ¶3 In 2024, Elhassan sued Coventry, alleging he was not given proper credit for all the sums he had paid and thus the amount listed in the 2021 stipulated judgment and writ of execution was incorrect. After discovery, Coventry moved for summary judgment, explaining in detail the amounts credited to Elhassan under the payment plan and that such amounts were properly reflected in the judgment and writ of execution. 1 In 1 Elhassan also sued the law firm representing Coventry, alleging the writ of execution did not fully account for the payments he had made toward the judgment up to the date of the writ. Elhassan v. Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, 1 CA-CV 24-0816, 2025 WL 1743064, at *1, ¶¶ 1–2, 4 (Ariz. App. June 24, 2025) (mem. decision). After the superior court granted the law firm’s motion to dismiss, this court affirmed the dismissal. Id. at * 1, 3 ¶¶ 5–6, 22. 2 ELHASSAN v. COVENTRY TEMPE, et al. Decision of the Court response, Elhassan argued a factual dispute existed regarding the amount owed and Coventry’s own accounting misstated that amount. ¶4 The superior court granted the motion, explaining in part that Elhassan did not produce any documents or other evidence disputing Coventry’s ledger of charges and credits included with the factual statements supporting the motion. The court therefore concluded that Elhassan had not met his burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact. The court also awarded Coventry attorneys’ fees and costs. ¶5 Elhassan timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶6 We review a summary judgment ruling de novo, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and construing all reasonable inferences for that party. Tilley v. Delci, 220 Ariz. 233, 236, ¶ 7 (App. 2009). A party seeking summary judgment must show there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). ¶7 Elhassan argues that the law firm hired by Coventry to handle the litigation “misstated the material fact of how much was still due on the judgment.” The only document he relies on to support that argument is his repeated reference to a portion of an email he attached to his opening brief as Appendix A. Elhassan suggests that the email shows payments that were made but not credited. But as noted by Coventry, the email is not part of the superior court record and therefore cannot be considered on appeal. See Schaefer v. Murphey, 131 Ariz. 295, 299 (1982) (“As an appellate court, we are confined to reviewing only those matters contained in the record.”); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)(B)(i) (requiring the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to provide “the specific, admissible parts of the record that establish” disputed facts). Because Elhassan has not established the existence of any genuine dispute of material fact, the court did not err in granting Coventry’s motion for summary judgment. ¶8 Coventry requests attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. In our discretion, we award reasonable attorneys’ fees to Coventry, plus taxable costs, subject to compliance with ARCAP 21. 3 ELHASSAN v. COVENTRY TEMPE, et al. Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶9 We affirm. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 4