Michael Washington v. City of Cincinnati

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0228p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ MICHAEL WASHINGTON, │ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ > No. 25-3692 │ v. │ │ CITY OF CINCINNATI, OHIO; SHERYL LONG, │ individually and in her official capacity as City │ Manager of the City of Cincinnati, │ Defendants-Appellants. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. No. 1:23-cv-00230—Stephanie K. Bowman, Magistrate Judge. Argued: March 19, 2026 Decided and Filed: August 13, 2026 Before: STRANCH, READLER, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Matthew T. Crawford, CITY OF CINCINNATI, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. Stephen E. Imm, FINNEY LAW FIRM, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Matthew T. Crawford, William C. Hicks, Matthew Slovin, CITY OF CINCINNATI, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. Stephen E. Imm, Matthew S. Okiishi, Samantha B. Isaacs, FINNEY LAW FIRM, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. STRANCH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BLOOMEKATZ, J., concurred. READLER, J. (pp. 18–26), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. This procedural due process case concerns the discharge of a public employee by a government official. Michael Washington, a longtime employee of the Cincinnati Fire Department, was promoted to Fire Chief in 2021. Around two years later, he was terminated from this position with no opportunity for a pretermination hearing. Washington sued the City of Cincinnati and the City Manager, Sheryl Long, for violations of his federal and state procedural due process rights, as well as defamation under Ohio state law. At summary judgment, the district court held that Long was not entitled to qualified immunity for pre-deprivation violations of Washington’s procedural due process rights, and that she was not entitled to statutory immunity for the defamation claim. Long and the City filed this interlocutory appeal challenging both denials of immunity. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM. I. BACKGROUND Washington began working for the City of Cincinnati Fire Department in 1993. In May 2021, he was promoted to Fire Chief. The Cincinnati City Charter (the “Charter”), per a 2001 amendment, contains the following language governing the Fire Chief position: The positions of fire chief and assistant fire chief shall be in the unclassified civil service of the city and exempt from all competitive examination requirements. . . . The fire chief may be removed at any time by the city manager. After the fire chief has served six months, he or she shall be subject to removal only for cause including incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, insubordination, unsatisfactory performance, any other failure of good behavior, any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, or conviction of any felony. If removed for cause the fire chief may demand written charges and the right to be heard thereon before the city manager. Pending the completion of such hearing the city manager may suspend the fire chief from office. Charter of the City of Cincinnati, Art. V, § 6. When Washington was promoted to Fire Chief, he signed a memorandum titled “Understanding of Unclassified Appointment” (the “MOU”), which provides, in full, as follows:  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 3 The position of Fire Chief is an unclassified position. Employees accepting employment in unclassified positions serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority and can be dismissed from employment without cause at any time. In addition, unclassified employees are not recognized under the Civil Service system and are, therefore, not afforded civil service protections and/or hearings granted to classified employees. In accepting unclassified appointments, employees forfeit the right to seek other employment via lateral transfers and the opportunity to take competitive, promotional exams. By signing below, I, Michael A. Washington, Sr., understand that the position of Fire Chief, which I am accepting, is an unclassified position and that I have read and understand the explanation of unclassified positions detailed in this document. R. 40-2, Exhibit A, PageID 1764. On March 24, 2023, Washington was called to a meeting at City Hall, where Long, accompanied by two Human Resources representatives, told him that he was being terminated, effective immediately. Long then handed him a termination letter. The letter began with an excerpt of the Charter language providing that “[a]fter the fire chief has served six months, he or she shall be subject to removal only for cause,” then provided five reasons for Washington’s termination: (1) poor workplace culture under his leadership, (2) that he was absent from a high- rise fire, (3) that he mishandled personnel matters when a lieutenant was charged with assault, (4) that he mismanaged the acquisition of a new training facility, and (5) ineffective communication with Long and others. After the meeting, Long informed the Mayor and members of the City Council that Washington had been terminated for cause, listing her reasons for terminating him in a memorandum titled “For Your Information.” On the same day, Long notified local media outlets of Washington’s termination by providing a copy of the termination letter and making statements in interviews consistent with the letter and memorandum. Washington subsequently requested a post-termination hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and Long and the City responded by offering him a hearing before Long. No post-termination hearing took place. Long testified at deposition that she consulted with HR and the legal department prior to terminating Washington. Regarding the legal department, Long stated, “[t]hey were aware that—when I let them know that I was going to make that decision, they told me that he was  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 4 having a hearing—that he would need a hearing.” R. 36, Long Depo., PageID 1209. When asked why she “didn’t . . . let him have a hearing before [she] fired him,” Long replied, “[b]ecause that was my choice to not.” R. 36, PageID 1217. Washington sued Long and the City, alleging procedural due process violations and defamation under Ohio state law. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court determined in relevant parts (1) that “Long and the City failed to provide Washington with adequate pretermination procedural due process when they terminated him on March 24, 2023”; (2) that there were triable issues of fact regarding “the adequacy of the post- termination process and whether Plaintiff waived his post-termination hearing”; (3) that Long is not entitled to qualified immunity for the pre-deprivation due process violation, but she is entitled to qualified immunity insofar as to any defects in post-termination process afforded to Washington; and (4) that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether Long’s allegedly defamatory statements about Washington were false and, if they were, whether she published them with bad faith or actual malice. R. 47, PageID 1982–83. In this interlocutory appeal, Long and the City challenge the district court’s holdings denying both qualified and statutory immunity to Long. II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, courts must view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chapman v. UAW Loc. 1005, 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc). A district court’s summary judgment decision is reviewed de novo. McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016).  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 5 III. ANALYSIS Long and the City appeal (1) the district court’s partial denial of qualified immunity to Long for the due process claim and (2) its denial of statutory immunity to Long on the defamation claim. Washington argues the court lacks appellate jurisdiction over both issues. Because whether there is jurisdiction on an interlocutory basis depends on the context in which a defendant seeks to appeal an immunity decision, we will address jurisdiction separately for each issue. A. Long’s Assertion of Qualified Immunity for the Due Process Claim 1. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, courts of appeals have jurisdiction to hear appeals from “all final decisions of the district courts.” Because a district court’s “denial of summary judgment is not a final decision, it ordinarily is not appealable,” Barry v. O’Grady, 895 F.3d 440, 443 (6th Cir. 2018), meaning a party to whom summary judgment is denied must ordinarily proceed to trial and await a final judgment before seeking appellate review. An exception to the final judgment rule exists under the collateral order doctrine, which “permits interlocutory appeals of orders that (1) are conclusive on the questions they decide, (2) resolve important questions separate from the merits, and (3) are effectively unreviewable if not addressed through an interlocutory appeal.” Estate of Lewis v. City of Columbus, 158 F.4th 814, 820 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). At summary judgment, a government official is entitled to qualified immunity “when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gillman v. City of Troy, 126 F.4th 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). A district court’s denial of qualified immunity “can—in some circumstances—be reviewed on an interlocutory basis under the collateral order doctrine” “because qualified immunity involves immunity from suit, not just from liability.” Id.  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 6 When there is appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity, however, that jurisdiction exists only “to the extent that [the appeal] turns on an issue of law,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); there is no jurisdiction “where the officer’s appeal is based on a quarrel with the plaintiff’s record-supported facts,” Heeter v. Bowers, 99 F.4th 900, 908 (6th Cir. 2024). Or as the Supreme Court put it in Johnson v. Jones, jurisdiction in such appeals must be “limited to cases presenting neat abstract issues of law.” 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995) (citation modified). The limited scope of these interlocutory appeals means that an appellate court generally must defer to “the district court’s determinations of fact,” including any “inferences that the district court draws from those facts.” Gillispie v. Miami Township, 18 F.4th 909, 916 (6th Cir. 2021) (first quoting Adams v. Blount County, 946 F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 2020); then quoting Barry, 895 F.3d at 443). Likewise, “insofar as [the district court’s] order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial,” it is unreviewable on interlocutory appeal. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 320. These guardrails focus appellate review of a denial of qualified immunity on “the purely legal question of whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions.” Gillispie, 18 F.4th at 916 (quoting Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265, 276 (6th Cir. 2020)) (citation modified). Whether Long is entitled to qualified immunity for pre-deprivation violations of Washington’s procedural due process rights turns on questions of law. The existence of a property interest sufficient to trigger procedural due process rights is a question of state law. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976). In the public employment context, there are multiple sources of state law that might provide a property interest in continued employment, including but not limited to statutes, regulations, local charters, and contracts between the parties or their representatives, see Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2004); depending on the claimed source, the existence of a property interest can be a question of law (e.g., regulations) or a mixed question of law and fact (e.g., contracts). Washington contends he had a property interest in his continued employment as Fire Chief under the Charter, which is a question of law. The question of what pre-termination process is due to an employee with a property interest in his continued employment is also a question of law. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1972).  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 7 But as the district court’s order explained, whether Washington had a property interest in his continued employment as of March 24, 2023, the day of his termination, depends in part on whether he waived his procedural due process rights by executing the MOU. Waiver is a mixed question of law and fact, Sandler v. All Acquisition Corp., Inc., 954 F.2d 382, 384–85 (6th Cir. 1992), and the parties disputed it below. Washington argued at summary judgment that, once he completed his first six months as Fire Chief, he had a property interest sufficient to trigger due process protections under the Charter, meaning that the MOU was about his status probationary period and did not waive his Charter rights. Long and the City contended, however, that Washington had no such property interest under the Charter, and that, even if he did, he waived his rights by signing the MOU. Counsel for Long and the City conceded during oral argument that they are not contesting whether Washington knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived any procedural due process rights he had under the Charter by signing the MOU. Thus, we may exercise jurisdiction on the basis that Long and the City have conceded Washington’s view of the facts regarding their waiver claim. See Barry, 895 F.3d at 443; Anderson-Santos v. Kent County, 94 F.4th 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2024). As a result, our jurisdiction is limited. We must presume Washington did not actually waive any rights, but, consistent with the qualified immunity inquiry, we may consider what a reasonable official in Long’s position would have understood about Washington’s rights based on the Charter and the fact that he signed the MOU. See Gillman, 126 F.4th at 1158. 2. Whether Long is Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Merits “Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent clearly establishes that public employees who may be fired only for ‘just cause’ have property interests in their continued employment protected by due process.” Rodgers v. 36th Dist. Ct., 529 F. App’x 642, 650 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985); Singfield, 389 F.3d at 566; Jefferson v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587 (6th Cir. 2004)). In Loudermill, the Supreme Court held that a security guard employed at a Cleveland public school had a property interest in his continued employment because a relevant Ohio state statute provided that he could be removed only for cause. See 470 U.S. at 538–39. “Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 8 manner’ if the State seeks to deprive someone of constitutionally protected liberty or property interests.” Hieber v. Oakland County, 136 F.4th 308, 321 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). It has been clearly established by decades of Supreme Court precedent that the “root requirement” of procedural due process is a pretermination hearing— “that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (emphasis in original)); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (collecting cases); Roth, 408 U.S. at 570–71; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also Hieber, 136 F.4th at 321. While precisely what form such a hearing must take in the public employment context depends on a balancing of competing interests, see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35, “a pretermination hearing must include: [1] oral or written notice of the charges, [2] an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and [3] an opportunity for the employee to tell his side of the story.” Hieber, 136 F.4th at 321–22 (quoting Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929 (1997)). Under the Charter, an appointment to the position of Fire Chief comes with a probationary period of six months, during which “[t]he fire chief may be removed at any time by the city manager.” Charter of the City of Cincinnati, Art. V, § 6. But “[a]fter the fire chief has served six months, he or she shall be subject to removal only for cause including incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, insubordination, unsatisfactory performance, any other failure of good behavior, any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, or conviction of any felony.” Id. The meaning of these provisions is unmistakable: once a Fire Chief serves six months, he can be terminated only for cause, which means he has a right to a pre-termination hearing under binding—and clearly established—precedent. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570–71; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538–39. The City of Cincinnati evidently understood this, as shown by an internal memorandum from a previous City Manager explaining that “[a]fter serving for six months, the Police and Fire Chiefs may be removed only for cause.” R. 40-9, Internal Memorandum, PageID 1814. Washington was appointed Fire Chief in May 2021, so his probationary period would have concluded in November 2021, at which point he attained for- cause status. Thus, the plain text of the Charter clearly indicates that Washington had a property interest in his continued employment as Fire Chief at the time he was terminated.  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 9 Long and the City argue, however, that regardless of what the Charter provides, it could not have been clear that Washington had for-cause protection after he signed the MOU. As noted, Long and the City concede for purposes of this interlocutory appeal that Washington did not in fact intend to waive, or understand himself to be waiving, any procedural due process rights by executing the MOU. Thus, we may consider the MOU only in the limited capacity of what a reasonable official in Long’s position would have understood about Washington’s status based on the fact that he signed the MOU. It is clearly established that “clear and unmistakable language . . . is necessary to waive procedural due process rights.” Morrison v. Warren, 375 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78–79 (1998)). This rule generally requires language specifically identifying the rights to be waived. The plaintiff in Morrison, a former deputy sheriff who alleged he was discharged without adequate process, signed a collective bargaining agreement that contained this arbitration clause: “Failure to elect and pursue one of these three options [appear at the hearing; appear at the hearing with counsel; or elect in writing to waive the hearing opportunity] will be deemed a waiver of the employee’s rights to disciplinary hearings.” Id. (alteration in original). We held that this language was not a “clear and unmistakable” waiver of Morrison’s procedural due process rights, even though it expressly discussed the possibility of waiving disciplinary hearings, because “[t]he only reference to waiver in Morrison’s arbitration clause relate[d] to the Sheriff's Office’s disciplinary procedures, not the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. We reiterated the same principle a few years prior to Washington’s termination in Endres v. Northeast Ohio Medical University, which concerned the dismissal of a medical student from a public university for allegedly cheating on a test: “parties may agree by contract to waive their constitutional rights . . . Such contracts, however, require ‘clear and unmistakable language’ for us to infer that one party has agreed to waive his constitutional rights.” 938 F.3d 281, 300 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Morrison, 375 F.3d at 474). Thus, a reasonable official in Long’s position would have known that a contractual waiver of procedural due process rights must be “clear and unmistakable.” Morrison, 375 F.3d at 474. The contract in this case falls short of that standard. Like the collective bargaining agreement in Morrison, the MOU contains no references to the Fourteenth Amendment or  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 10 Washington’s due process rights. See id. The MOU likewise makes no mention of the Charter or any rights Washington had under it. In fact, the only reference to any “right” in the MOU pertains to opportunities that are wholly separate from procedural due process rights: “In accepting unclassified appointments, employees forfeit the right to seek other employment via lateral transfers and the opportunity to take competitive, promotional exams.” R. 40-2, PageID 1764. As compared to the reference to waiving disciplinary hearings that we found insufficient in Morrison, see 375 F.3d at 474, it is even more obvious here that the possibility of “forfeit[ing] the right” to pursue “lateral transfers and . . . competitive, promotional exams” has nothing to do with waiving procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Long and the City emphasize that the MOU provides that “[t]he position of Fire Chief is an unclassified position” and unclassified employees “serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority and can be dismissed from employment without cause at any time.” R. 40-2, PageID 1764. It is difficult to call this language a “clear and unmistakable” waiver, Morrison, 375 F.3d at 474, when it contains no express indication that Washington is giving up anything; it merely states that Fire Chief is an unclassified position and offers a brief explanation of what unclassified means. On the other hand, and crucially on this record, the MOU’s language is wholly consistent with Washington’s six-month probationary period, during which the Charter provided he was unclassified and could be removed at any time by the City Manager. The MOU could have been simply an acknowledgment of this temporary status. And a reasonable official in Long’s position certainly would have known about the probationary period as provided in the Charter. Thus, it was not “clear and unmistakable” that Washington’s execution of the MOU was a waiver of procedural due process rights he had not yet accrued. Id. For all these reasons, a reasonable official in Long’s position (a) would have known that Washington, in his position as Fire Chief under the Charter, accrued for-cause protection following his six-month probationary period; and (b) would not have presumed the MOU operated as a waiver of the rights afforded by that status. Long’s failure to provide Washington with any pre-termination process before firing him on March 24, 2023, was a violation of clearly established law. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538–39.  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 11 Long and the City seek to evade this conclusion by claiming that relying on cases like Loudermill casts the “clearly established” net too widely. They note that the Supreme Court has cautioned courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (citation modified). This principle, however, is not without limits, as “an official can be on notice that his conduct violates established law even in novel factual situations. The operative inquiry is not whether a previous court faced perfectly analogous facts—it is ‘whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 904 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2015)). The type of constitutional right at issue matters too. The Supreme Court clarified in Mullenix that “[s]uch specificity” in the clearly established inquiry “is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context.” 577 U.S. at 12. There are meaningful distinctions between the procedural due process claim here and “Fourth Amendment cases involving split-second decisions where officials genuinely—but perhaps mistakenly—believe their actions to be appropriate.” Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789, 810 (6th Cir. 2024). Fourth Amendment claims often demand that we apply general standards to complicated, fact-specific scenarios in which law enforcement officers made quick decisions, often in the face of danger to themselves or others. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Puskas v. Delaware County, 56 F.4th 1088, 1096 (6th Cir. 2023). The type of procedural due process claim at issue in this case, however, relies on a principle much closer to a rule than a fact-bound standard: If a public employee has for-cause removal protection, then he has a right to a pretermination hearing. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538–39. Long and the City, moreover, had ample time to consider whether to provide Washington a pretermination hearing; there was no imminency or risk of danger. Indeed, they could—and did—consult counsel, who advised that Washington needed a hearing. These distinctions from the Fourth Amendment context justify requiring a “less granular” analogue here. Finley, 102 F.4th at 810; see also Pearson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 170 F.4th 1027, 1050–51 (6th Cir. 2026) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, Long and the City attempt to recast the clearly established inquiry in ways that are overly specific to the unique facts of this case, see Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 904, and that, in  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 12 addition, fail on their own terms. First, they argue that Long is entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of Washington’s termination, it was not sufficiently established under Ohio law that the specific language in Article V, Section 6 of the Charter gives a Fire Chief a property interest in his continued employment. But as Long and the City recognize elsewhere in their briefing, it is “clearly established [under Ohio law] that provisions of municipal charters should be given their plain meaning, and that unambiguous language must be applied faithfully in accordance with its plain meaning.” Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing State ex rel. Misnor v. Eschen, 656 N.E.2d 940, 944 (Ohio 1995); Roxane Labs., Inc. v. Tracy, 661 N.E.2d 1011, 1012 (Ohio 1996)). Under Silberstein, then, we need only observe that it is clearly established that unambiguous language in an Ohio municipal charter means what it says, which here is that “[a]fter the fire chief has served six months, he or she shall be subject to removal only for cause.” Charter of the City of Cincinnati, Art. V, § 6; see 440 F.3d at 316. Long and the City further argue that a reasonable officer would not have known the Charter creates a property interest in a Fire Chief’s continued employment when, in addition to the language granting for-cause status, it states that Fire Chief is an “unclassified” position. Generally, a classified public employee in Ohio has an interest in continued employment protected by procedural due process, while an unclassified employee does not. See Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479, 482 (6th Cir. 1995). There are two problems with the Defendants’ argument on this point. First, to the extent Long and the City assume that “unclassified” status is synonymous with lacking for-cause removal protection, it is clear that the Charter’s references to unclassified status apply only to the six-month probationary period at the beginning of the Fire Chief’s employment. See Charter of the City of Cincinnati, Art. V, § 6. Second, whether employees have a property interest in continued employment under Ohio law turns on whether they have for-cause removal protection, not whether they are labeled “classified.” For example, the Ohio Court of Appeals had held that village police officers who hold unclassified positions but “can be terminated only for just or reasonable cause” have “a property interest in continued employment.” Haven v. Lodi, 200 N.E.3d 395, 404 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotation omitted); see also Velazquez v. Village of Bratenahl, No. 81592, 2003 WL 549967, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2003); Lowe v. Village of McArthur, No. 06-cv-738, 2007 WL 654225,  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 13 at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 23, 2007). Loudermill confirms this point, as it explained that “the relevant portion” of the Ohio statute conveying a property interest in continued employment in that case was the portion providing for-cause removal protection. 470 U.S. at 539 n.4. Thus, given the Charter’s plain statement that Washington could only be removed for cause after six months, he had a property interest in continued employment after six months regardless of whether he was classified or not. The Charter’s references to unclassified status cannot negate the for-cause protection, and thus the property interest, it plainly provides. The dissent’s arguments to the contrary misapprehend the qualified immunity standard and how it interacts with the substantive legal rules that control this case. “The operative inquiry” in applying the clearly established prong of qualified immunity “is not whether a previous court faced perfectly analogous facts.” Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 904. Rather, we have instructed, the question “is ‘whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted,’” id. (quoting Baynes, 799 F.3d at 610)—or as the Supreme Court put it recently in Zorn v. Linton, “[a] right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right,” 146 S. Ct. 926, 930 (2026) (per curiam) (citation modified). Whether a violation is “sufficiently clear” under this standard, id., depends necessarily on both the substantive law and the factual situation at hand. In the procedural due process context, the relevant legal rules are simple: a provision of for-cause removal protection confers procedural due process rights to a public employee, including the right to a pre-termination hearing, see, e.g., Hieber, 136 F.4th at 321; and, once conferred, such rights can be waived only by “clear and unmistakable language,” Morrison, 375 F.3d at 474 (citing Wright, 525 U.S. at 78–79). We have applied these rules to novel situations before, including in the absence of a prior decision on the exact rights-governing language at issue, see Silberstein, 440 F.3d at 316, as the dissent concedes, Dissenting Op. at 20. A core premise of the qualified immunity doctrine is that “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing [her] conduct” and “be made to hesitate” when clearly established law calls her to do so. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). In the procedural due process context, the law commands a public employer to hesitate in the absence  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 14 of “clear and unmistakable language” waiving an employee’s rights. Morrison, 375 F.3d at 474 (citing Wright, 525 U.S. at 78–79). The dissent’s reasoning would instead extend immunity wherever a public employer can point to ambiguous language that does not come close to clearly waiving a constitutional right. This is the opposite of what the waiver standard provides, id., and it would open the door to obvious abuses. Tellingly, the dissent faults the majority for “demand[ing]” application of the clearly established rule that a waiver of procedural due process rights must be “clear and unmistakable,” id. Dissenting Op. at 24. But that is the law as our court has articulated it. See id. For the reasons we have explained, it should have been clear to “every reasonable official,” Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930, that Long’s termination of Washington would violate his rights. And not only should Long’s violation have been clear to a reasonable official in her position, but the record reflects that it was in fact clear to the other officials surrounding her at the time. When Long consulted with the City’s legal department, she was advised that Washington “would need a hearing”—but she chose to ignore that advice and fire him anyway. R. 36, Long Depo., PageID 1209, 1217. This is exactly the sort of “lawless conduct” that does not warrant qualified immunity. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. We hold that the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to Long for pre- deprivation violations of Washington’s procedural due process rights.1 B. Long’s Assertion of Statutory Immunity for the Defamation Claim We have jurisdiction to review a denial of statutory immunity on an interlocutory basis “only when the state immunity in question would provide complete immunity from suit.” Frenchko v. Monroe, 160 F.4th 784, 804 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 2014)). Provided this requirement is satisfied, the rules governing jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from denials of statutory immunity resemble those governing qualified immunity appeals: there is no jurisdiction to review a district court’s factual 1 In so holding, we draw no conclusions regarding the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Long for post-deprivation violations of Washington’s procedural due process rights. We have previously instructed, though, that analysis of post-deprivation process “has no place” in the qualified immunity inquiry because it concerns when a government entity can cure an officer’s due process violation after it has occurred, not whether the violation was clearly established. See Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 902–03 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Silberstein, 440 F.3d at 315–18; Thomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d 563, 579–81 (6th Cir. 2002)).  No. 25-3692 Washington v. City of Cincinnati, et al. Page 15 determinations, see id. at 806, and we have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction when a defendant fails to concede underlying factual disputes, see Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 398 (6th Cir. 2009). We also instructed in Frenchko that, “to the extent the parties’ state immunity arguments stray into the merits of [the plaintiff’s] underlying state tort claims, we may consider them only if they are inextricably intertwined with the statutory immunity issue.” Frenchko, 160 F.4th at 804 (citation modified). The Ohio statute at issue here provides immunity for “any act or omission in connection with a governmental or proprietary function,” but this immunity does not apply when an official acts “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). We recognized in Chesher v. Neyer, construing a 2003 legislative amendment, that this statute “provides political officials and subdivisions with immunity from suit, and thus warrants interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.” 477 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2744.02(C)). “Whether a government employee acted with the intent necessary to overcome the presumption of immunity [under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b)] is typically a jury question.” Post v. City of Monroe Falls, 861 F. App’x 69, 79 (6th Cir. July 1, 2021). We have previously exercised jurisdiction on an interlocutory basis over whether the record, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, is sufficient to submit that question to a jury. See DiLuzio v. Village of Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 612 (6th Cir. 2015); Frenchko, 160 F.4th at 803–07. Here, Long and the City contend they are entitled to summary judgment on the statutory immunity issue for two reasons: (1) the district court erred in finding there was sufficient evidence of knowing falsity for a jury to infer malice or bad faith, and (2) the district court erred in considering evidence related to Long’s violation of Washington’s procedural due process rights as relevant to statutory immunity for the defamation claim. The parties’ arguments regarding falsity are focused especially on Washington’s efforts (or, in Long and the City’s view, lack thereof) toward completion of a climate assessment after the department received complaints from female firefighters about poor workplace culture. Long’s memorandum following Washington’s termination stated that he “was directed to c